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The manner in which people have been talking and writing about ‘development’ 
and the rules according to which they have done so have evolved over time. 
Development Discourse and Global History uses the archaeological and genea­
logical methods of Michel Foucault to trace the origins of development discourse 
back to late colonialism and notes the significant discontinuities that led to the 
establishment of a new discourse and its accompanying industry. This book goes 
on to describe the contestations, appropriations and transformations of the con­
cept. It shows how some of the trends in development discourse since the crisis 
of the 1980s – the emphasis on participation and ownership, sustainable devel­
opment and free markets – are incompatible with the original rules and thus 
lead to serious contradictions. The Eurocentric, authoritarian and depoliticiz­
ing elements in development discourse are uncovered, whilst still recognizing its 
progressive appropriations. The author concludes by analysing the old and new 
features of development discourse which can be found in the debate on Sustain­
able Development Goals and discussing the contribution of discourse analysis to 
development studies. 
This book is aimed at researchers and students in development studies, global 
history and discourse analysis as well as an interdisciplinary audience from inter­
national relations, political science, sociology, geography, anthropology, language 
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The discourse of ‘development’ 
On January 9, 2015, the EU launched the ‘European Year for Development 
2015 (EYD 2015)’ and declared it ‘a year dedicated to raising awareness, engag­
ing Europeans everywhere in the EU’s development cooperation and sparking a 
debate around the motto “Our world, our dignity, our future” ’.1 The press release 
informs us that the ‘EYD 2015’ was proposed by the European Commission and 
unanimously adopted by the European Parliament and Council, what the EU 
International Cooperation and Development Commissioner has to say about it, 
and what events and creative opportunities for involvement across the mem­
ber states are being prepared – but it does not actually explain what is meant 
by ‘development’ and ‘development cooperation’. The terms are assumed to be 
self-evident: everyone knows that they are about something like projects for pov­
erty eradication in Africa, Asia and Latin America. 
On January 20, 1949 – 66 years earlier – when US President Truman announced 
a ‘program of development’ for the ‘underdeveloped regions’, this was different: 
he had to explain what he actually meant by these words, what he planned and 
why this endeavour was necessary and even useful to those who had just elected 
him as president. This difference shows that somewhere between 1949 and 2015, 
‘development had achieved the status of a certainty in the social imaginary’ 
(Escobar 1995: 5), that people know what to think when they hear the word 
development. 
This book is concerned with just that: what people think when they hear or 
speak or write development, what politicians try to achieve when they launch 
development programmes, what aid workers imagine they are doing when work­
ing in development projects – and with what all this has to do with relations of 
power between North and South. Its topic is the discourse of development, the 
structures that can be found in the speaking and writing on it. This implies a the­
oretical approach that deems discourse to be relevant, that assumes it makes a dif­
ference whether we designate an entity as an underdeveloped country, as a newly 
industrialising country, as an age-old civilisation or as a rogue state, because each 
of these expressions evokes different images, allows for different political meas­
ures and enables different perceptions and constructions of identity. 
In particular, the book is interested in the historical transformations that this 
way of speaking has undergone during the 20th century and until the present. Of 








object comprehensively. Yet it does try to trace the changes in the discourse of 
development during different periods by examining empirical material coming 
mostly from international organisations. It is in this respect, and in this respect 
only, that it deserves the title of global history. It cannot claim to be global in the 
sense of comparing local perspectives on development from different continents. 
Similarly, it cannot claim to be postcolonial in the sense of reconstructing the 
voice of those oppressed by colonialism and neocolonialism, but it is quite con­
cerned with elements of colonial discourse that have survived in contemporary 
development discourse. 
In a way, the book can be seen as a continuation of my PhD thesis (Ziai 2004) 
which analysed what I called the classical paradigm of development as well as the 
Post-Development critique. This paradigm is an arrangement of assumptions on 
different levels: on a philosophical level, the assumptions of Cartesian ration­
ality (separating the subject of knowledge from the object to be dissected into 
parts), the idea of Homo oeconomicus (we are all pursuing material interests and 
utility maximisation) and a Baconian view of nature as something to be ana­
lysed in order to be subdued; on a meta-theoretical level the assumptions that 
a good society is developed and all societies can become like this, and that there 
is one state and one process of development which can be identified by experts 
on development; on a theoretical level that industrialised societies are the norm 
for this state and process and that societies deficient in comparison to this norm 
need modernisation, economic growth and technology; on the level of methodol­
ogy that comparative analysis allows us to identify more and less developed socie­
ties and that development can be measured through quantitative indicators; on 
the level of methods that states are the units to be compared and measured and 
the most important indicator is economic performance in terms of GDP/GNP 
and per capita income; on the practical level that development can be achieved 
through planned interventions in society based on expert knowledge carried out 
by states or development organisations and that negative side effects have to be 
accepted for the sake of development. 
This last assumption was demonstrated memorably by a representative of 
the Indian consulate in Bonn, Germany, when in August 1999 demonstrators 
protested against the Sardar Sarovar dam and the flooding of several hundred 
villages (and some resisting villagers). In response to the protesters’ slogan ‘No 
human sacrifices for development!’, he replied: ‘So you want our country to 
remain underdeveloped!’ Obviously, he deemed the sacrifices necessary and the 
objective worth the cost – just as Nehru had, when he told those villagers who 
would be forcibly resettled for the Hirakud dam in 1948, that they were to ‘suffer 
in the interest of the country’, for the sake of national development (Roy 1999). 
What is this development? Who decides what it actually is? How it can be defined 
and achieved? The question has never left me since – and spoiled my planned 
career in development aid. 
Instead, I spent the next years reading and writing on this question, and some 
of the results have been assembled here in this volume. But, one might ask, is 















The discourse of ‘development’ 3 
argue, a perspective building on the work of Foucault, on his concepts of dis­
course and power, on his methods of archaeology and genealogy, can contribute 
to our knowledge of the topic by highlighting aspects so far unnoticed. Whether 
the book lives up to this claim remains of course for the readers to decide. 
The first part is concerned with theory and chapter 2 (‘Poststructuralism, 
discourse and power’) will lay the meta-theoretical, theoretical and conceptual 
foundation for the rest of the book. The next part is entitled ‘Archaeology’ and 
will dig into the constitution of development discourse. Chapter 3, ‘From “civilis­
ing mission” to “development” ’, starts with analysing the discursive similarities 
and differences of the two discourses. Chapter 4, ‘An archaeology of development 
knowledge’, analyses development as a discursive formation and its specific rules 
regarding its objects, concepts, subject positions and strategies. Chapter 5, ‘The 
concept of “development” and why the concept should be abandoned’, explores 
the Eurocentric, depoliticising, and authoritarian implications of the concept. 
In chapter 6, ‘Development discourse: appropriation and tactical polyvalence’, 
I examine how elites in postcolonial states have used the concept for their own 
ends in national and international arenas. 
‘Genealogy’ is the title of part III, and these chapters investigate the historical 
change of the discursive formation of development at the end of the 20th century. 
The first two of these chapters deal with different aspects of the transformation of 
development discourse after the ‘crisis of development’ in the 1980s. Chapter 7, 
‘The transformation of development discourse: Participation, sustainability, het­
erogeneity’, examines the effects of the inclusion of these three concepts into the 
discourse of development agencies and finds that they lead to incoherence and 
contradiction because some of their elements are incompatible with the rules of 
formation of the discourse. Chapter 8 (‘From “development” to “globalisation” ’) 
deals with the rise of neoliberalism and the discourse of globalisation which is 
found to operate according to new rules and lead to new policies in the realm of 
North-South relations. Chapter 9 examines documents of one of the institutions 
often identified with neoliberalism, the World Bank, and analyses the massive 
shifts that have occurred in the representation of poverty and the correspond­
ing strategies in this institution between the 1970s and the 2000s (‘World Bank 
discourse and poverty reduction’). 
Chapter 10 (‘ “Development”: Projects, power and a poststructuralist perspec­
tive’) looks at different programmes and projects of development of the 1980s, 
1990s and 2000s and finds that there has been a shift in relations of power con­
comitant to the transformation of development discourse and that development 
functions as an empty signifier that can be filled with various contents. In chap­
ter 11 (‘MDGs: back to the future?’), the story lines of the central Millennium 
Development Goals documents are analysed and compared with a similar docu­
ment: the declaration of the Second Development Decade of 1970. Chapter 12 –
entitled ‘Justice, not development: Sen and the hegemonic framework for 
ameliorating global inequality’ – is concerned with one of the most influential 
approaches in development theory in the beginning 21st century, with Amartya 











In Chapter 13, ‘Migration management as development aid?’, the focus is on 
the nexus of the two discourses of migration and development and specifically 
the International Migration and Development Initiative. Chapter 14 (‘The 
post-2015 agenda and the SDGs: The persistence of development discourse’) dis­
cusses one of the most important reports on the Sustainable Development Goals 
and compares it to the first announcement of a development programme by US 
President Truman, in order to ascertain continuity and change in the discourse 
between 1949 and 2014. Chapter 15 will deal with the question of what discourse 
analysis can contribute to development studies. First recapitulating and assessing 
some criticisms of this perspective, it proceeds to list what I deem to be significant 
arguments and insights it has brought the discipline, before closing with those 
points that the preceding chapters might add to this (‘Conclusion: The contribu­
tion of discourse analysis to development studies’). 
Note 
https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/sites/devco/files/eyd2015-press-release-20150109_en.pdf
(March 1, 2015) 
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2 Poststructuralism, discourse 
and power 
No one, not even a social scientist, has an unmediated access to social reality. All 
of us are influenced by socialisation, experience, assumptions, cultural conven­
tions, a certain knowledge interest, etc. – you could say we perceive reality from a 
certain perspective constituted in this manner, through a pair of glasses. A theory 
is nothing more than a deliberately crafted pair of glasses which should provide 
us with a more systematic or thorough view on reality, a perspective on our topic 
which makes sense for us.1 This chapter is concerned with clarifying and justify­
ing the glasses that are being used in this book: the epistemological and theoreti­
cal foundation and the central concepts and methods built on this foundation. 
This foundation can be described as social science informed by poststructuralism, 
the central concepts (inspired by Michel Foucault) are discourse and power, and 
the method is archaeology and genealogy. 
Epistemological and theoretical foundations: structuralism, 
poststructuralism and social science 
In order to argue why precisely this epistemological foundation was chosen, it is 
necessary to clarify what is meant by structuralism, poststructuralism and post-
structuralist social science. 
Structuralism 
Structuralism, at least in the meaning used in the arts and humanities, is based on 
the structural linguistics of Ferdinand de Saussure (see for the following Saussure 
1983a, 1983b, Münker/Roesler 2000, Stäheli 2000). Its objective was the descrip­
tion of the general structures of language. Saussure differentiated between langage
(the universal ability to speak), langue (a certain language system) and parole (an 
applied language). According to him, the sign, defined as the smallest unit of a 
linguistic structure carrying meaning, is composed of signifier and signified – e.g. 
in the English language the word ‘bread’ and the concomitant concept of a loaf 
of bread. Saussure highlights the arbitrariness of the sign, i.e. he emphasises the 
arbitrariness of the relation between signifier and signified: there is no natural 















and the thing it designates, it is an arbitrary convention. However, if there is 
no inherent relation between the level of signifiers and the level of signifieds, 
linguistic meaning cannot be constructed with reference to something beyond 
language, but only within language. The meaning of the signs is thus the results 
of differences within the language system: only because the word ‘bread’ differs 
from the words ‘bed’ and ‘head’ (or ‘cake’ and ‘cookie’) can it fulfil the function 
of designating a certain thing (bread). ‘What counts is not the signs’ reference to 
something beyond language, but their relation, to be precise: the mutual differ­
ence of the signs’ (Münker/Roesler 2000: 4, translation AZ). According to Saus­
sure, the sign is social by nature, i.e. it is independent of the individual’s will, as 
the linguistic structures predate each individual act of endowing something with 
meaning. Thus an objective, scientific analysis of language systems is possible. 
A central legacy of Saussure’s structural linguistics is the focus on the relation of
the elements of a structure. Saussure’s thought was universalised beyond the horizon
of linguistics. The ‘linguistic turn’, maybe the most important paradigm change in
20th century philosophy (see Rorty 1967), can basically be seen as the application
of Saussure’s ideas to other areas and systems of meaning.2 Its starting point is the
assumption that these other systems are (just like language) structured as systems of
difference and that they exhibit certain laws or principles. Meaning is produced by
the relation of the elements of the structure and can thus objectively be identified.
Thus the subject is seen in structuralism not as the agent who endows things with
meaning, but rather as an effect of these structures – which is why sometimes the
‘disappearance’ or even the ‘death of the subject’ was proclaimed. The universal
structures of the human mind thus constitute structuralism’s object of inquiry, and
questioning this claim became the starting point for poststructuralism. 
Poststructuralism 
Poststructuralism3 is best portrayed not as a coherent school of theory, but rather 
as a philosophical current that emerged from the critique of structuralism – which 
came in part from the structuralists themselves (on the following see Münker/ 
Roesler 2000, Stäheli 2000, Belsey 2002).4 It criticised the idea of a closed system 
of language structures, of a rigid order which assigns one signified to each signifier, 
and the claim of complete scientific explanation. Instead, the poststructuralists 
describe the incompleteness of language structures which allows for ever new 
meanings through contextual or historical shifts of the unstable relation between 
signifier and signified and reveals the idea of discrete, orderly systems as impre­
cise. In contrast to structuralism, the relations between signifiers and signifieds 
do not constitute a rigid structure, this structure exists only insofar as it is repro­
duced continuously and is thus (at least potentially) characterised by constant 
change. For poststructuralists, the structure of language not only precedes indi­
vidual speech acts, but is impossible to catch up with for theory, it is not organ­
ised around a centre and can never be described completely and unambiguously, 
which renders the theoretical claims of structuralism illusory. Furthermore, this 
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method, the structure’s Other. To capture meaning and create an orderly system 
of signifiers and signifieds, other possible meanings have to be excluded. 
Thus poststructuralist philosophy is a ‘vindication of difference’ (Münker/Roesler
2000), for engaging with the excluded Other to counter the totalising tendencies of
structuralism. Still, poststructuralism is based on some central theoretical tenets of
structuralism and examines structures which produce meaning, so it should not be
seen as the abandonment of structuralism, but its radicalisation and reflexive con­
tinuation. Poststructuralism’s important assumptions can be described as follows: 
•	 Reality can only be perceived through language structures or other systems of 
representation producing meaning in which reality is constructed. Language 
is not merely the description of reality, but the means by which it is created. 
•	 The smallest units of these structures are signs comprising signifiers and sig­
nifieds, their relation is arbitrary and unstable (but usually temporarily and 
contextually fixed, which enables communication). 
•	 Meaning and knowledge are thus effects produced by differential relations
within these structures, they cannot be based on nonlinguistic objective
foundations (such as religion, rationality, science, the knowing subject, etc.).5 
•	 In each structure there is something which cannot be grasped by this struc­
ture and is excluded. 
•	 The subject is the effect of the structures constituting it. Our subjectivity is the
product of different discourses that shaped it. However, unlike in structuralism,
subjects are not merely determined by these structures. As there are competing
discourses, there is agency in following one discourse instead of another. 
These characteristics have consequences for a social science informed by 
poststructuralism. 
Social science informed by poststructuralism 
The concept of poststructuralist social science seems imprecise on a closer look 
because social science is usually linked with the claim to a truthful description 
of social reality – a claim rejected by poststructuralist philosophy. Social sci­
ence which still clings to the claim of correctly describing social reality (though 
without an objective claim to truth) and which bases itself on the assumptions 
described above can be called inspired or informed by poststructuralism.6 
According to its philosophical orientation, social science informed by post-
structuralism can be described as constructivist and anti-essentialist, i.e. it regards 
reality as socially constructed and declines to attribute a specific nature to social 
actors and phenomena (‘democracy is . . .’, ‘women are . . .’, ‘African culture 
implies . . .’). Furthermore, it exhibits the following traits: 
•	 It regards society in analogy to language as a system of differences in which 
the identity of actors and phenomena is described through the opposition to 




















•	 It does not base itself on a foundation which exists beyond any systems of 
representation. Thus there are no laws determining the relation between
elements of society,7 merely by definition limited and unstable relations. So 
in poststructuralist terminology, the field of the social is one of undecidabil­
ity, or more precisely, one of contingency.8 
•	 The subject is not the origin of social relations, but is constituted by them. 
The plurality of social structures intersecting in the subject produces a plu­
rality of possible identities or subject positions (Laclau/Mouffe 2001: 114ff). 
The subject can thus be seen as the difference between the possible and the 
actual positions, the difference between undecidability and decision. 
•	 Meanings, i.e. relations between signifiers and signifieds, are never stable and 
unchanging, but are temporarily fixed, otherwise communication and society 
would not be possible.9 While it is possible to prove regularities within soci­
ety, they are 1) merely immanent and not the manifestation of a determinant 
external to the structure (e.g. the walk of history or human nature) and 2) 
they are (in contrast to natural laws) limited and subject to change. Still, the 
elements of society are not linked merely by coincidence, certain logics can 
be observed. And a temporarily coherent system of elements thus linked can 
be called a social formation (Laclau/Mouffe 2001: 136). 
•	 In such a paradigm truth cannot be conceived as correspondence between 
statement and reality, because there is no perception beyond systems of 
meaning. Truth can only be analysed as produced within a structure, as 
socially produced.10 
Why should we base research on such an admittedly complex and problematic 
epistemological foundation? My proposition is: because only this foundation is 
able to adequately accommodate the construction, complexity and historicity of 
social reality. Essentialisms reducing the complexity of reality are not accepted 
as explanations in the perspective of poststructuralism. As identities are con­
structed through difference, this shall be illustrated by some examples of different 
theoretical foundations.11 
A central premise of liberal economic theories is the assumption of Homo
oeconomicus: human beings are naturally inclined to further their own (above all
material) interests. So the empirical observation that many people act according
to this pattern is explained by reference to a prediscursive human nature, instead
of examining, in which societies, in which groups or at which points in time
this kind of behaviour was less or not at all dominant, and which social circum­
stances have supported the spread of this behaviour (Etzioni 1990, Habermann
2008). 
In realist theory of international relations, an image of human society based on
Thomas Hobbes plays a similar role. The absence of an institutional order endowed
with a monopoly of violence on the international level is assumed to lead to a
security dilemma: allegedly the security of actors (states) is principally endangered
through the existence and there is a situation of threat and rivalry which renders
















Poststructuralism, discourse and power 11 
In Marxist theory there are similar essentialisms, above all in the conception
of the economy as a social mechanism functioning according to objective laws
independent of human behaviour and in the category of objective (class) interest,
which assumes a logical – instead of a political – link between a certain position in
the process of production and the mentality of the people (Laclau/Mouffe 2001). 
In all three examples there is reference to some knowledge on society or 
human beings which renders a detailed engagement of specific social phenomena 
and their historical transformations superfluous and can serve as a legitimating 
ideology for certain types of domination. This kind of knowledge about reality 
constitutes a foundation which is beyond theoretical and political contestation – 
and beyond the historical and contextual shifts of the relation between signifier 
and signified. A sceptical posture towards this type of knowledge, however, leads 
to a social science informed by poststructuralism. 
Yet the poststructuralist foundation also has its problematic aspects, which 
need to be dealt with. The most important of these are the methodological exclu­
sion of the referent, the neglect of the subject and its agency and the focus on 
difference and microstructures. 
The methodological exclusion of the referent results from the insight that in 
the perception of reality we cannot do without systems of meaning. From the 
perspective of poststructuralism statements on reality are strictly speaking not 
possible, merely on the representation of reality. This confinement, however, is 
ultimately not acceptable for a social science. A possible way out of this dilemma, 
marking the difference between poststructuralism and social science informed by 
poststructuralism, is to be aware of the perspectivity of any and all statements on 
reality, and to present one’s own theoretical and normative glasses as the result 
of (hopefully) well-founded but always contingent decisions – and not as univer­
sally valid. This is the purpose of this section. 
The exclusion of the subject in the poststructuralist perspective seems almost 
equally problematic in the light of the object of social science, as subjects do seem 
to play a role in society. Yet in order to remain theoretically coherent, neither the 
existence nor the influence of the individual actions of individual actors must be 
disputed. It is however of central importance to analyse subjects as products of 
structures and not idealise them as the origin of these structures. 
Another problematic aspect is the focus on singularity, difference and micro-
structures. The omnipresent suspicion derived from poststructuralist philosophy
that theoretical constructs homogenise differences and flatten discontinuities, in
order to appear as a coherent explanation of reality, renders its usefulness as a
theoretical foundation for the analysis of society’s macrostructures rather doubtful.
Nevertheless, even with a microsociological theory there is always an even more
differentiated view on social and political phenomena, and the ever more detailed
description of an infinity of singular phenomena does not seem to be a reason­
able objective of theory. The construction of coherence (which is to a certain
extent always arbitrary),12 the ordering of the empirical material, is a condition
of theory-building in social science.13 Again, the point is to be aware of this con­






      
 
12 Theory 
Analytical categories: discourse and power 
In a poststructuralist perspective on society, language, or more general represen­
tation, is ineluctable: only through systems of language or representation do we 
have access to reality. Discourse, preliminarily defined as a system of meaning, 
in which relations between signifiers and signifieds are fixed, is thus one of the 
central theoretical categories of this study. The second category is a result of post­
structuralism’s effect to demonstrate the contingency and historicity of seemingly 
self-evident categories as well as their exclusions – in a more political view: their 
involvement with relations of power. Power is thus the second central theoretical 
category. The two concepts are being defined in this section based on the work 
of Michel Foucault.14 My proposition is that an analytics of discourse and power 
based on Foucault is able to illuminate relations of power invisible to other theo­
retical approaches,15 primarily those that result from discursive structures or that 
are not repressive but productive. 
Analysis of discourse following Foucault 
Discourse theory following Foucault is confronted with the question which works 
exactly to follow. A closer look reveals certain differences between his original 
methodology of discourse analysis in the archaeology of knowledge, the shorter and 
more accessible order of discourse, and his usage of the term discourse in the con­
text of his analyses of power in later works. 
The discourse analysis in the archaeology of knowledge is strongly influenced 
by structural linguistics and can be sketched as follows: discourse is defined as 
‘a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive formation’ 
(Foucault 1972: 117). According to Foucault, these discursive formations are not
necessarily characterised by a common topic or common concepts, but by regu­
larities in the formation of objects, types of statements and concepts, by common 
rules of formation: 
Whenever one can describe, between a number of statements, such a system of disper­
sion, whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, or thematic choices,
one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions and functionings, trans­
formations), we will say . . . that we are dealing with a discursive formation. . . .
The conditions to which the elements of this division (objects, mode of statement,
concepts, thematic choices) are subjected we shall call the rules of formation. 
(Foucault 1972: 38, emphasis in the original) 
‘System of dispersion’ means that there may be deviance from the norm and 
yet a systematic regularity of the discursive dispersion, so rules must not be 
conceived as determinants in the structuralist sense. The unity of a discourse 
is thus not given through a common topic, but ‘a group of rules that are 
immanent in a practice, and define it in its specificity’ (ibid.: 46, emphasis in 
the original) and which order the relations between statements and groups of 
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‘the regularity of a discursive practice’ (145), which does not, in contrast to 
the history of ideas, try to find the notions ‘behind’ the discourses, but merely 
analyses the set of conditions of the existence of statements, their linkages 
and accumulations (125, 145).16 
These discourses constitute ‘practices which systematically form the objects of 
which they speak’ (Foucault 1972: 49), which reveals the constructivist perspec­
tive: Discourses are not representations of an objective reality, but the bricks 
with which we build social reality. Foucault emphasises, however, that he does 
not want to treat discourses as ‘groups of signs (signifying elements referring to 
contents or representations)’ (ibid.), i.e. as systems of relations between signifiers 
and signifieds. Not because this would be wrong, but because he is interested in 
something else: ‘Of course, discourses are composed of signs, but what they do is 
more than use these signs to designate things . . . It is this “more” that we must 
reveal and describe’ (ibid.). This ‘more’ is the rules of the discourses. 
Although Foucault occasionally mentions societal influence on discourse – he 
writes about specific ‘forms of articulation’ ‘between discursive formations and 
non-discursive domains’ (162) and that theoretical choices of a discourse are 
dependent of its function in a ‘field of non-discursive practices’ (68) – he usually 
conceives of discourses as anonymous, subjectless and autonomous entities (62f, 
86f, 117, 121f, 169). Their rules of formation are according to him ‘not the result, 
laid down in history and deposited in the depth of collective customs, of opera­
tions carried out by individuals’ (63). In the archaeology of knowledge, ‘the rules 
of formation operate not only in the mind or consciousness if individuals, but in 
discourse itself; they operate, therefore, according to a sort of uniform anonymity, 
on all individuals who undertake to speak in this discursive field’ (ibid.). 
Thus Foucault assumes discourses to be entities that are autonomous regarding 
societal influence and individual actions and defined by certain regularities, the 
rules of formation. They construct the objects of which they speak and should 
not be analysed as systems of representation, but merely as positive realities. In 
this, he neglects that their constructive operations are possible only because they 
are systems of meaning and their linking of signifiers and signifieds is crucial for 
analysis. Further, the positive and objective description of discursive reality he 
envisions is not possible: even the discourse of discourse analysis constructs its 
objects and is unable to ‘say it like it is’. Finally, his concept of discourses as 
autonomous is theoretically and politically problematic. If the rules of the dis­
course actually were entirely independent of individual practices, they would 
have to originate in some other, metaphysical level – which would of course be 
opposed to Foucault’s philosophical location. And this concept is unable to focus 
on the doubtlessly existing and most asymmetrical influence of social actors on 
discourses. Dreyfus and Rabinow thus criticise Foucault’s ‘illusion of autonomous 
discourse’ with good reason (1983, Part I). 
Already two years after the publication of the archaeology of knowledge, in 
his popular inaugural lecture ‘L’ordre du discourse’ (English as ‘The Discourse on 






can be observed. Here, he describes rules of exclusion, systems for the control 
and delimitation of discourse and procedures for the rarefaction among speak­
ing subjects. This means for each discourse only certain objects, statements and 
speakers are allowed as legitimate. Not only the opposition between reason and 
madness, but also that between true and false operates in this perspective as rules 
of exclusion which change in the course of history. Foucault illustrates this point 
with the example of 19th-century biologist Gregor Mendel, whose hypotheses are 
true from the perspective of today’s biology, ‘but he was not dans le vrai (within 
the true) of contemporary biological discourse: it simply was not along such lines 
that objects and biological concepts were formed’ (224) – Mendel did not obey 
‘the rules of some discursive “policy” ’ (ibid.). Scientific disciplines are defined by 
‘groups of objects, methods, their corpus of propositions considered to be true, the 
interplay of rules and definitions, of techniques and tools’ (222).17 According to 
Foucault, religious, political or philosophical doctrines function in a similar man­
ner: they are also defined by the recognition of the same truths while at the same 
time they indicate the adherence to a certain group (class, nationality or party): 
‘Doctrine effects a dual subjection, that of speaking subjects to discourse, and that 
of discourse to the group, at least virtually, of speakers’ (226). 
In statements like these, the social character of discourses is being recognised, 
their entanglement with social (and economic and political) relations of power, 
in contrast to his earlier work they are ‘the very object of man’s conflicts’ (216). 
Yet Foucault still criticises that in Western thought, discourse was merely seen as 
‘thought, clad in its signs and rendered visible by words’ or as ‘structures of lan­
guage . . . producing a certain effect of meaning’ (227). The justified critique that 
language is not an innocent representation of objective reality again turns into 
a rejection of a theoretical and methodological perspective which examines the 
production of meaning through the interplay between signifiers and signifieds. 
One can only wonder why.18 
The motive of the entanglement of discourse and social relations of power 
(and the corresponding abandonment of the ‘illusion of autonomous discourse’ 
(Dreyfus/Rabinow 1983) is dominant in the following works of Foucault. He 
stresses the close relation between knowledge and power, that: ‘power and knowl­
edge directly imply one another; that there is no power relation without the 
correlative constitution of a field of knowledge, nor any knowledge that does not 
presuppose and constitute at the same time power relations’ (Foucault 1977a: 
27). Certain relations of power render possible certain discourses and discourses 
engender and support relations of power (1978: 97). Thus: ‘Each society has its 
régime of truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is, the types of discourse which 
it accepts and makes function as true’ (1980: 131) and truth is ‘linked in a cir­
cular relation with systems of power which produce and sustain it, and to effects 
of power which it induces and which extend it’ (133). Therefore Foucault is not 
concerned with revealing ideology and promoting nonideological truths (a ‘bat­
tle on behalf of truth’) and with ‘changing people’s consciousness’, but with the 
‘political, economic and institutional régime of the production of truth’ (132f). 
In line with the assumption of a close relation between knowledge and power, 
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he does not any longer claim objectivity, but is aware of the perspectivity of 
the knowledge he produces (‘affirmation of knowledge as perspective’, 1977b: 
156). And although he no longer perceives discourses as completely autonomous, 
he still perceives them (and not knowing subjects) as the main actors and thus 
maintains that the ‘subjects of knowledge’ are merely ‘effects of these fundamen­
tal implications of power-knowledge and their historical transformations’ (1977a: 
28) – of discourses. 
So in contrast to his earlier work, the social character of discourses and the 
relations of power in their production become the central focus of Foucault’s 
analyses. However, he mentions that these entanglements are sometimes not 
straightforward, emphasising what he calls the ‘tactical polyvalence of discourses’ 
(1978: 102): the same discourses can be employed in different political strategies: 
‘we must not imagine a world of discourse divided between accepted discourse 
and excluded discourse, or between the dominant discourse and the dominated 
one; but as a multiplicity of discursive elements that can come into play in vari­
ous strategies’ (ibid.). 
To productively use Foucault’s heterogeneous theory of discourse for social sci­
ence, we have to carefully reflect which elements we refer to and which others 
should rather be neglected. In doing so, I would argue that for social science 
informed by poststructuralism: 1) a perspective which stresses the social character 
of discourses and their entanglement with power is more useful than the con­
cept of autonomous discourses; 2) acknowledging the perspectivity of one’s own 
knowledge is more useful than the positivist claim of merely describing reality; 3) 
locating the theory in poststructuralist reflections on the constitution of meaning 
is more useful than rejecting this connection. 
In this context Foucault’s category of the ‘non-discursive’ needs to be discussed. 
In the light of poststructuralist reflections on the constitution of reality through 
discourses as systems of representations (which can also be found in Foucault’s 
work)19 it is strictly speaking not possible to designate a nondiscursive area of 
reality: we perceive reality only mediated by discourses. What Foucault refers to 
as nondiscursive, buildings, institutions, physical practices, are rather nonlinguis­
tic phenomena which are perceived to have a different materiality than texts or 
utterances.20 
So, taking all of the above into account, we can define discourse – partly build­
ing on Foucault’s work, partly modifying or rejecting it – as follows: discourses are 
systems of meaning, in which certain relations between signifiers and signifieds 
are fixed, certain assumptions are considered true, certain mechanisms for the 
production of truth are accepted, certain elements are linked and in which cer­
tain rules guide the formation of objects, statements, enunciative modalities and 
topics. They constitute identities by providing the subjects with certain concepts 
and ways of speaking, certain types of constructing reality and producing state­
ments. Discourses are open systems constituted by regularities, there are manifold 
overlaps between them and their number is limitless. Discourses are the result of 

















Analysis of power following Foucault 
In the area of power we have to similarly clarify which elements of Foucault’s 
theory can be usefully taken up, because differences and contradictions can be 
found here as well. In his most explicit presentation of his analytical method 
regarding power (1978: 81–102), Foucault describes power as relational, decen­
tered, ubiquitous, intentional, nonsubjective and above all productive, all in all 
as a ‘multiplicity of force relations immanent in the sphere in which they oper­
ate’ (92). Following Foucault, power must not be conceived as something that 
powerful persons or institutions possess. Rather, they are nodes in a web of power 
relations. The powerful state does not possess a monopoly of violence, but power 
manifests itself in social relations at the microlevel which lead to a situation in 
which the state appears to have this monopoly – or in which it does not, depend­
ing on whether individuals accept this claim. So in this perspective, state appa­
ratuses and hegemonies are ‘institutional crystallization[s]’ (93) of decentered 
power relations and thus their effects, not their origins.21 
The ubiquity of power is already a result of its close relation to knowledge.
As mentioned, there is no relation of power without corresponding knowledge
and no field of knowledge which does not presuppose and constitute relations of
power (Foucault 1977a: 27). So there are no spaces ‘outside’ of power (1980: 141).
However, this does neither mean that power is always negative (there is no nor­
mative judgment involved) nor that there is no possibility for individual action. 
The description of relations of power as simultaneously intentional and non-
subjective implies that these relations correspond to a certain observable logic and
rationality. So an objective or even an intentionality can be presumed (actually the
latter term may be misleading) which cannot be traced back to ‘the choice or deci­
sion of an individual subject’ (1978: 95). An example which illustrates this quality
of power (which does not come from Foucault though) can be seen in the economic
relations in capitalism, which take place according to a certain rationality and lead
to certain results, but without anyone planning or coordinating these relations. 
Relations of power are productive, according to Foucault, because they are not 
confined to a repressive function (e.g. limiting what can be said, outlawing prac­
tices, censoring truths) – they are generating or giving rise to fields of knowledge 
and types of practices: ‘power produces; it produces reality; it produces domains of 
objects and rituals of truth’ (1977a: 194). This productive function does not only 
refer to the mind. Through the disciplinary techniques of surveillance (which 
renders visible) and normalisation (which controls, sanctions and homogenises) 
(170, 183f), power influences the body of the individual or, through the control 
of birth rates or the health system, the whole population. Foucault refers to these 
techniques for disciplining bodies and regulating populations as bio-power, as 
power which is directed at biological processes of life (1978: 139). 
In his later works Foucault thus demonstrates the shortcomings of juridical,
repressive concepts of power operating with the categories of sovereignty, law and
prohibition (see also Rehmann 2003). According to him, these are not only una­
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89f). Linked with the discourse and techniques of right, they have ‘efface[d] the
domination intrinsic to power in order to present the latter at the level of appear­
ance under two different aspects: on the one hand as the legitimate rights of sov­
ereignty, and on the other, as the legal obligation to obey it’ (1980: 95). Thus
domination appears as a stabilisation of power relations trying to appear legitimate
by legal claims. In contrast to this, Foucault suggests a strategic concept of power,
which conceives ‘politics as war pursued by other means’ (1978: 93), and which –
as a ‘micro-physics of power’ (1977a: 26ff, 138ff) – describes the manifold, unsta­
ble, productive relations of power tied with fields of knowledge which together
constitute a ‘complex strategical situation’ in a particular society (1978: 93). 
The task of genealogy then is to provide a history of knowledges and discourses 
and their relations of power without reference to a historical subject or other 
teleological categories (Foucault 1980: 117). It should examine the historical 
change of these relations, yet ‘must record the singularity of events outside of any 
monotonous finality’ (1977b: 139) and ‘oppose . . . itself to the search for “ori­
gins” ’ (140). The focus on singularity, heterogeneity and difference is a genuinely 
poststructuralist element in Foucault’s theory. 
The term ‘dispositif’ (apparatus) finally links discourses and nonlinguistic ele­
ments. Foucault describes it as an ‘ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions,
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific
statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions’, among which
there is a system of relations. This apparatus possesses a strategic function at a given
historical moment and arises as a reaction to a strategic necessity (1980: 194f). 
However, Foucault’s approach to analysing power has certain problems as well: 
in the literature it has been accused of reductionism, because processes of sociali­
sation are perceived merely as conditioning (e.g. Rolshausen 1997: 75). Simi­
larly legal structures appear only as instances of domination, which sidelines the 
problem of collective decision-making and government (Lemke 1997: 122). And 
resistance of course occurs in Foucault’s concept, but is not explained theoreti­
cally. On the other hand, the focus on microrelations neglects the state’s contri­
bution in organising relations of power (120f). 
Partly in response to these criticisms, Foucault coined the concept of govern-
mentality, which reflects the role of freedom within relations of power and tries
to bridge the gap between micro- and macro-level (Burchell et al. 1991). Gov­
ernmentality denotes a specific relation of power which aims at the ‘conduct of
conduct’, and to govern from this perspective is ‘to structure the field of possible
action of others’ (Foucault 1982: 221). This relation of power leaves the individu­
als untouched as subjects of their action although it influences and governs them –
they are free to act as they will. The art of governmentality is how to guide the
usage they make of their freedom and the term links the act of governing (gou­
vernement) with the way of thinking (mentalité), focusing on the relation between
forms of domination and processes of subjectivation (Foucault 1991, Lemke 1997). 
Foucault thus differentiates between three different types of power,22 a sov­
ereign, a disciplinary and a governmental type. Sovereign power, sometimes 















says no, power is taken above all as carrying the force of a prohibition’ (1980: 
119). It oppresses or censors or conceals, and its mechanisms can be administra­
tive acts as well as exclusions from or in discourse (1977a: 194, 1972: 216). 
Disciplinary power, in contrast, is productive, it produces reality, generates
knowledge, induces pleasure, gives rise to certain practices, abilities and even sub­
jects (1980: 119, 1977a: 170, 194). It employs – as a ‘political anatomy of the body’ –
hierarchical observation and normalising judgment (1977a: 170). As ‘bio-politics
of the population’ its main instrument is the regulation of the sum of bodies, the
calculated transformation of human life and its mechanisms (1978: 139, 143). 
Governmental power, identified in the art of governing, operates through 
structuring the field of action of free subjects. It manifests itself in ‘action upon 
an action’ (1982: 220), in ‘guiding the possibility of conduct’ (221) or, to use the 
most commonly used phrase, in the conduct of conducts.23 Its objective is the 
governing of individuals by shaping their free will, their subjectivity. Govern­
ment is then ‘the art of exercising power in the form of and according to the 
model of the economy’ (1991: 92) – the capitalist economy, one should add. In 
another text, Foucault curiously identifies government with relations of power 
based on claims to truth (1992: 15). 
Problems, ambiguities, contradictions 
This is not the place to contrast Foucault’s theory with his concrete analyses, ask­
ing whether he has or has not implemented his methodological principles. Here, 
we are merely concerned with his most important theoretical categories sover­
eign, disciplinary and governmental power, and with the problems, ambiguities 
and contradictions that can be found here which require clarification before we 
can decide which elements of Foucault we can build on and which have to be 
modified or discarded. 
1)	 The definition of governmental power as ‘structuring the field of action’ is not 
identical with its other definition of ‘conduct of conduct’. The shaping of sub­
jectivities and of the subject’s preferences which is implied in the latter defini­
tion may be a long-term result of a structuring of the field of action, but is by no
means a necessary one. We have to differentiate between a (successful) act upon
the field of action and a (successful) act upon the preferences for action, i.e. the
subjectivity of a person. This point marks the difference between a determinis­
tic concept which conceives power as a conditioning which succeeds by defini­
tion and a concept which takes into account the freedom of the subjects. 
2)	 However, the structuring of fields of action is precisely what Foucault 
described in Discipline and Punish as characteristics of disciplinary power. 
How else would it be possible to discipline prisoners? In Foucault’s example 
of the Panopticon the field of action of the inmates is structured by surveil­
lance and possible sanction: within a certain space they are free to act as they 
will. The ideal outcome of this structuring, i.e. the internalisation of surveil­
lance and a subjectivity which exhibits conformist behaviour even after the 
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surveillance ceases, manifest a successful act upon the preferences for action 
as a result of productive, disciplinary mechanisms of power. 
3) The example also illustrates that the exercise of power does not presuppose 
an acting subject, as seems to be suggested in the definition of power as an 
‘action upon actions’. Impersonal entities and apparatuses can likewise con
stitute such relations of power. When Foucault stresses the nonsubjective 
character of relations of power, he implicitly rejects a definition of power 
which is closely intertwined with acting subjects. 
4) Sovereign power actually functions in the same manner. The existence of 
laws and prohibitions is nothing but a structuring of fields of action which 
can by no means guarantee that individuals will respect and abide by them. 
They can merely be threatened with sanctions if their deviant behaviour is 
noticed by state institutions. But their behaviour cannot be determined – 
breaking the law is a possible alternative of action. 
5) Therefore even Foucault’s example of a chained slave (‘slavery is not a power 
relationship when a man is in chains’, 1982: 221) has to be differentiated. 
He argues that there is a relation of physical constraint, not of power. But 
according to his definition of governmental power this is not quite the case: 
regarding the order to row there is merely a structured field of action. The 
slave can decide not to – although the sanctions are presumably unpleasant 
enough to render this alternative unattractive. 
6) Strictly speaking even a situation where someone threatens me at gunpoint 
to do something constitutes no qualitative difference to one where the per
son threatens merely to hit me in the face if I refuse. Of course there is a 
significant difference between life-threatening and other sanctions, but we 
can draw no objective line here: Which kind of threat is perceived as mas
sive enough as to subjectively cut off alternatives of action, is dependent on 
the values and emotions of a person. 
7) A relation of force is constituted then by acts of physical violence. In the 
case of the galley slave, the alternative of flight is excluded by iron chains. 
In this regard, there is no relation of power because this would presume a 
subject which is free to act. 
8) Another problem is the delimitation of sovereign power from productive 
power. Laws and prohibitions not only pursue the same objective as discipli
nary power (the production of docile subjects), they also use the same mech
anism (structuring fields of action). One could argue that the specificity of 
sovereign power lies in the codification of its norms and sanctions and in its 
claim to legitimacy in using violence to implement its sanctions. Yet regard
ing the prison, which is one of Foucault’s prime examples for disciplinary 
power, this would lead to its categorisation in the area of sovereign power. 
9) The production of true knowledge, which has also been mentioned as a char
acteristic of governmental power, cannot function to separate the categories 
either. Sovereign and disciplinary power are also relying on the constitu
tion of knowledge – e.g. knowledge about the correct behaviour in school or 



























Therefore it can be maintained that the structuring of fields and action and the
production of true knowledge are mechanisms employed by all three types of power.
The categories seem to blur. It is hard to assert that the analytical frame has been
unambiguously enhanced by the category of governmentality and the separation
of sovereign and disciplinary power is not convincing. Discursive power, on the
other hand, which limits what can be said or produces fields of knowledge and con­
structions of reality, appears somewhat neglected in Foucault’s writings on analysing
power. His ‘agency turn’ in these writings, defining power as ‘action upon actions’
does seem somewhat inappropriate regarding the relations of power immanent in
discursive structures. In earlier writings Foucault demonstrated that anonymous dis­
courses can become subjects of the exercise of power and subjectivities and construc­
tions of reality its objects. And it is still not quite clear, whether and how relations
of power in the field of the economy can be grasped with Foucault’s instruments. 
A systematisation of Foucault’s analysis of power could, in a first step, differ­
entiate between: 
•	 power as a structuring of fields of action which influences actions (one could 
call it conditioning power); 
•	 power as a shaping of preferences for action which influences subjectivities 
(subjectivising power); and 
•	 power as a structuring of constructions of reality which influences thinking 
(discursive or representing power). 
Classical examples of Foucault’s analyses could then be rephrased as follows: 
a discursive exercise of power which limits what is sayable and provides certain 
conceptualisations of an object while excluding others, is primarily a structuring 
of constructions of reality, thus an instance of representing power. It has repres­
sive (a certain kind of knowledge is prevented and oppressed) as well as produc­
tive effects (a certain kind of knowledge is generated). By offering certain subject 
positions within the discourse and portraying certain ways of behaviour as just 
and legitimate, it can also influence fields of action and even preferences for 
action (conditioning and subjectivising power). 
A disciplinary exercise of power which prescribes behaviours and threatens
refusal with sanctions is primarily a structuring of fields of action, thus an instance of
conditioning power. Again, we find both repressive (certain acts are prohibited) and
productive elements (certain acts are trained). In some cases, this exercise of power
may lead to a shaping of preferences for action – the trained behaviour is internal­
ised and subjectivities are shaped. In other cases, the trained behaviour is dropped
as soon as there is no surveillance or no conditioning anymore. What Foucault
describes as sovereign power is a special case of disciplinary power operating with
the demarcation legal/illegal and the claim or threat of a monopoly of violence. 
A governmental exercise of power which through commercials or generally the
media aims at the efficiency- or market-oriented conduct of individuals out of their
own free will, is (if successful) primarily a structuring of preferences for action,
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power as well. It is productive in the sense of creating a certain subjectivity and
has a repressive dimension insofar as other types of subjectivity are sanctioned. 
It becomes clear that a rigid separation between repressive and productive 
ways of exercising power is hard to maintain. What can also be observed is the 
entanglement of the levels of thinking (constructions of reality), agency (fields of 
action) and subjectivity (preferences for action). 
Poststructuralism, archaeology, genealogy:  
brief remarks on method 
So which methodological consequences follow from the above discussion of the­
oretical foundations and analytical categories? 
A poststructuralist analysis is not concerned with reality as it is, but the way it
is represented and constructed, primarily in texts. It focuses on the production of
meaning in discourse, and this means: on the relation between signifier and signified.
Which contents are attributed to which concepts in which contexts? And which
words or phrases are treated as synonymous, which signifiers are linked in chains of
equivalences? These are the questions that guide poststructuralist methods. 
Archaeology is the analysis of discursive formations. It thus looks for the rules of
formation that constitute the unity of a discourse. These rules concern the objects,
concepts, enunciative modalities and strategies of a discourse. It also examines the
limits of what can be said within the discourse and what is excluded – the repres­
sive dimension of representing power. Its productive dimension is also relevant:
which objects are created, which statements are provided possible, which realities
are constructed in the discourse? In archaeology, texts are being analysed not as
statements produced by individual subjects, but by the structures of the discourse,
by rules which impose themselves on anyone who speaks in this discursive field. 
Further, what is of interest is the way that discourses may be connected with 
institutions and practices to constitute an apparatus (dispositive) which produces 
regular effects and organises relations of power. This apparatus arises from a stra­
tegic necessity and has a strategic purpose which can be identified through its 
effects, although this strategy is independent of the intention of the individuals 
operating within this apparatus. 
If archaeology provides a synchronic analysis of discourses, genealogy provides 
the diachronic analysis. It examines the history and transformation of discourses 
and in particular of the relations of power inherent in them: Which relations of 
power gave rise to this discourse and which effects of power are produced by this 
discourse? The aim is to be aware of singularities and discontinuities and to avoid 
the homogenisation of discourse. 
Notes 
1 Of course this representation of the relation between science and reality is not neutral 

























2	 Examples are structuralist anthropology which was founded by Claude Lévi-Strauss, 
the structuralist revision of psychoanalysis by Jacques Lacan, or Roland Barthes’ semi­
otics, which takes any context of meaning as a topic of structuralist analysis. Michel 
Foucault’s archaeology can at first also be seen as an application of structuralist meth­
ods on the field of the history of ideas, but poststructuralist elements can be found here 
as well. 
3	 Following poststructuralism, it is not possible to say ‘what poststructuralism is’. 
Münker and Roesler put it this way: ‘Writing about poststructuralism means invent­
ing it’ (2000: ix). So all that can be done here is to describe one interpretation of 
poststructuralism which links the concept with certain contents. Defining the concept 
is not an act of representation, but a performative act. 
4	 In the works of Barthes, Lacan and Foucault a transition from structuralism to post-
structuralism can be observed. 
5	 This is why poststructuralist approaches are sometimes referred to as postfoundational. 
Marchart (2002: 11) defines postfoundationalism as follows: it rejects approaches 
which assume that knowledge can be anchored in a universal, objective foundation 
such as God or rationality (see also Stäheli 2000: 9). 
6	 Stäheli (2000: 15) also points to the impossibility of a poststructuralist sociology and 
postulates all that we could have were ‘poststructuralist perspectives on the social’. 
7	 Laclau and Mouffe state: ‘If society is not sutured by any single unitary and posi­
tive logic, our understanding of it cannot provide that logic. A “scientific” approach 
attempting to determine the “essence” of the social world would . . . be the height 
of utopianism’ (2001: 143). This means it is inadequate to describe the essence of 
our society as ‘capitalist’, because it is not merely determined by this single logic 
(Gibson-Graham 2006). 
8	 Undecidability refers to situations in which there can be no scientific analysis or deci­
sion on which elements of society will be articulated according to objective laws. Of 
course these articulations do take place, based on contingent processes and decisions –
the situations are in fact ‘decidable’, but not rationally or universally, therefore the 
second term seems more appropriate (cf. Laclau/Mouffe 2001: xif). 
9	 If Laclau and Mouffe talk about the ‘impossibility of society’, they refer to a rigid
social totality which appears impossible from the poststructuralist perspective
because of the instability of the relations. In the statement here the point is a differ­
ent one: that the unrestrained floating of signifiers would render social interaction
impossible. 
10	 On the concept of truth in poststructuralism see also Stäheli 2000: 271. 
11	 The following description of some social theories is necessarily simplified and merely 
serves to explain the specificity of the poststructuralist position – it cannot substitute 
a thorough engagement with these theories. 
12	 The construction of coherence refers to poststructuralism’s perspective that the 
empirical material never possesses an order in itself, but that it has to be constructed 
through categorizations, classifications and the like. 
13	 This is a point made by Christine Hanke. In her discussion of Foucault’s discourse 
analysis she raises the question how we can combine the construction of coherent 
formations with the recognition of discontinuity and claims: ‘Maybe the question is 
whether we want to demonstrate the power of discursive formations – this requires to 
act big and to gloss over differences – or whether in our work with texts we want to 
focus on fragments and details and go against the grain, linger at their margins, make 
them move and deconstruct their alleged coherence’ (Hanke 1999: 117, translation 
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14	 This implies that I disagree with a reading of Foucault (e.g. in Dreyfus/Rabinow 1983; 
Sawyer 2003) that sees theoretical incompatibilities between the earlier works of dis­
course analysis and the later works focusing on power. 
15	 Strictly speaking it is not the case that these relations exist on a prediscursive level of 
reality and the said analytics (functioning as a nonideological view on reality) merely 
‘sees’ them. Based on the epistemological foundation discussed above, it provides only 
one perspective, the plausibility of which is for the reader to decide. The order of 
discourse is constructed. 
16	 Later Foucault also described archaeology as a method which examines the ‘sys­
tem of acceptability’, which legitimates a certain knowledge as acceptable and true 
(1992: 33f). 
17	 There are clear parallels to Thomas Kuhn’s concept of paradigms (Kuhn 1962). 
18	 A possible though admittedly speculative explanation for Foucault’s strange rejection 
of the idea that social relations of power manifest themselves in language and the 
approach of examining signifiers and signifieds could be seen in the fact that both were 
quite en vogue in Paris around 1968, there were strong currents of Marxism (and the 
critique of ideology) on the one and hermeneutics and semiotics on the other hand 
and he wanted to emphasise their shortcomings and neglects. Maybe this is also a 
case of the academic necessity for researchers to distance themselves from prevailing 
schools of thought and present a new innovative approach which tends to lead to an 
overstatement of cases and novelties. 
19	 ‘[W]e should not imagine that the world presents us with a legible face, leaving us
merely to decipher it . . . We must conceive discourse as a violence that we do to things
or, at all events, a practice that we impose upon them’ (Foucault 1972: 229, see also 49). 
20	 Of course, one could also argue about the latter: texts and utterances also possess phys­
ical materiality, just as nonlinguistic practices also possess a dimension of meaning. 
21	 Here we can see parallels to the work of Nicos Poulantzas. 
22	 Although Foucault claims that ‘[w]e live in the era of governmentality’ (1991: 103), 
he stresses that the other two types of power relations are still in operation today as 
well (102). 
23	 The phrase ‘conduire des conduites’ (‘conduct of conduct’) does not appear in the 
English translation, but only in the French original (Foucault 1994: 237). However, it 
has become the most common description for governmentality since Colin Gordon’s 
introduction (Gordon 1991: 2). 
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3 From ‘civilising mission’ to 
‘development’ 
The way the relations between North and South, the West and the rest, metropolis
and periphery are represented is imbued with relations of power. These representa­
tions are structured by certain discourses which serve to produce knowledge and
construct identities. During the middle decades of the 20th century, the colonial
order of discourse was pushed aside by that of ‘development’. Yet some continuities
can be observed. 
Colonial discourse 
Whether Cecil Rhodes raves over the blessings of British world rule, the French 
foreign secretary Hanotaux announces to spread civilisation in barbarian lands, 
German Kaiser Wilhelm II proclaims his intent to win over other continents for 
Christian morality, US politician Beveridge talks about divine providence, the 
All-German Association talks about the rights of master races or Belgian King 
Leopold II talks about a crusade against darkness: the legitimisations of imperial 
policy and conquest of different colonial powers at the end of the 19th century 
are largely interchangeable. The basic structure of colonial discourse is the divi­
sion of the world into ‘civilised’ peoples or nations and ‘uncivilised’ tribes or 
masses. And the basic claim is that the latter are unable to effectively govern 
their own affairs, so that the former come to help them, because they are by 
nature or the will of God destined to rule or even obliged to do so for the sake of 
humanity. So far, so simple. 
However, this system of representation does not merely function to justify
imperial policy, the knowledge produced here also serves to construct identities,
i.e. it exerts not only representing but also subjectivising power. Yet the Euro­
pean, Western or occidental identity can only be constituted as progressive, lib­
eral and civilised, as the ideal norm of human existence, by distinguishing itself
from a backward and barbarian Other, which is constructed as deficient deviance
from this norm (Hall 1992). Certain discursive constructions enable the des­
ignation of the Self as civilised, even when engaging in the colonies in torture
and similar practices normally rather perceived as uncivilised. Commenting on
such practices of the US in the Philippines, regional expert Foreman argued in










a voluntary concession of justice is regarded [by the Filipinos] as a sign of weak­
ness. Hence it is, that the experienced European is often compelled to be more
harsh than his own nature dictates’ (cited in Doty 1996: 40). In this line of
argument, the brutality, cruelty or injustice of colonial practices is caused by
the spoiled mentality of the indigenous peoples, and actually runs counter to
the rather gentle disposition of the colonisers. The knowledge produced here
enables the civilised to employ barbaric practices while at the same time affirms
the construction of the perpetrator’s identity as civilised and that of the victims
as uncivilised. 
On top of that, the usage of such practices is designated as entirely rational. 
Here, just like in countless other instances, colonial discourse constructs an 
ensemble of differences: superior/inferior, civilised/uncivilised, rational/emo­
tional, guided by reason/guided by instinct, fit to govern/unfit to govern, sover­
eign/dependent, colonising/colonised, etc. The characteristics attributed to the 
Self and the Other are linked by chains of equivalence: to be superior means 
to be civilised, to be civilised means to act rational, to act rational means to 
be fit to govern, which in turn means to be superior, and so on. The positive 
and negative characteristics are all linked to one another. The implicit point 
around which the differences are organised, is the affiliation to a racially defined 
group, to be more precise: to a group defined primarily by race and gender. The 
positive characteristics all manifest in the ‘white man’. On the collective level, 
it provides the foundation of the ‘master race’. The white man thus constitutes 
what Laclau and Mouffe (following Lacan) call the ‘nodal point’ or ‘dominant 
signifier’ of a discourse (Laclau/Mouffe 2001: 112): the centre which serves as 
a point of reference for the differences according to which identities are being 
constructed. It is the benchmark according to which all other identities are found 
to be deficient. To be precise, one needs to specify the nodal point as the white 
adult middle class male, as the poor classes, women and children were in similar 
ways seen as inferior in a racial hierarchy as the non-Whites: poverty was seen as 
organic pathology and women were also often seen as a degenerate race, akin to 
black people and apes, while children and savages were linked by analogy anyway 
(McClintock 1995: 34–37). 
Correspondingly the indigenous, who represent the white man’s Other in colo­
nial discourse, are measured according to this benchmark and identified as (at 
best) children close to nature or (at worst) savage beasts. In any case, they are 
uncivilised, irrational and unfit to govern themselves. The difference between 
Self and Other is simultaneously being denied and affirmed, in an interplay of 
universalism and essentialism: It is being denied, because in the ethnocentric 
evaluation the indigenous appears merely as an incomplete image of one’s own 
norm of human existence, which is to be educated and assimilated according to 
this norm. The strange and unknown Other appears as a deficient version of the 
Self (see also Horkheimer/Adorno 1988: 13f, 18f). It is being affirmed, because 
despite all education and uplifting the colonised will always remain inferior 
within the order of discourse and are unable to fully reach the level of civilisa­
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mimicry: ‘colonial mimicry is the desire for a reformed, recognisable Other, as a 
subject of difference, that is almost the same, but not quite’ (1994: 122, emphasis in 
the original). Its epitome is Macauley’s objective of education: to breed ‘a class of 
persons Indian in blood and colour, but English in tastes, in opinions, in morals 
and in intellect’ (ibid.: 124f). Yet the natives will always remain Indian in blood 
and colour and never be fully regarded as equal. 
Nevertheless we already encounter the element of development in colonial dis­
course. Although even in the early 20th century some liberals vehemently reject 
the idea that ‘the negroes are simply not yet as developed as we are’ and maintain 
that they are products of an ‘inferior race’ (cited in Kößler 1998: 71, translation 
AZ), we can find others like John Stuart Mill, who already in the 19th century 
traced back the (unquestioned) inferiority and backwardness of the colonised to 
historical instead of racial factors: the Europeans were merely more progressed in 
the ‘history of human improvement’ (cited in Spurr 1993: 66). This, however, is 
a manifestation of a Eurocentric theoretical model which originated in Enlight­
enment thinking and became popular in 19th century evolutionism: that the 
societies in Africa, Asia and Latin America prior to conquest and settlement by 
Europeans represent earlier stages of the evolution of mankind in comparison to 
Europe (Comte 1923: 322). This model is summed up by philosopher John Locke 
in the phrase ‘in the beginning, all the world was America’, the continent was 
‘the childhood of mankind’ (cited in Hall 1992: 219). This model is described 
by Melber as ‘chronification of spatial co-existence’ (1992: 32, translation AZ) 
and by Nandy as ‘transformation of geo-cultural differences into historical stages’ 
(1992: 146). 
Yet in the application of this model the concept of development underwent 
a shift in meaning: it transformed from an intransitive to a transitive verb, i.e. 
‘to develop oneself’ was replaced by ‘to develop someone else’. Instead of the 
indigenous who were perceived as incapable of developing the land, the colonial 
powers assumed the task of ‘developing backward areas’. However, to develop at 
first referred to exploiting the economic resources of the region and civilising the 
colonised – but not to their standard of living. Only in a long and discontinuous 
process during the first half of the 20th century, the idea gained prominence that 
developing a colony had to be linked with material improvements for the indig­
enous population (see Alcalde 1987 and the next chapter). The mandate system 
of the League of Nations was an intermediate step on this way: the legitimation 
of the trusteeship that some countries exerted over others was connected to the 
well-being of the latter’s population. These countries were, in the words of the 
League of Nations ‘inhabited by people not yet able to stand by themselves under 
the strenuous condition of the modern world’ (cited in Rist 1997: 60) and thus in 
need of tutelage by others, but only under the watchful eyes of an international 
organisation: the Permanent Mandates Commission. There is already a hint of 
universalism in the air: a natural inequality of peoples is no longer mentioned. 
A new order of discourse is in the making, which after World War II and the 
second wave of decolonisation became the definitive structure in the representa­
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played a role: anticolonial movements, the Russian Revolution of 1917, strategic 
(economic and geopolitical) necessities of the industrialised countries (above all 
the USA) during and after the wars and the discrediting of openly racist world 
views through the crimes of Nazi Germany (see Alcalde 1987, Escobar 1995, 
Cooper 1997).1 Colonial discourse turned into the discourse of development. 
From colonialism to development: discursive discontinuities 
The discourse of development which became immensely influential in the second 
half of the 20th century exhibited fundamental changes in comparison with the 
discourse of colonialism as outlined in the previous section. The most important 
of these is certainly that people in colonised countries were no longer represented 
as unable to govern themselves (and therefore dependent on some benign colo­
nial rule). Colonial racism had been increasingly discredited after World War II 
and the Holocaust,2 the right of the peoples to self-determination and universal 
human rights came to be increasingly accepted as self-evident.3 
A new order of discourse becomes visible not only in the UN charter, but also 
in the oft-quoted inaugural address of US-president Truman which he delivered 
in January 1949: 
[W]e must embark on a bold new program for making the benefits of our sci­
entific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement and 
growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people of the world are 
living in conditions approaching misery. . . . Their economic life is primitive 
and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and 
to the more prosperous areas. . . . The United States is pre-eminent among 
nations in the development of industrial and scientific techniques. . . . 
I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples the benefits 
of ours sum of technical knowledge in order to help them realise their aspi­
rations for a better life. And, in cooperation with other nations, we should 
foster capital investment in areas needing development. Our aim should be 
to help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce 
more food, more clothing, more material for housing, and more mechanical 
power to lighten their burdens. . . . The old imperialism – exploitation for 
foreign profits – has no place in our plans. What we envisage is a program for 
development based on the concepts of democratic fair dealing. 
What becomes clear is the acceptance of a conditional equality of peoples: they 
are all equal, only some are not as progressed on the universal scale of develop­
ment as others, they are underdeveloped. However, after the abandonment of the 
earlier racism, there is hardly any mention of underdeveloped peoples or indi­
viduals, but of underdeveloped regions. This means the object of the discourse is 
being conceived in the terms of economic geography, not in the terms of biology. 
The dichotomy civilised/uncivilised is being replaced by the dualism developed/ 
underdeveloped. The corresponding ensemble of differences can be sketched as 
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follows: industrial and scientific progress/stagnation, economic growth/stagna­
tion, technology/manual labour, modernity/tradition, high productivity/low pro­
ductivity, prosperity/poverty, better life/conditions approaching misery, free trade 
and democracy/old imperialism, nations providing development aid/nations 
receiving development aid. Again, the individual elements of the ensemble of 
differences are linked through chains of equivalences: a better life is unthinkable 
without industrial and scientific progress, this demands high productivity, this 
in turn demands economic growth and investments, the condition of which is 
free trade. On the other hand, manual labour is a sign of poverty, it is linked to 
low productivity and a traditional society, etc. The point of reference for these 
differences, the nodal point of the discourse, is the developed industrial society, 
above all the US.4 According to this norm, the countries of the South and the 
countless heterogeneous ways of life to be found there are classified as deficient: 
they are poor in terms of their per-capita-income and gross national product, they 
suffer from a lack of development. This diagnosis calls for a certain medicine: they 
need development in terms of modernisation, capital investment and transfer of 
technology. 
In this discourse, the development of former colonies becomes a central task 
which can, now the racist element has been abandoned, no longer be withheld 
from the ‘natives’. Thus the trusteeship for the development of the society is given 
to and taken over by the new elites of postcolonial states. As Cowen and Shen­
ton (1996) showed, the idea of trusteeship was formulated by the followers of 
Saint-Simon, advocating social technology already in the 19th century. The 
trustees are those who have the capacity to use society’s resources for the bet­
terment of society as a whole, and the modernising elites assuming trusteeship 
readily adopted the hierarchies of development discourse and were willing to 
educate, modernise and develop their subjects in a similar authoritarian manner as 
the colonisers had done.5 Especially indigenous peoples in the postcolonial states 
were still seen as backward and in need of tutelage. 
However, not only the elites, but large parts of the population willingly adopted 
the discourse of development and the image of the South as underdeveloped. The 
reason is this that this discourse constructs them no longer as inferior subjects, 
but as equal participants in the ‘development race’ in the ‘economic arena’ (Sachs 
1990: 3), in the progress of humanity towards growth, who are able to catch up 
their backlog against the leading nations within a few decades. Yet this discourse 
simultaneously constructs the identity of the underdeveloped as backward and as 
part of an inferior culture whose deficits can only be compensated by taking over 
Western ideals of rationality, productivity and modernity and a constant effort to 
assimilate oneself to the norm. 
The identity of the developed produced by the discourse is not only linked to 
the ideals of freedom and democracy, free trade and progress, it is crucially also 
a ‘samaritan’ identity which grants development assistance to the peoples suf­
fering from ‘conditions approaching misery’. Truman admitted that self-interest 
also played a role in this, portraying the poverty in the South as a handicap and 






needed new markets (and old resource providers) after the boom period of World 
War II, in which it doubled its production – to avoid the impending bust. It was 
a threat because of the very real possibility of decolonising nations joining the 
communist camp – the containment of communism being the central imperative 
of US foreign policy during the Cold War. Therefore there was a strategic neces­
sity first of all to discover the problem of Third World poverty, and second to link 
it to traditional (noncapitalist) values and practices on the one and to a lack of 
capital and technology on the other hand.6 The obvious solution then was aban­
doning traditional social structures and importing Western values on the one and 
importing Western capital and technology through investments and integration 
into the world market on the other hand. 
The crucial significance of this way of constructing the problem results from 
the changed global constellation and the corresponding different, anti-colonial, 
bias of the development discourse. Contrary to the old imperialism the objective 
of the discourse was to help produce African, Asian and Latin American subjects 
who of their own free will support an international order in line with the interests 
of the metropolises in the First World.7 ‘The “white man’s burden” of the colonial 
period shifted from civilising the uncivilised to global governance, the produc­
tion of a world in which the US way of life could flourish’ (Doty 1996: 83). In 
theoretical terms, governmental, subjectivising power is at work in the new dis­
course of development far more effectively than in the discourse of the colonial 
era, as the use of disciplinary power and violence is increasingly delegitimised. 
The postwar discourse of modernisation theory depicted here constructed 
development (as mentioned) as a race in the economic arena, thus assuming that 
each country’s success is determined by its own efforts. During the 1960s and 
70s, this view was confronted by dependency theories promoting an alternative 
conception which pried open this structure of the discourse confining the debate 
on flawed and successful national policies. They did so through analysing under­
development and development as two sides of the same coin, that is of the capitalist 
world system. Consequently their recommendation was not integration into the 
world market, but delinking and self-reliance. However, the dependency theo­
ries shared the diagnosis of the problem promoted by development discourse: the 
industrialised states are developed and the underdeveloped states have to catch up 
with economic growth and industrialisation. For example Cardoso and Faletto 
define real (in contrast to dependent) development as ‘a reduction of dependence 
and the change of the economic system from a peripheral to a central economy’ 
(1976: 18). So the aim is the transition towards an industrial metropolis – to 
become like them. The system of differences of the discourse remains more or 
less the same. 
Another aspect of the new discourse also follows from the changed construc­
tion of Southern subjects. After those still designated as savages during colonial­
ism were perceived as equal human beings – and because of the strategic objectives 
mentioned above – Third World poverty became visible and turned into a new 
focus of North-South relations. Development aid did not only serve to amelio­
rate poverty, it also simultaneously served to monitor, administer and manage
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poverty – in particular regarding its potential threat to a capitalist global order, 
as can be observed in Truman’s address or Kennedy’s Alliance for Progress, which 
started in 1961. Therefore institutions were needed that produced knowledge 
on the Third World and its subjects, made them visible, calculable and objects 
of social technology (Escobar 1988, Brigg 2002).8 The legions of development 
aid workers that went to Africa, Asia and Latin America – over 200,000 in the 
Peace Corps alone9 – contributed to the discursive structure crucial to develop­
ment: there are problems in the South (related to underdevelopment) and peo­
ple from the North possess knowledge to solve these problems (because they are 
developed). Paulette Goudge (2003), a former aid volunteer, clearly observed the 
role played by race in the attribution of knowledge and expertise in this context. 
That there might be social problems in the North for which problem-solving 
knowledge might be available in the South is a statement which has no place in 
development discourse. It is beyond the limits of what can legitimately been said 
within it.10 Here we can observe the category of discursive power. 
Summing up, it can be said that in comparison to colonial discourse, the dis­
course of development is directed to a higher degree towards the production of 
identity in the South, as it has no place for the violent implementation of met­
ropolitan interests (the old imperialism).11 This is the logical consequence of the 
delegitimisation of racist ideologies of inequality which provided the foundation 
for structures of domination at the international level. So from this perspective, 
the new order of discourse appears to constitute progress in emancipation. 
From colonialism to development: discursive continuities 
Apart from these numerous changes, we can also observe constant elements in 
the comparison between the two orders of discourse. These concern the basic 
structure of discourse, the philosophy of history and the social technology, the 
latter two leading as a consequence to Eurocentrism and potential for violence. 
The basic structure of discourse is the division of the world into a progressive, 
superior part and a backward, inferior part. As this division takes place from the 
point of view of the North, it defines the Self (one’s own developed society) as 
the norm which is used to objectively prove the inferiority of the Other. There­
fore, no measurement of development has ever tried to operationalise hospitality, 
crime, suicide, social networks or a noninstrumental relation to nature as indi­
cators of a good society. Instead, what counts are life expectancy, years spent in 
school and above all, the GNP. The system of differences of the development era 
therefore ties in with that of the colonial era – both are derived from the same 
norm – and its divisions and dichotomies appear self-evident also because they 
can build on the preceding discourse. 
The element referred to as philosophy of history consists in a concept taken 
over from 19th century evolutionism in social science, and that is the idea of a 
universal scale of development for the whole of humanity, along which the indus­
trialised countries of Western Europe and North America are more progressed 








countless possibilities of human beings organising their coexistence and coopera­
tion are being reduced to following the footsteps of the West, whose past (awash 
with violence and environmental destruction) is being romanticised as a neces­
sary progress in human history. If ethnocentrism means that our interaction with 
others is governed by the patterns of perception and evaluation predominant in 
our culture (Melber 1992: 10f), then the discourse of development is imbued with 
a specific type of it, it is thoroughly Eurocentric.12 
The element referred to as social technology, i.e. the intent to shape the soci­
eties in the South (and the people therein) according to rational criteria, has 
also been present already in colonial discourse. As mentioned, the trusteeship
shifted from the colonisers to the elites in the postcolonial states, supported by 
development organisations of all kinds. But that the trusteeship – and the con­
comitant legitimation to define how a good society looks like and how it can be 
achieved – has been transferred from the colonisers to development experts from 
both North and South has done nothing to decrease its potential for violence. 
Therefore the record of authoritarian measures conducted (also by postcolonial 
states) in the name of development is long indeed. It spans from the violent small­
pox vaccination of Indian villagers in the 1960s (Apffel-Marglin 1990) to the 
‘punishment by six strokes’ for ‘not participating in development projects’ in Tan­
zania’s Handeni district in 1962 (Potter 2000: 287) and the regional president 
of Southern Sudan, who summed up the principle in the slogan: ‘If we have to 
drive our people to paradise with sticks, we will do so for their own good’ (Alva­
res 1992: 108). According to cautious estimates, in India alone over 30 million 
people have been displaced by dam projects (Roy 1999). The list could go on, the 
violence in the history of development has been documented by Berger (1974), 
Nandy (1994, 1995, 2004), Norberg-Hodge (2009), Seabrook (1993) and Sit­
tirak (1998) and lately (and surprisingly) even Easterly (2013).13 
This relation between violence and development is no coincidence, but a 
result of the authoritarian element in development discourse. Knowledge about
development is knowledge about the falsehood of others’ ways of living and their 
necessary correction. It grants legitimacy to interventions in these ways of liv­
ing, it allows them ‘to be sanctified in the name of a higher, evolutionary goal’ 
(Sachs 1990: 6). This authoritarian element is due to one rule of formation of 
the discourse: a statement in the discourse presupposes knowledge about what
development in the sense of an improvement, a step towards a good society, looks 
like and how it can be achieved. This implies the subordination of other ideas 
about a good society. Statements not claiming this kind of knowledge have no 
place in the discourse. (On the rules of formation see the following chapter.) 
Prominent theorists of development have proven that the elements of Euro­
centrism and social technology are still present at the turn of the century. They 
proclaim as the goal of development theory the ‘globalisation of the “project 
of modernity” in a European Anglo-Saxon fashion’ (Lühr/Schulz 1997: 11), 
they talk about ‘backward societies’ (Senghaas 1997: 59) or they identify as 
objective the establishment of modern societies with the ‘foundational insti­
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consumption’ and demand the transformation of individuals into ‘mobile, flex­
ible, performance-oriented personalities’ (Zapf 1997: 31, 34). The mission of 
civilising the uncivilised has been replaced by the global establishment of social 
institutions in a European fashion and the transformation of the people into 
performance-oriented individuals, but these intentions do not seem entirely 
novel. Just like in colonialism, the Northern experts still know how the South 
has to be remodelled: in their image and according to their values. 
Notes 
1	 Concerning the latter point (the discrediting of racism through the Holocaust), Aimé 
Césaire has claimed that ‘at bottom, what he [the Christian bourgeois of the twentieth 
century] cannot forgive Hitler is not . . . the crime against man, it is not the humili­
ation of man as such, it is the crime against the white man, the humiliation of the 
white man, and the fact that he applied to Europe colonialist procedures which until 
then had been reserved exclusively for the Arabs of Algeria, the coolies of India, and 
the blacks of Africa’ (1972: 174). In fact, the international discrediting of racism and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights came into being not after the colonial 
genocides committed by whites against people of colour in America, Africa and Asia, 
but after a genocide committed by whites against whites (Jews were seen as ‘internal 
others’) in Europe. 
2	 As William Easterly points out, this racism was increasingly contested already during 
World War II, e.g. when the British Colonial Office for West Africa forced the BBC 
to apologise after Ghanaians had complained vehemently about the use of the word 
‘nigger’ in a broadcast (Easterly 2013: 85). 
3	 Of course, the respect for the right of the peoples to self-determination and human 
rights had certain limits. Yet the counterinsurgency of the US in Latin America and 
Asia, for example, that openly disregarded these rights, is characterised by the employ­
ment of discursive strategies of the colonial era. This concerns in particular the alleged 
inability of the Filipinos, Vietnamese, Chileans, etc., to govern themselves responsi­
bly, so that in their own interest military interventions were necessary. Just like in 
contemporary ‘humanitarian interventions’, the decision of the necessity of such 
interventions is primarily discussed among the developed industrial nations, and only 
rarely among the United Nations. 
4	 Although this nodal point of the discourse might seem gender neutral at first sight, the 
values associated with it (modernisation, rationality, productivity, technology) clearly 
have a masculine connotation. 
5 Easterly (2013) provides numerous examples for this practice. 
6 The strategic necessity then gave rise to the establishment of the apparatus (Foucault’s 
dispositive) of the development industry. 
7	 So the development apparatus used both conditioning power (aid projects and 
loans) and representing power (the discourse of development) to achieve the desired 
subjecivisation. 
8 In this context, the political role of social science also deserves critical scrutiny 
(Gendzier 1985). 
9 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peace_Corps (September 17, 2014) 
10 In other discourses, such problem-solving knowledge from the South has been accepted 








11	 To be sure, this does not mean that such a violent implementation has not taken place 
during the era of development, but it has usually been legitimated with discursive 
strategies of the preceding colonial era (trusteeship in the interest of the ‘natives’). 
12	 Melber (1992: 12) sees the specificity of Eurocentrism in contrast to other ethnocen­
trisms that it even went so far as to construct a theory of the necessary disappearance 
of difference, as the deficient others (the underdeveloped) would become like the Self 
in due time. 
13	 While Nandy (1988) and especially Easterly (2013) stress the linkage between vio­
lence exerted in the name of development and state power (Nandy observes that devel­
opment has become the third ‘reason of state’ in the South, next to national security 
and scientific progress), it has to be pointed out that a great deal of the examples of 
destruction given in the works cited above refer to the workings of corporations or 
simply the world market. 
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4 An archaeology of development 
knowledge1 
The field of discourse analysis is inevitably linked to the work of Michel Foucault. 
However, whereas often Foucauldian discourse analysis is characterised by the 
analytical strategy of tracing the interconnectedness of power and knowledge, 
this has surprisingly little to do with Foucault’s methodological reflections in The 
Archaeology of Knowledge. Here, the analysis of discourses is specified as the posi­
tivist description of formal rules and regularities in speech and writing which are 
explicitly characterised as anonymous structures independent of the influence 
of powerful actors – rather surprising and disappointing for many who turn to 
discourse analysis as a more fashionable substitute for the critique of ideology. 
Nevertheless, as I shall argue in this chapter, Foucault’s archaeology can be 
usefully applied within social science to provide original perspectives and sensi­
tivity for the contingency and the relations of power implicit in discursive con­
structions. Yet to that end, some parts of his methodological rules have to be 
modified or left aside. To make this point, the chapter will take the discipline 
of development theory and policy as an example and submit it to an analysis of 
its discourse inspired by Foucault’s archaeological method, but deviating from it 
when deemed necessary. 
In the first part of the paper, the analytical approach presented in The Archae­
ology of Knowledge and the methodological rules that follow will be (briefly) dis­
cussed and modified according to the requirements of a critical social science. 
Then, this modified approach will be applied to the field of development theory 
and policy in order to point out the structures of development discourse in the 
postwar era of the 20th century. In the last part, the emergence of development 
discourse and the transition from colonial to postcolonial development knowl­
edge will be examined from this perspective, using several policy documents as 
empirical examples. 
Discourse analysis and its problems according to Foucault 
In this section, I will briefly reconstruct the methodological rules of Foucault in 
a fairly simplified form and later discuss their consequences. In The Archaeology 
of Knowledge, Michel Foucault (1972) provides a methodological framework for 
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history of ideas. Against the latter’s emphasis on the themes of continuity, origin 
and the sovereign subject, Foucault stresses discontinuities, transformations and 
structures in the fields of knowledge he examines (1972: 3–17). This should be 
taken as a methodological guideline, especially the attempt to identify structures 
in discourse, which are independent of individual actors. 
These discourses or discursive formations, Foucault argues, are not united by 
common objects, statements, concepts or thematic choices themselves, but by 
their formation and interrelation, not primarily by their content, but by the way 
this content is generated and ordered: ‘Whenever . . . between objects, types of 
statement, concepts or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, 
correlations, positions and functionings), we will say . . . that we are dealing with 
a discursive formation’ (1972: 38). These rather abstract rules of formation of 
a discourse are thus its core, according to the archaeological approach, not the 
assumptions he takes for granted which can change over time. 
In order to identify these rules, Foucault proposes an analysis of discourses 
based on ‘a pure description of discursive events’ (27) and distinguishes this from 
an ‘analysis of the language’ (ibid.) centring on linguistic signs as well as from an 
‘analysis of thought’ looking for the meaning of what was said or written (27f). 
Here, we are confronted with the adoption of a positivist epistemological stance 
and the rejection of a hermeneutic position dealing with questions of meaning 
and the evasion of a related poststructuralist position examining the relations 
between signifier and signified. Thus the early Foucault wants to analyse ‘dis­
courses as practices obeying certain rules’ (138), rules which originate in dis­
course itself – and not in extra-discursive relations of power such as capitalist 
relations of production, for example (47, 69). These rules are the rules of forma­
tion of objects, enunciative modalities, concepts and strategies, and according to 
his structuralist methodological position he claims that these rules ‘are not the 
result, laid down in history and deposited in the depth of collective customs, of 
operations carried out by individuals’, ‘the rules of formation operate . . . in dis­
course itself; they operate therefore, according to a sort of uniform anonymity, on 
all individuals who undertake to speak in this discursive field’ (63). 
How can we analyse these rules of formation? Referring to the formation of 
objects, Foucault tells us to ‘map the first surfaces of their emergence’ (41) – when 
did these objects appear, in which context, under which conditions – ‘describe 
the authorities of delimitation’ (ibid.) – which disciplines or institutions can 
define the object – and to ‘analyse the grids of specification’ (42) – according 
to which criteria is the object classified by the discourse? He stresses that ‘mutu­
ally exclusive objects’ can emerge from the same discursive formation. The for­
mation of enunciative modalities is described by answering the questions which 
individuals are accorded the right to speak, from which institutional sites the 
discourse is made, and which subject positions it implies in relation to the various 
objects. The formation of concepts refers to ‘forms of succession’ (56) and ‘forms 
of coexistence’ (57) of statements as well as ‘procedures of intervention’ (58) that 
may be applied to them. Finally, the formation of strategies reaches the level of 












and systematisation in the discourse (incompatible elements are formed accord­
ing to the same rules) and the ‘economy of the discursive constellation’ (66) (‘A 
discursive formation does not occupy therefore all the possible volume that is 
opened up to it of right by the systems of formation of its objects, its enunciations, 
and its concepts; it is essentially incomplete, owing to the system of formation of 
strategies’ (67)). The strategic and thematic choices are, according to Foucault, 
also dependent on ‘the function that the discourse under study must carry out 
in a field of non-discursive practices’, the ‘rules and processes of appropriation 
of discourse’ and the ‘possible positions of desire in relation to discourse’ (68). 
With this last rule of formation, Foucault apparently violates his own meth­
odological rule of not paying attention to the relation between discourse and 
extra-discursive, or to be more precise: nonlinguistic phenomena. 
Consequently, the methodological approach needs to be modified in two ways: 
it has to adopt a constructivist and hermeneutic epistemological stance which 
allows it to analyse the constitution of meaning through the relation between 
signifier and signified and it has to move away from the ‘illusion of autonomous 
discourse’ described by Dreyfus/Rabinow (1983) as the ‘methodological failure 
of archaeology’, in order to trace the interaction between discursive and nondis­
cursive/nonlinguistic practices. So in fact we should analyse the constitution of 
meaning in discourses and the interaction between discursive and nondiscursive 
practices (see also Wodak/Meyer 2009). With these two modifications, one actu­
ally takes up threads that can be found in the archaeology of knowledge itself 
(Foucault 1972: 45f, 69, 71, 162) (and especially in later works of Foucault as 
well). Conceding the perspectivity of our knowledge we have to acknowledge – 
contra Foucault’s positivist pretensions – the constructivist element in our activ­
ity as analysts of discourse: discourses are not objectively discovered. 
We can summarise the position taken here as follows: 1) Fields of knowledge or
scientific disciplines are to be examined taking account of discontinuities and with­
out homogenising the differences to be found; 2) At the same time, the analysis looks
for overarching structures, texts are examined not as products of individual actors,
but as manifestations of these structures, of rules that are immanent in discursive
practice; 3) The analysis examines the relation between signifiers and signifieds and
the interaction between discursive and nondiscursive practice; 4) The analysis tries
to identify the rules of formation of the objects, enunciative modalities, concepts and
strategies that constitute a discourse – not, at least not primarily, the objects, state­
ments, concepts and strategies themselves. Attention has to be given to the effects
of discourse which are independent of the intentions of the subjects (re)producing it. 
The structure of development discourse 
The standard criticism towards an analysis of development discourse argues that 
the singular is inappropriate, in the face of the diversity of concepts of develop­
ment we should be speaking only about development discourses. If we take our 
constructivist perspective seriously, this is merely a question of scale: if we are 
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rivalling approaches differing on the question how development can be achieved. 
But it is possible just as well to find similarities between them, just as it is pos­
sible to highlight the differences within different approaches to modernisation or 
dependency or sustainable development for instance. So whether we talk about a 
discourse of development or several discourses of development or even different 
discourses of dependency is dependent on the level at which we are looking for 
(and able to find, hopefully) common rules of formation. 
The analysis presented here is based on research conducted during my PhD 
(Ziai 2004) and focuses on the similarities in development theory amounting 
to a discourse of development. The empirical work in my thesis – based on pub­
lications of and interviews with staff of different development organisations – 
resulted in the hypothesis that this discourse of development is being transformed 
since the ‘crisis of development’ in the 1980s and the corresponding rise of new 
discourses in the field of development policy (neoliberalism, sustainability, par­
ticipation, etc.). However, this transformation will be dealt with later (chap­
ters 7–9). The historical transformation of colonial discourse which led to the 
emergence of development discourse will be discussed later in this chapter. The 
following remarks refer primarily to the period of the 1950s to the 1970s, but 
many of the features encountered are still prevalent today. 
Discourses do not emerge on an abstract level, they are formed under specific
historical circumstances and, at times as parts of a dispositive (apparatus) which
links discursive and nondiscursive practices, in reaction to strategic necessities
(Foucault 1980: 194f). Without going into detail (see chapter 2), one could argue
that development discourse, drawing on 19th century evolutionism as well as on
concepts of social technology, emerged out of colonial discourse during the first half
of the 20th century as a problem-solving theory which linked the newly-perceived
problem of global inequality to the geopolitical and economic interests of the US
and its allies. As a discourse of ‘the West and the Rest’ (Hall 1992), it provided
an analysis of societies of Africa, Asia and Latin America with a focus on their
deficiencies in comparison to the ideal Western society and on the interventions
necessary to improve them, to implement or induce processes of development. 
Formation of objects 
Correspondingly, the objects of development discourse were sociogeographically 
defined units (states, but also regions or villages) classified as underdeveloped (see 
also Ferguson 1994). The limitation of these units, mostly according to state bor­
ders, forms the basis on which statements on the ‘level of development’ are being 
made and has the effect of marginalising the vast differences in standards of living 
within these units. More specifically, certain aspects of these units appeared as 
objects of development discourse, aspects which were very heterogeneous – ranging
from population growth, the lack of ‘achievement motivation’, an inadequate 
savings rate, an insufficiently diversified economy, unsustainable agricultural 
practices, an inadequate integration of women, to problems of bureaucracy and 






























and gained visibility as elements explaining the underdevelopment of the societies 
in question and thus as deficiencies to be corrected by interventions of develop­
ment policy. 
The appearance of the objects is regulated by a pattern of specification which
makes visible (Escobar 1988) and registers ways of life deviating from the norm
through certain indicators and simultaneously defines them as deficient. Gener­
ally, development discourse divides the world into developed and underdeveloped
units, and only the latter become the objects of this discourse. Accordingly, global
development institutions classify the units as developed, less developed and least
developed or sometimes as high, middle or low income countries. More concretely,
we can recognise what Derrida has termed logocentrism. The non-Western world
is subjected to hierarchical dichotomies, it is described solely according to the
criteria of and in relation to the West: as non- or less industrialised, non- or less
rational, non- or less democratic, etc., all in all as an inferior version of the origi­
nal. The countries of Western Europe and North America, though, have hardly
been seen as developing by development theory, they belonged to the realm of
logos, of pure and invariable presence in no need of explanation (Manzo 1991).
This also explains why development theory and policy have (with few excep­
tions) been dealing only with those regions where there was no or too little devel­
opment: they are social science disciplines dealing with the Other. 
A central part of the rules of formation of the objects of discourse is therefore
that the objects are judged not according to what they are but what they are
supposed to become one day according to the order of discourse.2 To achieve
this goal, measures founded on knowledge about these objects, their future state
and the process of transition are necessary. The rule governing the appearance of
objects in this discourse thus implies the diagnosis of a deficit as well as measures
to compensate it through knowledge-based interventions. However, because the
problem-solving envisioned by the discourse has to fail in terms of transforming
the objects according to the norm – on the one hand because of the magnitude of
the task, on the other because the order of discourse defines these objects as the
Other of the norm3 – there are at best partial successes and often failures. These
give rise to new, modified attempts of problem-solving through making visible,
incorporating and treating a new aspect of the object. In the history of develop­
ment theory, this new aspect was first infrastructure, then the rural poor, basic
needs, women, ecology, the market and governance, to name but the most promi­
nent (Escobar 1995, Rist 1997). After admitting the failures of development the
expansion of the object area to new aspects and new plans for transforming soci­
ety according to the ideal of ‘real’ development follow. This is possible through the
invention of new subdiscourses or the linkage of development discourse to others. 
Formation of enunciative modalities 
The enunciative modalities in discourse are also governed by certain regulari­
ties. The competence and legitimacy to make statements and knowledge claims 
is confined to development experts – mostly, but by no means necessarily, white 
 
 
An archaeology of development knowledge 43 
men from developed countries. The institutional places from which the discourse 
is possible are on the one hand organisations or institutions of development pol­
icy, on the other hand also certain university departments dealing with issues of 
development (often from economics, agricultural science, political science, sociol­
ogy, anthropology or geography). Truth claims on the objects are usually based on 
the knowledge production of these experts and institutions. 
The most important of the rules of formation regarding the modalities of artic­
ulation is the one governing the subject positions. While there might be differ­
ent subject positions of academics, politicians and practitioners, a statement in 
development discourse implies the position of a person who knows what develop­
ment is and how it can be achieved. Only from this position meaningful state­
ments within the discourse are possible. Statements from a different position and 
therefore not claiming this kind of knowledge are outside the discursive forma­
tion, and are judged to be useless from the perspective of this discourse. However, 
because development is conceived as the state of a ‘good society’ and the process 
of getting there, and because there are in fact different conceptions of how such 
a society should look like and which measures are necessary to achieve it, the 
position one has to adopt implies the subordination of other people’s views on 
desirable social change. Development discourse therefore constructs the subject 
position of a knowing and prescribing expert and thus invariably contains an 
authoritarian element. This effect of the enunciative modality is independent 
of the intention of the subject occupying the subject position. Statements from 
locals, which are nowadays also sometimes to be found in development policy, 
merely serve to underline the necessity to develop by articulating their ‘develop­
ment needs’, and thus to support the authority of the experts, but do not question 
the assumption that there is development in terms of a universal conception of a 
good society and that there is expert knowledge on how to achieve this state. 
Formation of concepts 
Concerning the formation of concepts in development discourse, there are two 
main characteristics to be identified: First, in analogy to the object underdevelop­
ment problems are conceived as deviations from the norm and the concepts are 
formed correspondingly: illiterate, malnourishment, unemployment, overpopula­
tion (Escobar 1995: 41). One could add failed states, bad governance, defective 
democracies and other concepts. The implied norm is that of the developed soci­
ety. This norm is present as well in ‘positive’ concepts like ‘good governance’ and 
‘ownership’, the rule is that in underdeveloped societies there is a lack – a lack of 
capital, of knowledge, of entrepreneurship, of technology, of accountability – but 
always a lack which is responsible for the problems and which is addressed by 
these concepts. 
Second, in the history of development theory and policy, the arrangement of 
concepts occurs according to a general pattern. An aspect of the objects is identi­
fied as a crucial factor leading to underdevelopment and a corresponding concept 
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Figure 4.1 The cycle of the ‘development’ gaze 
problem of underdevelopment will be solved and development will take place. After 
the desired results fail to appear, the insufficient implementation of the policy 
advice by institutions and organisations of development is made responsible and 
bemoaned. But soon scientific studies reveal the importance of a new factor hith­
erto neglected, and a new concept is promoted in development policy, reiterating 
the promise of well-being and abundance in the future – if the correct policies 
are applied. There is a cycle of diagnosis – prescription and promise – disappoint­
ment – new diagnosis, etc., in which new concepts emerge regularly. 
Formation of strategies 
According to Foucault, a discursive formation does not occupy the whole space 
prefigured by the rules of formation of its objects, modalities of articulation and 
concepts. Its actual content is guided by the formation of strategies or thematic 
choices, and these are related to historical factors and social functions. The rules 
of formation outlined so far imply that some countries are seen as the norm, but 
not which ones. In the case of development discourse, the industrialised societies 
of North America and Western Europe constituted the norm. (The historical 
factors and social functions are discussed in the section ‘The rise of develop­
ment discourse’.) Regarding the history and heterogeneity of development dis­
course, we can discern points of incompatibility, points in which the rules of 
discourse led to the formation of elements which were incompatible with each 
other, though still part of the same discourse, and constituted discursive subsets. 
Incompatible elements were for example the promotion of capitalist or socialist 
paths to development, of export orientation or import substitution, of balanced 
or unbalanced growth. A great deal of the conflicts in development theory took 
place between the discursive subsets of modernisation and dependency theories. 
The latter did not fundamentally break with development discourse, but implied 
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promoted to achieve development). The same holds true for most theories of ‘alter­
native development’, as the Post-Development critics have correctly pointed 
out. A critique of development policy demanding better projects or a more equal 
distribution of resources still remains within the same discursive formation. To 
a lesser extent, this even holds true for a critique formulating a goal different 
from modern industrial society. Only a fundamental rejection of the possibility 
of comparing and evaluating societies according to universal standards, of expert 
knowledge on development constitutes a break with the discourse. 
But there is more to be said on the formation of strategies in development 
discourse. Regarding the interaction between discursive and nondiscursive 
practices, it seems that there is a dependency or at least a strong relationship 
of the theories and strategies in development policy with the historical constel­
lation of North-South relations. During the late 1960s and early 1970s, when 
actors like the G77 and the Non-Aligned Movement were active and influen­
tial, development aid gained in importance and the policy recommendations 
of development institutions were often concerned with regulating markets and 
‘redistribution with growth’ (Chenery et al. 1972). With these actors becoming 
less significant, with the debt crisis of 1982 and finally with the end of the Cold 
War, the economic and geopolitical constellation changed: development coop­
eration became less important and the policy recommendations of development 
institutions often refocused on growth (without redistribution) and promoted
liberalisation – according to critics in the interest of Northern companies and 
banks. The new concept of good governance which rose to prominence during the 
1990s was possible only after the perceived necessity to support anti-communist 
dictatorships had diminished with the demise of the Soviet Union. Apparently 
the formation of theories and strategies in development discourse was signifi­
cantly influenced by nondiscursive practices and specific historical constellations. 
In the transformation of development discourse during the neoliberal 
‘counter-revolution’ (Toye), which abandons the Eurocentric and paternalist, 
but also visionary and somewhat egalitarian prospect of ‘developing the underde­
veloped regions’ through political programmes and interventions (see chapter 8), 
an aspect is highlighted to which Frederick Cooper has pointed already in his 
words of caution against the Post-Development critique: that the discourse of 
development could be read not only as a ‘form of European particularism imposed 
abroad’, but also as a discourse of universal rights which lays claim on a ‘globally 
defined standard of living’ (1997: 84). This ambivalence becomes even clearer in 
the context of colonial discourses. 
The rise of development discourse: empirical observations 
To the above analysis of development discourse, which in a simplified form can 
be found already in some Post-Development writings, critics have replied that 
the focus on the second half of the 20th century is misplaced: concept and prac­
tice of development were older than that and could be found in practices of colo­

























capitalist progress within Europe (Cowen/Shenton 1996). While the similarities 
of practices and their legitimations are certainly relevant, practices in Europe 
have, however, usually not been based on a discourse of the ‘West’ and the ‘Rest’, 
in the sense that they have not constituted ontological differences between dif­
ferent races or cultures, which is a central point in development discourse. The 
other criticism deserves closer attention: if practices concerned with ‘develop­
ing the Other’ in Africa and Asia were already a part of colonialism, then an 
examination of development discourse has to deal with the 1920s and 1930s just 
as the 1960s and 1970s. One could object that the establishment of a host of 
organisations, institutions, ministries, university departments, etc., dealing with 
the issue of development and providing jobs for countless ‘development experts’ –
what has been called the development industry, but in Foucault’s terms can be 
described as the dispositive of development, as an ensemble of discursive and 
nondiscursive practices united by a strategic purpose – took place predominantly 
after 1950. However, in this section I propose that one could also argue that even 
on the level of discourse it is possible to discern a number of discontinuities and 
differences between colonial conceptions of development and the discourse on 
development in the second half of the 20th century. These will be shown using 
quotes from influential policy documents and politicians from 1900 to 1960. 
During this period, the discourse of development as it was described in the sec­
tion ‘The structure of development discourse’) was formed. This formation was
characterised by a specific interaction of discursive and nondiscursive practices,
the discourse was shaped by its historical context and its social functions. Drawing
on Alcalde’s (1987) study on the emerging idea of Third World Development, the
historical context can briefly be described as follows: the First World War hastened
the emergence of the US as the dominant economic power and the decline of
Great Britain. It also caused a wave of anti-colonial nationalism in the colonies
which Britain sought to appease with measures of economic reform and promises
of material well-being. The League of Nations represented a new responsibility of
the international community for the welfare of less developed countries. The Great
Depression of 1929 had several effects which played a role as well: Roosevelt’s
New Deal as a project of government planning and welfare programs on the one
hand and impoverishing effects which led to international comparisons of stand­
ards of living on the other. Finally, the aim of drawing the advanced economies
out of the recession caused Eugene Staley to conceive of an ‘international develop­
ment program’ linking the development of Third World countries with operations
of international capital. World War II not only ended US isolationism but gave
new strategic value to the development and welfare of these countries and provided
experience with development assistance as a policy instrument – also for govern­
ments in the South. The beginning Cold War restored development assistance
after a brief interval (neither in Bretton Woods 1944 nor in San Francisco 1945
was it envisioned as a part of the postwar economic order), mainly triggered by
strategic concerns of a geopolitical, but also an economic nature. 
In this historical context, the strategic necessity which gave rise to the disposi­
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colonial division of labour in a liberal world economy with countries striving for 
or having already achieved independence. The promise of material well-being in 
the discourse of development had the aim to keep Third World states from pursu­
ing a socialist path to progress and at the same time ensured their role as suppliers 
of raw materials and markets for manufactured products (in particular for a US 
economy geared to wartime production). Development discourse conceptualised 
the newly perceived problem of inequality in terms of a lack of capital, knowledge 
and technology and provided corresponding solutions: financial and technologi­
cal assistance and development projects based on expert knowledge. A percep­
tion of global inequality in terms of exploitation, power relations and hierarchies 
in the global political economy was thus excluded.4 Alcalde concludes: 
The first and broadest function of the idea of development was to give eco­
nomic activity, particularly foreign economic activity, a positive and essential 
meaning for the lives of less-developed peoples. Whether it was Woodrow 
Wilson associating American exports with the happiness of mankind, the 
League Covenant and British colonialists linking development and welfare, 
New York financiers enticing foreign governments to contract American 
loans, Eugene Staley proposing a program of industrialization for the welfare 
of the Third World, or Sumner Welles spreading the creed of peace and pros­
perity, the aim was essentially the same: enhancing a mental linkage between 
capitalism and well-being in the South. 
(Alcalde 1987: 223) 
Now what are the differences I have asserted regarding the discourse of develop­
ment which emerged under these circumstances and with these strategic func­
tions, and the colonial discourse, which also talked about development in Africa 
and Asia? I believe that significant discontinuities can be identified. They can be 
found in the constitution of the object of the discourse, the enunciative modali­
ties, the concept and in the strategies and to my mind they allow us to differenti­
ate between colonial and development discourse. 
Differences in the formation of the object 
Whereas both discourses are dealing with societies in Africa, Asia and Latin 
America which have to be improved (civilised or developed by experts from the 
North), the crucial difference to the West on the level of ontology which quali­
fies them as objects of the discourse is based on biological considerations in the 
one and on economic considerations in the other case: colonial discourse refers 
not only to uncivilised territories but also to uncivilised peoples, while devel­
opment discourse predominantly talks about underdeveloped regions. The object 
of colonial discourse is constituted as a biological and anthropological unit, the 
object of development discourse as a political or geographical unit with certain 
economic qualities. This can be seen in Article 22 of the League of Nations from 
1919 which refers to ‘colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late 
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war have ceased to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly gov­
erned them and which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by them­
selves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world’. These people are thus 
unable to govern themselves, and require guidance by people from other nations. 
Therefore, ‘the tutelage of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations 
who by reason of their resources, their experience or their geographical position 
can best undertake this responsibility’. Note that the document does not any 
longer explicitly assert racial superiority – colonial discourse around 1900 often 
talked about ‘self-governing races’ and others (Alcalde 1987: 4) – but still denies 
that the people in these countries qualify for the principle of self-determination 
determinedly propagated by US President Wilson. 
Thirty years later, in Truman’s often quoted inaugural address where as a point 
four he announced a program of international development assistance, we also 
hear about territories and peoples: ‘we must embark on a bold new program for 
making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for 
the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. More than half the people 
of the world are living in conditions approaching misery. . . . For the first time 
in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to relieve the suffer­
ing of these people. . . . I believe that we should make available to peace-loving 
peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them 
realize their aspirations for a better life’. The object of the discourse are underde­
veloped areas, and though the people living there lack science and industrial pro­
gress, nowhere do we find a hint that they themselves are backward or inferior or 
unable to govern themselves. (What we do find is a limitation of the noble efforts 
to ‘peace-loving’ – that is noncommunist – peoples.) Instead, we already find a 
reference to the activity of these peoples (they try to realise their aspirations for a 
better life and by democracy – probably in the sense of self-determination – will 
be stirred into ‘triumphant action’ against hunger, misery and despair). So the 
doctrine of racial inferiority which appears in the League of Nations document 
only in a relatively modest version but is still present, has been abandoned in the 
Truman speech. 
Differences in the formation of enunciative modalities 
The different formation of the object of the discourse implies a different subject 
position for non-Western people. Whereas in colonial discourse the subject posi­
tion of colonised peoples was mainly that of an inferior, backward and uncivilised 
other in need of education and guidance from the white man, this has changed in 
development discourse: the appellation is no longer a version of ‘you are backward 
because of your race’ but rather of ‘you are backward for historical and cultural 
reasons – and we can help you to become like us and no longer be backward’. In 
Truman’s speech, the people in the South are no longer portrayed as children 
unable to cope with modernity on their own, but as (future) equal partners in 
the United Nations whose underdevelopment is a matter of their being less fortu­
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of democratic fair-dealing’. The technocratic explanation of global inequality 
identifies ‘modern scientific and technical knowledge’ as being the key to greater 
productivity and thus prosperity, and this knowledge can be made available to 
peace-loving peoples. So the subject position of development experts is opened 
to nonwhites who acquire this knowledge. Development thus becomes a matter 
of culture and technology: anyone can achieve it now, no one is condemned to 
remain in the undignified condition of underdevelopment – all you have to do is 
modernise and industrialise and do as the West does. So while the uncivilised 
are clearly inferior, the underdeveloped are also deficient and dependent on the 
assistance of the West, but they are given the prospect of catching up, they are 
potentially equal competitors in the race for productivity and growth. This can 
also be seen in the UN charter, which affirms in Article 1 ‘the principle of equal 
rights and self-determination of all peoples’. Of course at that time (1945) many 
countries were still colonised and the charter includes a declaration regarding 
non-self-governing territories (Chapter XI). However, it talks about ‘territories 
whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government’ (Article 
73) – a statement which does not deny the status quo but no longer legitimates 
it by referring to an alleged inability of these peoples to govern themselves. This 
dubious (or, to be frank: racist) claim has disappeared since 1919. A change in 
the formation of enunciative modalities of the discourse in the shape of a subject 
position accorded to the South which is almost (but not quite) equal to that of 
the North is evident.5 This vastly more attractive subject position offered by the 
development discourse explains why it was taken up and appropriated in the 
South far more enthusiastically than the colonial discourse. 
Differences in the constitution of concepts 
Related to this new subject position and to this appropriation is a difference con­
cerning the central concept of the discourse: while the uncivilised need to be 
civilised from outside – a weak version is the tutelage by more advanced nations 
mentioned in the League of Nations – the underdeveloped can develop by them­
selves, at least if they are assisted by the US and other developed nations. This 
is the picture drawn by Truman’s address where the role of the latter is mostly 
confined to ‘help’ the people’s ‘own efforts’ to ‘produce more food, more cloth­
ing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power’. Thus to develop is 
within this discourse an activity which is no longer performed by external actors, 
the verb is no longer exclusively transitive but becomes intransitive (again):6 
countries can develop themselves. 
Differences in the constitution of strategies 
Another difference between colonial and postcolonial usage of development 
implying different strategies can be observed if we trace the relation between 
signifier and signified. Whereas development in colonial discourse predominantly 





industry and infrastructure, in the post–World War II context it evidently 
included social aspects which were not necessarily linked to the term in former 
times.7 This transition can be seen if we compare the British Colonial Devel­
opment Act of 1929 to the Colonial Development and Welfare Bill of 1940. 
The former aimed at ‘aiding and developing agriculture and industry in certain 
colonies and territories’ and listed 14 different types of activity to achieve these 
aims, from the adoption of improved machinery in agriculture, the improvement 
of transport, the construction of harbours, to the supply of electricity and the 
development of mineral resources. Only one of these 14, the promotion of pub­
lic health, was actually concerned with the well-being of the people living in 
these areas. In the second edition of this law, presented in 1940, the empha­
sis has clearly shifted. Not only is the very title changed to explicitly include 
the welfare of the people, the aim is also reformulated, it is now to ‘promote 
the development of the resources of any colony or the welfare of its people’. It 
becomes clear that these are taken to be two different objectives united here in
this law – a conception that seems rather strange for the student of development as 
we know it. In the postwar era, these two aspects – development of resources and 
industry and social welfare of the people – are usually conflated under the head­
ing of ‘economic and social progress and development’ (UN charter Article 55, 
1945), ‘economic and social development’ (UN General Assembly Resolution 
1710 announcing the first Development Decade, 1960) or simply development. 
However, even though the term development is increasingly employed to denote 
social as well as economic progress, the strategies applied to achieve these aims 
and the indicators used to measure this progress are predominantly of an eco­
nomic nature. The focus in concepts and practices of development at that time is 
mostly on economic growth and sometimes the necessary growth rates are exactly 
specified (see the UN General Assembly Resolutions 1710 and 2626 on the 
development decades), as are the necessary financial transfers from the developed 
economies (e.g. UN Resolutions 1711 and 2626) or the necessary savings rates in 
developing economies (Rostow 1960). This reflects the then dominant belief in 
the trickle-down effect: economic growth will automatically lead to social wel­
fare and poverty reduction – a belief that was at least badly shaken if not refuted 
by the results of the Pearson Report 1969 but has in some circles survived until 
today. So the meaning of development has apparently changed between 1929 and 
1960: it still refers primarily to economic progress but in the later phase this is 
identified with social progress as well. 
To sum up the results of the analysis in a slightly simplified manner, the discon­
tinuities between two ways of speaking about social change in Africa, Asia and 
Latin America refer to a different formation of the object of discourse (countries 
instead of peoples), a different formation of enunciative modalities (almost equal 
and merely culturally inferior subject position instead of racial inferiority), a dif­
ferent formation of the central concept (intransitive instead of transitive verb) 
and a different strategic focus (economic and social progress instead of merely 
economic focus). It can be seen that three of the four differences identified are 
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govern themselves is no longer denied in the discourse prevalent in later docu­
ments, the trusteeship for the development of these regions is being transferred to 
indigenous elites, supported by Northern or multilateral institutions and organi­
sations of development. 
Now where does this discursive shift come from? Tracing again the relation
between discursive and nondiscursive events, it appears likely that the explicit
racism which was central to legitimise colonial rule was largely discredited after
World War II and the Holocaust and in the face of anticolonial movements and
Cold War rivalry a new way of conceptualising the relation between North and
South was seen as appropriate which operated without the notion of racial supe­
riority. The UN charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed
the equality of all peoples and in order not to violate this new principle, a trans­
formation of colonial discourse was required. As this transformation consisted of
changes in the formation of objects, subject position and concept of the discourse,
it seems possible to argue that we are dealing with a new discursive formation:
colonial discourse was replaced by a new way of speaking: a discourse of develop­
ment. To be sure, there is an element of arbitrariness involved in this distinction,
which is, however, inevitable if we take a constructivist instead of a positivist
stance. Yet the differences listed above seem significant enough to attribute a
central role to the transfer of trusteeship and thus to justify this distinction. Of
course, it is possible to find in postcolonial texts on development arguments
which recur on the alleged inability of people in Africa, Asia or Latin America
to responsibly govern themselves – usually in discursive legitimations of military
interventions. And it may be possible to find texts from the colonial era which
adopt a stance attributed here to a discourse of development. But the majority of
texts – this assertion is made here – adheres to different rules and manifests a ‘sys­
tem of dispersion’ which allows us to identify two different discursive formations. 
It could be argued that both discourses historically still belong to the colonial 
era, and it is correct that the documents analysed here originate from points 
in time (1945–1960) where especially in Africa colonialism was well in power. 
However, the universalism of the declaration of human rights in 1948 and other 
texts already marks the beginning of a postcolonial era because it delegitimises 
the justifications which provide the foundation of colonial rule. Therefore we can 
differentiate between colonial and postcolonial discourses centred on develop­
ment even before the end of (formal) colonialism. 
Conclusion 
The chapter has examined the methodological rules outlined by Michel Fou­
cault’s archaeological approach to discourse analysis. It has proposed to modify 
it to address its problematic aspects (conception of autonomous discourses, pos­
itivist epistemological stance), but to retain its other methodological features 
(focus on discontinuities, structures and rules of formation). This methodologi­
cal approach was then applied to the field of development theory and policy in 

























rules of formation concerning the objects, concepts, enunciative modalities and 
strategies of the discourse. In the last part, the question is addressed whether the 
discourse of colonial development adheres to the same rules as the discourse on 
development identified for the second half of the 20th century. On the basis of 
empirical examples from a number of policy documents,8 the chapter concludes 
that the transfer of trusteeship which is evident in the era of decolonisation 
implies changes in the rules of formation which allow us to speak about a new 
discourse: a discourse of development. 
Notes 
1	 Chapter 4 is based on a keynote lecture given at the conference ‘Developing Africa. 
Development Discourse(s) in Late Colonialism’ in Vienna, January 13–15, 2011. 
2	 Therefore, policy practices inspired by the Post-Development critique of development 
discourse have superseded the analysis of ‘needs’ within a community with an analysis 
of the ‘assets’ present (Gibson-Graham 2005). 
3	 ‘Inferior alterity, the ‘other’, is needed for the West’s self-construction as developed. If 
it were possible for Western commercial industrialisation to spread the world over, the 
West would lose its primacy’ (Biccum 2002: 39). 
4	 The renowned economist Kenneth Boulding thus asserted in 1945: ‘The black mass 
of grinding poverty. . . . is not due primarily to exploitation, or to bad distribution 
of income, or to lack of purchasing power. It is due to the sheer unproductiveness of 
the mass of human labor. . . . It is not unfair, therefore, to regard economic progress – 
increase in output per head – as the prime desideratum and to relegate distributional 
justice to the position of an important side issue as far as the abolition of poverty is 
concerned’ (cited in Alcalde 1987: 151). 
5	 For the notion of colonized people in the process of colonial education becoming 
almost the same, but not quite, see Bhabha 1994. 
6	 In its original use in enlightenment philosophy, the term referred to an intransitive 
activity. 
7	 For a more detailed account of concepts and practices of colonial development, see 
Hodge et al. 2014. 
8	 As the empirical basis of these conclusions is not too broad, further research is needed 
to substantiate the claims. 
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5 The concept of ‘development’ 
and why it should be abandoned 
Let me start by juxtaposing two quotes coming both from the broad field of devel­
opment studies: 
Development research is important. It helps to solve development problems 
and thus to fight poverty. 
(ZEF news nr. 23, editorial, February 2011) 
It seems to us today almost non-sensical to deny that there is such a thing as 
‘development’, or to dismiss it as a meaningless concept. 
(Ferguson 1994: xiii) 
While the first quote affirms the importance of research about development and 
suggests that the content of the term is concerned with poverty and the struggle 
against it, the second one considers the possibility of its emptiness and questions 
its very existence. How can that be? This chapter tries to shed light on this para­
dox. It discusses the usage of the concept of development in development policy 
and research and its effects and argues that there are good reasons for giving up 
the concept of development and replacing it with various other concepts. How­
ever, this should not be misunderstood as a call to dismiss all practices which aim 
at improving the human condition. Yet there is no need to identify these prac­
tices with the term development. On the contrary, as numerous practices which 
have definitely not improved the human condition have been carried out in the 
name of development, it might be a good idea to reject this connection. The chap­
ter argues that these negative phenomena should not be seen as an abuse of a 
positive concept, but as linked to certain Eurocentric, depoliticising and authori­
tarian implications of the concept of development. 
In the first section, the chapter will lay out the theoretical background of the 
argument and give reasons for the subsequent engagement with conceptual ques­
tions, establishing the relevance of discourse analysis. The second section deals 
with the concept of development in the social scientific literature. In the follow­
ing section I will then argue that development researchers need to abandon the 
concept because development has Eurocentric, depoliticising and authoritarian 
implications. The fourth section will then deal with the hypothetical and actual 
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attempts to redefine the concept – and with their limits. Subsequently, the fifth 
section analyses the numerous misunderstandings which result also from these 
frequent redefinitions. The final section will then try to answer the question of 
what other concepts can be employed. 
Theoretical background: the relevance of discourse 
Since the establishment of the linguistic turn in the social sciences, few scholars 
would still maintain that language merely mirrors an objective reality which is 
there for all to see. In everyday life, the question of how language represents 
our reality becomes apparent when different people see different things although 
they observe the same event: are the combatants of Hamas (of the FARC, of 
the EZLN, of the PKK, of the LTTE, etc.) freedom fighters or terrorists? Are the 
military attacks of US forces in Syria (in Afghanistan, in Iraq, in Yugoslavia, 
in Somalia) an imperialist war or a humanitarian intervention? Of course, one 
might give definitions and criteria and reasonable arguments, but the decisive 
point is that it makes a fundamental difference whether we describe reality in one 
way or another. As a consequence of our perception, some political actions will 
appear as legitimate, and others as illegitimate or even criminal. In development 
research, the same pattern applies when we classify China (Brazil, India, South 
Africa, etc.) as a regional power or as a developing country. Language constructs 
our reality, and the specific way in which it does so has consequences. 
Not entering into theoretical debates and differences here (see Keller 2005, 
Diaz-Bone et al. 2007, Wodak/Meyer 2009), the term discourse usually denotes 
a structure in the way reality (or a certain aspect of it) is constructed through 
language. Building on poststructuralism (which itself is based on structural lin­
guistics) (Münker/Roesler 2000, Belsey 2002) the smallest unit in language is 
the sign, and the sign is composed of the signifier (e.g., the word ‘tree’) and the 
signified (the large thing with twigs and leaves under whose shadow we can read 
romantic poems and get stung by bees). According to structural linguistics, the 
relation between signifier and signified is arbitrary (in other language systems, 
different words are used), and the sign carries meaning as a result of differences 
between the signifiers (‘tree’ is different from ‘bee’ and ‘sea’). Thus our access 
to reality is only through language, through systems of representation in which 
certain signifiers are linked to certain signifieds. 
Now poststructuralism maintains that these systems that structural linguistics 
talks of are by no means unambiguous, discrete and stable. On the contrary, they 
are sometimes ambiguous and allow for misunderstandings, they cannot be easily 
delineated, and each relation between signifier and signified is inherently unsta­
ble and has to be reproduced continuously. Thus, discourses can be described 
as systems of relations between words (signifiers) and things (signifieds) which 
construct a topic in a certain way. They provide certain statements, images and 
arguments. Following Foucault (1972, 1980), they possess certain rules on what 
can be said and regarded as true and are linked with institutionalised knowledge 




















This poststructuralist perspective implies a postpositivist stance in terms of 
meta-theory or philosophy of science, that is the positivist principles of objectiv­
ism (value neutral knowledge is possible, separation between fact and value and 
subject and object in research), empiricism (knowledge is based in empirical mat­
ters only and empirical testing of hypotheses is the only valid way of generating 
knowledge) and naturalism (just like the natural sciences, social science should 
aim to explain and predict reality through universal laws) are rejected (Smith 
1996). The methodological consequence is that this chapter is predominantly 
confined to the meta-theoretical level while being compatible with different 
theoretical perspectives.1 The argument proceeds by reviewing the literature and 
discussing the concept of development, it does not seek to establish whether one or 
the other construction of reality can be empirically verified but primarily explores 
their political implications. These are important because discourses have signifi­
cant effects in terms of enabling or legitimating certain practices while rendering 
others unthinkable. 
The concept of development 
For reasons of space, only a cursory and incomplete review of the literature on
the concept of development will be provided here. While most surveys on the
history of development theory begin in the mid-20th century, a broader perspec­
tive proves to be illuminating and allows to draw parallels to earlier conceptions
of political economy (see Martinussen 1997, Chang 2003) or social philosophy
(Kößler 1998). A thorough examination of these predecessors (Ziai 2004a) yields
that development theory has two roots: 19th century evolutionism (and earlier
philosophies of history) (Nisbet 1969) and 19th century social technology (build­
ing on Enlightenment philosophy and designed to reconcile order and progress in
the face of the problems caused by industrial capitalism) (Cowen/Shenton 1996).
Evolutionism assumed that social change in societies proceeds according to a uni­
versal pattern (usually in historical stages), while social technology claimed that
social interventions based on expert knowledge (possessed by a privileged group
that acts as a trustee for the common good) are necessary to achieve positive social
change. Both roots can be found in 20th century development theory, which is as
often a ‘description of ongoing self-propelled processes of social change’ as it is a
‘blueprint for action’ (Cooper/Packard 1997: 8). In a more critical vein, Alcalde
(1987: 223), concerning the rise of the idea of Third World development during
the first half of the 20th century, argues that the ‘first and broadest function of the
idea of development was to give economic activity, particularly foreign economic
activity, a positive and essential meaning for the lives of less-developed peoples’. 
This critical perspective on development is characteristic of the so-called 
Post-Development school in development theory (see above all Esteva 1987, 
Sachs 1992, Escobar 1995, Rahnema 1997a, for the debate see Ziai 2004a, 2007). 
Whereas earlier critiques of development theory and policy were usually focusing 
on inadequacies and shortcomings which prevented the achievement of develop­
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rejected the entire paradigm and denounced development as a ‘failed project’ 
(Esteva 1985: 78f) and an ‘ideology’ (Rahnema 1997b: 379). Already here it 
becomes visible that in Post-Development, development refers on the one hand to 
the practices of post–World War II aid which aimed at developing the underdevel­
oped regions, on the other hand to a certain concept of social change. This article 
will deal exclusively with the latter, leaving aside the rather controversial call to 
stop all projects of development aid. 
Post-Development has been widely criticised, above all for homogenising devel­
opment and neglecting its positive aspects, for romanticising local communities
and legitimising oppressive traditions, and for being just as paternalistic as the
chastised development experts (see above all Corbridge 1998, Kiely 1999, Neder­
veen Pieterse 2000). However, it has been shown that these criticisms are justified
only in respect to some Post-Development texts, but not to others, leading to a dif­
ferentiation between neopopulist and skeptical Post-Development (Ziai 2004b). 
Ahorro (2008) identifies a second wave of Post-Development which acknowl­
edges that many criticisms of (neopopulist) Post-Development were exaggerated 
or flawed but wants to build on some of their insights and provides either more 
balanced empirical findings or a more nuanced critique of development discourse. 
The chapter attempts to contribute to the latter group. 
But is it really possible to talk about the discourse of development in the singu­
lar? Are there not vast differences between approaches inspired by modernisation 
theory or by dependency writers, proponents of balanced or unbalanced growth, 
export orientation or import substitution, capitalist or socialist development? Of 
course there are. But there are a number of assumptions and discursive regularities 
shared by very different perspectives on development theory and policy. Four of 
them can be termed core assumptions, for they form the basis of nearly everything 
that is written and spoken on the topic. These are: 
1)	 The existential assumption: There is such a thing as development, i.e. develop­
ment functions as an organising and conceptual frame. An organising frame, 
because the term allows the linking of diverse social, economic, political 
and cultural phenomena to a single process of development. In the words of 
Foucault, it allows ‘to group a succession of dispersed events, to link them 
to one and the same organising principle, to subject them to the exemplary 
power of life . . . to discover, already at work in each beginning, a prin­
ciple of coherence and the outline of a future unity’ (Foucault 1972: 22). 
A conceptual frame, because the term allows us to make sense of diverse 
social, economic, political and cultural phenomena, to interpret them as 
manifestations of development and underdevelopment. The concept makes 
the ‘images of the ragged poor of Asia [or other continents] . . . legible as 
markers of a stage of development. . . . Within this problematic, it appears 
self-evident that debtor Third World nation-states and starving peasants 
share a common “problem”, that both lack a single “thing”: “development” ’ 
(Ferguson 1994: xiii). In fact, the continuing debt crisis of many states in the 





















may both be somehow linked to relations of power in the global political 
economy, but on a concrete level have quite different causes. 
2)	 The normative assumption: development is a good thing. Although rarely made 
explicit, the assumption is ubiquitous in development policy. Development
denotes the state of a good society or the process leading to it, which is why
Chambers (1997) rephrased it as ‘good change’. As a consequence, stagnation is
seen as bad, a good society can be achieved only through change and progress. 
3)	 The practical assumption: development can be achieved. Not only that devel­
opment should be realised all over the world, it is assumed that it is possible 
to realise it all over the world. The normative and the practical assumption 
together constitute the foundation of the entire development industry –
institutions, experts, projects, etc. 
4)	 The methodological assumption: units can be compared according to their 
development. Units of analysis are usually geographically and politically sepa­
rated entities: states (sometimes also continents or regions). The possibility 
of comparison implies that there is a universal scale on which development 
can be measured, leading to the identification of developed and less developed
(or underdeveloped or developing) units. 
These assumptions are, however, quite abstract. They determine that there are
developed and less developed countries, but not which ones. They determine that
development should be achieved, but not what it looks like and how this can be
done. Additional assumptions were necessary, and they are to be found in the clas­
sical paradigm of development which was dominant from the 1950s to the 1970s
and still is very influential. The most prominent of these concrete assumptions are: 
1)	 The specification of the goal: the industrialised countries of North America 
and Europe are developed. Other countries, specifically those of Asia, Africa 
and Latin America, are less developed. These countries of the global South 
need development. 
2)	 The specification of the process: the countries of the global South need 
economic growth, industrialisation and modernisation in order to become 
developed. Therefore, specific interventions (also interventions in the market 
mechanism) are necessary to help them, which usually consist in the transfer 
of capital, technology and knowledge from the North. 
3)	 The legitimation of the process: These interventions (development projects 
and programmes) are based on expert knowledge on how to further devel­
opment, how to attain a good society and improve the lives of the people. 
Therefore, they are legitimate. 
Other assumptions contain further specifications and details, e.g. that develop­
ment can be measured by the gross national product or per capita income (an 
assumption that has been challenged by the Human Development Index since 
the 1990s) or the philosophical foundations of Homo oeconomicus, Cartesian 
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Why we should abandon the concept 
In the first section of this chapter we saw that discourses provide a contingent 
way of constructing reality; in the second, we dealt with the assumptions of 
development discourse. This section aims to provide arguments why develop­
ment researchers should rethink or even dismiss the concept of development. It 
argues that the assumptions outlined in the previous section have Eurocentric, 
depoliticising and authoritarian implications. 
Eurocentric implications 
The concept of development has Eurocentric implications, because it assumes 
European societies (including the European settler colonies in North America) 
as ideal models: they are referred to as developed, i.e. as mature and complete in 
contrast to other societies which are deviations from this norm: the less developed
or developing ones. These are framed linguistically as lacking, backward and infe­
rior. This means that through this denomination other societies are not accepted 
on their own terms, but merely as inferior versions of one’s own society, because 
the standards of a good society are assumed to be both universal and identical 
with particular European standards: There is a universal scale of development at 
the top of which we find the US and Western Europe, while poorer societies are 
deemed traditional and thus have to become modern (i.e. Western). The idea 
that non-Western societies are historically backward and can be compared to 
earlier periods of European history has been described as the ‘transformation of 
geo-cultural differences into historical stages’ (Nandy 1992: 146), as the ‘chroni­
fication of spatial co-existence’ (Melber 1992: 32) or simply as the ‘colonizer’s 
model of the world’ (Blaut 1993) because it justified the colonial expansion of 
the most advanced states. The historical processes that these developed societies 
underwent in the past centuries are thus not seen as contingent (dependent on 
certain capitalist relations of production, a colonial division of labour and certain –
patriarchal – productivist values), but as universal progress of humanity. Here, 
the evolutionist heritage of the concept of development is visible. 
In this context, the methodological assumption of discrete development units 
fails to realise that these historical processes cannot simply be reproduced by 
other countries in completely different historical (economic, political, social) 
global environments. And the normative assumption that these processes have 
led to better, developed societies neglects the downside of the historical processes 
of colonial industrial capitalism as well as the possibility that some cultures or 
some people in general might object to the assumption that highly individualised 
consumer societies based on competition, infinite human needs and unimpaired 
exploitation of nature constitute the best of all possible worlds. 
Thus, from the perspective of the West, our own society serves as the standard 
by which the inferiority of the (less developed) Other is identified. The diagno­
sis implies the therapy: they have to become more like us: more modern, more 
productive, more secular, more democratic, etc. Not only historically, but also 




of civilising the uncivilised. While the Other is constructed as an inferior version 
of the Self in order to constitute the latter’s identity as enlightened and supe­
rior (Hall 1992), the attempts to reform the Other in the image of the Self will 
never succeed entirely – the copy will never achieve the status of the original, at 
least ‘not quite’ (Bhabha 1994: 85–92). The concept is tainted with the colonial 
notion of European superiority. 
Now few would contest that for many people in the world, a middle-class exist­
ence in the US and the democratic values of the Enlightenment often associated 
with the West do seem vastly more attractive than their current situation. Does 
this not prove the superiority of these societies, at least in the eyes of the major­
ity? And here, critics of Post-Development have added, it appears paternalistic 
and cynical for intellectuals in the North to dismiss the attempts to ameliorate 
global inequality as Eurocentric and authoritarian. Which right do the rich have 
to tell the poor that they should not follow their example? As the author is also 
situated in the North and enjoys a middle-class existence, the question is even 
more pressing. While the traditional answer of the development expert was that 
the rich have no right to do so because all people have a claim to the superior way 
of life, neopopulist Post-Development would answer that this way of life is not 
superior but destructive (and, implicitly, that it is therefore legitimate to tell the 
poor not to follow the example of the rich). Skeptical Post-Development would 
reject both positions and argue that ‘[t]here are numerous ways of living a “good 
life”, and it is up to each society to invent its own’ (Rist 1997: 241). 
Still, the attractiveness of North America and Western Europe does not prove 
the superiority of these societies. Such a conclusion would be premature for sev­
eral reasons. It leaves out the realisation that many aspects of these developed 
societies, e.g. racism against immigrants, seem not attractive at all to the major­
ity. Migrants are often dissatisfied with their economic and political situation 
in their country of origin, not with their country or culture in general. It also 
leaves out the relation between affluence in one and misery in another part of 
the world and the question of non-universalisable, oligarchic models of society, 
which can be maintained only because the production of other societies is geared 
to the demands of the oligarchic society or because their level of pollution does 
not reach the level of the oligarchic one. And it neglects that although the terms 
democracy and human rights are sometimes claimed to be European inventions, 
the underlying concepts of political self-determination, moral standards and indi­
vidual rights are definitely not, as many tribal societies with consensual demo­
cratic decision-making procedures have proven (Sigrist 2005). 
Depoliticising implications 
The concept of development has depoliticising implications, because it obscures 
inequalities and conflicts on the national and international level. The World 
Development Reports up until very recently still constructed a scale along which 
the development units are placed according to their per capita income. Although 
they also include statistics on Gini-coefficients, this still suggests that the average 
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income denotes a certain level of development of the population. This ranking 
neglects social inequality and the tremendous differences between living stand­
ards in the favelas and the residential estates. Not only here, but in general devel­
opment appears as something which refers to the situation of a group of people 
living in one country and which improves the life of all members of this group 
(see the methodological and normative assumptions in the second section of this 
chapter). 
Correspondingly, the classical paradigm of development constructs social 
problems (whose existence is not called into question) in peripheral countries 
as development problems, as problems linked to a lack of capital, knowledge, 
technology, productivity, institutions, etc., which can be solved by projects or 
programmes of development which deal with these shortcomings. These devel­
opment interventions are therefore serving the common good and benefiting all 
members of society – at least if they are successful. First of all, this perspective 
again neglects the differences between the supposed beneficiaries, between, say, 
farmers and landless labourers, small farmers and latifundistas, rural and urban 
poor, men and women, wage labourers and company owners, ruling elites and 
marginalised groups. Second, this perspective assumes that social problems can 
be solved with technocratic solutions – with solutions unconcerned with politics, 
relations of power and conflicts of interest, solutions that are rational and that no 
one can object to. However, problems of social inequality can only rarely be dealt 
with successfully in this manner, which is why James Ferguson argues: ‘By uncom­
promisingly reducing poverty to a technical problem, and by promising techni­
cal solutions to the sufferings of powerless and oppressed people, the hegemonic 
problematic of “development” is the principal means through which the question 
of poverty is de-politicized in the world today’ (1994: 256). 
In his study of a large integrated rural development programme in Lesotho, 
Ferguson (1994) not only illustrates that in the name of development the mas­
sive transfer of resources to the government enabled the ruling party to extend 
its administrative control in an oppositional province through financial support 
of its followers and infrastructure projects.2 He also points out that this techno­
cratic bias in development discourse is reproduced by the institutional interests 
of development organisations: 
An academic analysis is of no use to a ‘development’ agency unless it pro­
vides a place for the agency to plug itself in, unless it provides a charter for 
the sort of intervention that the agency is set up to do. An analysis which 
suggests that the causes of poverty in Lesotho are political and structural 
(not technical and geographical), that the national government is part of 
the problem (not a neutral instrument for its solution), and that meaningful 
change can only come through revolutionary social transformation in South 
Africa has no place in ‘development’ discourse simply because ‘development’ 
agencies are not in the business of promoting political realignments or sup­
porting revolutionary struggles. . . . For an analysis to meet the needs of 




fails to do; it must make Lesotho out to be an enormously promising candi­
date for the only sort of intervention a ‘development’ agency is capable of 
launching: the apolitical, technical ‘development’ intervention. 
(1994: 68f) 
In other words: development organisations are designed (and allowed) to launch 
technocratic projects in the common interest, not to take sides with the less 
privileged parts of the population in conflicts on the national or international 
level. So in combating poverty while avoiding political conflict, these organisa­
tions try to ameliorate the results of asymmetrical relations of power while not 
openly questioning or attacking these relations. 
Although some NGOs adopt a more political and conflictive stance towards 
these issues, the large majority of development organisations and consultants 
knows very well and adheres to the limits of what can be said and written in 
terms of project proposals and reports without endangering the flow of money in 
the development industry. It is far easier to obtain funding for improved irrigation 
systems in agriculture (development) than for supporting the struggle of indig­
enous groups or landless labourers for fundamental social change (politics). And 
a relatively recent study by Li (2007) illustrates that the depoliticising implica­
tions of development discourse are still very influential, even when sustainability 
and participation are project priorities. 
Authoritarian implications 
The concept of development has authoritarian implications because it prescribes 
interventions in people’s lives that these people themselves may disapprove of. 
Knowledge about development is knowledge about what a good society looks like 
and how it can be realised. In so far as there are competing conceptions about 
this goal and the ways to get there, it invariably contains an authoritarian ele­
ment because it is based on one particular conception which is then assumed to 
be universal while other conceptions are ignored or subordinated. Development 
interventions based on expert knowledge are in the classical paradigm not in 
need of legitimation by the people affected by these interventions, because they 
are – as rational measures in the common interest – legitimated through expertise 
and through their results (output legitimacy, as the political scientists say). Here, 
the heritage of social technology and the principle of trusteeship are obvious. 
The experts know better what the people need than they themselves. 
This holds true even after the trusteeship has been transferred to national elites 
after decolonisation, as is demonstrated by laws sanctioning nonparticipation in 
development projects with corporeal punishment in Tanzania in the 1960s (Pot­
ter 2000: 287) by the violence accompanying the campaign to wipe out smallpox 
in India (Apffel-Marglin 1990), or by the Regional President of Southern Sudan 
announcing ‘If we have to drive our people to paradise with sticks, we will do 
so for their own good’ (Alvares 1992: 108). But of course Western experts still 
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development ‘is an empty word which can be filled by any user to conceal any hid­
den intention, a Trojan horse of a word. It implies that what is done to people 
by those more powerful than themselves is their fate, their potential, their fault’ 
(Frank 1997: 263). 
Still, one might argue that if these interventions have positive results for the 
people concerned, this might make up for the lack of democratic participation 
and input legitimacy. This may well be the case, but a look at the history of 
development policy reveals a long list of White Elephants, failed projects and dis­
astrous consequences of development projects. Probably the most obvious cases 
are large infrastructure projects like dams. According to the (rather conservative) 
estimates of the World Dam Commission, 40–80 million people have lost their 
homes as a result of dam projects in the name of development (WCD 2000: xxx). 
Usually, these people are counted as environmental refugees. It might be more 
appropriate to refer to them as development refugees. 
These interventions are more often than not designed or evaluated for fund­
ing by experts who are not locals nor speak the local languages, but who possess 
universally applicable knowledge on the process of development. As the process 
is assumed to take place in all societies roughly in the same manner, the experts 
can be sent to any country, even without having been there before. They did not 
grow up or live in this society, but still they know how it is supposed to change. 
Thus it can be argued that the authoritarian implementation of what has been 
defined as the common good is a structural feature of development – despite the 
attempts to introduce the principles of participation, ownership and empow­
erment in development policy since the 1980s. While rigidly following these 
principles would be a powerful antidote against these authoritarian features, the 
practice shows that participation is in most cases closely confined due to the 
institutional constraints of the development industry (Cooke/Kothari 2001). As 
long as there are donors who spend taxpayers’ money on development, they will 
be reluctant to give up control, even if only out of responsibility towards their 
constituency – after all, they are supposed to represent their national interest. 
Thus orthodox conceptions of politics and identity play an important role in 
maintaining these relations of power as well. 
Because of these Eurocentric, depoliticising and authoritarian implications 
of the concept it should be abandoned. From the point of view of poststruc­
turalism, these implications have dangerous effects and ‘changing the order of 
the discourse’ is no mere linguistic endeavour but ‘a political question’ (Escobar 
1995: 216). 
On the difficulty of redefining ‘development’ 
Now one could certainly argue that within the academic debate in development 
theory, there has been an awareness of some of these criticisms for a considerable 
time, and that there have been numerous attempts to redefine development in a 
more critical manner. Beyond economic growth, development was in the course 






school education, life expectancy, gender equality, empowerment, democracy and 
human rights or simply freedom. It was redefined as endogenous, participatory, 
alternative, sustainable and human development. So the response to the criti­
cisms raised above would be that development theory has learned and progressed 
as a reaction to the criticisms. A similar response, often from the Marxist camp, 
would be that the criticisms only apply to normative conceptions of development
(as used in development policy), but not to those that are merely descriptive or 
analytical and talk about the development of capitalism. Within the poststructur­
alist framework, both could argue that the signifier development can be and has 
been linked to other signifieds than was the case in the classical paradigm, and 
that a critical redefinition of the concept would therefore be rid of its supposedly 
nasty implications. 
In this context, careful critics have questioned the theoretical coherence of the 
poststructuralist criticism of development discourse: If it is acknowledged that 
the meaning of development has changed regularly in the history of development 
policy and is context-specific, up to the point where it was condemned as an 
‘amoeba-like concept’ (Esteva 1985: 79), how can one reject the entire concept 
irrespective of its content? Crush, commenting on one of the Post-Development 
proponents (1995: 3), rightly argues: ‘in the very call for banishment, Sachs 
implicitly suggests that it is possible to arrive at an unequivocal definition’. 
The answer that can be given to these objections is twofold. For one, most 
of the redefinitions and alternative concepts of development still share most of 
the core assumptions of development discourse and often even the tenets of the 
classical paradigm: ‘our’ society is developed, ‘theirs’ is not, therefore investments 
and technology and experts from the North are necessary to improve their lives. 
This holds true even for many of the allegedly descriptive and analytical ver­
sions. And even differing concepts of development may have a similar function in 
that irrespective of their content they legitimate interventions based on expert 
knowledge and carried out under the principle of trusteeship in the name of the 
common good. 
Second, even if the assumptions discussed are questioned by the redefined con­
cept, and this is the case when sustainability leads to rejecting the model of the 
industrialised countries or when participation and empowerment lead to a rejec­
tion of expert knowledge and trusteeship, linking the signifier to a new signified 
it not as easy as it might seem in the first place: 
Development cannot delink itself from the words with which it was formed – 
growth, evolution, maturation. Just the same, those who now use the word cannot 
free themselves from a web of meanings that impart a specific blindness to their lan­
guage, thought, and action. No matter the context in which it is used, or the precise 
connotation that the person using the word wants to give it, the expression becomes 
qualified and coloured by meanings perhaps unwanted. The word always implies a 
favourable change, a step from the simple to the complex, from the inferior to the 
superior, from worse to better. The word indicates that one is doing well because 
one is advancing in the sense of a necessary, ineluctable, universal law and towards 
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a desirable goal. . . . for two-thirds of the people on earth, this positive meaning of 
the word ‘development’. . . is a reminder of what they are not. It is a reminder of 
an undesirable, undignified condition. 
(Esteva 1992: 19, emphasis in the original) 
The web of meanings tied around the concept during six decades of develop­
ment policy cannot be unmade simply by adopting a progressive definition. The –
perhaps unwanted – implications are still there, even if we try to give the term
a different meaning. Of course, from a poststructuralist point of view, there is
no guarantee that any new alternative concept will not be instrumentalised and
linked to similarly negative images and connotations. However, this possibility
cannot be evaded, there are no pure or essentially critical signifiers, meaning is
always contested and there are always discursive struggles. Regarding the concept
of development and its implications, attempts to redefine it in a progressive manner
seem to be but a losing battle, or at least one that faces extremely long odds and
may take decades. A simpler alternative is to drop the concept and find a new one. 
On misunderstandings and their productivity 
Even if one does not share the analysis presented here regarding the negative 
implications of the concept of development, I argue there is still a case to abandon 
the concept simply because it causes so many misunderstandings and through 
this obstructs the academic and political debate. Misunderstandings results from 
the fact that the same signifier is linked with different signifieds in the systems 
of representation of different actors. Whereas one assumes development to denote 
a higher income for the rural population, a second links it with a better invest­
ment climate for multinational companies leading to employment and economic 
growth, a third with sustainable resource use, a fourth with better health care for 
mothers and infants, a fifth with economic and cultural imperialism, and a sixth 
with an opportunity to make a living in the aid business. Development means dif­
ferent things to different people. The productivity of these differences in defini­
tion lies in the fact that they allow these people to cooperate without having to 
engage in conflict about their different assumptions and world views. 
Even a cursory glance reveals that within development projects and pro-
grammes the term refers to, e.g. road building, hydroenergy and irrigation, 
resettlement, birth control, biodiversity conversation, introduction of more pro­
ductive agricultural techniques, food-for-work programmes, counterinsurgency 
measures, microcredit provision and small enterprise promotion, fighting corrup­
tion and improvement in electoral participation (see chapter 10). We simply 
have to acknowledge that although these measures may have all been carried out 
under the banner of improving living standards and pursuing the common good, 
we are dealing with extremely heterogeneous interventions that may affect the 
lives of different groups in positive or negative ways. 
However, especially the latter aspect is obscured by the normative assumption 





organisations produce development. There are plenty of examples that the work 
of development organisations has not benefited but sometimes even harmed the 
poor. But again we are caught up in misunderstandings: a project may be success­
ful in promoting development in the sense of improving agricultural productivity 
yet fail in achieving development in the sense of reducing poverty because only 
well-off farmers can afford the new technology. Often, two meanings of develop­
ment are conflated: on the one hand a ‘process of transition or transformation 
toward a modern, capitalist, industrial economy’ and on the other the ‘reduction 
or amelioration of material want’ (Ferguson 1994: 15). Criticisms raised against 
negative consequences of development policies are usually countered with refer­
ences to the latter meaning, which subsequently often serve to legitimate inter­
ventions which are closer to the former meaning. But even if this is not the case, 
misunderstandings abound. 
It should not be ignored that these misunderstandings can be beneficial to 
progressive NGOs as well. There are some NGOs whose understanding of devel­
opment comes close to ‘supporting marginalised groups in the South in their 
political struggles’. Because their interventions and projects are designated as 
development, there is a chance that they will obtain funding by development 
institutions which have a rather different – often a slightly more conservative – 
understanding of the concept. 
Often, however, the productivity of misunderstandings related to the concept 
is less benign: it allows countless interventions with often highly dubious aims 
and effects to be launched in the name of the common good while being sup­
ported or even conducted by people who would otherwise not subscribe to these 
aims and effects. And it allows institutions like the World Bank to co-opt critical 
approaches and initiatives by claiming that they are pursuing the same goal as the 
institution itself – development. 
Alternative concepts 
For these reasons, I propose that we as development researchers should be more 
careful and more precise in our language – and maybe in our practices of produc­
ing knowledge and legitimating policy. If we are examining strategies of farm­
ers to cope with climate change or looking for factors contributing to economic 
marginality or analysing conflicts about irrigation or land distribution, there is 
nothing wrong with it. But why should we call all this development research and 
thereby blur what we are actually doing by subsuming it under this all-too-vague 
concept with dubious implications? 
Some people argue, we should do so for lack of a better concept. But do we 
really need such a general concept which covers change and improvement at the 
same time? If we are for example referring to rural-urban migration or processes 
of de-industrialisation, we do not have to talk about processes of development,
we can use the concept of social change in general or we can use these more 
specific descriptions. If we are referring to processes of redistribution on an inter­
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this development aid – we could designate this as global social policy. If we are 
striving for a world different from the present one in which tens of thousands of 
people are dying each single day for lack of food, clean water or affordable medi­
cine while others live in affluence, we should admit that we are guided by the 
ideals of justice and solidarity or the concept of human rights – instead of using 
the vague and problematic notion of development. After all, what development 
theory and policy are concerned with can in a more precise way be described as 
the explanation and amelioration of global social inequality. Analysing change 
and improving livelihoods could thus be the future objectives of what is until 
now called development theory and policy. 
If we want to measure the qualities of different ways of living and compare 
them, we can include incidences of suicide and violent crime, racism and sexism, 
the propensity to conduct wars, the relation to nature and other societies and 
therefore the pressing question to what extent a certain way of living depends 
on the subordination of other economies and ecologies (their resources, their 
labour power) for its consumption patterns or on the production of exclusion and 
inequality. What would such a reorientation mean for those conducting research 
and guiding policy on the political, economic, social, cultural and ecological sys­
tems of this world, and their interconnections? Let us find out. 
There is an increasing awareness of indigenous concepts which could replace 
the now dominant notion, concepts like buen vivir (sumak kawsay in Kichwa) 
(Gudynas 2011), ubuntu (Andreasson 2007) or haq (Madhok 2009). In the words 
of Rahnema (1997b: 391): ‘The end of development should not be seen as an end 
to the search for new possibilities of change.’ It should be seen as the beginning 
of less Eurocentric and vague notions of change.3 
Notes 
1 For the problems of postpositivist empirical research, see Ziai 2010. 
2 His field research was conducted in the early 1980s and therefore does not reflect the 
neoliberal turn in development policy. 
3 Needless to say, alternative concepts of social change and improvement also need to 
be questioned concerning their implications or their instrumentalisation. 
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6 Development discourse 
Appropriation and tactical polyvalence 
Let us start by examining the following quotes, which depict the asymmetrical rela­
tions between the global North and the global South at different points in time in
the 20th century. In 1901, President Theodore Roosevelt portrayed the relation of
the US to the rest of the world as follows: ‘this nation most earnestly desires sin­
cere and cordial friendship with others. . . . Wars with barbarous or semi-barbarous
peoples come in an entirely different category, being merely a most regrettable
but necessary international police duty which must be performed for the sake of
mankind’ (cited in Alcalde 1987: 4). There could be no doubt that the barbarous
peoples he referred to were people of colour who lived outside of Europe and North
America. Half a century later his successor Harry Truman struck a different note
when envisioning future US foreign policy: ‘More than half the people of the world
are living in conditions approaching misery. . . . I believe that we should make
available to peace-loving peoples the benefits of our store of technical knowledge
in order to help them realise their aspirations for a better life’ (cited in Rist 2008:
71). And the economist Paul Rosenstein-Rodan in 1944 anticipated Truman’s
‘program of development’, when he demanded: ‘we have to provide for some inter­
national action to improve the living conditions of those people who missed the
industrialisation “bus” in the nineteenth century’ (cited in Alcalde 1987: 154). 
Comparing the above quotes, one cannot but wonder about the shift in the 
way the relation between the North and the South, or more precisely: the US and 
certain peoples in Africa, Asia and Latin America, has been conceived. Whereas 
in the beginning of the 20th century people in the non-Western world were seen 
by politicians in North America and Western Europe as racially inferior and 
could be killed with impunity, so that the relation between the North and the 
South was primarily framed in terms of security, since the middle of the 20th cen­
tury the aim of politics seems to be to help these people and improve their living 
conditions through a programme of development. Thus between 1900 and 1950, 
the dominant way of speaking and writing about the South from the perspective 
of the North underwent a significant change, a change which can be depicted as 
one from a discourse of colonialism to a discourse of development, implying the 
norm of helping certain peoples in the sense of improving their material condi­
tion. This chapter is concerned with the constitution, appropriation and contes­
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On the theoretical level, the article is inspired by the Post-Development school 
(Sachs 1992, Escobar 1995, Rahnema 1997a), as well as different strands of post-
colonial analysis. In contrast to the first wave of Post-Development theory, the 
emphasis here is not merely to focus on the power of Western discourses in con­
structing the reality of the Other outside the West, a strategy of analysis linked to 
Said’s (1978) analysis of Orientalism, but also to examine the ways in which these 
discourses were modified, appropriated and transformed by non-Western subjects 
and thus produced unintended effects, understood in terms of Bhabha’s (1994) 
concept of hybridisation. 
The constitution of ‘development’ 
In the literature, there is disagreement as to when the discourse of development 
emerged. Gustavo Esteva (1992) claims it was in Truman’s inaugural address in 
1949, other researchers situate the discourse in late colonialism:1 Robert Nisbet 
(1969) points to 19th-century evolutionism (for example of Spencer and Marx), 
while Michael Cowen and Robert Shenton (1996) attribute responsibility to the 
Saint-Simonian doctrines (also of the 19th century). Reinhart Kößler (1998) and 
Philipp Lepenies (2014) point to its origins in Enlightenment philosophy. 
In this article, discourse shall be briefly defined as a system of statements, 
which are produced according to certain rules of formation, certain regularities 
concerning their objects, concepts and subject positions (Foucault 1972: 31–76, 
Diaz-Bone et al. 2007). This discourse allows for (and is influenced by) certain 
nondiscursive2 practices, merging with them to a strategic dispositive (Foucault 
1980: 119–23). 
Regarding the idea of development, it is useful to distinguish between concepts of
evolutionary social change (usually brought about by capitalist modes of produc­
tion) and concepts designed to ameliorate negative effects of this change. Cowen
and Shenton (1996: 3–5) refer to the first as ‘immanent development’, to the sec­
ond as ‘intentional development’. The idea of a general pattern of social change
in which some societies (in Western Europe and North America) are at a more
advanced and others at a backward stage (what could be called the evolutionist
legacy of development) was present already in 18th- and 19th-century thinking
in social philosophy and political economy. And policies (based on expert knowl­
edge and trustees) to reform societies and improve the lot of the poor to maintain
social order (the trusteeship legacy) were applied in the 19th century as well – but
predominantly in Europe (Cowen/Shenton 1996: 12). In the colonies, however,
Europeans saw their task not merely as exploiting these areas, but also as uplifting
and civilising the barbarians and savages (what Rudyard Kipling described as the
‘White Man’s Burden’), so at least in part they did perceive themselves as being
entrusted and responsible for the native population. But this responsibility was
usually understood in terms of civilising and Christianising and not in terms of
raising their standard of living. The development of these areas (as in the British
Colonial Development Act of 1929) referred to the natural resources and the








Thus the discourse of development as we know it, a concept of international 
policies linked with practices aiming at the improvement of the material con­
ditions of people living in Africa, Asia and Latin America, was in fact gradu­
ally constituted in the first half of the 20th century. After World War I, in the 
Versailles Treaty and the League of Nations Covenant of 1919, the development
of the colonised populations was already an issue, but they were still treated as 
inferior: 
To those colonies and territories which as a consequence of the late war have ceased 
to be under the sovereignty of the States which formerly governed them and which 
are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenu­
ous conditions of the modern world, there should be applied the principle that the 
well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and 
that securities for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Cov­
enant. The best method of giving practical effect to this principle is that the tutelage 
of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations who by reason of their 
resources, their experience or their geographical position can best undertake this 
responsibility, and who are willing to accept it, and that this tutelage should be 
exercised by them as Mandatories on behalf of the League. 
(League of Nations Covenant, Art. 22, italics added) 
A careful reading of Truman’s inaugural address reveals that the Western claim to 
superiority has markedly diminished between 1919 and 1949: it is predominantly 
confined to the level of technical knowledge and material wealth, and the com­
monplace assumption that people in the South were unable to govern themselves 
(which made the benign tutelage of the West necessary) has disappeared. The old 
imperialism based on this premise was rejected and instead a ‘program of devel­
opment’ was announced to relieve the misery of the formerly colonised, albeit 
one ‘based on democratic fair-dealing’, namely, on a relationship which bears 
semblance to one between equal subjects (Truman 1949 cited in Rist 2008: 71). 
The work of Javier Gonzalo Alcalde (1987) examines the factors that played 
an important role in the constitution of these discourses. To summarise briefly: 
as a consequence of World War I Britain had to initiate a new focus on the 
development of the colonial economies. The war had led to a wave of nation­
alism in the colonies sought to appease by Britain with promises of material 
well-being. After the war, the League of Nations occasioned the first reflections 
on the relation between economic development and popular welfare, manifest 
later in the Colonial Development Act of 1929 and its replacement with the 
Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1939/40. The Great Depression of 
1929 had impoverishing effects which led to the first international comparisons
of living standards and proposals of basic needs standards and gave rise to the New
Deal whose reliance on government planning and welfare programs had inter­
national repercussions: it triggered plans to draw the advanced economies out 
of the recession through a world development program based on capital invest­
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first successful attempts to employ development assistance as a policy instrument, 
which persuaded governments of both industrialised and nonindustrialised coun­
tries to rally behind the call for development of the global South. Last but certainly 
not the least, anti-colonial struggles and the Russian Revolution (1917–1918) 
compelled the West to promise the colonised peoples economic progress and 
technological advancement and to demonstrate that capitalism could bring wel­
fare to the poor as well. The strategic concerns of the Cold War restored devel­
opment assistance after a brief postwar interval, trying to secure prosperity by 
fighting poverty (or at least appearing to do so). By 1950, social and economic 
progress was merged in the idea of development whose ‘first and broadest func­
tion’, according to Alcalde, was ‘to give economic activity, particularly foreign 
economic activity, a positive and essential meaning for the lives of less-developed 
peoples’ (1987: 223). 
However, one factor underestimated by Alcalde should be mentioned: one of 
the most, if not the central difference between the framing of North-South Rela­
tions in 1919 and in 1949 was the disappearance of the racist claim that certain 
people were not capable of self-government. Several studies from the 1950s (e.g., 
Césaire 1972 [1955] and Adorno et al. 1993 [1951]) reveal that racist discourses 
were still very much prevalent in the US and Europe at this time, but the hor­
rors of the Holocaust had started to discredit this type of thinking – or at least 
its unadorned exposure in international relations. After the Universal Declara­
tion of Human Rights, racist ideas of white supremacy were increasingly frowned 
upon on the international stage, and this is reflected in the shift from colonial to 
development discourse. 
Andreas Eckert (2012: 20) also points out that the massive strikes in Africa, 
strong nationalist movements in many colonies and the Second World War led 
to a shift in perception among the colonisers during the 1940s: the backward­
ness of the colonised was seen no longer as a permanent racial quality, but as a 
cultural feature subject to change, so that colonial rule could thus be legitimised 
as progressive and that development aid could continue the civilising mission 
under a new guise. 
Both discourses describe the Other as deficient in relation to the Self (civi­
lised vs. uncivilised, developed vs. underdeveloped) and operate through similar 
dichotomies between superior and inferior (modern vs. traditional, advanced 
technology vs. manual labour, prosperity vs. misery, assisting vs. assisted, etc.). 
Yet some marked differences can be observed. The objects of the discourse are 
now geographical regions, not (or hardly) any longer people: a shift from biology 
to economic geography. And although two different types of objects exist (devel­
oped and underdeveloped countries), the difference is not qualitative and insur­
mountable any longer, but the latter can become like the former at some point 
in the future.3 Thus the trusteeship for the development of the country, which 
can no longer be justified by theories of race, passes with independence from the 
colonial masters to the postcolonial elites who run these countries. As there still 
is an assumption of cultural inferiority, this trusteeship is often linked to expert 










The appropriation of ‘development’ 
Majid Rahnema (1997b: ix) points out that the new discourse on development 
was widely adopted by different groups for different reasons: by leaders of inde­
pendence movements hoping to ‘transform their devastated countries into mod­
ern nation-states’ (ibid.), by the masses in the ex-colonies hoping for an end 
to subjugation and a better life, and by the former colonial masters seeking a 
new system of domination which allowed them to maintain their presence in 
these regions ‘to exploit their natural resources, . . . use them as markets for 
their expanding economies or as bases for their geopolitical ambitions’ (ibid.). 
Rahnema describes this adoption of the discourses of development and its cor­
responding values as a virus which invaded and colonised Third World subjects 
from within: ‘The “power” of development, like that of the AIDS virus, lies in 
its internalisation by the host’ (Rahnema 1997c: 119).4 While he stresses the 
ideological aspirations of the discourse, he entirely neglects its progressive aspects 
and processes of appropriation – and thus portrays the infected subjects as help­
less victims of this power. By appropriation I mean the practice of adopting and 
(possibly) simultaneously transforming a discourse to one’s own ends – in contrast 
to denouncing the discourse as alien, colonial or Western and rejecting it, which 
is the only alternative that Rahnema envisions. 
Frederick Cooper has examined such processes of appropriation and concludes: 
Development ideology was originally supposed to sustain empire, not facil­
itate the transfer of power. Yet developmentalist arguments – about labor 
policy as much as economic planning – were something trade union and 
political leaders could engage with, appropriate, and turn back. This frame­
work allowed them to pose demands in forms that could be understood in 
London or Paris, that could not be dismissed as ‘primitive’. . . . Much as one 
can read the universalism of development discourse as a form of European 
particularism imposed abroad, it could also be read . . . as a rejection of the 
fundamental premises of colonial rule, a firm assertion of people of all races 
to participate in global politics and lay claim to a globally defined standard 
of living. 
(Cooper 1997: 84) 
Taking into account Cooper’s arguments allows us to conceive the adoption of 
development discourse by actors in the South not in Rahnema’s terms as manipu­
lation and infection, but as a strategical appropriation. 
One of the reasons for the success of development discourse in the second half 
of the 20th century is that the identity offered by this discourse (being less devel­
oped) proved to be far more attractive to the formerly colonised in comparison 
to the one provided by racist colonial discourses (being uncivilised). The other 
reason lies in the appropriation of the discourses – primarily – by the postco­
lonial elites in myriad ways. I would like to particularly focus on two signifi­
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Development and the appropriation at the international level of the UN decla­
rations of Development. Both processes shall be briefly sketched here, especially 
with respect to one crucial element of the discourse: trusteeship. 
In the case of India, the appropriation of the discourse already began in 1938, 
when the Congress party set up a National Planning Committee (headed by 
Jawaharlal Nehru) whose task was to devise a program of national development 
(Bose 1997: 38). After independence, development became for the Indian state ‘a 
primary source of its own self-justification’ (ibid., 53), even as the accumulation 
of capital and processes of industrialisation were prioritised over improvement 
in the quality of life of the poor in concrete projects and programs. This was 
apparent in the building of massive dams, which were lauded by Nehru as ‘tem­
ples of modern India’ (cited in Roy 1999). Since independence 3,300 large dams 
have been built in India, displacing an estimated thirty to 40 million people, the 
majority of them tribal and other marginalised communities (Roy 1999). Nehru 
said to the villagers displaced by the Hirakud dam in 1948: ‘If you are to suffer, 
you are to suffer in the interest of the country’ (cited in Roy 1999). He might just 
as well have said: in the name of national development, because this is how the 
dams were usually justified.5 
This sheds light on the fact that the trusteeship over the presumably igno­
rant people, the ability to know what was good for them even if they themselves 
apparently did not (Cowen/Shenton 1996: 25–27), was taken over by the post-
colonial elites from the former colonial masters without any qualms. In the case 
of the Sardar Sarovar dam, the World Bank had to withdraw its support after 
massive protest campaigns by civil society groups in national as well as inter­
national arenas – but the Indian state carried forward the project nevertheless. 
This trusteeship arrogated itself the right to exert violence if the people were 
obstinate enough to resist the well-meaning policies of those who knew better. 
Apffel-Marglin (1990: 118–120) documents how in the course of the Indian 
state’s smallpox eradication campaign, vaccination squads raided villages and 
forcefully vaccinated unwilling villagers (who employed traditional, culturally 
embedded and in terms of disease prevention slightly less effective methods of 
inoculation) – all in the name of development and based on scientific knowl­
edge.6 Although this may seem an extreme case, similar instances can be found 
in other countries, too. In some regions in Tanzania in the 1960s, participation 
in development projects was mandatory, and refusal could be punished by six 
strokes (Potter 2000: 287). The list of violence exerted in the name of national 
development is long and the connection between violence and development is 
no coincidence (see Nandy 1995 and 2004). Thus we can conclude that at the 
national level, the principle of trusteeship has been reaffirmed through appropria­
tion by national elites. 
Looking at the appropriation of the norm at the international level, it is 
instructive to examine the UN declarations on development and the correspond­
ing policies. The representatives of the increasing number of former colonies, 
which had become independent states, have used the UN as a forum to articu­




agreements – mobilising their constituted identities as underdeveloped coun­
tries. Moreover, they have vigorously rejected any international tutelage, often 
denouncing the policies of the International Financial Institutions. 
While the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance, inaugurated under 
the auspices of the UN in 1950, was still uncontroversial, in subsequent years 
the question of development finance led to fierce debates. To meet their par­
ticular needs, a report by a group of experts appointed by the Secretary-General 
on ‘Measures for the Economic Development of Under-Developed Countries’ 
published in 1951 proposed an International Development Authority which was 
to disburse grants (Adams 1993: 55). The idea was taken up and the countries 
defined as such launched a major campaign in the General Assembly, opposed by 
the UN and other rich countries not willing to fund such an institution. In 1953, 
another committee dealing with the issue proposed a Special United Nations 
Fund for Economic Development (SUNFED) in which control over finance 
would be equally shared between major contributors and other members (ibid.). 
The proposal was hotly debated but did not prevail, and instead in 1959, as a con­
solation prize, the United Nations Special Fund, came into being – with a budget 
10 times smaller than that envisioned for SUNFED (ibid.: 56). 
However, these demands for a UN Fund for Economic Development and a UN 
Economic Development Agency in the early postwar period led also to the estab­
lishment of the International Development Association, an offshoot of the World 
Bank that provided interest-free loans to the least developed countries (UNIHP 
2010: 2f). Of course, as a daughter to the International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development, control over finance remained with the major shareholders in 
the North. Despite the defeat of a financial institution in which Southern coun­
tries would have a decisive influence, the campaign ‘is an important example of 
their early determination to bring their new-found strength to bear on the design 
of international economic institutions’ (Adams 1993: 57) – and an example of 
how the discourse of development was appropriated to ends not intended by its 
original proponents. The status as underdeveloped countries was used to demand 
(in a UN resolution of 1951) ‘international measures required to mitigate the 
vulnerability of the economies of underdeveloped countries to fluctuations in 
international markets, including measures to adjust, establish and maintain 
appropriate relations between prices of raw materials on the one hand, and essen­
tial manufactured goods on the other’ (Adams 1993: 59). These measures – price 
regulations to oppose declining terms of trade – can be seen as political interven­
tions in the economy directly based on dependency theorems, launched in the 
name of development. 
In 1961, the UN declared the first Development Decade calling upon its 
member states to pursue economic policies to achieve ‘self-sustaining economic 
development in the less developed countries’ (UN 1961). This included pursu­
ing stable and remunerative prices for primary commodities, an equitable share 
of earnings from extraction and marketing of natural resources and greater pri­
vate investment on terms satisfactory for both importers and exporters of capital. 
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the hope that the flow of assistance money to the less developed countries should 
reach ‘as soon as possible approximately 1 per cent of the combined incomes of 
the economically advanced countries’ (UN 1960).7 In the following years, the 
World Food Program, the UN Research Institute for Social Development, the 
UN Conference for Trade and Development (UNCTAD) and the UN Industrial 
Development Organisation (UNIDO) were established. More often than not, 
the recommendations of these organisations were incongruous with the agenda 
of the developed states during the 1960s and 1970s. 
In particular the UNCTAD, the first of which took place in 1964, was convened
‘against the clear wishes of the major industrial countries’ (Adams 1993: 79) and
provided a forum for the less developed countries to demand ever more regulations
of international trade to further their development as well as to negotiate interna­
tional commodity agreements (ibid.: 95). According to Adams, the ‘very principle
on which UNCTAD had been founded’ was ‘the need for special and differential
treatment to be accorded to developing countries to allow them to survive and
prosper in a world of unequals’ (185). It also functioned as a site where a common
identity and a united front in the Group of 77 could be forged (80). 
In the 1970s, the first declaration was followed by the International Devel­
opment Strategy for the second UN Development Decade (UN 1970). Here, 
the heads of state not only claimed that development required the ‘elimination 
of colonialism, racial discrimination, apartheid and occupation of territories of 
any State’ (Art. 5), but also ‘in the conviction that development is the essential 
path to peace and justice’ reaffirmed in their ‘common and unswerving resolve 
to seek a better and more effective system of international co-operation whereby 
the prevailing disparities in the world may be banished and prosperity secured 
for all’ (Art. 6). Because if ‘undue privileges, extremes of wealth and social injus­
tices persist, then development fails in its essential purpose’. Therefore, ‘a global 
development strategy based on joint and concentrated action by developing and 
developed countries in all spheres of economic and social life’ was required, ‘in 
industry and agriculture, in trade and finance, in employment and education, in 
health and housing, in science and technology’ (Art. 7). Thus, the discourse of 
development is appropriated by the new majority of Third World heads of state 
in the UN for three primary reasons: first, to reject international trusteeship (bear 
in mind that just a few decades earlier the necessity of development was employed 
to legitimise colonialism); second, to demand social justice and equality and 
denounce prevailing disparities; and third, to devise a comprehensive program 
of planned intervention which would include the global economy. The Declara­
tion on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order (UN 1974) 
underlined the latter point unambiguously and could be seen as the concretisa­
tion of such a program. Additionally, it claimed the right of states to adopt the 
economic or social system ‘most appropriate for its own development’ without 
being subjected to discrimination (Art. 4d), to nationalise enterprises (Art. 4e) 
and regulate and supervise transnational corporations (Art. 4g). The declaration 
was followed by a more detailed programme of action outlining the envisioned 





president of the General Assembly stated that the present order ‘constitutes the 
major obstacle standing in the way of any hope of development and progress for 
all the countries of the Third World’ (cited in Adams 1993: 123). 
It is obvious that, based on their classification as less developed, the leaders 
of Third World states were using the UN as a platform to launch demands for 
redistribution, justice and economic intervention in the name of development. 
In other words, they were appropriating the discourse of development in a way 
that was at odds with the imperialist objectives of the discourse of only a couple 
of decades earlier. This demonstrates what Foucault (1978: 100) has called the 
‘tactical polyvalence of discourses’: they can be used for different or even oppo­
site political ends. Regarding the principle of trusteeship, one can conclude that 
while the appropriation of the discourse of development by Third World elites 
has led to a rejection of the principle on the international level, on the national 
level the principle has been reaffirmed. 
The contestation of ‘development’ 
Taking a closer look at the processes of appropriation reveals that while the 
discourse of development has been appropriated by Third World leaders in the 
1960s and 1970s, it has not been fundamentally contested. Neither has the goal 
to transform the underdeveloped regions into developed ones (by means of eco­
nomic growth, industrialisation and modernisation) been questioned, nor the 
underlying constructions of identity (developed vs. underdeveloped) and the cen­
tral principle of trusteeship. However, since the 1980s, such contestations have 
occasionally taken place. Two of them will be briefly discussed here: the discourse 
of participation and ownership and the discourse of Post-Development. Both 
cases will be supplemented by practical examples from Bolivia, because here the 
clashes between different discourses can be observed easily. 
Although the discourse of participation originates in the 1980s (Chambers 
1983, Leal 2010) and ownership became a topic of development policy only in 
the late 1990s (Buiter 2010), both approaches are in unison in their rejection of 
top-down development approaches and their emphasis to ‘let the people decide 
what development is for them’.8 However, if this statement were to be taken seri­
ously, it would spell the end of the principle of trusteeship in development dis­
course, which assumes that experts are competent to decide for the people. Thus, 
the discourse of participation and ownership in development policy is fraught 
with ambiguity and contradictions. 
The meaning of participation of course depends on the question who partici­
pates in what. Early concepts and techniques of participation (like Participatory 
Rural Appraisal or Participatory Learning and Action) were linked to the idea of 
marginalised people taking control over their lives. However, the application of 
participation in the practice of development organisations was often more con­
cerned with a more efficient implementation of projects. And if participation 
is restricted (on the level of actors) to male village elders or (on the level of 
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to empowerment – at least if empowerment is understood in the sense of more 
self-determination of marginalised people and a change in the relations of power.9 
On the other hand, its emancipatory potential must not be underestimated, as 
the discourse could be a useful tool for such an empowerment (Hickey/Mohan 
2004). 
In contrast to the concept of participation, which was directed against 
top-down decision-making in development projects, the concept of ownership 
had a similar thrust, but operated more on a macro-level (usually referring to 
the ownership of countries): it was directed against top-down decision-making 
in international development policy. Of particular concern was the trusteeship 
assumed by the International Financial Institutions in the context of the Struc­
tural Adjustment Programs (SAP), but representatives of recipient countries 
complained about donor-driven development policy also in general. Since the 
late 1990s and especially since the Paris Declaration of 2005, documents and
strategies of development policy usually have to be ‘owned’ by the recipient coun­
try, meaning that the latter’s government – and not the donor organisations –
devised and drafted these papers. However, the case of the World Bank’s Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) demonstrates that more often than not, the 
donors still exert considerable influence on these strategies (Spanger/Wolff 2003, 
WDM 2005, Siebold 2008). And even if there is country ownership of a poverty 
reduction strategy, it often comes down to ‘this programme is supported by the 
people who own the country’ (Buiter 2010: 228) – i.e. although officially civil 
society participation is mandatory in devising PRSPs, this participation is often 
confined to ruling elites or at best professional NGOs in the capital and usually 
excludes poorer sections of society. 
Thus, while the discourse of participation in its dominant form questions 
the universal superiority of expert knowledge and suggests participation of 
project-affected people as a way to achieve more successful development projects, 
it does not do away with the role of experts and the development industry in gen­
eral, nor with the fundamental assumptions concerning problems and identities 
it is based on. This could also be said about the discourse of country ownership, 
which, at least rhetorically, explicitly rejects the principle of international trus­
teeship and thus the influence of international or foreign actors like the World 
Bank, the IMF or Northern donor organisations on national development policy. 
Numerous studies demonstrate that the structures of the development industry 
certainly impose limits on the extent of participation and ownership – after all, 
experts and donor organisations still want to have a say in development policy 
and because of privileged speaker positions and financial leverage often exert 
crucial influence. However, there may also be another dimension, as shown by 
the development project ‘Towards an Inclusive Election Process’, launched in 
2002 in Bolivia and funded by a number of European development agencies.10 
Its objective was to improve political participation in the election process and 
the local promoters who had planned the project were organised in the Pro 
Citizens’ Participation Consortium. The project aimed to tackle the problem of 






process by explaining to these groups citizens’ rights and supporting their claims 
to an identity card. However, the Bolivian government was convinced that the 
problem was already dealt with through educational programs and that this was 
sufficient. The support and resources which the project intended to provide to 
grassroots organisations mobilising people to vote was perceived as interference 
in internal political matters and maybe even an infringement on sovereignty. 
Thus the project was denounced as donor-driven and in violation of the principle 
of country ownership. This led to the withdrawal of two development agencies 
from the project, while the other two continued to fund it (Eyben/Ferguson 2004, 
Eyben/Leon 2005). 
What becomes visible here is again the tactical polyvalence of discourses: the 
discourse of country ownership, which was originally directed against interna­
tional trusteeship, is used here as an instrument to reaffirm the principle of trus­
teeship on a national scale and to prevent increased political participation. If the 
discourse of participation and ownership is seen as a unity, then this discourse 
is appropriated by Third World elites and turned against First World donors 
who are reproached with not abiding by their principles and thus faced with a 
dilemma: either they renounce the principle of country ownership or the objec­
tive of increased political participation, but they cannot have both. 
While in the case of participation and ownership the objective of transform­
ing the underdeveloped countries into developed ones and the implicit construc­
tions of superior and inferior identities were not contested and merely the central 
element of trusteeship was challenged, the discourse of Post-Development (PD) 
acts as a more fundamental challenge to development discourse. The objective 
is often regarded as neither feasible nor desirable, and the construction of devel­
oped and underdeveloped countries is rejected as a narrow universalism based on 
Eurocentric criteria. Furthermore, the authority of the development experts is 
also contested. 
As characteristic elements of PD, Arturo Escobar (1995: 214) identifies the 
rejection of the entire paradigm of development and its economic reductionism, 
an interest in local culture and knowledge, a critical stance towards established 
scientific discourses, and the promotion of pluralistic grassroots movements. 
A closer look reveals that it is useful to differentiate between two variants of 
PD: a neopopulist variant which rejects Western modernity and seeks recourse 
to traditional cultures (e.g. Esteva/Prakash 1998), and a skeptical variant which 
similarly denounces cultural domination and Eurocentrism but refrains from out­
lining alternative models of society beyond supporting grassroots initiatives11 and 
explicitly recognises the right of local communities in the global South to opt for 
a Western model (Banuri 1990: 95f, Marglin 1990: 27). 
Although at first glance we observe a radical repudiation of the discourse of 
development, a critical analysis yields that in some PD writings, the central ele­
ment of trusteeship is brought in again through the backdoor: when Rahnema 
(1997d: 388f) suggests that the needs of the people should not be ascertained 
by democratic processes, but by the ‘good and authoritative persons’ of a com­
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can serve both radical democratic as well as conservative political ends, and this 
constitutes its ambivalence (Ziai 2004b). 
The concept of Buen Vivir which enjoys enormous popularity in Bolivia and 
Ecuador (and increasingly other countries as well) can be seen as a manifestation 
of PD discourse. Buen vivir (good life) is the Spanish expression for sumak kaw­
say in Kichwa and suma quamaña in Aymara (Baéz/Cortez 2012). Even though 
buen vivir may be a plural endeavour and may be used with different meanings, 
it is generally seen as ‘a replacement of the very idea of development’ (Gudynas 
2011: 445). Other characteristic features are that it is rooted in traditional indig­
enous world-views and envisions the possibility of a good life only in one’s social 
context and not as an individual good life, on the basis of the dissolution of the 
dichotomy between society and nature (renouncing the idea that nature should 
be dominated and controlled by mankind) and as part of a process of (mental) 
decolonisation (ibid., Fatheuer 2011: 19f). 
The ambivalence of PD is also visible in the debate around buen vivir in Bolivia: 
whether and to what extent it ignores processes of cultural transformation and 
hybridisation, constructing a pure and traditional indigenous identity; whether 
and to what extent it allows for emancipatory processes of decolonisation and 
self-assertion, whether and to what extent it is used by national elites as a mobi­
lising ideology to evade class and gender conflicts – these are pertinent questions 
to be seriously examined (Ascarrunz 2011). And so is the question, whether and 
to what extent the counterdiscourse of Buen Vivir and its related practices negoti­
ate aspirations for a better life not entirely different from those that Third World 
people have been expressing with the idea of development. 
It can be observed that even the counterdiscourses to development which con­
test and repudiate the concept, sometimes bear traces and patterns which are 
somewhat familiar. This, however, must not lead to homogenising their differ­
ences, which are worthwhile being pointed out. 
Conclusion 
Although the discourse of development was constituted in the first half of the 
20th century as a transformation of colonial discourse which legitimised the 
North to maintain economic domination and exert global influence, during
the course of the next decades the discourse was appropriated by the newly 
independent countries of the South in ways not intended by the North, which 
included demands for financial transfers and even a more regulated global eco­
nomic order. While these appropriations left the principle of trusteeship, a cen­
tral component of the discourse, untouched at least on the national level, some 
of the more recent contestations of the discourse – linked to the concepts of 
participation and Post-Development – have challenged this principle. However, 
a closer look reveals that even a rejection of trusteeship can be used to reintro­
duce the principle through the back door. Politically speaking, there are no safe 
discourses. This is, and here Foucault seems right, a consequence of the tactical 
























1	 See e.g. the research project on ‘Colonial Concepts of Development in Africa’ at the 
University of Vienna (http://www.univie.ac.at/colonial-development/seiten/projekt. 
html). 
2	 These practices which Foucault refers to as nondiscursive are nonverbal, physical 
practices, which are, however, mediated through discourses. 
3	 Of course the civilising mission of colonialism had also included a diminishing of the 
difference, but its disappearance was inconceivable – the Other could be ‘almost the 
same but not quite’ (Bhabha 1994: 122). 
4	 This analogy is of course highly problematic. Rahnema presents as natural a certain 
way of life and as unnatural any deviance. He engages in a biologisation of social phe­
nomena which ignores their contingent nature and their political aspects. 
5	 When protesters in Germany demanded a stay on the construction of the Sardar Saro­
var dam in 1999 and rallied behind the slogan ‘No human sacrifices for development!’,
a high ranking official of the Indian embassy replied: ‘So you want our country to
remain underdeveloped!’ (personal experience). Of course, there had also been mass
protests in India itself against the dam – which was to submerge the homes of hundreds
of thousands of villagers (mostly indigenous peoples) – but they were usually beaten
down by the police and the activists often ended up in jail (Mehta 1994, Roy 1999). 
6	 With Spivak (1999: 82) we can refer to this as an enabling violation. With this term 
she describes the legacy of colonialism and the ambivalence of violent interventions 
which may have positive results for at least some of its victims in certain ways. How­
ever, this does not legitimate the violence. 
7	 This figure was lowered to 0.7% but seen as obligatory in the next Development Dec­
ade Declaration. 
8	 This sentence (or variations of it) was the one used most often by development experts 
of different development policy organisations to describe their views on development in 
interviews I conducted for my PhD thesis (Ziai 2004a). The interviewees linked this 
attitude to the concepts of participation, ownership and partnership. 
9 For these and other criticisms see Rahnema 1990, White 1996, and Cooke/ 
Kothari 2001. 
10 DFID (Great Britain), SIDA (Sweden), DANIDA (Denmark) and NEDA 
(Netherlands). 
11 This lead to the accusation of ‘Pontius-Pilate-politics’ (Kiely 1999: 45). 
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Participation, sustainability, heterogeneity 
Following or criticising the Post-Development approach in development theory 
(see above all Sachs 1992a), many studies have been analysing the discourse 
of development in the past two decades (Ferguson 1994, Crush 1995, Moore/ 
Schmitz 1995, Cowen/Shenton 1996, Cooper/Packard 1997, Grillo/Stirrat 
1997, Rahnema 1997, Eriksson Baaz 2005, Groves/Hinton 2005, Mosse/Lewis 
2005, Cornwall/Eade 2010, Ziai 2013). Although these – often interesting and
insightful – studies and this line of inquiry in general have often been associated 
with the work of Michel Foucault (e.g., Storey 2000: 40), most of them have 
more or less traced the link between knowledge and power and few of them have 
seriously engaged in applying Foucaultian concepts (these notable exceptions 
are, e.g., Escobar 1988 and 1995, Brigg 2002, Rossi 2004, Li 2007). However, 
none of these have actually implemented the methodology for discourse analysis 
outlined in Foucault’s Archaeology of Knowledge (1972). The article undertakes a 
first attempt to do so.1 
The methodological approach of archaeological discourse analysis is able to 
illuminate discursive structures and thus aspects of development policy hitherto 
unnoticed. The way the objects of development policy are discursively con­
structed and the rules according to which this is done are certainly relevant to 
scholars of development studies. Applying the approach outlined in chapter 4, 
this chapter will deal with the transformations in development discourse which 
occurred as a reaction to the ‘crisis of development theory’ in the 1980s and 
the corresponding rise of new concepts in development policy. Three of these 
discursive transformations, the rise of concepts like civil society participation, 
ownership and empowerment, the awareness of ecological questions and the 
commitment to sustainable development, and the rejection of one-size-fits-all 
solutions in development policy, are examined more thoroughly in the context 
of an empirical study of development institutions in the beginning of the 21st 
century. This examination reveals that these transformations resulted in incoher­
ences and contradictions regarding the discourse of development. It is argued 
that these incoherences and contradictions arise inevitably because some of the 
new concepts like participation and sustainability have implications which are 
incompatible with the rules of development discourse which have been formed 





The transformation of development discourse 
Although the classical development discourse described in chapter 4 was not a 
rigid, stable system, its rules of formation remained in operation as mostly unques­
tioned discursive structures from the 1950s to the 1970s. Things have changed 
since then. Especially since the crisis of development theory in the 1980s and 
some corresponding historical experiences in development policy the discourse 
has undergone a number of modifications and processes of change. New con­
cepts have appeared and become influential in development policy, the most 
prominent of which are sustainable development, good governance, globalisa­
tion, global governance, participation, civil society and ownership.2 The way we 
talk about development has changed, a transformation of development discourse 
can be observed. The question is, whether the rules of formation of develop­
ment discourse have been affected by this transformation as well. Even the most 
sharp-sighted critiques of development discourse such as Escobar (1995) and Fer­
guson (1994) have not sufficiently explored this transformation and, above all, 
its implications for the structure of the discourse. It is here that the approach of 
archaeological discourse analysis can contribute to further our understanding. 
Development discourse in the 21st century can be conceptualised as a network 
of interrelated and partly competing (sub)discourses. Its transformation since the 
1980s and the factors leading to the rise of these new discourses can, in a slightly 
simplified manner, be sketched as follows: 
The perception of an impasse in (above all Marxist and structuralist) devel­
opment theory and its universalist and determinist assumptions (Booth 1985) 
allowed the neoliberal ‘counter-revolution in development theory and pol­
icy’ (Toye 1987). It also led to a focus on less ambitious and more specific 
‘middle-range theories’ rejecting the universalist one-size-fits-all approaches in 
development theory and policy and an intensified debate on sociocultural factors 
in development. The perception of failures in development policy led to widely 
diverging interpretations. In some circles, the market – as opposed to inefficient 
and corrupt state apparatuses – was discovered as a universal remedy, in others 
the lack of civil society participation was blamed for the failures. Still others gave 
up on the entire promise of development and suggested confining the efforts to 
‘relief instead of development aid’ (Myrdal 1981) – thoughts which were taken 
up in later debates about crisis prevention, failed states and trusteeship. A differ­
ent conclusion of the same diagnosis was drawn by the Post-Development school: 
turn away from the development industry and look for grassroots ‘alternatives to 
development’ (Sachs 1992a, Escobar 1995). 
The experience of successful industrialisation in South-East Asia was also 
interpreted in different ways: while some saw it as proof for the neoliberal hypoth­
eses of the Washington Consensus, the inevitability of world market integration 
and the beneficial effects of economic globalisation (World Bank 1993), others 
stressed the significance of institutions for economic policies, advocating a new 
role of the state – though often without fundamentally challenging neoclassical 
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neoliberal discourse surrounding market solutions and globalisations (there was 
no need to prove the superiority of the capitalist system through regulatory social 
policies) as well as the discourse of abandoning the promise of development (fear 
of former colonies joining the communist bloc had been one if not the major 
motive for development aid in the first decades) and it made demands for good 
governance in the South possible (World Bank 1992) (while anti-communist 
dictatorships were rarely confronted with their shortcomings in the areas of 
democracy and human rights beforehand). On the other hand, the end of the 
Cold War also made possible the discourses of One World and Global Govern­
ance, in which the world’s governments cooperate to solve the world’s problems 
(Commission on Global Governance 1995). 
The latter point is also closely related to the perception of global ecological 
problems which do not stop at the border of nation-states and which endan­
ger the lives of future generations. The concept of sustainable development was 
promoted by the Brundtland report (World Commission on Environment and 
Development 1987) and increased in momentum after the Earth Summit in Rio 
1992. The concept contributed to the abandoning of the promise of development
and to the Global Governance discourse. A factor which enabled the rise of the 
concept of sustainable development was the critique from civil society since the 
late 1960s. Similar critiques led to the inclusion of the discourses of empower­
ment, participation and ownership on the one and women (WID) and gender 
(GAD) on the other hand into development discourse, as well as to the concept 
of human development put forward by the UNDP. Finally, the politics of struc­
tural adjustment was also involved in the rise of the good governance agenda 
(political factors were made responsible for the disappointing economic results) 
(Abrahamsen 2000), while the confined capacity of states for certain types of 
policies in the context of neoliberal globalisation contributed to the perception 
that globalisation has to be regulated through global governance. 
While this cursory description of the transformation of development discourse 
is based on primary and secondary literature in development theory and policy, 
my own empirical research for my PhD thesis led to some interesting specifica­
tions. In 20 qualitative interviews conducted with staff of different development 
organisations (the World Bank, the German ministry of development BMZ and 
two German NGOs, Misereor and medico international),3 the transformation 
of development discourse and the prominence of the new concepts were clearly 
visible. But what could also be discerned were some incoherences and contradic­
tions which – this is my central argument here – arise because some of the more 
progressive concepts and arguments adopted in this transformation are incom­
patible with the rules of formation of development discourse outlined in the sec­
ond section. Nevertheless, these rules are still partly adhered to because they are 
closely linked to questions of identity and institutional interests. In the following, 
interview sections centering on three of these new concepts – participation, sus­
tainability and the rejection of universal models – will be drawn on to elaborate 
my argument. 
 
   










Participation vs. expert knowledge 
Despite ideological differences between the different organisations (and individ­
uals), the sentence which occurred in one form or another in almost all the inter­
views was ‘the people have to decide themselves what development is for them’ 
(Int 8, 9, 12). Variants of this statement were, e.g., ‘we are neither legitimised 
nor competent to define development for others’ (Int 16); ‘development . . .
does not mean that we decide about concrete goals because actually it is the 
partner who should decide’ (Int 2); ‘The developing country must be the one 
who decides about development goals’ (Int 6); and ‘It is not our task to define for 
Burkina Faso or indigenous people in Brazil’s rainforest how their development 
should look like. . . . We must not define for others. This is virtually the categori­
cal imperative’ (Int 18). This attitude was justified and linked with concepts of 
‘participation’ (Int 3), ‘partnership’ or ‘partner-driven development’ (Int 11, 1) 
and ‘ownership’ (Int 6, 16). 
These statements can be seen as a reaction to the critique of development 
policy as a top-down, authoritarian enterprise and an endorsement of the view 
of those critics promoting participation or empowerment since the 1980s (Fried­
mann 1992, Chambers 1997): that the persons affected by development projects 
should decide for themselves what kind of social change they desire and what 
constitutes a good society for them. Here, the transformation of development dis­
course according to the new concepts of participation, empowerment and owner­
ship manifests itself. Strictly speaking, the transfer of the ability to decide what 
development means for them deprives the experts of their superior competence to 
do so and eliminates the element of trusteeship – which is revealed as a mecha­
nism for nondemocratic decision-making on social values and priorities. 
However, the same persons who emphatically stated this view also had dif­
ferent definitions of development, i.e. certain conceptions of how a good society
in the South looks like and how it can be realised. These definitions could be
the ‘satisfaction of basic needs’ (Int 6), the ‘enlargement of choices’ (Int 16),
‘justice, peace and the preservation of the creation’ (Int 12) or even ‘over­
coming the health-impairing condition of capitalism’ (Int 9) in another case.
The same experts who vehemently opposed giving prescriptions for development
prescribed measures like ‘investing in people, empowerment, good investment
climate’ (Int 16) or ‘transfer of capital, education and access to markets’ (Int
15) as remedies. 
Yet this inevitably leads to a tension in the cooperation with Third World 
partners: On the one hand the development workers have certain conceptions 
of development and are willing to implement them, on the other hand they are 
unwilling to force their ideas on others. The tension becomes a contradiction 
when the development organisations preach participation, partnership, owner­
ship or empowerment while their politics remain framed by conditionality and 
good governance. Even if the conception of development is seen as an offer the 
people can decline the promise of resource transfers does lead to an adaptation 
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The transfer of the right to define development to the partner in the South 
becomes farcical when the other partner determines the conditions, sets the 
agenda or decides what sound economic policies look like. Despite the com­
mitment to ideals of participation and partnership, there are some structural 
elements in the donor-recipient relationship which prevent a symmetrical par­
ticipation of all actors in the decision-making process. One is that the donors 
want to maintain control over their resources for reasons of national interest or 
out of accountability towards the taxpayers. Another is that the expert knowl­
edge questioned by these ideals is closely linked to the identity of those working 
in the development industry. 
Looking at the level of discourse, in order to ‘speak development’, one has to 
say what a good society looks like and how it can be attained. This is what devel­
opment experts are hired to do and this is the place assigned to them in discourse, 
by the rule of formation of enunciative modalities. The discourse constructs the 
subject position of a knowing and prescribing expert. The expert is defined by 
his or her expert knowledge on the process of development, the ability to gener­
ate, articulate and apply this knowledge is constitutive of his or her identity. 
A development expert who takes seriously the claims of empowerment discourse 
and denounces the superior competence in outlining progressive social change 
would be confronted with the question what the use of experts is if they have no 
expertise. 
To be precise: while statements on historical social change are still possible
for experts who refuse to formulate goals for people in the South, any statement
which would include normative and political elements like desirable social con­
ditions or preferences concerning the manner in which future social change is
envisioned appears illegitimate unless it is based on a clear (and ideally consen­
sual) articulation of the people concerned. In such a scenario, the researchers
would be confined to the role of assistants to social movements and communi­
ties. This is rather at odds with the traditional role of experts in development
discourse. 
Of course, the concepts of participation, partnership and empowerment have 
been adopted in development institutions often only in a selective and depoliti­
cised manner which did hardly question existing relations of power, as has been 
amply illustrated by the critical literature on the topic (Rahnema 1990, 1992, 
Macdonald 1995, White 1996, Mohan/Stokke 2000, Cooke/Kothari 2001, Abra­
hamsen 2004, Cornwall/Brock 2005, Batliwala 2011, Leal 2011). However, my 
research suggests that even in the supposedly co-opted versions of the concepts 
which have lost their critical edge they exert enough influence to disturb the 
order of development discourse and cause incoherences and contradictions, thus 
highlighting the nonparticipatory and authoritarian rules of the discourse. So 
even a depoliticised version of participation leads to contradictions in develop­
ment policy, to unpleasant questions and incoherent practices, which in turn can 
be used as tools in political change. Thus there may be a potential for a repoliti­





Sustainability vs. developed north 
A similar observation can be made regarding the concept of sustainability in 
development discourse. The concept defines sustainable development as ‘devel­
opment which meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability 
of future generations to meet their needs’ (World Commission on Environment 
and Development 1987). This has a particular consequence for the role of indus­
trialised countries in the discourse. As one interviewee correctly pointed out: ‘If 
we adopt the concept of sustainability, the industrialised countries are developing 
countries’ (Int 15, a similar phrase appeared in Int 6), because the resource use 
and environmental pollution caused by these countries indicate that this model 
of society cannot be universalised. It can be maintained only as long as it is con­
fined to a privileged minority – one could say it is an oligarchic model of society. 
Again, telling incoherences and contradictions can be encountered. On the 
one hand, the concept of sustainability is heralded as the new and only way for­
ward in the interviews. One interviewee emphasised: ‘We rigorously promote the 
concept of sustainable development’ (Int 1), another asserted: ‘Concerning the 
concept of development, we adhere to the concept of sustainable development 
as defined in Rio 1992’ (Int 5). Less explicit, but similar commitments could be 
found in many other interviews (Int 2, 6, 7, 11, 13, 15). 
On the other hand the industrialised countries are still constantly referred to as 
the developed societies – which implies that less developed or underdeveloped socie­
ties should become like them, and development policy should help assist them 
in this process. Although taking the concept of sustainable development and its 
often quoted definition seriously would render this traditional identification of 
developed and industrialised countries impossible, such an equivalence is exactly 
what can be found in many interviews. The developed countries are specified as 
the ‘OECD member states’ (Int 1.4), the ‘Western world’ (Int 3), or, straightfor­
wardly, as the ‘industrialised countries’ (Int 6, 18). This is where the incoherence 
becomes manifest: either the industrialised North provides a model to be copied 
or its lifestyle is entirely unsustainable. The two perspectives are not compatible. 
While the development experts do pay at least lip service to the new influen­
tial concept of sustainable development, they still refer to Northern countries as 
developed and thus adhere to the rule of formation of strategies which dates back 
to the postwar era and identifies the industrialised North as a model for all other 
societies. According to this rule, the statement ‘the USA is an underdeveloped 
society’ does not make any sense, because what is understood as a developed soci­
ety is intimately linked to the US through a chain of equivalence between the 
signifiers (Laclau/Mouffe 1985: 127ff). That statements like these appear today 
provides another example of the disturbing effects that an originally critical but 
supposedly co-opted and mainstreamed concept can unfold in development insti­
tutions. Many studies have convincingly argued that sustainable development 
has been reinterpreted as ‘sustainable growth’ (World Bank 1989) and instru­
mentalised as yet another concept reinforcing technocratic constructions of 
social problems and the competence and duty of the North to manage the planet 
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1999, Scoones 2011). The argument here does not disprove the criticism raised 
against this process of co-optation, but puts it into perspective: it is less encom­
passing as its critics fear. 
Heterogeneity vs. one-size-fits-all 
A third area where incoherences and contradictions are visible is not as closely 
related to the rise of a new concept as the first two. However, a significant reali­
sation which became prominent during the crisis of development theory of the 
1980s was that the countries of the South were more heterogeneous than had 
hitherto been assumed. The perception of a growing process of differentiation 
within this group of countries – into successful industrialisers, rich oil-exporters 
and an increasingly impoverished rest – (together with the demise of the Soviet 
bloc) led to the catchphrase ‘the end of the Third World’ (Harris 1987, Men­
zel 1992, Berger 1994). The corresponding criticism implied that development 
theory had been wrong in lumping together a group of countries with widely 
diverging economic and political conditions and social and cultural backgrounds 
and in assuming a single bundle of problems and corresponding solutions, a single 
pattern of social change, a single process of development in all of them, a single 
size for all. 
This transformation of discourse can be observed throughout the interviews. 
The heterogeneity of conditions and factors influencing social change in dif­
ferent societies is readily acknowledged, and we find statements that ‘There is 
not one solution’ for the problems of the ‘less developed’ countries (Int 3), that 
‘The conditions for development are different in each country. Patterns of devel­
opment, like the industrialisation of Germany, cannot be transferred to devel­
oping countries’ (Int 4), and that ‘There are no blueprints for development. 
There are different cultural conditions in each country, different economic, geo­
graphical conditions’ (Int 5). The interviewees insist that ‘[e]ach country has 
to find its own way’ (Int 15, 16), ‘individual solutions for each country’ (Int 6) 
and a ‘tailor-made approach’ (Int 16) were needed, and a one-size-fits-all or a 
cookie-cutter approach are vehemently rejected (Int 16, 18). What this implies 
is that there is not one process of social change which takes place in all societies 
sooner or later, but that there are different historical developments. 
Despite this insight, there are numerous references to be found to ‘the process of
development’ (Int 6, 7, 9, 12) which suggest that there is a universal process and
thus a single model. Sometimes, the experts were even more explicit and argued
that the process of development in Europe ‘surely is a model’ for the developing
countries (Int 4), maintained that ‘if you try to find Somalia’s level of develop­
ment in European history, you have to go back a few hundred years’ (Int 18) and
stated that ‘Development is actually a process, human development simply pro­
gresses and there are few cultures who want to live as they did a thousand years
ago’ (Int 3). In other words: there is a pattern of social change which occurs in
all societies irrespective of their different conditions and backgrounds and it has































why they are at the top of the universal scale of development. Modernisation theory
is not dead yet. Or rather, the rules of development discourse, specifically the
norms guiding the formation of objects and concepts, are still present even after a
discursive transformation has asserted the contingency and historicity of processes
of social change and the heterogeneity of conditions and factors influencing them
in different places of the world. Again, a coherent progress in development policy
is prevented by the order of development discourse which assumes that there is
universal knowledge on social change irrespective of regional circumstances. 
In this context, it is worth while noting that development institutions are 
based on the assumption of such knowledge. How else could they justify that 
their experts are able to analyse and design social change in societies where they 
have not lived for more than a few months or even weeks? That their compe­
tence in doing so is superior to those who have lived there all their lives? Only 
because they possess knowledge on social change which is universal in character 
and therefore applicable all over the world. 
Conclusion 
The method of archaeological discourse analysis employed here (building on ear­
lier critiques) has yielded some interesting insights. The objects of development
discourse are sociogeographical units categorised as deficient in relation to the
norm of the Western society and thus classified as underdeveloped. Correspondingly,
the concepts of the discourse are always concerned with some lack or deficiency
(e.g. failed states), which, however already imply a cure or positive strategy (e.g.
state-building). Usually, the problems of these units are constructed as lack of capi­
tal, knowledge or technology and in general as problems amenable to nonpolitical,
technocratic solutions offered by development institutions and organisations. The
diagnosis of deficiency is articulated from the subject position of the knowing, pre­
scribing expert which has to be assumed by anyone performing (speaking in) the
discourse. In the history of development policy, several diagnostic cycles can be
identified: e.g. in the 1960s the particular aspects of the objects of discourse which
gained new visibility in economic modernisation theories were the rates of savings
and economic growth. They were seen as keys to development. After sustained eco­
nomic growth during the 1960s had not led to substantial reductions in poverty,
development was redefined to explicitly include poverty and a new focus on the rural
poor and their basic needs emerged, coupled with a new promise given by the devel­
opment industry. Further cycles put forward a focus on women, the environment,
markets, and institutions/governance. Each diagnostic cycle linked the explanation
of earlier failures with a new aspect, a new prescription, and a new promise. 
Yet some of the concepts adopted in development discourse since the crisis of
the 1980s led to significant discursive transformations. In this article, we examined
the concepts of participation/ownership/empowerment, sustainable development
and the rejection of one size fits all solutions. In all three areas, we see that due to
external criticisms and internal learning processes, the discourse of development
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to the older conceptions tending towards top-down measures, universal blueprints
and neglect of environmental consequences. However, these progressive changes
lead to incoherences in development discourse because some elements of these
new ideas are incompatible with the rules of formation of development discourse.
The willingness to adopt these new concepts combined with an unwillingness
to abandon the discursive rules of development produces the contradictions we
have encountered in the interviews. The practice of development institutions to
include and co-opt formerly oppositional concepts which have (supposedly) been
robbed of their critical content thus has unintended effects. On the other hand,
progressive transformations in development policy are confronted with certain
limits which are constituted not only by the structures of the development indus­
try, but also by the structures of development discourse. Overcoming these limits
presupposes not only political will but first of all an awareness of these structures. 
Notes 
1	 The argument of this paper has been presented at the 6th Interpretive Policy Analysis 
Conference in Cardiff/UK in 2011. I would like to thank the panel conveners Elena 
Heßelmann and Franziska Müller for useful comments. 
2	 Neoliberalism does not appear in this list because it is debatable whether it still 
belongs to development discourse, as it rejects some of its principles (see chapter 8). 
3	 The interviewees were predominantly from the middle management level and from dif­
ferent departments (not from PR) of the organisations, so as to render the sample at least
moderately representative. The interviews were semi-structured and based on questions
concerning the conception of development and the role of development experts. 
4	 The experience of the substitution of structural adjustment programs by PRSPs is 
a vivid illustration of this case. Officially, the government of the recipient country 
should prepare a poverty reduction strategy based on participation of the civil society –
ownership and participation are heralded as the guiding principles of the process 
(World Bank 2002). But as the World Bank and the IMF decide whether or not this 
strategy is worth supporting through loans, the recipient governments often confine 
participation to social policy and adhere to the macroeconomic conceptions of the 
Washington consensus in order to gain approval of the donors. ‘We give them what 
they want before they start lecturing us’, commented an African minister of finance 
(World Development Movement 2001: 7). 
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8 From ‘development’ to ‘globalisation’
 
This chapter1 is concerned with the academic and political fields of North-South 
relations, often circumscribed as ‘development theory’ and ‘development policy’ 
respectively. I argue that a shift from a discourse of development to a discourse 
of globalisation has occurred in recent years and that this shift is central to the 
changing ways in which knowledge about global relations of power and exchange 
has been conceptualised in the past two decades or so. A concise analysis of 
both discourses is relevant and insightful because notions of development and of 
globalisation are conceptualising social change in strikingly different ways and 
with different attitudes towards social engineering. A comparison of these latter 
qualities enables us to better decipher the social production of knowledge about 
changes in the global system. 
Discourse analysis is particularly fruitful if discourses are understood as powerful 
and meaningful systems of representation that interlink the production of knowl­
edge with material practices that are in turn justified and thus substantiated. As 
we have seen in earlier chapters, the discourse of development has already been 
dissected by scholars like Ferguson (1994) and Escobar (1995). These scholars 
focused on the historical constellation that facilitated its rise, its underlying 
assumptions and its effects. A similar dissection, however, remains to be done 
for the discourse of globalisation. Some scholars have identified shifts in devel­
opment theory and policy during the past two decades (see especially Moore/ 
Schmitz 1995 and Mosse/Lewis 2005). McMichael (2000) claims that the devel­
opment project has been replaced by a globalization project. Gibson-Graham 
(1996) and Ho (2005) offer immensely interesting critiques of this latter project, 
which provide valuable points of reference for future analysis. However, little sys­
tematic discourse analysis has been carried out on the shift identified above. This 
article will attempt to engage these gaps – although it will certainly be impossible 
to close all of them, given how vast the field of analysis is. 
One of the field’s main challenges is reflected in the fact that the article deals 
primarily with the discourses of Western Europe and North America.2 This focus 
is particularly relevant in the field of development aid, where in recent years –
following the rise of China and others to the status of influential donor-countries –
there has been some debate about a new plurality of actors. However, this sup­
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Only after 1989 the West had the monopoly on development aid, allowing it to 
pursue good governance policies and the like. 
In order to establish my argument, the general hypothesis of the shift from a 
discourse of development to one of globalisation shall be elaborated and speci­
fied in the course of the following sections. First, it is necessary to outline more 
precisely what is to be understood by the term discourse. Then, the discourse of 
development and the reasons for its putative demise coinciding with the rise of 
the discourse of globalisation are sketched. The ensuing main section will high­
light the differences between the discourses of development and globalisation 
with particular reference to the practices rendered possible or impossible by each 
of them respectively. Throughout these sections, I will indicate how both notions 
and knowledge about change have been altered in the course of the historical 
shift from development to globalisation as the driving force of global interaction. 
Discourse, discourse analysis and the 
question of representing the world 
Discourse will be understood here in a Foucauldian sense. What this means has 
been succinctly captured by Stuart Hall: 
By ‘discourse’ we mean a particular way of representing [. . .] A discourse is a 
group of statements which provide a language for talking about – i.e. a way of rep­
resenting – a particular kind of knowledge about a topic. When statements about 
a topic are made within a particular discourse, the discourse makes it possible to 
construct the topic in a certain way. It also limits the other ways in which the topic 
can be constructed. 
(Hall 1992: 291, emphasis in the original) 
This rather general definition stresses the constructivist point that ‘to speak is to 
do something’ (Foucault 1972: 209) (namely to construct social reality). This can 
be made more precise – as well as more complicated – by referring to Foucault 
himself. In the Archaeology of Knowledge, he identifies discourses as discursive for­
mations and states that ‘whenever, between objects, types of statement, concepts, 
or thematic choices, one can define a regularity (an order, correlations, positions 
and functionings, transformations), we will say [. . .] that we are dealing with a 
discursive formation’ (ibid.: 39). Thus, discourses can be recognised due to the 
existence of these regularities – due to their rules of formation. 
On the other hand, as poignantly expressed in the quote by Hall above, the 
existence of such regularities always implies exclusions. This nexus of regularity 
and exclusion is especially relevant for the link between discourse and power: 
Each society has its regime of truth, its ‘general politics’ of truth: that is, the 
types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mecha­
nisms and instances which enable one to distinguish true and false state­






value in the acquisition of truth; the status of those who are charged with 
saying what counts as true. 
(Foucault 1980: 131) 
This perspective does not relate to truth as a question of the accurate representa­
tion of reality by language, but seeks to identify which discourses are accepted as 
true. Truth furthermore is always produced and embedded in relations of power. 
If we agree with Foucault that the production of knowledge is a central task of 
discourses, and that this knowledge enables certain social and political practices 
while excluding others, we will see that the notions of and knowledge about 
change generated by the discourses of development and globalisation are highly 
significant for the material realities of the global system. As a standard criticism 
of Foucault’s discourse analysis is that it fails to grasp the opposite influence of 
historical constellations in politics and the economy on discourses (which is jus­
tified only for the Archaeology of Knowledge, but less so for his later writings), we 
will also be dealing with the question which factors have made possible certain 
discourses. 
The rise and decline of ‘development’ discourse 
Development is a word that has been used to designate processes of change in 
numerous areas and disciplines. My discussion shall be confined to the develop­
ment of societies, especially of non-Western societies. If we take a cursory glance 
at the history of this concept (among the vast literature see especially Nisbet 
1969, Alcalde 1987, and Cowen/Shenton 1996 for thorough discussions), we can 
see how two discourses originating in the 19th century merged due to geopolitical 
constellations in the 20th century: social evolution and social technology. 
The discourse of social evolution (which other than commonly assumed was 
not overly concerned with Darwin’s theory) was influenced above all by the theo­
ries of Spencer, Marx and Comte. Its paradigmatic assumption is that there is a 
general evolution of human societies (a universal process realised along national 
paths, cf. Sidaway 2007: 350), which proceeds along a sequence of stages. This 
sequence was ultimately defined by the industrialised capitalist societies of the 
West that were positioned at the top of this evolutionary scale. In this perspec­
tive, the conditions in ‘backward’ areas corresponded with evolutionary stages 
through which Western European and North American capitalist societies had 
passed long before. One can thus say that Comte’s ‘comparative method’ of look­
ing at different societies in order to examine the process of evolution formed the 
backbone of a perspective, which translated ‘geocultural differences into histori­
cal stages’ (Nandy 1992: 146). 
The second discourse of social technology was closely linked to the writings 
of Saint-Simon and his followers, who saw the task of a positive social science 
in devising social interventions that aimed at rationally reforming society and in 
the acceleration of its evolutionary transformation. These views sought to answer 
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A central role in these interventions was attributed to privileged actors: ‘Only 
those who had the “capacity” to utilise land, labour and capital in the interests 
of society as a whole should be “entrusted” with them’ (Cowen/Shenton 1996: 
25). Thus, this discourse sanctioned state interventions based on the knowledge 
of expert groups as a means to positively stimulate social and economic change. 
The merging of these two discourses is at the root of what Cooper and Packard 
call the ‘ambivalence of development’. This ambivalence is grounded in develop­
ment being a ‘description of ongoing self-propelled processes of social change’ on 
the one hand and a ‘blueprint for action’ on the other (Cooper/Packard 1997: 8). 
But the prominence that development discourse should gain in the second half 
of the twentieth century was built on preconditions structuring the global system. 
A number of historical events in the first half of the 20th century laid the founda­
tions for its rise: The Russian revolution, the global economic crisis emerging in 
the 1920s, Roosevelt’s New Deal policies of the 1930s, the World Wars, and the 
global upsurge of anti-colonial struggles, coupled with the idea that all human 
beings are equal, laid the foundations for Cold War policies of development aid. 
Despite its equality oriented dimension, such aid was foremost an instrument 
of enlarging the capitalist bloc’s spheres of influence and securing access to raw 
materials (for a detailed account see Alcalde 1987). It was under these historical 
conditions that, in 1949, US President Harry Truman announced a ‘bold new 
program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress 
available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas’ (Truman 
1949) and that new ministerial offices, departments, international organisations, 
and even academic disciplines were formed under the heading of development. 
Rahnema argues that the success of development discourse in the era of decolo­
nisation was due to a convergence of aspirations between three quite different 
groups of actors: 
[T]he leaders of the independence movements were eager to transform their 
devastated countries into modern nation-states, while the ‘masses’ . . . were 
hoping to liberate themselves from both the old and the new forms of subju­
gation. As for the former colonial masters, they were seeking a new system 
of domination, in the hope that it would allow them to maintain their pres­
ence in the ex-colonies . . . The myth of development emerged as an ideal 
construct to meet the hopes of the three categories of actors. 
(Rahnema 1997: ix) 
This myth of development, reflected in the early modernisation theories, pro­
claimed that the underdeveloped areas could become developed through the trans­
fer of capital and knowledge within a few decades. Thereby global inequality 
was depoliticised as ‘[t]he effect of this powerful narrative was to transform a 
spatialised global hierarchy into a temporalised (putative) historical sequence’ 
(Ferguson 2005a: 178). The Post-Development critics (see Esteva 1992 as the 
prime example) have highlighted not only the economic and political interests 





(in the terminology of postcolonial theory, the Other) were conceived as defi­
cient versions of the ideal norm (the Self). Still, Cooper is right in pointing out 
a more positive aspect of this concept when he writes: 
Much as one can read the universalism of development discourse as a form of 
European particularism imposed abroad, it could also be read . . . as a rejec­
tion of the fundamental premises of colonial rule, a firm assertion of people 
of all races to participate in global politics and lay claim to a globally defined 
standard of living. 
(Cooper 1997: 84) 
It is this point that helps to explain the popularity that the development dis­
course enjoys in the peripheries of the global system until today.3 
And yet, this popularity seems to be on the decline since the 1980s at least. 
Leys (1996: 26) notes that the history of development theory and policy shows 
how its core ideals have progressively been altered and abandoned, from the ideal 
of catching up in the 1960s to redistribution with growth and basic needs in the 
1970s and on to structural adjustment in the 1980s. The promise of improvement 
for the underdeveloped regions became more and more modest in the course of 
time. This has led the Post-Development school as far as to proclaim the end of 
the age of development: ‘The idea of development stands like a ruin in the intel­
lectual landscape’ (Sachs 1992: 1). Its proponents give four reasons for this claim. 
First, once the ecological consequences of industrialisation had become obvious, 
it had become impossible to portray the developed societies as a model for the 
rest of the world. Second, with the end of the Cold War a central precondition 
of the discourse of development was lost and the benevolent dimension of the 
relationship between North and South came to be increasingly conceptualised in 
different frameworks (e.g., crisis prevention). Third, the project of transforming 
the underdeveloped areas into developed ones was proven unsuccessful in light of 
the growing gap between rich and poor countries – especially after development’s 
‘lost decade’, the 1980s. Fourth, the cultural homogenisation linked to the uni­
versalisation of the Western way of life came to be increasingly rejected (Sachs 
1992). 
Obviously, nondiscursive factors are seen as influencing discourses here in 
the first three points. It has to be noted that these four points refer to different 
dimensions or aspects of development and these dimensions need further evalua­
tion. The first point highlights the ecological impossibility of universalising the 
Western way of life. But despite its validity, its recognition has hardly led to an 
abandonment of attempts to industrialise countries of the South. On the other 
hand, the ecological restructuring of the highly industrialised countries has so 
far produced only modest results. On a conceptual level nevertheless, the term 
development has since the Brundtland Report (1987) and the UN Conference on 
Environment and Development (1992) usually been coupled with the qualifier 
sustainable.4 Concerning the second point referring to the impact of End of the 
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rate (measured as a percentage of the OECD countries’ GNI) continuously 
declined throughout the 1990s (from 0.33 per cent to 0.22 per cent) and has only 
slightly risen since the turn of the century (to 0.28 per cent) (DAC 2008: 15).
According to these statistics, development in terms of financial transfers from 
North to South has clearly lost in significance after the end of the Cold War and 
although the proclamation of the Millennium Development Goals in 2000 has 
had some effects, it has not offset the earlier loss.5 Support from the Soviet Block 
(which was markedly less than the Western ODA) was also lost. Beyond these 
financial aspects, the peripheral countries lost in geopolitical significance due to 
the end of the Cold War and could not credibly threaten to join the rival camp 
any longer. As regards the third point, the growing gap between rich and poor 
countries can hardly be denied – although most countries in the South actually 
experienced improvements in social indicators such as life expectancy until the 
1970s. A widespread disillusionment with development as a means to overcome 
global social inequality is certainly manifest at least since the 1980s. Concern­
ing the fourth point, which refers to the putative effects of successful processes 
of development (and therefore seems somewhat contradictory to the preceding 
point), countless anthropologists have shown that not cultural homogenisation, 
but rather processes of hybridisation have taken place in the periphery – although 
this does not mean that the perception of cultural homogenisation as threatening 
was no important factor in the rise of some anti-Western social movements. 
Still, other factors also contributed to the decline of the development dis­
course. Apart from the failure of development policy, manifest in the growing 
gap between rich and poor countries and the increase in absolute poverty in 
Sub-Saharan Africa and some other regions, another kind of failure or impasse 
of development theory, in particular of Marxist development theory, has been 
identified by Booth (1985). This impasse was the result of theoretical problems 
(Booth accuses Marxist development theory of economism and determinism) 
exemplified in the inability to explain the successful development of the East 
Asian Tiger states from a perspective, which had regarded the inclusion into the 
capitalist world system as the least promising way to achieve industrialisation and 
material improvements.6 Another factor was the ongoing critique of develop­
ment projects as top-down interventions caring little about the people who were 
supposed to benefit. That some projects instead supported corrupt dictatorships 
was part of the criticism voiced by Third World solidarity groups and nongovern­
mental organisations as well as by some individuals in the development institu­
tions themselves.7 
Another effort to explain the decline of development discourse adopts a more 
global approach and focuses on the predominance of the Fordist system (Arri­
ghi 1999). Arrighi argues that as early as the late 1960s the Fordist capitalist 
world system evidently failed to deliver on its promise to increase the material 
well-being of the inhabitants of poor countries while at the same time failing 
its promise of increasing the prosperity of the people in the rich countries. He 
attributes this to the exhaustion of the system’s capacities expressed in declining 




same time, a strategy for solving this crisis became prominent that would later 
be called neoliberalism. This included trade liberalisation, privatisation of state 
enterprises, the deregulation of markets and the increasing commodification of 
social relationships and nature (see Gledhill 2004). As we shall see in the next 
section, the rise of neoliberalism and the discourse of globalisation are inter­
twined with the decline of development discourse. 
At the end of this section, it is important to note that all the factors mentioned 
above contributed to the decline of the development discourse. This means that 
the orthodox way of speaking and writing about development and the practices 
that were enabled thereby became increasingly rare and the ones that persisted 
became increasingly questioned during the 1990s. This is not to say that the 
development industry set up in the preceding decades ceased to exist, but that 
this industry had to react to a crisis that arose because of deficits in internal log­
ics and changes in the wider global system, by integrating new discourses into its 
portfolio. As some of these discourses were not quite compatible with the rules 
of the traditional formation, we can identify a transformation of development 
discourse sui generis (see chapter 7). 
These new discourses are too numerous to be dealt with in detail here.8 But 
probably the most important factor in this transformation was the rise of neo­
liberal and globalisation discourse, which will be dealt with in the next section. 
Thus, at the end of this section we can note that due to a number of factors – 
in particular the end of the Cold War, the disillusionment with the promise of 
transforming the underdeveloped into developed countries, the crisis of Fordism, 
the awareness of the ecological predicament and last but not least the rise of 
neoliberalism – the discourse of development was on the decline since the 1980s. 
The structure and rise of globalisation discourse 
In this section, the discourse of globalisation will be sketched out in light of its 
variations, related standardised phrases and the criticisms that have been voiced. 
In particular, we will be dealing with the historical rise of this discourse to its 
present prominent position. Special reference will be given to the phenomenon 
of so-called Newly Industrializing Countries (NICs) in East Asia and its het­
erogeneous interpretations. The next section will then discuss in how far the 
notion of change in the globalisation discourse differs from that within the above 
discussed development discourse and whether such a difference has enabled new 
political-economic practices and power structures. 
Since the mid-1990s, globalisation has become the new buzzword in the social 
sciences. Although probably not (yet) comparable to the postwar omnipresence 
of development, a host of academic volumes, courses, conferences and new profes­
sorships bear witness to the catch-all qualities of globalisation. As a signifier, glo­
balisation is linked to a variety of signifieds across different contexts. In order to 
provide some orientation in this confusing array, we can at least distinguish two 
usages: a general one, highlighting increasing global interconnectedness, and an 
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standard formula of the first variant is that since several years and as a result of 
flows of information, capital and people, the world has become more and more 
interconnected. In the spheres of media, economy, culture and ecology, actions 
and events in any part of the world are said to have consequences elsewhere and 
therefore no place or nation-state on the globe can regard itself or be regarded 
as isolated. This discourse is exemplified in the writings of Castells, for example: 
[T]his is indeed a time of change [. . .] In the last quarter of the twentieth 
century, a technological revolution, centered around information, trans­
formed the way we think, we produce, we consume, we trade, we manage, 
we communicate, we live, we die, we make war, we make love. A dynamic, 
global economy has been constituted around the planet, linking valuable 
people and activities from all over the world. 
(Castells 2000: 1) 
The other, more specific and probably more important variant employs a different 
standard formula, namely: As a result of advances in information technology and 
of the liberalisation of world trade, national economic policy became subject to 
(increasing) global competition compelling states to compete with one another 
for capital investment. Thus, states have to align their economic and fiscal policy 
according to the preferences of global financial markets and enterprises, which 
basically means that thereby a new structure of dependency is created. In turn, 
workers have to accept the necessities of global competition and adapt to harsher 
production regimes and reduced remuneration for reproduction. Key terms in this 
discourse, which has exerted considerable discursive and also conditioning power 
since the 1980s, are: liberalisation, deregulation, privatisation, welfare cuts and 
tax breaks for investors on the state level as well as global sourcing, just-in-time 
production, lean management and competitiveness on the enterprise level, and 
increased flexibility and reduced social security on the workers’ level. Michel 
Camdessus, former Managing Director of the IMF, gave a paradigmatic statement 
illustrating this discourse: 
[I]t is now nearly universally accepted that the most effective economic strat­
egies are private sector-led and outward-oriented. The strategies that have 
been systematically adopted in the OECD countries, with various shadings, 
have been the secret of success in East Asia, and they are in turn generating 
fresh opportunities in Latin America and other regions of the world. Con­
versely, there is ample evidence that when the state dominates the economy, 
resources are often misallocated, and private investment and growth suffer. [. . .]
[C]ountries that hope to attract private capital inflows must pursue policies 
that the market believes will result in economic stability and growth. 
(Camdessus 1996) 
Although some critics of globalisation like former Chief Economist of the World 




   
 
 
   




gloomier picture of today’s global environment, they mostly agree to the analysis. 
While Stiglitz fundamentally disagrees with Camdessus’ positive judgement, he 
also sees globalisation characterised by the transnational flows of goods and capi­
tal and the inability of states to regulate these flows: 
Today, with the continuing decline in transportation and communication
costs, and the reduction of man-made barriers to the flow of goods, services
and capital [. . .] we have a process of ‘globalization’ analogous to the earlier
processes in which national economies were formed. Unfortunately, we have
no world government, accountable to the people of every country, to oversee
the globalization process in a fashion comparable to the way national govern­
ments guided the nationalization process. Instead, we have a system [. . .] in
which a few institutions [. . .] and a few players [. . .] dominate the scene, but
in which many of those affected by their decisions are left almost voiceless. 
(Stiglitz 2003: 22) 
It could be said that Stiglitz and others employ a critical economic variant in 
opposition to the affirmative economic variant of globalisation discourse pre­
sented in the Camdessus quote. Still, a discourse can be stabilised by those forms 
of critique which unquestioningly accept its foundations, and this applies for the 
critical economic variant as well. First of all, it is easy to realise that the flows of 
capital, information and people are still by no means evenly distributed around 
the globe, and that investment and internet-access are heavily concentrated in 
some areas. In this vein, Ferguson (2005b) has argued that many accounts of the 
process – Giddens (2002) or Held et al. (1999), but also supposedly critical ones 
by Stiglitz (2003), Sassen (1999) and Hardt and Negri (2001) – are largely ignor­
ing the experiences of certain regions, notably Africa, which do not fit into the 
perception of a globalised world. Thus, such accounts are reproducing the ques­
tionable assumptions of the discourse they seek to criticise fundamentally. The 
general variant of globalisation discourse has also been subject to a trenchant 
critique by Anna Tsing (2000) who maintains that the discourse’s assumptions 
of newness and globality obstruct a more accurate vision of historical continui­
ties and local practices, for example by erecting unhelpful and all-too-simple 
dichotomies. 
Concerning the economic variant, it has been argued that the increasing 
economic interdependence is vastly exaggerated, especially compared with the 
situation at the beginning of the 20th century, and the possibilities of political 
regulation are vastly underestimated (Hirst/Thompson 1996). Gibson-Graham 
(1996) observes that the standard script of this variant overstates corporate 
power and downplays the potential for negotiation and resistance other actors, 
particularly unions, still have. Another critique is voiced regarding the disman­
tling of the welfare state and the increasingly precarious and flexible character of 
wage labour as a result of globalisation. This perception has been called a ‘legend 
of Fordism’ by George Baca because it ignores that in the peripheral areas of the 
world economy, and even in some regions and sectors in the centre, the welfare 
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state and social security have never been realised. This legend would thus con­
flate and idealise the post–World War II experience of the industrialised capitalist 
countries as a global experience (Baca 2004; see also Neveling 2006). 
However, the questions to be answered here are: What happened to 
North-South relations as the globalisation discourse became the master narrative 
of global economic integration? And what effects can be identified in compari­
son to the earlier conception of social change under the heading development? 
The first question shall be dealt with in the following, while the next section is 
devoted to the second. 
If we are talking about the rise of globalisation discourse we have to be aware 
that it is a popular, watered-down version of neoliberal discourse linked to the 
idea of globality and One World which became prominent after the end of the 
bipolar world order. Yet, the rise of neoliberal discourse in institutions of develop­
ment policy was long underway at that time. In his study of this rise John Toye, 
at that time Director of the Institute of Development Studies (IDS) at Sussex 
University, called it ‘the counter-revolution in development theory and policy’ 
(1987), because it started as a countermovement against the Keynesian doctrine 
of state intervention in economic policy. In the neoliberal perspective, whose 
theoretical basis was to be found in neoclassical and monetarist economics, the 
perceived failures of development policy were attributed to flawed Keynesian 
strategies: the idea of the necessity and beneficial effects of state intervention was 
blamed for over-inflated public sectors, inefficient state enterprises, an overem­
phasis on the means of production, neglect of human capital development and 
price-distorting interventions in the market mechanism benefiting urban sectors 
over rural producers.9 
When neoliberal discourse entered development theory and policy, it not 
only pointed out these problems but promoted its own formulae as solutions: 
the efficiency of the allocation of resources through market mechanisms and the 
welfare-increasing effects of competition, liberalisation, privatisation and deregu­
lation in terms of lower prices and higher productivity, innovation and progress 
were stressed. These market-oriented strategies were vehemently promoted by 
the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) as universally appli­
cable in (and for) Third World countries. 
The Asian tiger states as best-practice examples of neoliberalism? 
In this respect, the appropriation of the unique success story of the Southeast 
Asian Tiger states by neoliberal discourse played an important role. The rapid 
processes of economic growth, industrialisation and technological progress in 
South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore were interpreted as proof for 
the benefits of a neoliberal and world-market oriented development strategy.10 
These success stories already featured prominently in the quote by Camdessus 
above, whose author identified the private-sector led and outward-oriented strat­
egies as the secret of success. While it is correct to point out that these states did 









concept of import-substituting industrialisation, which was only partly success­
ful in Latin America, this emphasis omits several crucial points. Among these 
points are the positive geographical (two of the Tigers are city states), historical 
(Japanese colonisation did have some positive effects in terms of infrastructure), 
geopolitical (they were massively supported by the USA during the Cold War) 
and economic (relatively egalitarian distribution after land reforms) conditions 
prevalent in some or all of these countries (Castells 2000: 256–306). Yet the most 
important omission concerns the role of the state in the processes of economic 
growth and industrialisation which can hardly be underestimated and is in direct 
opposition to the neoliberal credo of rolling back the state and letting the market 
rule. As Castells puts it in his section on the Tiger states: 
[A]ny serious, unbiased observer of the Asian Pacific scene knows that sys­
tematic state intervention in the economy, as well as the state’s strategic 
guidance of national firms and multinational corporations located in the 
country’s territory, were fundamental factors in ensuring the transition of 
industrializing economies to each of the stages they were reaching in their 
developmental process . . . the ‘developmental state’ lies at the core of the 
experience of newly industrializing economies. 
(Castells 2000: 258) 
Although Castells is a proponent of what I have labelled the general globalisation
discourse above, this quote shows the proximity of his work to the critical variant.
Adams (1993: 224–228) arrives at similar conclusions: the examples of the Asian
Tiger states ‘suggest very strongly that at critical stages in the development process,
the free market solution may be incompatible with the desired objectives’ (227). 
The World Bank, however, did not see the experience of the Tiger states as the 
definitive refutation of neoliberal strategies. In its 400-page study on the ‘East 
Asian Miracle’, the World Bank argues that the states basically adopted the strat­
egies of the Washington Consensus (Williamson 1990): ‘The authors conclude 
that rapid growth in each economy was primarily due to the application of a set 
of common, market-friendly economic policies, leading to both higher accumu­
lation and better allocation of resources’ (World Bank 1993: vi). This conclu­
sion can only be explained by the World Bank’s remarkable skills in the ‘art of 
paradigm maintenance’ (Broad 2006). Regardless of how justified this appropria­
tion was, the example of the (South-)East Asian Tiger states as successful glo­
balisers played an important role in the rise of neoliberal globalisation discourse 
in the field of development theory and policy and legitimised the promotion of 
market-oriented strategies in poor countries all over the world. 
The significance of economic factors in the rise of globalisation discourse has 
already been referred to above. According to Arrighi, neoliberalism can be seen as 
a strategy to overcome the crisis of Fordist capitalism. The importance of political 
factors in this rise, notably of the coming to power of conservative governments 
in the USA, Great Britain and Germany between 1979 and 1982, deserves to 
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done their best to promote the assumptions of neoliberal globalisation discourse 
and discredit its rivals (Thatcher’s slogan ‘There is no alternative’ became the ral­
lying cry of this faction). Some scholars even go so far as to argue that the imple­
mentation of neoliberal policies in the South through the Structural Adjustment 
Programs (SAP) of the World Bank and the IMF were not primarily designed 
to reorient their economies to the maximisation of interest payments (as many 
critics claim), but to prevent the very policies that had allowed the newly indus­
trialising economies to emerge as rivals to the industrialised states of the North: 
That the Reagan/Thatcher Neoliberal revolution has reversed the policies 
proved successful by the Asian NICs and has insisted that the rest of the 
Third World then implement them reveals something of the revolution’s 
actual intentions. Their setting these new rules into place during the 1980s 
was a rational reaction to the quick rise of the Asian NICs by the world’s 
traditionally wealthy countries in the 1970s. The real policy has been, and 
continues to be: ‘No more NICs!’ 
(Rowden 1998: 156) 
This explanation builds on the historical fact that all the industrialised countries
(with the partial exception of England as being the first-comer) have employed
those protectionist strategies, which they later tried to prevent others from employ­
ing. Chang (2003) has described this method as ‘kicking away the ladder’. Adams
(1993: 223) outlined the strategies which were a standard feature of development
policy before the rise of neoliberalism: government intervention to promote key
industries and sectors, protectionist measures, special allocations, foreign exchange
policies, etc. Most of them were outlawed by international agreements by 2000. 
It cannot finally be clarified here to what extent the rise of the neoliberal discourse
of globalisation in the realm of development theory and policy was a rational reac­
tion to the shortcomings of Keynesian development economics and the convincing
arguments of the neoliberal critics, or to what extent it was an economic process
triggered by the economic crisis of Fordism, or to what extent it was a political means
to maintain global inequality. Certainly all three elements played an important role. 
In the previous section, we have discussed the characteristics of development 
discourse and the reasons for its decline. In this section, we have been dealing 
with the assumptions of globalisation discourse in its different variants and the 
factors contributing to its rise. Our main question now is: In what ways did this 
new perspective on processes of change differ from the old conception of develop­
ment? This will be discussed in the next section. 
From ‘development’ to ‘globalisation’ – different 
assumptions, different policies 
While in the last section the characteristics and assumptions of globalisation dis­
course have already been mentioned, they will be more thoroughly and system­









a different conception of social change than development, we will compare the 
two discourses in terms of their general principles, their assumptions regarding 
material improvements, the consequences of these assumptions for North-South 
relations and the policies and practices rendered necessary, possible or impossible 
by these consequences. This section thus constitutes the a first step towards a sys­
tematic comparison of development and globalisation as two concepts of change 
from the perspective of discourse analysis which up to now is still missing in 
the literature. The material used in my analysis represents central, programmatic 
and/or typical texts of both discourses. 
Beginning with the general analytical principles, it is easy to see that the dis­
course of development is based on a fundamental dualism between developed and 
underdeveloped or less developed or developing countries, areas, states or nations. 
Thus Truman’s inaugural address, which is often cited as the beginning of devel­
opment discourse, envisioned a ‘program of development’ for ‘making the benefits 
of our scientific advances and industrial progress available for the improvement 
and growth of underdeveloped areas’ (Truman 1949). In the discourse of globali­
sation, this dualism is gone. Although differences in material wealth between 
countries are by no means denied, the world is not split up into two different 
kinds of international political entities that have to be treated differently: all 
states are equal before the market. There is only one world (not three), and, 
one might add, only one way to survive in this world. Thus when IMF Man­
aging Director Camdessus11 talks about the process of globalisation, he claims 
‘this sea change in policies and performance is associated with two phenomena 
of profound and universal significance; first, the changing role of the state, and 
second, the globalization of the international capital markets’ (Camdessus 1996). 
As these phenomena constitute the global environment of all states alike, the 
developmental dualism is replaced by a universalism.12 
Beyond the dimension of general world-view and the conception of one or 
two types of actors in the international arena, fundamental differences can also 
be traced in the construction of these subjects or actors’ relation to historical 
processes. In development discourse, the ultimate goal was quite ambitious, the 
development of the underdeveloped areas, and therefore the socioeconomic trans­
formation of the greater part of the world according to the model of the indus­
trialised capitalist countries. Such enthusiasm did not survive the second half 
of the twentieth century but it is worthwhile to remember that in 1970 the UN 
resolution for the second development decade13 announced what follows: 
In the conviction that development is the essential path to peace and justice,
Governments reaffirm their common and unswerving resolve to seek a better
and more effective system of international co-operation whereby the prevail­
ing disparities in the world may be banished and prosperity secured for all. 
(UN 1970, par. 6) 
This amounts to no less than a plan of action for eliminating global inequali­
ties, with the international community as an acting subject shaping the global 
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environment accordingly. Paragraphs 13ff go one step further, as they outline the 
exact rates of economic and population growth to be achieved for the different 
categories of countries (developing/developed). Thus, global social change can and 
must be planned in development discourse, and its second underlying principle 
can be identified as social technology, bearing witness to its theoretical roots 
discussed earlier.14 
Neither this nor a resembling principle forms part of the discourse of globali­
sation. Here it is stated that global economic forces have changed and can no 
longer be objects of planned action. On the contrary, globalisation is constructed 
as an active force that leaves no society untouched. In many political speeches 
and texts of the mid and late 1990s and early 2000s, globalisation is portrayed as 
a natural phenomenon. Then-Director General of the World Trade Organization 
Renato Ruggiero (1998) told the European Commission at a conference on trade 
in services that ‘globalization is an inescapable process’ and repeated this claim 
many times. Bill Clinton claimed in 2000 that ‘[g]lobalization is not something 
we can hold off or turn off . . . it is the economic equivalent of a force of nature –
like wind or water.’15 So the only course of action available was to adjust to the 
new realities of the global economy on the levels of the state, the enterprise, 
and the worker as pointed out above. The authors of the highly influential 2002 
World Bank publication ‘Globalization, Growth, and Poverty’ (which until today 
is the prime reference cited on globalisation on the World Bank’s homepage)16 
state that: ‘A century ago globalization seemed as inevitable as it does today’ 
(World Bank 2002a: 4). The inevitability of the prescribed policies is underlined 
by the slogan referred to above: ‘There is no alternative’. The structural adjust­
ment programs (SAP), which delineate World Bank and IMF conditionalities 
concerning the economic and fiscal policy of Third World countries in exchange 
for loans, were based on the principle that national policies have to adjust to the 
inevitable realities of the global economy. Therefore, the second principle of the 
discourse of globalisation can be identified as adjustment. This principle is also 
rooted in the theoretical foundations of the discourse, as, according to neoclassi­
cal economics, the economic sphere is best left to work on its own (without state 
interventions apart from securing property rights). 
Although both discourses deal with the possibility of material improve­
ments for the poorer part of the world’s population, their assumptions of how 
to achieve these improvements again differ significantly. While it is usually not 
mentioned explicitly, development discourse assumes that interventions in the 
market mechanism in favour of less developed countries are absolutely indispen­
sable for achieving material improvements. A hotly debated question amongst 
development economists therefore was what kinds of interventions in the market 
mechanism were the most promising, but not whether this was a good idea in 
principle (see Martinussen 1997: 56–72). Globalisation discourse, on the other 
hand, argues in line with neoclassical economic theory and regards interventions 
in the market mechanism as the source of inefficient resource allocation resulting 
in higher prices and lower quality in goods and services. The principle paradigm 





country can produce best will be economically beneficial for all countries (ibid.: 
20f). The ‘invisible hand’ of the market invoked by Adam Smith will thus help 
the poor far more than state interventions in the market. David Ricardo applied 
this idea to the international level with his concept of ‘comparative advantage’, 
arguing that international trade is beneficial for all countries under any circum­
stances as long as they specialise in exporting those goods (his classic example 
was wine for Portugal and cloth for England) they can produce most efficiently 
(i.e. in whose production they have a comparative advantage over other goods 
they can produce – not necessarily an absolute advantage over the production of 
other countries). Thus free trade is, according to Ricardo, the best option even 
for less competitive economies. 
The application of such different principles in North-South relations raises 
awareness of the general structures of the global political economy once the link 
between development economics, development aid and the developmental state 
on the one hand and the alteration of the related principles under globalisation 
are considered. It is evident that as long as there is a notion of two groups of 
international actors, one of which is disadvantaged and lagging behind the other, 
special rules for these less developed countries (LDC) may very well be considered 
appropriate and necessary. In this case scientific practice, development econom­
ics, devoted to elaborating these rules and the conditions for material improve­
ments in these handicapped countries, does make sense. If, on the other hand, 
one rejects the premise of different kinds of international actors, then the same 
rules can and should apply for all. Assuming that material improvements will 
be achieved only through market mechanisms, the main characteristic of these 
rules needs to be the liberalisation of these mechanisms from earlier constraints. 
In this line of thinking, the existence of development economics does not make 
sense, as there is only one economic theory that applies to all countries alike – be 
they in the North or in the South. Therefore Deepak Lal (1983) proclaimed the 
‘poverty of development economics’. 
This leads us to the next point: In this view, state intervention in the work­
ing of a market economy (deriving from what Lal calls the ‘dirigiste dogma’) is 
ineffective and damaging, because it results in a situation where resources are 
allocated and prices are not set according to the laws of supply and demand but 
according to political preferences. Ultimately this means that producers will 
either make undeserved profits or will not get a fair price, while consumers will 
either pay too little or too much for the goods and services purchased. Opposed 
to this is the understanding of a developmental state as an indispensable tool to 
steer the economy, to interfere in market prices and to channel investment of 
state and private capital into priority sectors highlighting the (at least poten­
tially) positive effects of capital and technology transfer into less developed coun­
tries. These are clearly interventions in the market mechanism, which is why the 
more consistent proponents of neoliberalism demand their abolition (the latest 
one being Dambisa Moyo [2009]). 
Looking back at the historical record of development policy, it can be
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possible different sets of practices and policies, but that these policies were
in fact implemented according to the discursive principles and assumptions.
Of course, there is no clear-cut line separating an era of development from
an era of globalisation (see McMichael 2000), but it is possible to argue that
the different forms of knowledge about social change identified above were of
varying influence during certain decades. Practices based on the discourse of
development were dominant from the 1950s to the 1970s, while during the
1980s and 1990s, practices based on the discourse of globalisation became
more and more influential – i.e. exerted discursive and then even condition­
ing power. 
One arena that provides an obvious illustration of these changes is the global 
trading system and its institutional structure. The General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATT) (which was ratified in 1948 as a framework for multilateral 
trade in the post–World War II era) includes clauses on Special and Differential 
Treatment (SDT) for less developed countries, reflecting the assumption of two 
different kinds of international actors with different capacities and needs and 
granting the LDCs exceptions and waivers. In 1964, a new clause, Part IV, was 
added to the GATT, which was designed to reconcile the right to development
with international economic integration and firmly established the principle of 
nonreciprocity for LDCs – meaning that these countries would benefit from pref­
erential market access to developed countries following the above outlined prin­
ciple of market intervention. In 1979 (during the Tokyo Round of negotiations), 
the enabling clause legalised preferential (i.e. nonreciprocal) treatment for LDCs 
within the GATT (Rocher 1996: 45f). 
The 1980s, the decade of the rise of neoliberal discourse in the field of 
North-South relations, saw ‘a movement towards reappraisal and roll-back of the 
various privileges and special advantages that developing countries had enjoyed 
in the trading system’ (Adams 1993: 191). For example individual countries were 
pressured to unilaterally renounce the right to import restrictions according to 
the balance-of-payments provision of GATT article 18-B, and a number of them, 
including Korea and Brazil, have in fact done so (ibid.: 192). Also, the entry 
conditions for developing countries in the GATT became much stricter in terms 
of tariff bindings and restrictions during the 1980s, and the required free trade 
commitments of new member states such as Mexico, Tunisia, Venezuela, El Sal­
vador, Guatemala, Costa Rica and Bolivia, far exceeded those of older members, 
notably India (ibid.). The General System of Preferences (GSP) was often used 
to further this roll-back: threatening to withdraw its benefits was a practice regu­
larly used above all by the US to extract concessions in relation to issues like 
intellectual property, services and investment which were not covered by the 
GATT (ibid.: 193). These issues were, however, on the agenda of the World 
Trade Organization. 
In 1995 (in line with the 1986 commenced Uruguay Round of negotiations), 
the GATT was superseded by the World Trade Organization (WTO) as the new 
framework for multilateral trade – meaning that the GATT was now one in a 






















LDCs,17 but many critics maintain that it ‘has suffered a massive dilution’ (Lal 
Das 1998a: 4) and was ‘drastically eroded’ (Cuttaree 2002) in comparison to the 
era of the GATT. 
The WTO is devoted not only to establishing a transparent, rule-based system 
of international trade, but also to the basic principles of free trade and nondis­
crimination. In its own words: 
The trading system should be without discrimination – a country should 
not discriminate between its trading partners (they are all, equally, granted 
‘most-favoured-nation’ or MFN status); and it should not discriminate 
between its own and foreign products, services or nationals (they are given 
‘national treatment’). 
(WTO 1998: 5) 
That is the WTO is designed to outlaw discrimination between foreign multina­
tional companies and small local enterprises – the same rules have to apply for all. 
Therefore the special treatment still granted within the WTO is mostly confined 
to longer transition periods for LDCs before the nondiscriminatory WTO rules 
have to be implemented (see Lal Das 1998a, 1998b). 
Another example is provided by the relationship between the EU/EC and the
ACP-countries (the former colonies of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific).
The treaties of Yaoundé (1963, 1969), Lomé (1975, 1979, 1984, 1990) and Coto­
nou (2000) between these two groups of states illustrate a major shift in their
strategic cooperation (on the following see Raffer 2002). The first of these trea­
tises established a nonreciprocal system of preferences for the ACP countries
and included a contractual right to aid. Lomè I (which was ratified in 1975 as
a concession of the European countries after the blockade of the New Interna­
tional Economic Order resolution ratified by the UN in 1974) introduced STA­
BEX (System for the Stabilization of Export Earnings), a mechanism to stabilise
the revenues of countries exporting raw materials and suffering from the high
fluctuations in world market prices and supply. Lomé II added SYSMIN (Sys­
tem of Stabilization of Export Earnings from Mining Products), which provided
similar assistance to the mining industries of countries strongly dependent on it.
In Lomé IV (1990), the transformation of development discourse can already be
observed: less aid is provided and Good Governance criteria are introduced. The
Cotonou agreement (2000) is explicitly designed to be compatible with WTO
rules (‘Economic and trade cooperation shall be implemented in full conformity
with the provisions of the WTO’, EC and ACP 2000, Art. 34.4) and aims at
establishing free trade agreements with parts of the ACP-countries (the Eco­
nomic Partnership Agreements or EPAs) instead of the former system of prefer­
ences (ibid., Art. 36ff). STABEX and SYSMIN were abolished with the Cotonou
agreement. Raffer concludes: ‘The history of Lomé after 1975 has been charac­
terised by a continuous and tenacious roll-back of the concessions once granted’
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have been abolished, and the rules of free trade are now applied to all contract­
ing parties. 
For the field of development aid we have already discussed the decline of
financial transfers during the 1990s above. Of course one could correctly argue
that the development institutions established in the era after World War II are
still existent and active, which highlights the persistence of development dis­
course and the corresponding policies and practices. The prime examples would
be the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) and its
subsidiary, the International Development Association (IDA) – the two are bet­
ter known as the World Bank. Especially the activities of the IDA – providing
almost interest-free loans to low-income countries – clearly correspond to devel­
opment discourse (market distortions, special rules for poorer countries). Still,
the rise of neoliberal discourse has markedly changed policies and priorities in
the World Bank. During the 1980s and 1990s, an increasing part of its lending
was based on programme lending, not project lending. While development pro­
jects include planned socioeconomic interventions and the transfer of finance,
knowledge and technology, programme or policy-based lending (the Structural
and Sectoral Adjustment Loans of the SAPs) is more concerned with imple­
menting sound economic policies in the receiving countries through lending
conditions and to initiate policies to abolish interventions in the market mecha­
nism and to roll back the developmental state (George/Sabelli 1994, Mohan
et al. 2000). 
One might object however, that such SAPs did not apply to all the countries, 
but merely to the poorer ones. And if the discourse of globalisation was so influ­
ential during the 1980s and 1990s, should we not expect to find similar condi­
tionalities being applied to the industrialised countries? Indeed, we should. Apart 
from the WTO rules referred to above, the most striking example is probably the 
European Monetary Union (EMU). The Maastricht criteria, the provisions on 
the basis of which countries were eligible for the EMU, bear a striking similarity 
to the conditions of the SAP, especially in terms of fiscal austerity – and have 
had similar effects on the member-states’ social policies. This can be observed 
in the experience of poorer EU countries, in particular Greece, in the financial 
crisis of recent years. The EMU criteria can thus be seen as a comparable form of 
disciplinary application of neoliberal policies in the North, as has been argued by 
Gill (2001, 2003).18 
The differences between the discourses can thus be (incompletely) sketched 
in Table 8.1. 
Social reality does not neatly fit into boxes, but the table tries to illustrate 
the differences in the two discourses on social change regarding the two basic 
principles (concerning the actors and the actions), specific principles and pol­
icy recommendations derived from these, and the corresponding status of the 
developmental state, development aid and development economics. Thus, the 
regularities of the discursive formations and the practices they render possible or 







Table 8.1 Characteristics of the discourses of ‘development’ and ‘globalisation’
 
Discourse of: ‘Development’ ‘Globalisation’ 
Basic principle (actors), 
patterns of change: 
Basic principle (actions), 
how to achieve change: 
Derived principle (actors), 
policy recommendations: 
Derived principle (actions), 
policy recommendations: 
Derived status of and 
recommendations towards 
developmental state: 
Derived status of and 
recommendations towards 
development aid: 
Derived status of and 
recommendations towards 
development economics: 
Dualism (developed vs. 
underdeveloped) 
Social technology 
(transforming the LDC) 
Special rules for LDC (SDT, 
NIEO) 
Interventions in market 
mechanism (Lomé) 
Developmental state 
necessary or even crucial, to 
be strengthened 
Development aid necessary 
or even crucial, to be 
increased 
Development economics 
necessary or even crucial, to 
be supported 
Universalism (One World) 
Adjustment (globalisation 
inevitable, TINA) 
Same rules for all (SAP/ 
Maastricht, WTO) 
No interventions, free trade 
(Cotonou) 
Developmental state 
ineffective or even damaging, 
to be pushed back or 
abolished 
Development aid ineffective 
or even damaging, to be 
decreased or abolished 
‘Poverty of development 
economics’, general 
economics is sufficient, dev. 
ec. is superfluous 
Conclusion 
In this chapter I have argued that two different discourses, development and
globalisation, can be identified as successively dominating global North-South 
relations in the past decades. These discourses are based on different forms of 
knowledge about social change, work according to different rules and assumptions 
and correspond to different, even opposed, practices and policies. While devel­
opment discourse was dominant from the 1950s to the 1970s, it lost importance 
with the rise of globalisation discourse in the 1980s. I have illustrated this shift 
with examples from international political economy ranging from the GATT 
and the EU-ACP-treaties to Structural Adjustment Programs of the IMF and the 
World Bank. One crucial conclusion that can be drawn from my observations is 
that the knowledge about historical change is itself subject to historical change – 
the changing conceptions of social change are part of social change itself. 
Despite the important differences between the two forms of knowledge dis­
cussed in this chapter, my analysis of the respective discourses indicates that the 
institutional places where claims to knowledge are formed and substantiated 
mostly remain the same: international organisations concerned with North-South 
relations (above all the World Bank as the leading player) and a limited number 
of university departments. In this respect, continuities are dominant. Neverthe­
less, there are of course differences in the way globalisation discourse is formu­
lated in different institutions – in the IMF and in the United Nations Conference 
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However, a few more recent developments have to be noted briefly. First, since
the Report of the Commission on Global Governance (‘Our Global Neighbour­
hood’) appeared in 1995, the concept of Global Governance has become quite
prominent at least in the political and academic arenas. Although it is in impor­
tant aspects a new version of the neoliberal discourse on globalisation, it explicitly
acknowledges the need to steer, shape or regulate the global economy in the light
of the consequences of unmitigated neoliberalism (Brand 2005). Second, another
reorientation took place in 1999, when the SAPs were renamed Poverty Reduc­
tion Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and restructured according to the principles of own­
ership and poverty reduction (World Bank 2002b).19 Critics argue that despite the
new rhetoric, the insistence of World Bank and IMF on sound economic policies
has basically remained the same (World Development Movement 2001, Craig/ 
Porter 2003). (Chapter 9 will deal with the discourse of the World Bank.) Third,
in the field of development policy, the rise of the Millennium Development Goals
(MDGs) in recent years cannot be overlooked. While the relevant documents
testify to a significant reverse regarding the declining importance of development
discourse during the 1990s and heavily emphasise the need for development aid,
they nevertheless accept neoliberal globalisation as a process to which individuals
and states have to adjust to (UN Millennium Project 2005: 13; see also UN 2000,
2005). Chapter 11 will take a closer look on the MDG discourse. 
The analysis presented above allows us to see that no new discourse is being 
formulated here. These recent developments can rather be seen as attempts to 
reconcile the two discourses by integrating aspects of one into the other and pro­
ducing hybrid forms. It can be assumed that this merging of discourses presents a 
reaction to the massive antiglobalisation protests prevalent since the second half 
of the 1990s – but this remains to be examined in another article. 
This chapter has tried to address the challenge formulated by Tsing (2000) of 
mapping the discourse of globalisation in a similar way as the discourse of devel­
opment has been analysed. I have done so through a systematic comparison of 
these discourses in the field of North-South relations and highlighted their dif­
ferent regularities, principles and policy implications. However, regarding recent 
processes in this field, a merging of these discourses can be observed that deserves 
further research: Which elements of the two discourses are adopted by whom? 
Which institutional contexts seem more prone to one discourse than to the other 
and why? What is the relation between geopolitical and economic transitions 
and forms of knowledge about change? Questions like these can be addressed 
more specifically on the groundwork of the analysis presented here. 
Notes 
1 Many thanks to Patrick Neveling and also to the anonymous reviewers for a host of 
comments which have greatly improved the text. 
2 This article relies mainly on sources and scholars from these regions. However, this 
should not be perceived as Eurocentrism. Just as people from the South (especially if 
educated in the North) are by no means immune to Eurocentric ideas, people from 
 
  






















the North are not necessarily prisoners to their cultural upbringings. Gayatri Spivak 
(1994) has convincingly warned against a cultural essentialism that emphatically jux­
taposes First and Third World as it embraces and romanticises supposedly authentic 
Third World voices. 
3	 Failure to acknowledge this point often leads scholars to resort to theories of ideology 
and false consciousness as explananda, which means to regard large percentages of 
the Third World population as passive objects of manipulation (as is illustrated in the 
work of Rahnema and Esteva referred to earlier). 
4	 Both established the concept of sustainable development as a new kind of development
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future genera­
tions to meet their own needs. 
5	 The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) have been proclaimed by the UN Gen­
eral Assembly in 2000 and include (among others) the aim of halving the number of 
people living in extreme poverty until 2015. Other goals are concerned with universal 
education, gender equality, child health, maternal health, HIV/AIDS, environmental 
sustainability and a global partnership (see chapter 11). 
6	 This critique does not do justice to the more sophisticated accounts of Marxist and/ 
or dependency theory like Cardoso and Faletto (1979), which left room for (world 
market-) dependent development. Second, this position may reflect the majority posi­
tion but is still not shared by every scholar. Leys claims for example that the decline 
of dependency theory and the rise of neoliberalism were the results of transformations 
in the world economy instead of problems inherent to the theoretical position itself 
(1996: 19; see also my later reference to Arrighi’s position). The example of the East 
Asian Tiger states will also be relevant in the third section of this chapter. 
7	 One faction of this civil society critique of development became what is now known as 
the Post-Development school around Esteva, Escobar and Rahnema (see earlier). 
8	 To name but a few: good governance and democratization emerged after the end of the
Cold War and as a reaction to the critique by civil society; an emphasis on relief, crisis
prevention, failed states, humanitarian interventions and even liberal imperialism as a
reaction to the disillusionment with the promise of development (the Post-Development
discourse can be seen as a rather different reaction to this factor); sustainable develop­
ment and one world discourses as a reaction to the ecological predicament; participa­
tion, civil society, ownership and empowerment as reactions to the critique of top-down
approaches; and gender mainstreaming, human development, sociocultural issues and
middle-range theories came up to deal with other critiques of development theory and
policy – or, if you will, as the result of processes of institutional learning. Although these
discourses here are presented as reactions to certain historical factors, their emergence
is of course a multicausal and somewhat more complicated issue. For example the one
world discourse owes its existence not only to the realization of the reach of ecological
problems, but also to the end of the bipolar world order – and even the photographs of
the earth taken from space. For a more thorough examination, see Ziai (2007: 66–94). 
9	 The latter point had been described by Michael Lipton (1977) as ‘urban bias’. Lipton 
at that time also worked at the IDS and later contributed to World Bank and UNDP 
(United Nations Development Programme) reports. 
10	 Sometimes other countries are also subsumed under the heading Asian Tigers, such as 
Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand, but most scholars refer primarily to the four coun­
tries mentioned here. 
11	 As has already been mentioned, the IMF was at the forefront of the neoliberal coun­
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12	 By this I mean that the assumptions of the discourse claim to be universally valid as 
its subjects or actors are not divided by the dualism of its predecessor in two differ­
ent kinds of countries/states/regions/economies (developed/underdeveloped). In another 
dimension, globalisation discourse does of course employ dualisms, above all, the 
dichotomy between the global and the local (see Tsing 2000). Although this is a spa­
tial distinction with connotations similar to development (e.g. modernity/tradition), 
the discourse of globalisation claims to be universally applicable, in contrast to the 
discourse of development, which was targeting the less developed parts of the world. 
Therefore it seems justified to attribute a universalism to globalisation discourse. 
13	 This declaration can be seen as a landmark in development policy because it intro­
duced the commitment by the industrialised countries to devote at least 0.7% of their 
GDP to development assistance – a promise never kept except for the Netherlands 
and the Scandinavian countries. 
14	 In the second section of this chapter, we have identified the concept of social engi­
neering as one of the two sources of development discourse. 
15	 http://thinkexist.com/quotes/top/last-name/clinton/ (December 27, 2008) 
16	 http://www1.worldbank.org/economicpolicy/globalization/ (December 27, 2008) 
17	 To be precise, the WTO rules mention two groups: developing countries and least devel­
oped countries (WTO 1998). Here, both are referred to as LDCs. 
18	 Although one might be tempted to point out that the Maastricht criteria have not 
been implemented too rigorously in comparison to the SAP, the study by Mosley et al. 
(1991) reveals that at least the World Bank has surprisingly often been not very strict 
in enforcing its conditionalities either. 
19	 World Bank and IMF demand PRSPs from the receiving countries, in which the gov­
ernment with the participation of civil society should outline its economic policies 
and poverty reduction strategies. The World Bank now gives out Poverty Reduction 
Strategy Credits (instead of Structural and Sectoral Adjustment Loans), and the 
IMF’s Enhanced Structural Adjustment Facility is now called Poverty Reduction and 
Growth Facility. 
Bibliography 
Adams, Nassau A. 1993: Worlds Apart: The North-South Divide and the International System. 
London: Zed Books. 
Alcalde, Javier Gonzalo 1987: The Idea of Third World Development: Emerging Perspectives 
in the United States and Britain, 1900–1950. Lanham, MD: University Press of America. 
Arrighi, Giovanni 1999: The Global Market. Journal of World-Systems Research 5(2), 
217–251. 
Baca, George 2004: Legends of Fordism: Between Myth, History, and Foregone Conclu­
sions. Social Analysis 48(3), 169–178. 
Booth, David 1985: Marxism and Development Sociology: Interpreting the Impasse. 
World Development 13(7), 761–787. 
Brand, Ulrich 2005: Order and Regulation: Global Governance as a Hegemonic Discourse 
of International Politics? Review of International Political Economy 12(1), 155–176. 
Broad, Robin 2006: Research, Knowledge, and the Art of ‘Paradigm Maintenance’: The 
World Bank’s Development Economics Vice-Presidency (DEC). Review of International 
Political Economy 13(3), 387–419. 
Camdessus, Michel 1996: Argentina and the Challenge of Globalization. Online http:// 












Cardoso, Enrique/Faletto, Enzo 1979: Dependency and Development in Latin America. 
Berkeley: University of California Press. 
Castells, Manuel 2000: End of Millennium. The Information Age: Economy, Society and Cul­
ture, Vol. 3. 2nd ed. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Chang, Ha-Joon 2003: Kicking Away the Ladder: Development Strategy in Historical Perspec­
tive. London: Anthem. 
Cooper, Frederick 1997: Modernizing Bureaucrats, Backward Africans, and the Develop­
ment Concept. In: Cooper, Frederick/Packard, Randall (eds.) 1997: International Devel­
opment and the Social Sciences: Essays on the History and Politics of Knowledge. Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 64–92. 
Cooper, Frederick/Packard, Randall 1997: Introduction, In: Cooper, Frederick/Packard, 
Randall (eds.) 1997: International Development and the Social Sciences: Essays on the His­
tory and Politics of Knowledge. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1–41. 
Cowen, Michael P./Shenton, Robert W. 1996: Doctrines of Development. London: 
Routledge. 
Craig, David/Porter, Doug 2003: Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers: A New Conver­
gence. World Development 31(1), 53–69. 
Cuttaree, Jayen Krishna 2002: Rules Issues and Special and Differential Treatment. Online 
http://www.inwent.org/ef-texte/wto02/cuttaree.htm (November 30, 2008). 
DAC (Development Aid Committee of the OECD) 2008: Are Targets Slipping Out of 
Reach? Online http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/47/25/41724314.pdf (November 27, 
2008). 
EC/ACP 2000: Partnership Agreement Between the Members of the African, Caribbean 
and Pacific Group of States and the European Community and Its Member States 
(Cotonou Agreement). Online http://ec.europa.eu/development/icenter/repository/ 
agr01_en.pdf (November 30, 2008). 
Escobar, Arturo 1995: Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of the Third 
World. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
Esteva, Gustavo 1992: Development. In: Sachs, Wolfgang (ed.) 1992: The Development 
Dictionary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power. London: Zed Books, 6–25. 
Ferguson, James 1994: The Anti-politics Machine: ‘Development’, Depoliticization and Bureau­
cratic Power in Lesotho. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. 
Ferguson, James 2005a: Decomposing Modernity: History and Hierarchy After Develop­
ment. In: Ferguson, James 2006: Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 176–193. 
Ferguson, James 2005b: Globalizing Africa? Observations From an Inconvenient Conti­
nent. In: Ferguson, James 2006: Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order. 
Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 25–49. 
Foucault, Michel 1972: The Archaeology of Knowledge & The Discourse on Language. New 
York: Pantheon Books. 
Foucault, Michel 1980: Power/Knowledge: Selected Interviews & Other Writings 1972–1980. 
New York: Pantheon Books. 
George, Susan/Sabelli, Fabrizio 1994: Faith and Credit: The World Bank’s Secular Empire. 
Harmondsworth: Penguin. 
Gibson-Graham, J. K. 1996: Querying Globalization. In: The End of Capitalism (As We 
Knew It). A Feminist Critique of Political Economy. Minneapolis: University of Min­
nesota Press, 120–147. 








From ‘development’ to ‘globalisation’ 123 
Gill, Stephen 2001: Consitutionalising Capital: EMU and Disciplinary Neo-liberalism. 
In: Bieler, Andreas/Morton, Adam David (eds.) 2001: Social Forces in the Making of 
the New Europe: The Restructuring of European Social Relations in the Global Political 
Economy. Houndmills: Palgrave, 47–69. 
Gill, Stephen 2003: Globalization, Market Civilization and Disciplinary Neo-liberalism. 
In Gill, Stephen 2003: Power and Resistance in the New World Order. Houndmills: Pal-
grave Macmillan, 116–142. 
Gledhill, John 2004: Neoliberalism. In: Nugent, David/Vincent, Joan (eds.) A Companion 
to the Anthropology of Politics. Oxford: Blackwell, 332–348. 
Hall, Stuart 1992: The West and the Rest. In: Gieben, Bram/Hall, Stuart (eds.) Formations 
of Modernity. London: Polity Press, 276–320. 
Hardt, Michael/Negri, Antonio 2001: Empire. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. 
Held, David/McGrew, Anthony/Goldblatt, David/Perraton, Jonathan 1999: Global Trans­
formations: Politics, Economics, Culture. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. 
Hirst, Paul/Thompson, Grahame 1996: Globalization in Question: The International Econ­
omy and the Possibilities of Governance. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Ho, Karen 2005: Situating Global Capitalisms: A View from Wall Street Investment 
Banks. Cultural Anthropology 20(1), 68–96. 
Lal, Deepak 1983: The Poverty of ‘Development Economics’. London: Institute of Economic 
Affairs. 
Lal Das, Bhagirath 1998a: An Introduction to the WTO Agreements. Penang, Malaysia: 
Third World Network. 
Lal Das, Bhagirath 1998b: The WTO Agreements: Deficiencies, Imbalances and Required 
Changes. Penang, Malaysia: Third World Network. 
Leys, Colin 1996: The Rise and Fall of Development Theory. London: James Currey. 
Lipton, Michael 1977: Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development. Lon­
don: Temple Smith. 
Martinussen, John 1997: Society, State and Market: A Guide to Competing Theories of Devel­
opment. London: Zed Books. 
McMichael, Philip 2000: Development and Social Change: A Global Perspective. 2nd ed. 
Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press. 
Mohan, Giles/Brown, Ed/Milward, Bob/Zack-Williams, Alfred B. 2000: Structural Adjust­
ment: Theory, Practice and Impacts. London: Routledge. 
Moore, David/Schmitz, Gerald J. (eds.) 1995: Debating Development Discourse: Institutional 
and Popular Perspectives. Basingstoke: Macmillan. 
Mosley, Paul/Harrigan, Jane/Toye, John 1991: Aid and Power: The World Bank and 
Policy-based Lending. Vol. 1. London: Routledge. 
Mosse, David/Lewis, David (eds.) 2005: The Aid Effect. Giving and Governing in Interna­
tional Development. London: Pluto Press. 
Moyo, Dambisa 2009: Dead Aid: Why Aid Is Not Working and How There Is Another Way 
for Africa. London: Penguin. 
Nandy, Ashis. 1992: Traditions, Tyranny, and Utopias: Essays in the Politics of Awareness. 
Delhi: Oxford University Press. 
Neveling, Patrick 2006: Spirits of Capitalism and the De-alienation of Workers: 
A Historical Perspective on the Mauritian Garment Industry. SCM Online Paper 
Series, No.2, MLU Halle-Wittenberg. Online http://www.scm.uni-halle.de/gsscm/ 
die_graduiertenschule/online_papers/2006/mauritian_garment_industry/. 
Nisbet, Robert 1969: Social Change and History: Aspects of the Western Theory of Develop­


















Raffer, Kunibert 2002: Cotonou: Slowly Undoing Lomé’s Concept of Partnership. Journal 
für Entwicklungspolitik 18(2), 171–184. 
Rocher, Joseph 1996: The GATT in Practice: Understanding the World Trade Organisation. 
Paris: RONGEAD/La librairie FPH. 
Rowden, Rick 1998: Developing Savages, Spreading Democracy: Popular Conceptions of 
North-South Relations. Berkeley Journal of Sociology 43, 149–187. 
Ruggiero, Renato 1998: Towards GATS 2000 – A European Strategy, Address to the Confer­
ence on Trade in Services, organized by the European Commission in Brussels, 2 June 1998.
Online http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/sprr_e/bruss1_e.htm (December 27, 2008). 
Sachs, Wolfgang 1992: Introduction. In: Sachs, Wolfgang (ed.) The Development Diction­
ary: A Guide to Knowledge as Power. London: Zed Books, 1–5. 
Sassen, Saskia 1999: Globalization and its Discontents: Essays on the New Mobility of People 
and Money. New York: New Press. 
Sidaway, James D. 2007: Spaces of Postdevelopment. In: Progress in Human Geography
31(3), 346–361. 
Spivak, Gayatri 1994: Can the Subaltern Speak? In: Williams, Patrick/Chrisman, Laura 
(eds.) Colonial Discourse and Post-Colonial Theory: A Reader. New York: Columbia Uni­
versity Press, 66–111. 
Stiglitz, Joseph 2003: Globalization and its Discontents. 2nd ed. New York: W.W. Norton. 
Toye, John 1987: Dilemmas of Development: Reflections on the Counter-revolution in Develop­
ment Theory and Policy. Oxford: Blackwell. 
Truman, Harry 1949: Inaugural address, Thursday, January 20, 1949. Online http://www. 
let.rug.nl/usa/P/ht33/speeches/truman.htm (October 1, 2008). 
Tsing, Anna 2000: The Global Situation. Cultural Anthropology 15 (3), 327–360. 
UN 1970: International Development Strategy for the Second United Nations Development 
Decade, Resolution 2626. 
UN 1974: Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, Resolu­
tion 3201. 
UN 2000: United Nations Millennium Declaration, Document A/RES/55/2. 
UN 2005: In Larger Freedom: Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All. 
Report of the Secretary-General, Document A/59/2005. 
UN Millennium Project 2005: Investing in Development: A Practical Plan to Achieve the Mil­
lennium Development Goals. Overview. New York: UNDP. 
Williamson, John 1990: What Washington Means by Policy Reform. Online http://www.iie. 
com/publications/papers/print.cfm?doc=pub&ResearchID=486 (December 27, 2008). 
World Bank 1993: The East Asian Miracle: Economic Growth and Policy. Washington, DC: 
World Bank/Oxford University Press. 
World Bank 2002a: Globalization, Growth, and Poverty: Building an Inclusive World Econ­
omy. Washington, DC: World Bank/Oxford University Press. 
World Bank 2002b: A Sourcebook on Poverty Reduction Strategies. Overview, Online 
http://povlibrary.worldbank.org/files/5301_overview.pdf (October 17, 2006). 
World Development Movement 2001: Policies to Roll-back the State and Privatize? Poverty 
Reduction Strategy Papers Investigated. UNU: WIDER discussion paper No. 2001/120. 
WTO 1998: Trading Into the Future. Introduction to the World Trade Organisation. 
Geneva: Author. 
Ziai, Aram 2007: Globale Strukturpolitik? Die Nord-Süd Politik der BRD und das Dispositiv der 





9 World Bank discourse and 
poverty reduction 
The critical literature on Neoliberalism, or the neoliberal discourse of globalisa­
tion, as we have termed it in the last chapter, usually sees the World Bank as 
a stronghold of this discourse (e.g. Peet 2003: 23). A closer look at the World 
Bank and its discourse on development and poverty reduction reveals that this 
view sometimes tends to overlook both the historical changes in this discourse 
and competing variants of this discourse in the World Bank. So, after some 
introductory remarks about neoliberalism and the World Bank, this chapter will 
engage with the shifts and variants that can be discerned within this institu­
tion’s discourse. The next section will compare WB discourse in three important 
publications in its history (the 1973 study Redistribution with Growth, the 1981 
report Accelerated Development in Sub-Saharan Africa: An Agenda for Action and 
the 1989 From Crisis to Sustainable Growth: Sub-Saharan Africa – A Long-Term 
Perspective), before examining more in detail the ambivalent World Development 
Report 2000/2001: Attacking Poverty and briefly contrasting it with the 2002 study 
Globalization, Growth and Poverty. 
Neoliberalism and the World Bank 
As we have seen in the last chapter, a coherent neoliberal discourse of globalisa­
tion opposes interventions in the market mechanism, special rules in world trade 
for poorer countries a developmental state, development aid and even a separate 
discipline of development economics. The neoliberal case against all this aid has 
been presented already in the 1960s and 1970s by Peter Bauer (Bauer 1974, 1981), 
restated by Deepak Lal and others like Ian Little, Bela Balassa and Harry Johnson 
in the 1980s (Lal 1983a, 1983b, 1985, Toye 1987) and somewhat unoriginally 
repeated by Dambisa Moyo in the 2000s (Moyo 2009). Apart from the reproach 
that development aid has the ‘disastrous tendency to politicise life in poor coun­
tries’, that is to ‘increase the power, resources and patronage of governments com­
pared to the rest of society’ (Bauer 1974: 268) and subsidises rent-seeking elites 
as well as ‘classes of beneficiaries of official aid in the donor countries (exporters, 
consultants, civil servants, and academics)’ (ibid.: 271), the economic core of the 
criticisms is that development interventions distort market prices (leading to an 




























Lal, instruments of government policy usually ‘induce economic agents to behave 
less efficiently’ (1983a: 285): if there are financial transfers for those below a 
certain threshold of income (or increased taxes for those above), this provides 
an incentive for individuals not to raise their income in order not to lose this 
transfer. The same holds true for those transfers to low-income countries called 
development aid. Thereby all of these ‘bureaucratic failures’ impair productive 
efficiency and lead to ‘welfare losses’ (ibid.: 284). 
Institutions of development aid which are engaged with financial transfers to 
poorer countries are therefore, from a neoliberal perspective, at best ineffective in 
relation to the goal of poverty reduction, at worst damaging, because they main­
tain structures in the global economy (and polity) which prevent self-sustaining 
growth processes. Dambisa Moyo charges these institutions with upholding a 
‘vicious cycle of aid’ which ‘chokes off desperately needed investment, instils 
a culture of dependency, and facilitates rampant and systematic corruption, all 
with deleterious consequences for growth’ (Moyo 2009: 49). So now the question 
appears: if the World Bank is (as the left critics say) a stronghold of neoliberalism, 
but as it is also an institution delivering development aid, which makes it (as the 
neoliberal critics say) opposed to neoliberalism: how does all of this fit together? 
Let us start by briefly taking a look at the World Bank’s characteristics (for the
following see George/Sabelli 1994, Rich 1994, Kapur et al. 1997, Goldman 2005,
Marshall 2008, Toussaint 2008). The International Bank for Reconstruction and
Development (IBRD), which later became known as the World Bank, was devised
in 1944 at the conference on the postwar economic order in Bretton Woods, New
Hampshire, in the US. Its initial role was to finance the reconstruction of war-torn
Europe through long-term loans, but soon (after the introduction of the Marshall
Plan) its focus turned to the global South. Here, it functioned as a manifestation of
Truman’s promise to support the efforts of less developed countries to become developed
by financing projects, primarily in the field of infrastructure. As already mentioned
in chapter 6, since 1960 it has been supported by the International Development
Association (IDA), which gave out loans not on market conditions, but with
extremely low interest rates to the poorest countries. IBRD and IDA are usually seen
as the World Bank, while the World Bank group also comprises the International
Finance Corporation (IFC), focusing on private investment, the Multilateral Invest­
ment Guarantee Agency (MIGA) and the International Centre for the Settlement
of Investment Disputes (ICSID). The President of the World Bank is traditionally
a US citizen (while the Managing Director of the IMF is European). The World
Bank is governed by the Board of Directors, in which 24 representatives of the 185
member states are taking decisions, their voting power is calculated according to the
capital shares of their countries (in contrast to the ‘one country, one vote’ system
of the UN). In 2014, it had more than 10,000 employees in more than 120 offices
worldwide,1 and its lending commitments amounted to US$40.84 billion.2 Given
that and the widely recognised intellectual leadership, the World Bank is certainly
‘the most important development institution in the world’ (Peet 2003: 111). 
Turning to the question of neoliberalism, it can be observed that the IBRD does 
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countries, so in this respect is actually not guilty as charged by its neoliberal 
critics. The IDA, however, does provide almost interest-free loans, i.e. financial 
transfers on concessional, not market terms (Marshall 2008: 36f), which are not 
compatible with the discourse of neoliberalism. Further, the debt relief for the 
Highly Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC), which was funded also by IDA and 
IBRD (Marshall 2008: 156f), cannot be reconciled with a rigid neoliberal posi­
tion either (Bauer 1974: 272f). On the other hand, the World Bank has used 
its position as the largest and most influential donor to achieve changes in the 
economic policy of recipient countries in the course of the structural adjust­
ment loans, changes guided by the discourse of neoliberalism and the ‘Washing­
ton Consensus’:3 liberalisation of trade and capital markets, deregulation of the 
economy, privatisation of public institutions, etc. (Hayter/Watson 1985, Cornia 
et al. 1987, George 1988, Sparr 1994, World Bank 1996, Mohan et al. 2000, 
SAPRIN 2004). Thus our first look at the Bank leaves us with an ambivalent 
picture. A strictly neoliberal position would demand the abolishment of develop­
ment institution, but this might be too strict a demand for a development institu­
tion incompatible with the institutional interest in survival. Rather, the World 
Bank opted for the middle path of trying to implement market reforms while not 
abiding by market principles itself and using financial transfers to further these 
reforms.4 In the next section, we will examine the discourse of the World Bank 
and its relation to neoliberalism more in detail. 
World Bank discourse: from redistribution to adjustment 
The number of World Bank publications far exceeds the capacity of a single 
researcher in a single chapter. Therefore I will concentrate in this and the follow­
ing section on some of them which have been widely read and cited. I will start 
with the study Redistribution with Growth. Policies to improve income distribution in 
developing countries in the context of economic growth, which was a joint study by 
the World Bank’s research centre and the Institute of Development Studies in 
Sussex (Chenery et al. 1973). It starts with the statement: ‘It is now clear that a 
decade of rapid growth in underdeveloped countries has been of little or no ben­
efit to perhaps a third of their population’ (Chenery et al. 1973: xiii), delivered by 
the World Bank’s vice-president for development policy. There was ‘evidence of 
growing inequality in the Third World’ because this growth was ‘very unequally 
distributed among countries, regions within countries, and socio-economic 
groups’ (ibid.) – an unambiguous indictment of trickle-down assumptions. Yet 
the study also warns of policies which would prioritise redistribution and neglect 
the significance of growth altogether: this ‘new conventional wisdom seems to be 
almost as misleading as the old’ (ibid.).5 
On the other hand, the study recommends the policies of countries ‘in which 
the poor have shared equitably in income growth’, such as Israel, Yugoslavia, 
Taiwan, Korea, Sri Lanka, Costa Rica and Tanzania (ibid.: xv). These consist of 
improving access to modern-sector employment through education, redistribu­




point does not seem quite consistent with a neoliberal discourse relying strictly 
on market forces and decrying the welfare losses produced through government 
policy providing what is seen as false incentives. The inconsistence becomes a 
clear contradiction when the study claims that elements of public and private 
ownership are needed: ‘laissez faire instruments of taxation and price policy as 
well as the socialist instruments of state ownership and direct intervention’ (ibid.: 
xvii). Far from being opposed to markets, the study claims: ‘While we advocate 
maximum use of instruments that operate through factor and product markets, 
often they will not be sufficient for this purpose [poverty reduction]’ (ibid.). 
Policy measures suggested include controversial ones such as land reform (59f), 
consumption transfers (64f) and nationalisation (61f). It is even mentioned that 
there are ‘market mechanisms that discriminate against low-income groups’ (17). 
The message could hardly be clearer: reliance on market mechanisms alone will 
not reduce poverty, redistribution in favour of the poor is indispensable. 
As it is deemed ‘necessary to evaluate the results of any development policy in 
terms of the benefits it produces for different socio-economic groups’ (ibid.: 39), 
an index of economic performance is developed which measures the growth rate 
of each income quintile and thus potentially poverty weighted welfare increases 
(note that welfare is identified with economic growth). The study explicitly men­
tions the possibility of giving weight to economic growth in inverse proportion to 
income levels (ibid.: xvi), i.e. focusing on the progress of the poor. Yet even the 
equally weighted measurement would imply that an income increase of $1 in a 
household with an income of $100 were seen as significant as an increase of $10 
in a $1,000 household – something which is not the case in unspecific statistics 
taking the state as a unit of analysis. 
As regards the role of international aid agencies, the study proposes their firm 
endorsement of redistributive policies and corresponding support for such poli­
cies on the national level (175), a diversification of funds to mitigate large donor 
influence (ibid.), achievement and increase of the 0.7 per cent target (ODA in 
relation to GNP) (177), untying of aid (178) and giving ‘much greater prior­
ity . . . to countries whose development policies showed an open and effective 
commitment to poverty-focused strategies’ (ibid.). It even stresses ‘the need to 
alter the framework of international economic relationships’ (175) to achieve 
the objective of redistribution. In other words, the policy recommendations are 
clearly rooted in the discourse of development, emphasising the necessity to 
achieve or at least approach global equality through financial transfers and inter­
ventions in market mechanisms. 
A mere eight years later, the tide had turned, and the World Bank increasingly 
saw its role as a promoter of market-oriented policies in the structural adjustment 
programmes. One of the first hallmarks of this turn was the report Accelerated 
Development in Sub-Saharan Africa (World Bank 1981), nicknamed Berg report 
after its coordinator Eliot Berg.6 Already the foreword by World Bank President 
Clausen emphasised ‘more efficient use of scarce resources’ and suggested that 
‘governments can more effectively achieve their social and development goals by 
reducing the widespread administrative overcommitment of the public sector and 
 
 
World Bank discourse and poverty reduction 129 
by developing and relying more on the managerial capacities of private individu­
als and firms’ (World Bank 1981: v). This echoes Lal’s (and others’) opposition to 
the developmental state’s government intervention which was based on neoclas­
sical economic theory. 
The report sees weak growth in Africa as the problem and ‘domestic policy 
inadequacies’ (4) as ‘sources of lagging growth’, next to other factors (among 
them the ‘economic disruption that accompanied decolonization and postcolo­
nial consolidation’, but not the economic disruption that accompanied colonial­
ism), and here in particular protectionism, overextended public sectors and a bias 
against agriculture (ibid.). The central policy actions advocated to cure these ills 
are market oriented: devaluation in exchange rates, deregulation, privatisation 
and liberalisation in the public sector and in agricultural policies (5). While all 
this is in line with neoliberal discourse, the report also demands ‘a commitment 
to larger aid flows in the 1980s’, more specifically ‘a doubling of aid in real terms’ 
by the end of the decade (7) – which is clearly contrary to it. The aid should, 
however, be ‘targeted to improve efficiency of resource use’, (ibid.) which in the 
historical context of structural adjustment can easily be read as ‘used as leverage 
for neoliberal reforms’. 
Inequality, however, does not feature prominently in the Berg report. In fact, 
it is mentioned not once in the 217 pages. The market, in contrast, is mentioned 
around 230 times. (To compare: in the 1973 study, which was also concerned 
with growth and poverty reduction, the market was mentioned 137 times and 
inequality 117 times.) Market-oriented reforms are seen as the crucial instrument 
for attaining the goal of economic growth. In line with the classical theory of 
comparative advantage, the report argues: 
Economic growth implies using a country’s scarce resources – labor, capital, 
natural resources, administrative and managerial capacity – more efficiently. 
Improving efficiency requires, first, that a country produces those things 
which it can best produce as compared with other countries and, second, 
producing them with the least use of limited resources. 
(24) 
Therefore great emphasis is given to calculating the domestic resource costs 
(DRC) per unit of foreign exchange in export crops for African countries (65) 
in order to identify the goods in which the specific countries have a comparative 
advantage and in whose exports they should specialise. This World Bank advice 
reflects the following assumptions: 
Local production should be geared to earn foreign exchange. This constitutes 
the rationale of the structural adjustment programmes which were, after all, 
designed to solve the debt crisis by enabling the debtor countries in the South 
to pay their debts to the Banks in the North – the purpose of local production 
should not be to address the basic needs of the population. 
Countries should produce whatever they are able to efficiently produce in the 





shaped in the past by the needs of European colonialism. Neither does it take 
into account the problematic aspects of being locked into a colonial division of 
labour as an exporter of primary goods (see Singer 1950), nor that all industri­
alised countries have at one point in their history decided to focus on industrial 
production – against their comparative advantage in agricultural production (see 
Chang 2003). So the World Bank recommendations end up in ‘freezing countries 
in existing patterns of production which are, on the whole, the ones left over 
from colonialism’ (George/Sabelli 1994: 65f). 
The present world market prices will remain more or less stable. This assump­
tion neglects not only the usual volatility, but in particular the consequences of 
the Bank’s own actions. If it pushes all the recipients of structural adjustment 
loans in the Third World towards exporting more primary goods, oversupply will 
reduce the prices. And this is just what happened during the 1980s. Unsurpris­
ingly, the Bank’s projections of world market prices turned out to be too opti­
mistic on a regular basis (George/Sabelli 1994: 79–95). This can be seen as a 
consequence of methodological nationalism which sees single countries as the 
units of analysis.7 
Another eight years later, another influential report on Sub-Saharan Africa 
was published by the World Bank, entitled Sub-Saharan Africa: From Crisis to 
Sustainable Growth (World Bank 1989). It is noteworthy that only two years after 
the Brundtland report introduced the new catchphrase ‘sustainable develop­
ment’, the World Bank adopted it, but transformed it to ‘sustainable growth’. 
It continued the argument on adjustment and neoliberal reforms, stressing from 
the outset a new buzzword from the discourse of globalisation, competition:8 ‘We 
have come to appreciate that fundamental structural change is needed to trans­
form African economies and make them competitive in an increasingly competi­
tive world. The adjustment efforts must be continued and the reforms broadened 
and deepened’ (World Bank 1989: xi). This was necessary to achieve economic 
growth of ‘at least 4 or 5 percent annually’ which was a requirement for ‘a mod­
est improvement in living standards’, jobs and food security (ibid.). However, 
‘although sound economic policies and an efficient infrastructure are essential’, 
they are not sufficient: 
A root cause of weak economic performance in the past has been the failure 
of public institutions. Private sector initiative and market mechanisms are 
important, but they must go hand-in-hand with good governance – a public 
service that is efficient, a judicial system that is reliable, and an administra­
tion that is accountable to its public. 
(xii) 
Thus even three years before the influential Governance and Development, the 
World Bank introduced the concept which was to become a central concept in 
development policy during the 1990s. 
It has been noted that the new emphasis on good governance can be seen as 
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2000). Whereas the neoliberal reforms were heralded as the way forward at the 
beginning of the decade, the report cannot but realise that ‘Sub-Saharan Africa 
as a whole has now witnessed almost a decade of falling per capita incomes, 
increasing hunger and accelerating ecological degradation. The earlier progress 
made in social development is now being eroded’ (World Bank 1989: 1). In a situ­
ation where the majority of African countries have been undergoing structural 
adjustment, the failure of these policies to improve lives or even spur economic 
growth can now be attributed to ‘weak public sector management’ leading to 
‘loss-making public enterprises, poor investment choices, costly and unreliable 
infrastructure, price distortions . . . and hence inefficient resource allocation’ (3) 
– instead of blaming the economic reforms themselves. In this way, the argument 
for good governance actually affirms the legitimacy and necessity of neoliberal 
reforms and the concept becomes ‘synonymous with sound development man­
agement’ (World Bank 1992: 1). Other elements of good governance – rule of 
law, accountability, democracy, etc. – are thus merely seen as means to the end 
of market-oriented reforms and a stable and attractive environment for investors 
(World Bank 1989: 9, 11, 15, 126). 
The measures proposed by this agenda of neoliberal reform and good
governance – among them the introduction or raising of fees for health care (6, 
64, 67f), water provision (7, 53, 55, 86, 165), schooling (7, 80–82) and even fuel-
wood (11), the freezing or lowering of wages (5, 12, 29, 42, 49, 75, 110, 167, 175, 
186, 191) and the cutting of social services (and instead using women’s unpaid 
work) (7, 46, 64, 86) – are purportedly 
aimed at empowering ordinary people, and especially women, to take greater 
responsibility for improving their lives – measures that foster grassroots 
organization, that nurture rather than obstruct informal sector enterprises, 
and that promote nongovernmental and intermediary organizations . . . 
development must be more bottom-up. 
(xii; see also 1, 4, 55, 187) 
Thus empowerment was envisioned as a dismantling of supposedly corrupt 
and overregulating states to allow for entrepreneurial individuals who would take 
over the responsibility for improving their lives. Here, we have a clear rejection 
of the trusteeship of developmental states and the corresponding elements of the 
discourse of development. And although of course the existence of development 
aid and development institutions is again not called into question (and even 
more ODA and debt reductions are recommended, 13f), the report warns that 
in ‘the long term, dependency on aid and technical assistance must be reduced’ 
(xii). Inequality is again a nonissue: the term is not to be found on the 322 pages.9 
We find that while the World Bank in the 1973 study was still firmly anchored
in the discourse of development, in the 1981 and the 1989 report, it has adopted
most elements of the discourse of neoliberal globalization – except for the demand
to abolish development aid and development organisations, which would be


















the developmental state in general and interventions in the market mechanism in
particular on the grounds that they distort prices and provide false incentives is as
pervasive as the advocacy of liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation and the
corresponding orientation to competition and the world market. These elements
could not be found in the 1973 study. Another significant finding is that the World
Bank’s concern with the question of inequality visible here – a topic not entirely
unexpected when dealing with questions of growth and poverty reduction –
has disappeared entirely in the 1980s. That inequality is something negative
and a concern for politics is a view which Friedrich August Hayek, the Austrian
economist and mentor of neoliberalism, has fought vehemently again and again.10 
The increasing inequality as a result of neoliberal adjustment (Mohan et al. 2000,
SAPRIN 2004) thus is not a coincidence and during the 1990s led to an increas­
ing crisis of legitimacy of those global economic institutions promoting these poli­
cies, above all IMF, World Bank, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). 
Contested neoliberalism: the World Bank report on poverty 
When the World Bank celebrated its 50th anniversary in 1994, it was met by 
protesters from civil society proclaiming ‘50 years in enough!’ and demanding the 
shutdown of the institution (Danaher 1994). When World Bank president James 
Wolfensohn took office in 1995, he seemed determined to take action regarding 
this crisis of legitimacy. He launched the headline ‘Our dream is a world free 
of poverty’ on the World Bank homepage, initiated internal reforms, engaged 
the critics of adjustment in dialogue and even joint research,11 and made Joseph 
Stiglitz, who was more of a Keynesian than a neoliberal, Chief Economist of 
the Bank. The 1997 World Development Report The State in a Changing World
(World Bank 1997) coordinated by Stiglitz already aroused some attention as it 
saw a more positive role of states in the process of economic growth and develop­
ment, whereas a few years earlier, the World Bank had still maintained that the 
impressive successes of the East Asian Tiger states came about despite and not 
because of massive state intervention in the economy (World Bank 1993). 
In this context, the World Development Report 2000/2001 Attacking Pov­
erty deserves special attention. The World Development Reports are the World 
Bank’s flagship publications, at least 50,000 copies are printed, it is translated into 
seven languages and it can be downloaded for free on its website. The 2000/2001 
report was to be coordinated by Ravi Kanbur at the behest of Joseph Stiglitz. The 
report drew heavily on the ‘Voices of the Poor’, a combination of participatory 
studies by the Bank involving 60,000 people in 60 countries, and although it did 
not deny the significance on growth for poverty reduction, its draft from Janu­
ary 2000 stressed that liberalisation and deregulation had sometimes worsened 
the situation of the poor and proposed to focus on the three areas of empow­
erment, security and opportunity. It even advocated capital controls to avoid 
financial crises. The draft unsurprisingly provoked serious opposition from the 
hard-core neoliberal faction at the Bank as well as from some economists and the 
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that further amendments would go too far and resigned in the face of insistent 
demands. He then refused all press interviews, not dissociating himself from the 
Bank in order not to legitimise further revisions of the report. The final version 
of the report which was published in September 2000 differed in some respects 
from the January draft – the pro-market position was strengthened – but still had 
enough original elements to make it a strange mixture and probably the most 
progressive outline of World Bank policy to date (Wade 2001). 
Already in the first sentence – ‘Poor people live without fundamental freedoms 
of action and choice that the better-off take for granted’ (World Bank 2000: 1) –
the question of liberty is linked to that of material deprivation. This linkage 
(echoing the work of Amartya Sen, see chapter 12) is an important move in the 
context of the preeminence given to political rights in the West to the detriment 
of economic and social rights. It is also remarkable that according to the report 
we live in ‘a world where political power is unequally distributed and often mim­
ics the distribution of economic power’ (1) – an argument which can be used by 
Marxists to question the democratic credentials of the existing political and eco­
nomic system. The frequent quotes of poor people, although often not mentioned 
by name, also introduce a new, participatory element in the report. However, the 
selectivity of the quotes cannot be evaluated without a major study of the exten­
sive data. Concerning the important question of state intervention for the sake 
of the weak, the report clearly demands ‘effective national action to manage the 
risks of economic shocks and effective mechanisms to reduce the risks faced by 
poor people . . . It also requires . . . providing a range of insurance mechanisms . . . 
from public work to stay-in-school programs and health insurance’ (7). 
Probably the most obvious sign of the partial deviance from the neoliberal 
orthodoxy can be found in the surprisingly prominent role given to inequal­
ity. In stark contrast to its complete absence in the 1981 and 1989 reports, the 
term appears around 110 times and also figures in the heading of chapter 3. In 
this chapter, we learn that ‘income inequality between countries has increased 
sharply over the past 40 years’ and that inequality among individuals has also 
risen (51). Related to this, power and powerlessness are frequently invoked as 
explanations for poverty and inequality, and ‘empowerment of poor people – by 
making state and social institutions more responsive to them’ is described as ‘key 
to reducing poverty’ (3). ‘Social barriers such as class stratification and gender 
division’ have to be tackled according to the report (10), just as ‘legal discrimina­
tion’ against ‘disadvantaged ethnic and social groups’ has to be eliminated (7). It 
is even asserted that ‘[m]any development programs are inherently political and 
powerful vested interests can be expected to mobilise against reforms that seek 
to erode their position in the name of poor people’ (131). These statements may 
seem to refute Ferguson’s hypothesis of the development apparatus functioning as 
an ‘anti-politics machine’ which reduces poverty and inequality to technocratic 
problems to be solved by unpolitical interventions side-lining the question of 
power and the political dimension of the state (Ferguson 1994: 69, 256). 
However, a closer look reveals that a depoliticising function can in fact be







































number of occasions the report claims that there is no conflict between the objec­
tives of growth and poverty reduction but, on the contrary, there are ‘reinforcing
effects from economic development to human development and back’ (World
Bank 2000: 58). The report goes on to assert that the ‘interests of the poor and
the nonpoor are intertwined in many ways’ because ‘efforts to reduce poverty
can promote social and economic development for the whole nation, thereby
also raising the living standards of the nonpoor’ (108). Not only are promoting
market opportunities for the poor, facilitating their empowerment and reducing
their vulnerability beneficial both to the poor and to the growth process (7), even
environmental protection (52), participation (113) and gender equality (39, 49,
119) are conducive to growth – and thus to poverty reduction. Repeatedly, a
link or even an equivalence between market-friendly reforms, economic growth
and development or poverty reduction is discursively constructed: ‘[T]here is
now substantial evidence that open trade regimes support growth and devel­
opment . . . Trade reforms have delivered growth, and thus poverty reduction’
(70). Sometimes this equation is also used to construct the identities of reform­
ers as well-meaning and democratic, in implicit opposition to those opposed to
these reforms: ‘Well-functioning markets are important in generating growth and
expanding opportunities for poor people. That is why market-friendly reforms
have been promoted by international donors and by developing country govern­
ments, especially those democratically elected’ (61). Or it is used to explicitly
delimit the discourse of poverty reduction to the space of neoliberal reforms: ‘The
debate about reforms is therefore not over a choice between reforms or no reforms:
the absence of reforms to develop vibrant, competitive markets and create strong
institutions condemns countries to continued stagnation and decline’ (62).12 
Second, and in line with the quotes above, power is discussed only in relation
to the state, not in relation to enterprises or market forces. The negative conse­
quences of neoliberal reforms in different contexts which are mentioned on page
65 are e.g. attributed to flawed state institutions (corruption, inadequate public
investment, excessive bureaucracy), but not once to the simple workings of market
mechanisms (65) – as if the market itself cannot fail. Participation in markets is
always constructed as beneficial, exclusion from markets as a barrier to improve­
ment (39, 76, 115, 179). There is a deafening silence on transnational companies
and no hint in the report that they might be involved in creating or worsening pov­
erty. Merely some vague ‘forces affecting poor people’s lives . . . beyond their con­
trol’ are mentioned (16). Even when negative consequences of neoliberal reforms
are mentioned, it is (inconsistently) claimed that they are a) inevitable and b)
their alternative had even worse consequences: In an economic crisis, ‘restrictive
fiscal and monetary policies are inevitable and less costly than the alternative of
delaying such measures’ (162). And even when parts of the population will suffer as
a consequence of these reforms, this must not be used as an argument against these
reforms: ‘In view of the urgent need to get countries into dynamic, job-creating
development paths, it is critical that the difficulty of reform and the impossibil­
ity of compensating every loser not lead to policy paralysis’ (76). So the decision
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contingent political decision. The market thus takes on the character of a force of
nature – the anti-politics machine has been dismantled only in respect to the state.
And all of this has to be seen in the context of a report which aroused serious unrest
within the World Bank because of its deviation from the neoliberal orthodoxy. 
However, the next important World Bank report on the topic released shortly
afterwards – Globalization, Growth and Poverty by Collier and Dollar (World Bank
2002) – was painting a clearer, less ambivalent picture: ‘Globalization generally
reduces poverty because more integrated economies tend to grow faster and this
growth is usually widely diffused’ (World Bank 2002: 1). Given the crisis of legiti­
macy mentioned at the beginning of the section, it cannot avoid recognising that
‘[g]lobalization also produces winners and losers’, but the responsibility for the lat­
ter lies with unfavourable geographies, weak policies, institutions and governance
or civil war (2) – not with the market mechanism. Inequality is still an issue in the
report (around 100 mentions), but increased inequality as a consequence of liber­
alisation is either denied (6) or attributed to inadequate participation in the world
market (7). Power and empowerment are redefined in a similar manner as partici­
pation: ‘The combination of strong education for poor people and a more positive
investment climate is critical for empowering poor people to participate in the
benefits of a more strongly expanding economy’ (20). The meaning of empower­
ment is thus limited to participating in the growing market economy through
wage labour – a rather reductionist version of empowerment. The message is clear:
the problems of liberalisation and globalisation have to be addressed, but certainly
not by questioning liberalisation and globalisation, but by integrating the poor
into the world economy: ‘Many poor people are benefiting from globalisation. The
challenge is to bring more of them into this process’ (22). That their inclusion
in the world economy on asymmetrical terms may be a reason of their poverty is
thus conveniently excluded. We thus find a clearer commitment to the principles
of neoliberal discourse, with the usual exception of demanding more foreign aid
(20) and even debt relief for poor countries – which would contribute to ‘enabling
them to participate more strongly in globalization’ (21). This kind of participation
seems to be the universal recipe for growth and poverty reduction. 
Looking back at the two reports, it can be observed that the moderate neo­
classical faction in the World Bank (the Post-Washington-consensus advocates 
around Stiglitz and Kanbur) did suffer a defeat, but managed to retain some of its 
views in the WDR 2000/2001. In particular the clear statements about the rela­
tion between power and poverty seem remarkable, as they highlight that poverty 
is also closely related to discrimination and denial of freedom. Yet the relations 
of power implicit in a capitalist economy and the market mechanism are usually 
ignored even where the World Bank is at its most progressive. 
Conclusion 
Even the relatively brief and cursory analysis in this chapter has shown the vast
differences in the World Bank publications over time and hinted at the existence






















    












rooted in the discourse of development and advocated a mixture of market-oriented
instruments and state ownership to achieve the objective of growth and poverty
reduction, the tide had clearly turned in the 1980s. The 1981 and 1989 reports
were unambiguous and vehement in their promotion of market-oriented policies
and their rejection of the developmental state and its interventions. Inequality
was a nonissue in these reports and the policy recommendations of neoliberalism
were put forward with unbroken confidence – with the exception of the ques­
tion of development aid. Here, the World Bank deviated from rigid neoliberalism
for obvious reasons. In the reports of the new century, the confidence has been
substituted by an awareness of the discontents of globalisation, coupled with the
conviction that the market still provides the best of solutions, but that the task
of institutions is to create an environment where people will benefit from the
market mechanism. This results in what can be called a neoliberal discourse of
development: the task of poverty reduction is (contra Hayek) seen as the prime
objective, but liberalisation and private initiative are seen as the most effective
instruments to achieve it. Development aid and assistance to the poor are (con­
tra Bauer) necessary, yet they should be as market-oriented as possible (as in the
strategies of opportunity, empowerment and security). Yet the controversy around
the WDR 2000/2001 has shown that this discourse is contested within the World
Bank: next to the still dominant faction that continues to promote growth and
liberalisation as still the best cure, there is a faction whose trust to the market is
less than complete and whose awareness of relations of power and inequality is far
more developed than that of the orthodox neoliberals. 
Notes 
1 http://www.worldbank.org/en/about/what-we-do (December 19, 2014)
 
2 http://www.worldbank.org/projects (December 19, 2014)
 
3 John Williamson, who coined the phrase Washington Consensus to describe the polit­
ical reforms demanded both by the US government and the IMF and the World Bank, 
differentiates between this more general consensus and the more hard-line position he 
regards as neoliberalism (Williamson 1993). 
4	 That its efforts to achieve market reforms in recipient countries have sometimes been 
thwarted by the pressure to lend (giving out loans was more important to the institu­
tion than strict adherence of the recipients to the letter of intent), was a highly inter­
esting result of the research by Mosley et al. (1991). 
5	 Actually, this new conventional wisdom is not spelled out precisely, but the context 
suggests the meaning assumed here. 
6	 Evidently, the report was an answer to the Lagos Plan of Action, a strategy for devel­
opment adopted by the African heads of state at the meeting of the Organization of 
African Unity 1980 (World Bank 1981: 1). 
7 Here, the theoretical contribution of dependency and world-system approaches 
becomes obvious. 
8 Competition and competitiveness appear 147 times in the 1989 report. The terms 
appeared 13 times in the 1973 study and 31 times in the 1981 report. 
9	 However, there are a few instances where the report is concerned with unequal distri­
bution of livestock, natural energy resources or regional integration benefits across the 
continent (97, 128, 161) – not of property, land or income though. 
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10	 ‘Inequality is not regrettable, but highly enjoyable. It is simply necessary . . . Precisely 
the differences in remuneration bring the individuals to actions which give rise to the 
national product’ (Hayek 1981: 36, translation AZ). 
11	 Together with a number of NGOs, Wolfensohn initiated the Structural Adjustment 
Participatory Review Initiative (SAPRI), where World Bank representatives together 
with their critics chose local experts to assess the results of structural adjustment pro-
grammes in selected countries. When it turned out that the results would confirm 
the views of the critics more than its own, the World Bank withdrew from and even 
obstructed the review (SAPRIN 2004). 
12	 Bachrach and Baratz (1962) have termed such attempts to prevent controversy and 
further a particular agenda in this way as nondecisions. 
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Projects, power and a 
poststructuralist perspective 
In the late 1980s and especially during the 1990s, the Post-Development school 
in development theory became widely known (see above all Esteva 1987, Sachs 
1992, Ferguson 1994, Escobar 1995, Rahnema 1997). Its argument, in a nutshell, 
was that the concept of development is Eurocentric because it implicitly clings to 
colonial assumptions of the superiority of Western societies and that it repro­
duces power relations between developed and less developed regions or individuals –
even in well-meaning development projects aiming at poverty reduction (DuBois 
1991). Going beyond a neo-Marxist critique that development projects actually 
serve as means for exploiting the periphery, the Post-Development school funda­
mentally questioned the endeavour of industrialising, modernising and uplifting 
the Third World, emphasising cultural difference against Western universalism 
and exposing what Cowen and Shenton (1996) have described as trusteeship: 
the authoritarian exercise of power based on expert knowledge at the root of 
development policy with the aim of improving society on behalf of poor and 
ignorant people. It was time, the Post-Development authors argued, to look for 
alternatives to development which could be found in grassroots movements and in 
the informal sector of the periphery. 
Many critics have criticised or even rejected the Post-Development stance 
(Corbridge 1998, Kiely 1999, Nanda 1999, Nederveen Pieterse 2000). Most of 
the criticisms can be argued to be only valid for what could be called the neopop­
ulist variant of Post-Development (Ziai 2004). However, one important criticism 
concerns the historical place of the Post-Development criticism and thus turns 
one of its major arguments against it. While the Post-Development school has 
argued that development was a child of the Cold War era (the geopolitical inter­
ests of the US are seen as a midwife of the concept), one could return that its 
critique may be appropriate for the 1970s and 1980s, but overlooks the profound 
transformations which have taken place in development policy since then. 
Undoubtedly there has been a transformation in development discourse which 
includes the rise of neoliberalism, good governance, sustainable development, 
global governance, civil society, participation and partnership (IDS 2001, Mosse 
2005). The latter are especially relevant in this context, because these elements 
directly contradict the view that development was a top-down, authoritarian pro-






can also be observed on the level of development projects and whether and how 
it affected the implicit power relations. 
In the following section, the concepts and the method of the argument will 
be outlined. After that, I will discuss several development projects as empirical 
examples before proceeding to the analysis of power relations and drawing some 
preliminary conclusions. 
Concepts and method 
When examining the power relations inherent in development projects, the 
first step is evidently to define these concepts. Development projects shall be 
defined as spatiotemporally limited formal measures in developing or less devel­
oped or underdeveloped countries aiming officially at improving the standard of 
living of the resident population. This is a rather broad definition which does 
not confine development projects to the practice of international development 
or aid organisations but does include measures taken by national governments 
or even private initiatives should they be sufficiently formalised (although this 
will not be relevant in this article). It does not preclude the result of these meas­
ures (whether they have in fact improved the standard of living) but takes as a 
defining factor the formal intention to do so. However, it excludes measures in 
developed countries as well as continuous or geographically unlimited government 
policies designed to improve the standard of living. 
Reflecting on power in the social sciences, one can hardly avoid the classic 
definition given by Max Weber: According to him, ‘Power denotes any chance 
to implement one’s will in a social relation also against resistance’ (Weber 2006: 
62, translation: AZ). This definition appears less than ideal for our purposes for 
the following reasons: It confines power to social relations between individuals, 
leaving aside less personalised workings of power. Furthermore, it takes the occur­
rence of resistance as a defining factor of a power relation, neglecting the fact that 
power can operate to prevent resistance – through fear, distorted information or 
ideologies, for example. A more encompassing definition is needed. 
One more suitable definition is provided by the work of Michel Foucault. In his 
later work he differentiates between three types of power: sovereign, disciplinary 
and governmental power.1 Whereas sovereign power operates through repression 
and laws, disciplinary power works through training, repeated practices and condi­
tioning. Governmental power refers to the ‘conduct of conduct’, thus emphasises 
the free will of the individual as an object of power relations. According to Fou­
cault, power is exercised in general through the production of knowledge and –
this is particularly relevant for our topic – through the structuring of possible 
fields of action.2 Power, in this view, does not necessarily mean to coerce some-
one,3 but power is also present where individual decisions are taken voluntarily 
in a field of action which is structured in a specific way, or where a discourse 
provides only certain ways of constructing social reality. Power does not only 
preclude certain actions or information, it is also productive, creating certain 












this definition, power is ubiquitous. This does not free critical scholars from the 
obligation of analysing its operations. 
So power shall be defined here as the structuring or restructuring of fields of 
action in political, economic, social or ecological spheres. It aims at changing 
the practices of individuals and can be exercised through sovereign, disciplinary 
or governmental mechanisms – or, if we use the more precise terms of chapter 2, 
through representing, conditioning or subjectivising mechanisms. 
Returning to our research question, we have to ask how a possible transforma­
tion of development policy on the level of projects and on the level of power
relations can be observed. Obviously only by examining empirical examples of
development projects, but equally obviously it is beyond the scope of a single
paper to provide a thorough overview over the myriads of projects. Some exam­
ples have to be selected. The criteria here have been the following: the cases have
to fit into the definition, they have to cover the relevant time span from the 1980s
to the present, should represent different continents and different types of coun­
tries (large/small, different levels of industrialisation) and be somewhat typical of
the time and the region. Practically, the projects must be also have been docu­
mented by scholars and the results published (or otherwise accessible). In spite of
these criteria, a certain element of arbitrariness in the selection of examples inevi­
tably remains and has to be borne in mind when formulating the conclusions. 
These projects shall be presented in the following way: their name, content 
and measures will be portrayed as well as the relevant political context, the 
donors financing them and the time span during which they took place. Then we 
will focus on their implementation and the attempted (re)structuring of fields of 
action in different spheres and on their success in changing the practices of the 
target group. In the ensuing section, the results will be analysed. 
Development projects: examples 
Lesotho: integrated rural development4 
The Thaba-Tseka Integrated Rural Development Project was implemented in 
Lesotho during 1975 and 1984. It comprised measures in the areas of infrastruc­
ture, agriculture, administration and health and was financed by the World Bank 
and the Canadian Development Agency CIDA. 
As the project took place in a mountain area, heavy emphasis was laid on live­
stock and range development: the increase of commercial livestock production 
was a (if not the) central goal. In order to facilitate the supply of inputs and the 
marketing of farm produce, two components were seen as crucial: the construc­
tion of an all-weather road linking Thaba-Tseka with the capital city of Maseru 
and the construction of a regional centre at Thaba-Tseka, comprising office 
buildings, staff housing, warehouse and workshop facilities as well as a Farmers’ 
Training Centre. In the area of administration, a new district (Thaba-Tseka) was 
formed and Village Development Committees were entrusted with hiring local 











new crop farming techniques, health and educational training programmes, the 
establishment of a transport pool for vehicles and a number of other measures. 
Due to the geopolitical and economic insignificance of Lesotho, it can safely 
be assumed that the project in question was not designed to serve the interests of 
donor countries in a strict sense.5 There are no signs indicating this might be the 
case. The project measures did not result in an improvement of the standard of 
living of the population in the target area, nor did they manage to introduce new 
relations of production: The attempted commercialisation of livestock produc­
tion was utterly unsuccessful because it did not take into account the economic 
and cultural context of the target population. It ignored 1) that most of the cattle 
farmers were not classical farmers, but predominantly migrant labourers who also 
owned cattle; 2) that cattle functioned as a form of old-age pension for this group; 
3) that cattle was imbued with symbolic value and therefore not a commodity to 
be freely traded like all others but instead was a manifestation of prestige and also 
a place-holder for absent males which could be borrowed by fellow villagers in 
need, making it an unselfish – and gendered – form of wealth; 4) that the com­
mercial practices (above all enclosure of range areas) amounted to an attack on 
the communal land and were perceived as anti-social. 
Despite this failure, the project had far-reaching effects which were not 
intended by the donors. The ruling party BNP (Basotho National Party) was able 
to acquire and instrumentalise resources provided by the project on a broad scale. 
The Village Development Committees were in fact party organisations promot­
ing its cause and privileging its supporters. The measures in the areas of infra­
structure and administration did not lead to a change in agricultural production, 
but allowed for an intensified control by the government in an area that had been 
quite remote from the capital and known to be a stronghold of the oppositional 
BCP (Basotho Congress Party). 
So we can observe a restructuring of the fields of action in the political and 
economic sphere (e.g. by offering economic incentives for commercial cattle 
farming or by providing resources for the ruling party) which however is not 
always identical with donor intentions. The attempts to change the behaviour of 
the target group related to this restructuring were largely unsuccessful. 
Guatemala: security and development6 
In 1982, the new military regime under Rios Montt presented the ‘National Plan
for Security and Development’ (Plan Nacional de Seguridad y Desarrollo). In its name,
numerous projects were implemented during the next years especially in the Ixcan and
other highland regions where the guerrilla were active. It included above all the estab­
lishment of development poles, model villages, civic patrols and inter-institutional
coordinations – mostly measures in the areas of infrastructure and administration,
only a few in agriculture and the social sector. Many of these projects were supported
by food aid from the World Food Program (WFP) and USAID, from 1987 onwards –
after the military conceded formal political authority to a civilian government – also









The measures have to be seen in the context of the revolutionary movement 
against the military regime and the ruling elites, the civil war and an estimated 
one million of refugees as a result of the army’s scorched-earth policy in the years 
before. Since the democratic government of Arbenz (a social democrat who had 
expropriated unused land from United Fruit) had been removed by a military 
coup backed by the CIA, the USA had been an ally of the regimes in Guate­
mala and after 1979 was determined to prevent a second Nicaragua in Central 
America.7 
The development poles are microregions (largely identical with areas of con­
flict) in which the government tried to foster infrastructure and export-oriented 
agriculture, although this transformation of agricultural production (a goal 
emphasised in US foreign policy documents concerning the region) was not 
the priority – all in all a rather vague concept. The model villages are far more 
concrete: through food-for-work programmes homeless and starving refugees are 
brought to build villages in strategic locations (usually in the vicinity of a military 
camp) and thus resettled. Resources for the model villages usually come from 
international development aid. Then the males between 18 and 60 are recruited 
in formally voluntary8 civic patrols, paramilitary groups which aid the army by 
accompanying them on their missions, keeping villagers under surveillance or 
cutting wood and building roads for the next military camp. The civic patrols 
replace former administrative units on the local level, establishing a new, milita­
rised and hierarchical political structure. A similar function can be attributed to 
the inter-institutional coordinations, new administrative units which constitute 
a parallel structure controlled by the military and are used to collect development 
aid funds and channel them into the strategically important areas. 
It can easily be observed that the measures financed by development aid were 
an integral part of a counterinsurgency campaign designed to control the popula­
tion and stabilise the regime. It can be assumed that the donors were well aware 
of this. A massive political and economic restructuring took place (e.g. through 
offering food-for-work programmes and pressuring people to participate in the 
civic patrols). The measures were successful in inducing a change in behaviour of 
the target population, mainly as a result of force or threat thereof. 
India: Narmada Valley Development project9 
The Narmada Valley Development project comprises the impressive number 
of 3,200 dam projects, of which the vast majority are small, 135 are medium 
and 30 are major dams. The biggest of these is the Sardar Sarovar in Gujarat 
with a proposed height of 136.5 m. According to the government of India, this 
multi-purpose dam (irrigation, power production, flood-control) would irrigate 
more than 1.8 million hectares and bring drinking water to drought prone areas. 
Opponents claim that these benefits are vastly exaggerated and that more than 
300,000 people have to be displaced without adequate compensation. Between 
1985 and 1993, the project was financed above all by the World Bank ($280 mil­











The Japanese loan consisted of tied aid, it was linked to the purchase of turbines
from Sumitomo Corporation. The report of an independent review commission
(the Morse Report), which was called into being by the World Bank as a con­
sequence of massive protests against the dam, came to the conclusion that the
criticisms raised by the opponents were justified. Environmental and social impacts
had not been adequately considered let alone addressed, and it would be best to
withdraw from the project – which the Bank management was not willing to do but
its Executive Directors agreed to after several months of debate and bad publicity.10 
The government of Gujarat decided to pursue the project on its own, used 
fraud and deception to implement its resettlement schemes, occasionally resorted 
to violent means to oppress the protests and was taken to the Supreme Court by 
the opponents (organised in the Narmada Bachao Andolan (Save the Narmada 
movement) which has so far allowed a raise of the dam to 121 m. Concerning the 
benefits of the dam, one has to note that the irrigation schemes will by all prob­
ability benefit primarily the sugar cane agriculture and industry close to the river, 
and not the drought prone areas further away. Concerning the displacements, it 
has to be remarked that almost 60 per cent of the estimated 300,000 persons los­
ing their home are Adivasis, indigenous people, who constitute only 8 per cent of 
the population of India. Even more will be and are already negatively affected by 
the impact of the dam on the ecosphere on which they make their living. Many 
resettled people have left their new homes because they were unable to survive 
there and now live either in the slums of one of the big cities or in their old vil­
lages to be submerged soon. 
What we find here is again a major restructuring of fields of action in the 
spheres of economy and ecology (through flooding the areas concerned and offer­
ing or implementing resettlement schemes). The change of behaviour was the 
result of force, which in contrast to Guatemala can at least claim to be democrati­
cally legitimated. 
Peru: family planning and reproductive health11 
Under President Fujimori the National Programme for Reproductive Health and 
Family Planning (Program Nacional de salud reproductiva y planificación familiar) 
was established in Peru between 1996 and 2000. Fujimori promoted it explicitly 
as a means of fighting poverty. It comprised projects and measures in the field of 
health and population policy and was financed by USAID, the World Bank, and 
the United Nations Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA). Some Peruvian 
women’s NGOs cooperated with the government and were partly integrated in 
the implementation of the programme through a large reproductive health pro­
ject of USAID. 
The measures taken were not confined to the improvement of maternal health 
care (to which only a small part of the budget was devoted) and the provision of a 
broad range of contraceptive methods, but included ‘sterilisation festivals’ which 
took place especially in rural or poorer urban areas. Women were enticed to take 





hospitals, women were exempted from the high costs of in-patient childbirth if 
they agreed to be sterilised. But also pressure and threats were used: they would be 
refused medical treatment in the health centre if they did not agree, and nurses 
and doctors had to fulfil quotas. Although at the International Conference on 
Population and Development in Cairo 1994 such measures had been banned, 
they were regularly applied in Peru, and not without success: between 200,000 
and 300,000 persons have been sterilised in the course of the programme, 90 per 
cent of which were women. 
The government thus managed to restructure the field of action predominantly 
of its female population in the area of reproduction in a way that led to the 
desired change in behaviour – not through the direct use of force, but through 
conditioning and disciplinary measures (incentives offered for compliance and 
sanctions used against dissident conduct). 
Indonesia: sustainable development12 
The Central Sulawesi Integrated Area Development and Conservation Project 
was started in 1998. It is financed mainly by the Asian Development Bank and is 
pursuing several objectives: the sustainable use of natural resources, an improve­
ment in agricultural productivity, as well as the conservation of biodiversity in 
and around the Lore Lindu National Park. 
In marked contrast to the project in Lesotho, the political, economic, eco­
logical and cultural context was well researched by a design study and an envi­
ronmental assessment, although some results were ignored in the actual project 
plan – results indicating that conservation and development are not at all easy to 
combine in the present situation. And in contrast to the all of the earlier projects, 
participation of the target group is seen as important, and local NGOs are inte­
grated as organisations implementing the project. While improving protection 
of the biodiversity and natural resources of the park was a priority, the project 
sought to provide alternative sources of income for those dependent on the park’s 
land and forest resources for economic sustenance. 
However, achieving the project’s goals proved extremely difficult, not only 
because police and army collaborated in the illegal extraction of timber from 
the park, but especially because the target group was very keen on improving 
their livelihoods but not in the sustainable manner envisioned by the experts. 
Instead of planting economically useful native tree species, they resorted to 
monocropping cacao and collecting rattan within the park and protested against 
the attempted enforcement of its boundaries. The NGOs hired to educate the 
farmers, introduce participatory monitoring and bring them to sign community 
conservation agreements, were not able to achieve these goals either, and even 
coercive exclusion from the park by arresting farmers and burning huts and crops 
could not stop these practices in the light of increasing landlessness. Following 
the example of indigenous communities successfully struggling against eviction, 
in 2001 about 1,000 families calling themselves the Free Farmers Forum went so 
















The restructuring of economic and ecological fields of action visible here 
(enclosures, incentives, sanctions) failed to achieve the intended change in 
behaviour in the target group – conditioning power did not lead to subjectivising 
power. That the government did not resort to large-scale violence to implement 
the project has to be seen in the context of the recent democratic transition in 
Indonesia after the fall of the Suharto regime in 1998. 
Nepal: microcredits for women13 
In 1998, the Asian Development Bank (ADB) established the Rural Microfi­
nance Development Centre (RMDC) to implement the Nepal Rural Microfi­
nance Project. Its main objective is to reduce rural poverty and empower women, 
concretely: to channel international and national resources to rural poor house­
holds, especially to women by borrowing from the government and lending (at 
market interest rates) to smaller microfinance institutions (MFIs) who then lend 
to the target group. The RMDC has access to 12 million SDR (special drawing 
rights) of loan fund from the ADB and is active in 47 out of the 75 districts of 
Nepal. Between 2000 and 2006, it has disbursed loans of the amount of 982 mil­
lion Nepalese rupees (NR) to about 370,000 clients (all of them women), with 
a loan recovery rate of 100 per cent. Apart from that, the RMDC holds work­
shops, trains MFI staff, supervises its partner organisations, and tries to promote 
a market-friendly environment and spread best practices between MFIs and 
develop the microfinance industry. 
The standard model of lending is the so-called Grameen Bank model: the 
credit system is based on a survey of the social background and peer groups of five 
members which are then incorporated into centres of up to 10 groups. Weekly or 
fortnightly meetings are held to collect compulsory payments: savings as well as 
loans. Loans are initially made to two members, the others follow subsequently, 
and the group members guarantee each other for loan repayments – as a substi­
tute for collateral which the rural poor do not possess. The loans are used for 
different purposes, but the most important and certainly the one advised by the 
RMDC is the setting up of small enterprises by the women. 
Obviously, we are confronted with a market-oriented development scheme: the
availability of capital and the access to financial markets are supposed to reduce
rural poverty and empower the women. The sources indicate that to a certain lim­
ited extent this seems to have been the case. Apart from that, it can be observed
that the specific lending model reduces the costs of the lending institution by
outsourcing the activities of information gathering on the borrower and moti­
vating timely payments to the peer groups (also called solidarity or borrower
groups). What is also worth noting is that the members of the group develop
an economic interest in surveilling the financial practices of the other members
and their enterprises, the groups assume as their primary objective the financial
health of the microcredit programme (instead of the welfare of their members),
and their empowerment is seen as achieved through participation in the market.




The reports indicate that the restructuring of the economic field of action 
in rural Nepal by offering microcredits attached to certain conditions has been 
quite successful in inducing a change in behaviour. This has not been achieved 
through repressive or disciplinary measures, but through relying on the voluntary 
actions of individuals, the rational and responsible conduct of the target group 
responding to their needs and the incentives provided. Conditioning power led 
to subjectivising power. 
Bolivia: political participation14 
In 2002 the British and Swedish development agencies (DFID and SIDA) 
launched a project designed to improve political participation in the Bolivian 
elections (‘Towards an Inclusive Election Process’) which proved somewhat 
controversial because the Bolivian government disagreed with it. The Danish 
and Dutch agencies initially involved as well left the project after the Boliv­
ian government had made its disapproval clear and referred to the project as 
donor-driven, which was clearly in contrast to the commitment of the donor 
community and the Comprehensive Development Framework spearheaded by 
the World Bank which aims at putting the recipient country in the driver’s seat. 
The other two donors continued their engagement, pressed by the Bolivian civil 
society consortium that had planned the project (the Pro Citizens’ Participation 
Consortium consisting of 15 local NGOs and three grassroots organisations). 
While the problem that a large part of the indigenous population did not par­
ticipate in the elections was undeniable, the government deemed it sufficient to 
tackle the problem through educational programmes in the mass media. When 
some donors announced that they were going to support grassroots organisations 
trying to mobilise people to use their rights as voters, the government saw this as 
an interference in internal political matters and denounced the project for lack 
of ownership. Despite some hindrances, the project went ahead and showed that 
over 90 per cent of the clients (around 26,000 inhabitants of rural and peri-urban 
communities) did not even possess adequate personal documentation as a pre­
condition for the right to vote and pointed to the link between lack of voice 
and social exclusion. Consequently, the project explained their citizens’ rights to 
them and supported their claims to an identity card, the right to vote and politi­
cal participation in general vis-à-vis the state bureaucracy. 
The project seems to have successfully restructured the political field of action 
for its target group and induced a change in behaviour. Again, this was accom­
plished through offering possibilities for action and appealing to self-interest 
(though this time rather collective than individual self-interest). 
Analysis 
In the following I am going to analyse the empirical examples first in relation 
to the hypothesis of a transformation of development policy and second from a 
specifically poststructuralist perspective. Right at the outset it has to be stated 
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that the small amount of examples given here is by no means a sufficient basis for 
wholesale assertions concerning development policy in general. Yet they allow 
for some interesting observations which can serve as a groundwork for further 
research. 
Concerning the question in how far the transformation of development dis­
course since the 1980s can be observed on the level of development projects, 
sweeping statements are misplaced. All aspects of the transformation cannot be 
discussed here, but the crucial rise of catchwords like participation, civil society 
and ownership can also be traced in the project examples. Participation of the 
people who were affected by the project was not an issue in the plans of the 
Narmada Valley project and their protests were deliberately overheard as long 
as possible. Guatemala demonstrates an extreme case of authoritarian measures 
in the field of development policy.15 In Lesotho one could at best talk of a par­
ticipatory role of the Village Development Committees, which were in fact front 
organisations of the ruling party, but not of participation by the persons affected. 
In Peru, NGOs were already seen as playing a role and attempts were made to 
coordinate governmental policy with them. In Indonesia, NGOs and participa­
tion by the target group constituted important elements of the project (although 
participation was of course limited to the implementation of the project). In 
Nepal, the borrower groups have been described by the donors as self-help civil 
society organisations and they were obviously crucial to the project. In Bolivia, 
the project was conceived of, pushed forward and implemented by local NGOs 
and the donors took their support serious enough to annoy the government. The 
examples indicate that the hypothesis that the transformation of development 
discourse concerning participation since the 1980s is matched by a parallel trans­
formation on the level of development projects seems a reasonable basis for fur­
ther research.16 
If we address the question of power relations, it can be seen that all projects 
imply a restructuring of the field of action of affected persons in the economic, 
political, social, reproductive or ecological spheres. On top of the intentional 
restructuring planned by the donors we also remark the possibility of unintended 
but nevertheless far-reaching restructurings as in Lesotho. Here the widely dif­
fering effectiveness of the respective restructurings becomes obvious. Only some 
of them managed to achieve the intended change in behaviour in their target 
group, and the power relations employed to do so can be differentiated between 
the three types presented in the first section: sovereign, disciplinary and govern­
mental mechanisms. 
In Lesotho, we find that the restructuring intended by the donors did not man­
age to induce a lasting change in behaviour among many people. In Guatemala, 
there was a successful restructuring enforced by repression (sovereign mecha­
nisms of power). In India, the restructuring also changed the behaviour of the 
target group in the last instance only through the force of law – and even then 
resistance took place (sovereign power). In Peru, the combination of incentives 
and threats in the restructuring of reproductive policy can be identified as quite 









ended in a failure as the governmental and disciplinary mechanisms employed 
were not able to achieve a change in behaviour and the government shied away 
from decisively using repressive means. In Nepal, subtle mechanisms of power 
have been applied in the restructuring of the economic field of action for rural 
women and the ‘conduct of conduct’, the government through the voluntary 
actions of the responsible individual, has been successful. Likewise, the restruc­
turing of the political field of action in Bolivia has also relied on governmental 
relations of power – although of a very different political quality: the subjectivi­
ties produced were not those of rational entrepreneurs, but of democratic citizens 
claiming their rights. 
Summing up the results, it seems fairly safe to say that the increasing impor­
tance of participation and civil society in development projects (whether as part 
of a general transformation or not) seems to be accompanied by a shift in the 
mechanisms of power to be found in these projects from sovereign and discipli­
nary to governmental ones, from repressive to subjectivising power. 
It can also be observed that the deployment of mechanisms of power – even of 
brutal force – was legitimated in a recurring pattern: the measures took place in 
the name of development, they were constructed as somehow leading to improve­
ments in the standard of living. This brings us to our second point of analysis: 
I argue that a poststructuralist perspective on development can highlight aspects of 
this use of this concept which otherwise remain unnoticed. 
Poststructuralism is discussed in chapter 2. How can it contribute to the analy­
sis of development? If we take a look at the projects sketched above it becomes 
clear that the signifier development is taken to be synonymous with concepts like 
progress, improvement, positive social change, poverty reduction and better 
standard of living. This can be denoted as a chain of equivalences which exists 
between the signifiers. But what is also obvious is that the signifier development 
refers to completely different projects and thus signifieds: infrastructure projects, 
resettlement and counterinsurgency, dam building and irrigation, birth control, 
biodiversity protection and promotion of sustainable agriculture, microcredit pro­
vision and small enterprise promotion, improvements in electoral participation –
all these heterogeneous signifieds have been linked with the signifier development
in the examples mentioned above – and further examples with again different 
signifieds could be found easily. Development can thus be termed an empty signi­
fier which can be filled with almost any content. 
In the terminology of Laclau’s poststructuralist theory of discourse, we could 
say that development is not a floating signifier incapable of being wholly articu­
lated to a discursive chain (Laclau/Mouffe 2001: 113) because the term is at the 
centre of the discourse of development theory linking developed, modern, indus­
trialised, affluent and a number of other concepts. Neither is the term privileged 
signifier wholly adequate: although development is at the centre of the discourse, 
it does not ‘fix the meaning of a signifying chain’ (Laclau/Mouffe 2001: 112), but 
rather allows for a plurality of meanings to be linked with it. Therefore, the term 
‘empty signifier’ (Laclau 1996) seems more appropriate, with its connotation of 













signify universal interests – in this case on a global scale. Moreover, an empty sig­
nifier, according to Laclau, ‘has no content, because it only exists in the various 
forms in which it is actually realised . . . [it] is present as that which is absent; it 
becomes an empty signifier, as the signifier of that absence. In this sense, various 
political forces can compete in their efforts to present their particular objectives 
as those which carry out the filling of that lack’ (Laclau 1996: 44). 
From a poststructuralist perspective, it therefore seems futile to engage in dis­
cussions over the true meaning of development. As the relation between signi­
fier and signified is arbitrary, the term has no real or essential meaning – the
controversies whether development is a ‘mission to achieve global equality’ or ‘a 
project of cultural imperialism’ make sense only in their political, not their epis­
temological dimension. In this perspective, it becomes also clear that the dis­
course of development – just like that of civilisation in the preceding era – was 
an important element in constituting the identity of the West as progressive, 
industrialised, democratic, wealthy etc. The idealised picture of the Self consti­
tuted the universal norm according to which the deficiencies of the Other (the 
under- or less developed societies) could be proven. 
However, the empty signifier development does not, as indicated by Laclau, 
constitute an antagonism between and in-group and excluded others. Rather, it 
serves to link the concrete practices with the signifiers mentioned in a chain of 
equivalences (progress, improvement, etc.) and legitimates hierarchies between 
experts and beneficiaries. Returning to our examples, not only the heterogene­
ity of the measures but also the similarity of their legitimation is remarkable. 
All the restructuring and all the demands to change one’s behaviour were made 
in the name of development in the sense of a process towards a universally desir­
able state of society which would result in the improvement of the lives of all its 
members – and thus the ‘filling of the lack of development’. The representation of 
the measures to attain this state also had another quality in common: they were 
based on supposedly technical expert knowledge, i.e. nonpartisan, nonpolitical 
knowledge. 
These similarities in the techniques of legitimising the use of power in the
field of development suggest that despite the arbitrary content with which the
concept can be filled, this content has to assume a certain form: the form of a
technical intervention leading to an improvement in the standard of living of all
members of society, as development denotes a process which usually takes place in
units like society-state complexes. Although its content is vague and arbitrary,
the function of the signifier development is clear: it is to legitimise certain inter­
ventions as beneficial. Metaphorically speaking, development works as an ‘empty
plus’.17 
That the discourse of development constructs the otherwise arbitrary content 
in a certain way can be explained with institutional constraints. As Ferguson has 
argued, a development agency tends to ignore analyses that locate the problem of 
poverty in the spheres of political and economic structures, because this sphere 
is outside its mandate. Its job is to improve agricultural productivity, not tackle 






take on government elites. The latter activities would be perceived as politics, as 
affairs which are not the business of development organisations. This is why they 
are prone to construct the problem of poverty in such a way that their nonpoliti­
cal development projects seem promising (Ferguson 1994: 68f). The discourse of 
development thus allows, as we have seen, for the depoliticisation of measures 
implying far-reaching restructurings in political, economic and other spheres. 
Similarly, it depoliticises the phenomenon of social inequality, because it frames 
it as a result of a historical stage and a fundamentally technical problem (lack of 
knowledge, education, infrastructure or technology) to be solved by nonpolitical 
interventions – not as a political problem requiring a change in asymmetrical 
power relations. 
The example of Bolivia demonstrates the vivacity of these constraints: as the 
government of Bolivia learned of the donor plans to support grassroots organisa­
tions in investigating and mitigating political exclusion of certain segments of 
society, it denounced the project as political interference from the outside, in 
other words as a measure which was not technical, apolitical and for the benefit 
of all but partisan and for the benefit of the opposition. That the government’s 
intervention was only halfway successful (only two of the four donors abandoned 
the project), indicates three things: that the discourses of participation and civil 
society are indeed changing the rules of the development game, that these same 
discourses can be turned against progressive changes (the government invoked 
the idea of ownership to fend off the project plans) – and that personal engage­
ment by grassroots organisations and DFID staff is also a relevant factor. Accord­
ing to the poststructuralist perspective, the rules of the discourse are not set in 
stone, but have to be reproduced continuously. Nevertheless, the institutional 
constraints are still very much alive and kicking. 
Conclusion 
The chapter has argued that the transformation of development discourse since 
the 1980s leading to the rise in significance of concepts like participation and 
civil society is also visible in the examples of development projects that have 
been examined. The measures taken in these projects have been analysed as 
restructurings of fields of action of the people affected by them, thus as implying 
relations of power in the Foucauldian sense. It could be shown that the increasing 
emphasis laid on participation went hand in hand with a tendency to abandon 
sovereign, repressive mechanisms of power in favour of governmental, subjec­
tivising techniques. Lastly, from a poststructuralist perspective the concept of
development was analysed as an empty signifier which can be filled with almost any 
content. However, the institutional constraints of development discourse pre­
scribe the form that this content must take: that of a technical, apolitical inter­
vention based on expert knowledge which will benefit all members of society, 
that is bring about development. Thus, the signifier development can be described as 
an empty plus, a discursive shell capable of modifying and legitimising its largely 









   
 
   
  
   
  
  














1	 See Foucault 1991, 1980 and 1983. On the theoretical problems of Foucault’s inter­
pretive analytics see Dreyfus/Rabinow 1983. 
2	 Although Foucault mainly identifies the structuring of possible fields of action of oth­
ers with a relation of government (Foucault 1983: 221), his description of disciplinary
measures reveals that their operation of power relies on sanctions and incentives and
does leave room for individual decisions not to comply, and this even holds true for laws
(the archetypical sovereign mode of a relation of power) which can always be broken. 
3	 In this view power is only present where physical force is absent and choice is possible: 
‘Power is exercised only over free subjects, and only insofar as they are free. . . . slavery 
is not a power relationship when [a] man is in chains’ (Foucault 1983: 221). 
4	 For the following see Ferguson 1994. 
5	 One might argue that the project was intended to stabilise the capitalist world system 
by reducing global inequalities, or to promote commercialisation and the substitu­
tion of subsistence activities through market-oriented activities, and that the donor 
countries governments had an interest in these effects. This, however, is applicable to 
most development projects and shall not be termed interests in the strict sense. This 
category shall be reserved for interests in stabilising regimes allied to the donor gov­
ernment (especially but not only during the Cold War) and for interests in improving 
the economic opportunities of Transnational Companies of the donor country. 
6 For the following see Barry/Preusch 1988, Sacher 1991, Schultz 1992 and Wilson 1993. 
7 Although it has to be noted that the government of Carter was markedly more reluc­
tant to support the military dictatorship than that of Reagan. 
8 Many witnesses tell of threats, punishments and torture as elements of recruitment 
procedures. 
9 For the following see Mehta 1994, Rich 1994, Caufield 1996 and Roy 1999. 
10 Officially, it was the Indian government that withdrew after the Bank had given it 
another deadline to meet the conditions based on the report. 
11	 For the following see Schultz 2000 and Coe 2001. 
12	 For the following see Li 2007. 
13	 For the following see Rankin 2001 and Majorano 2007. 
14	 For the following see Leon et al. 2003, Eyben/Ferguson 2004, and Eyben/Leon 2005. 
15	 The example of Guatemala reminds us of the fact that not all measures implemented 
in the name of development do automatically benefit their target group, although of 
course it cannot at all be seen as representative for the whole of development aid. 
16	 That the transformation also includes a rise in the significance of gender, sustainabil­
ity and market relations can be assumed, but in the light of the few examples must 
remain hypothetical. 
17	 Sachs 1995: 30. The phrase has been translated as ‘curious plus’ (Sachs 1990: 6) in the 
one and simply skipped in the other English translation (Sachs 1999: 7). 
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11 Millennium Development Goals 
Back to the future? 
The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) constitute more or less a normative
consensus in the development community of the beginning of the 21st century.
Apart from some scattered critics, the overwhelming majority seems to agree that
to attain these eight goals and 18 targets are a worthwhile cause or even the most
urgent challenge humanity faces today. Who would disagree? Who would be against
reducing the proportion of people suffering from hunger or the under-five mortality
rates? Hardly anyone of sound mind. Still, it must be permitted to scrutinise and
critically analyse the MDGs without being reproached of promoting world hunger.
The chapter attempts to examine the MDGs from the perspective of poststructural­
ist discourse analysis and to situate them in their specific historical context. A his­
torical comparison between the key documents reveals how development discourse
has shifted between 1970 and the beginning of the 21st century in terms of topics
and priorities, objectives and lines of causation, responsible actors and proposed
measures. 
The article proceeds as follows: in the first part the exact object of analysis, the 
analytical background, the research question and the method will be clarified. 
The second section will analyse the texts in relation to the question, while the 
third introduces the historic dimension by comparing the MDG documents to 
the UN declaration 2626 which spearheaded the Second Development Decade 
in 1970 and introduced the 0.7 per cent goal, which is still referred to today. 
As objects of analysis, the following texts can be identified as the most impor­
tant documents concerning the MDGs: the UN Millennium Declaration (UN 
2000), the report of the then Secretary-General for the 2005 World Summit 
entitled ‘In Larger Freedom’ (Annan 2005), and the report by the UN Millen­
nium Project headed by Jeffrey Sachs (UN Millennium Project 2005). They are 
the points of reference cited most often in political as well as academic texts 
concerned with the MDGs and figure prominently on the website www.un.org/ 
millenniumgoals. 
Concerning the analytical background (research does not start from nowhere 
but takes place in a specific context), it seems promising to relate an examina­
tion of the MDGs to the hypothesis asserting a transformation in development 
discourse since the 1980s. The most radical of its proponents were arguably the 




who claimed that with the end of the Cold War and with the realisation of the 
ecological predicament, the ever-rising global inequalities between countries and 
the cultural homogenisation accompanying the post–World War II development 
enterprise, no one believed or was interested in development anymore – the era 
of development was over, or at least about to end. Superpower rivalry would no 
longer bribe peripheral countries with aid to join their side, the model of the 
industrial nations could obviously not be universalised, the gap between rich 
and poor had been growing instead of shrinking, and cultural diversity was seen 
as valuable and threatened by the homogenisation brought by the development 
project. Other works would not go that far, but still acknowledge the productiv­
ity of a discourse analysis of development and subscribe to the thesis that after 
the crisis in development theory and policy and the lost decade of the 1980s, a 
profound transformation was taking place in development discourse, introducing 
new (or sometimes not-so-new) buzzwords like sustainability, participation, good 
governance, poverty reduction, gender, globalisation, market-orientation, own­
ership and the like (Crush 1995, Moore/Schmitz 1995, Cooper/Packard 1997, 
IDS 2001, Mosse/Lewis 2005). At the end of the 1990s, it seemed reasonably 
plausible to assert that these new issues were becoming more and more impor­
tant in North-South relations, and that not only the Official Development Assis­
tance, but also the concept of development itself was on the decline. 
With the advent of the MDGs this seems to have changed, although rather 
gradually than with a big bang. Already in 1996, the Development Aid Commit­
tee (DAC) of the OECD presented a paper called ‘Shaping the 21st Century’, in 
which several measures and a timetable were proposed to halve the number of the 
absolute poor until 2015 (Development Assistance Committee 1996). The Mil­
lennium Declaration in 2000, the Monterrey Conference on Finance for Devel­
opment in 2002, and the MDG world summit in 2005 were the landmarks of the 
goals’ rise to prominence. 
Thus, from a point of view which asserts the decline of the development concept 
because of structural factors, the MDGs must appear anachronistic, remnants 
of a bygone era which are now heralded as the way into the future. From the 
perspective of poststructuralist discourse analysis, the article examines whether 
this is really the case. This perspective (see Belsey 2002 for a good introduction) 
investigates the relation between signifier and signified and identifies signifying 
systems which construct reality as discourses. Poststructuralist discourse analysis 
thus sets out to examine these discourses, their rules of formation, their con­
tinuous transformations, their story lines and the subjectivities they produce. Of 
special interest in this context is the relationship between discourse and power: 
how do power relations in the field of the economy, politics, gender and culture 
in general influence the production of discourses? Which discourses are recog­
nised as scientific and true, and which remain marginal? What are the effects of 
certain discourses in terms of reproducing or transforming relations of power and 
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Analysis of the documents 
This section will analyse how the problem of human suffering (e.g. poverty) and 
the corresponding solutions (e.g. poverty reduction, development) are constructed 
in the MDG documents. While the analysis will start with the titles of the docu­
ments and the MDGs themselves, the next subsections will deal with the central 
themes and story lines of the three publications, that is with the way certain 
signifiers are related to each other and to certain signifieds and the way these 
relations are justified. 
The titles of the documents are not uniform: The United Nations Millennium 
Declaration (MD) does not hint at a specification of its topic and its sections 
cover a wide range of issues (‘Peace, security and disarmament’, ‘Development 
and poverty eradication’, ‘Protecting our common environment’, ‘Human rights, 
democracy and good governance’, ‘Protecting the vulnerable’, ‘Meeting the spe­
cial needs of Africa’, ‘Strengthening the United Nations’). Although it intro­
duces what later became the MDGs, it is not called Millennium Development 
Declaration. The Report of the Secretary-General (as a follow-up to the outcome 
of the Millennium Summit) bears the title ‘In larger freedom: towards develop­
ment, security and human rights for all’ (ILF). Here, the three latter issues are 
united under the umbrella of larger freedom, which already indicates a liberal 
commitment in contrast to other conceivable headings for a report on the MDGs 
like ‘Towards development for all’ or ‘Implementing the right to development’. 
The Report to the Secretary-General by the Millennium Project (headed by Jef­
frey Sachs) is entitled ‘Investing in Development. A Practical Plan to Achieve 
the Millennium Development Goals’ (IID), framing the task in economic terms 
of investment and planning. 
The perspective of planning, of deliberate interventions in economy and soci­
ety with the aim of achieving improvements, is also at the basis of the MDGs 
themselves. The eight goals (‘Eradicate extreme poverty and hunger’, ‘Achieve 
universal primary education’, ‘Promote gender equality and empower women’, 
‘Reduce child mortality’, ‘Improve maternal health’, ‘Combat HIV/AIDS, 
malaria and other diseases’, ‘Ensure environmental stability’, ‘Develop a global 
partnership for development’) are operationalised in 18 targets, 10 of which con­
tain quantitative targets to be achieved at a certain point in time (usually 2015). 
The last goal, which deals with actions to be taken not on the national, but on 
the international level, is operationalised in seven targets alone, all of which 
are nonquantitative. Obviously the emphasis on concrete, measurable progress 
is abandoned when it comes to the necessary reform of global trade and debt 
issues. This becomes even clearer when the Millennium Project lists the uneven 
and insufficient progress towards the MDGs in a table of 20 measurable targets, 
only one of which refers to goal eight (‘A global partnership for development’), 
and this target is the improvement of youth unemployment (IID, 3) – not the 
cancellation of debt or another of the original MDG eight targets concerned with 
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Story line 1: poverty reduction, development and growth 
In the MDG documents we find numerous occasions where the signifiers develop­
ment and poverty reduction are closely linked or even used synonymously, such 
as the following: 
We will spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the 
abject and dehumanising conditions of extreme poverty . . . We are commit­
ted to making the right to development a reality for everyone and to freeing 
the entire human race from want. 
(MD par. 11) 
Often, however, a chain of equivalences is established between these two signi­
fiers and another, economic growth: ‘Our goal is to eradicate poverty, achieve 
sustained economic growth and promote sustainable development’ (IID, 5). 
Sometimes this growth is specified as being private-sector growth dependent on 
foreign direct investment and on policies of good governance: 
In order to reduce poverty and promote global prosperity for all . . . (i) Devel­
oping countries should recommit themselves to taking primary responsibility 
for their own development by strengthening governance, combating corrup­
tion and putting in place the policies and investments to drive private-sector 
led growth and maximise domestic resources to fund national development 
strategies. 
(ILF Annex, par. 5) 
This line of argument – in order to reduce poverty, development has to be achieved
and the way to do so is through economic growth – has a very familiar ring within
development theory and is reminiscent of 1950s and 60s trickle-down-assumptions
(Martinussen 1997, ch. 5). However, a new element can be found in quotes like
‘meeting the Goals for hunger, education, gender equality, environment, and
health is vital for overall economic growth and development’ (IID, 4f): Here,
the causality is reversed. Not only growth is necessary for poverty reduction, but
poverty reduction or the provision of basic needs is a contribution to economic
growth. This argument (which is repeated on p. 13 of IID) is familiar from the
World Bank’s WDR 2000/2001 on poverty (World Bank 2000) and constructs
a harmonious, mutually reinforcing relationship between poverty reduction and
economic growth and thus the proponents of either goal as allies. The relationship
between the different signifiers becomes especially clear in the following quote: 
Achieving the [Millennium Development] Goals is largely about making 
core investments in infrastructure and human capital that enable poor peo­
ple to join the global economy, while empowering the poor with economic, 
political and social rights that will enable them to make full use of infra­
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and cities can become part of global economic growth if they are empowered 
with the infrastructure and human capital to do so. If every village has a 
road, access to transport, a clinic, electricity, safe drinking water, education, 
and other essential inputs, the villagers in very poor countries will show the 
same determination and entrepreneurial zeal of people all over the world. 
(IID, 15) 
Development and poverty reduction are thus understood as joining the global 
economy and becoming part of global economic growth, and the necessary means 
are investments in infrastructure and human capital which empower the poor. In 
contrast to a meaning of empowerment as a change in power structures initiated 
by the disempowered (e.g. Friedmann 1992), empowerment is reduced to pub­
lic investments which will allow the poor to escape poverty by unleashing their 
entrepreneurial zeal and joining the global economy. Power structures do not 
seem to be present, reducing poverty is merely a matter of mobilising resources 
for the right investments, afterwards market forces and entrepreneurship will do 
the job – structures present in the market economy leading to unequal distribu­
tion of profits are completely neglected. This fits to the specifications about how 
to achieve growth in the previous quote: through investments, the private-sector, 
good governance and the maximisation of resources for development. This leads to 
the next element of the MDG discourse. 
Story line 2: development as a technical problem 
Achieving development, meeting the MDG targets and reducing global poverty 
are presented not as political, but as technical problems: ‘The unprecedented 
combination of resources and technology at our disposal today means that we are 
truly the first generation with the tools, the knowledge and the resources to meet 
the commitment, given by all States in the Millennium Declaration, “to making 
the right to development a reality for everyone and to freeing the entire human 
race from want” ’ (ILF par. 27). The main problem seems to arise from a lack of 
resources: ‘We are concerned about the obstacles developing countries face in 
mobilising the resources needed to finance their sustained development’ (MD 
par.14). But how are these resources to be used? The answer given here is: 
The key to escaping the poverty trap is to raise the economy’s capital stock 
to the point where the downward spiral ends and self-sustaining economic 
growth takes over. This requires a big push of basic investments between now 
and 2015 in public administration, human capital (nutrition, health, educa­
tion), and key infrastructure (roads, electricity, ports, water and sanitation, 
accessible land for affordable housing, environmental management). 
(IID, 19) 
A big push in investments should raise the capital stock to the (potentially calcu­
























1950s-era theories of unbalanced growth and necessary savings rates, although
it has to be noted that investments in basic needs and education are given a
more significant role here. Apart from mentioning the issues of governance
and corruption, the documents contain no hints concerning political obstacles,
social conflicts or parties whose interests would be harmed by a shift in policy
on a national and international level prioritising the achievement of the MDGs.
Development seems as a consensual, nonconflictive goal to be achieved by tech­
nical processes to which no one can object.3 In the light of the link between
poverty reduction and growth, one could even argue that the achievement of
the MDGs is presented as being in everyone’s interest. This point is stressed by
Kofi Annan in the conclusion to his report as well: ‘We are united both by moral
imperatives and by objective interests’ (ILF, par. 220). Achieving the MDGs is
prescribed not only from the ethical point of view, but also from that of economic
interest. The reason for this is not only the harmonious relationship between
poverty reduction and growth, but also that between security and development, or
in a more general formulation: the interconnectedness of all peoples in the age
of globalisation. 
Story line 3: globalisation, security and development 
The term globalisation is linked with two slightly different signifieds in the doc­
uments: in a more general meaning with something like global interconnect­
edness, in a more specific one with global economic liberalisation. Although
global economic liberalisation is by no means rejected, a significant departure
from the neoliberal discourse prevalent in the 1990s in many official texts on
development and poverty reduction can be observed in the following quotes: 
We believe that the central challenge we face today is to ensure that glo­
balisation becomes a positive force for all the world’s people. For while glo­
balisation offers great opportunities, at present its benefits are very unevenly 
shared, while its costs are unevenly distributed. 
(MD, par. 5) 
But when individuals and whole economies lack even the most basic infra­
structure, health services, and education, market forces alone can accom­
plish little. Households and whole economies remain trapped in poverty, 
and fail to reap the benefits of globalisation. Without basic infrastructure 
and human capital, countries are condemned to export a narrow range of 
low-margin primary commodities based on natural (physical) endowments, 
rather than a diversified set of exports based on technology, skills, and capi­
tal investments. In such circumstances, globalisation can have significant 
adverse effects . . . rather than bring benefits through increased foreign direct 
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While in neoliberal discourse the standard formulae had been ‘globalisation is 
inevitable and we have to adjust’ and ‘globalisation brings huge opportunities and 
benefits’, both documents now also mention the costs and the uneven distribu­
tion of the benefits. Nevertheless, the process of global economic liberalisation is 
still seen as a potentially beneficial force, and the Millennium Project sees its task 
less in reforming (or even stopping) it, but in adapting the actors to the process, 
in building people’s and economies’ capacities so that they can reap the benefits. 
These benefits are thereby assumed to be naturally existent and the failure to 
attain them lies within the responsibility of the actors and is not the fault of the 
process of liberalisation. 
The basic attitude towards free markets is also visible in Target 12 of the MDGs 
which explicitly demands an ‘open, rule-based, predictable, nondiscriminatory 
trading and financial system’ (IID, xv). Nondiscriminatory – in the context of 
WTO trading rules – means that it is not allowed to discriminate against certain 
(usually foreign) economic actors in favour of other actors. Thus supporting less 
competitive, local enterprises and protecting them from the often overwhelm­
ingly superior competition of transnational corporations (a practice that can 
be observed in nearly every successful process of industrialisation in history, see 
Chang 2003) is constructed as an activity usually associated with racism or patri­
archy (discrimination). 
The other sense of globalisation conveys increasing global interconnectedness, 
as in the following quote: 
As the world’s only universal body with a mandate to address security, devel­
opment and human rights issues, the United Nations bears a special burden. 
As globalisation shrinks distances around the globe and these issues become 
increasingly interconnected, the comparative advantages of the United 
Nations become ever more evident. 
(ILF, par. 21) 
So according to the report, the shrinking distances cause a mutually reinforcing 
relationship between development, security, and human rights: 
This relationship has only been strengthened in our era of rapid techno­
logical advances, increasing economic interdependence, globalisation and 
dramatic geopolitical change. While poverty and denial of human rights may 
not be said to ‘cause’ civil war, terrorism or organised crime, they all greatly 
increase the risk of instability and violence. Similarly, war and atrocities are 
far from the only reasons that countries are trapped in poverty, but they 
undoubtedly set back development. Again, catastrophic terrorism on one 
side of the globe, for example an attack against a major financial centre in a 
rich country, could affect the development prospects of millions on the other 
by causing a major economic downturn and plunging millions into poverty. 
(ILF, par. 16) 
 
 




This construction of linkages aims at a reconceptualisation of interests and iden­
tities, which can, in a slightly simplified manner, be sketched as follows: if pov­
erty increases the risk of violence and terror which can affect the centre, it is in 
the interests of the rich countries to assist the poor. And if attacks like in Sep­
tember 2001 bring about a recession which also affects the periphery, it is in the 
interests of the poor countries to help preventing them. Thus the convergence of 
interests compels another construction of identity than the one based on nations: 
an identity based on perceiving oneself as first and foremost part of humanity, 
part of ‘one world’: 
If we act boldly – and if we act together – we can make people everywhere 
more secure, more prosperous and better able to enjoy their fundamental 
human rights. . . . All the conditions are in place for us to do so. In an era of 
global interdependence, the glue of common interest, if properly perceived, 
should bind all States together in this cause, as should the impulses of our 
common humanity. 
(ILF, pars. 1–2) 
Thus we can observe the construction of a Self (we) which comprises the entire 
human race as an actor driven to reforms for the improvement of development
and security and human rights not only by ethical motives but at least equally by 
self-interest: ‘In a world of interconnected threats and challenges, it is in each 
country’s self-interest that all of them are addressed effectively’ (ILF, par. 18). 
This construction is problematic in several respects: if the link between prob­
lems in the South and well-being in the North turns out to be less strong in 
concrete examples as is suggested here, e.g. because the UN manages to contain 
conflicts and refugee flows on a regional scale, the argument loses its force. From 
the point of view of enlightened self-interest, wars and misery in the periphery 
do not pose a threat if they have no detrimental effects for those in the cen­
tre. Further, the construction assumes an objective interest without taking into 
account the diverse subjective conceptions of interest and well-being and, what’s 
more, the different positions occupied by individuals in the global society. Prob­
ably global warming is a less pressing problem for people dying from malaria or 
AIDS in Africa or for those who can still afford to go skiing at a higher place, 
just as the financial markets crash is maybe less significant for those searching the 
waste dumps of Sao Paulo for something to eat.4 The political consequence of the 
assumption of an actor called humanity united by common interest is that one 
loses sight of the numerous conflicts of interests within this humanity, of the vast 
differences in resources, power and influence, and of their deadly effects. 
The only precondition for humanity to solve the problems of development and 
poverty, security and human rights, seems to be that the leaders ‘make the right 
choice’ and Annan encourages them ‘to transcend their differences’ and calls 
for ‘wisdom’ and ‘firm, clear-sighted leadership’ in order to achieve ‘a visionary 
change of direction in our world’ (ILF, par. 222). So the problem boils down 
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constraints, no conflicts, no power, merely a potential lack of courage and wisdom 
which can hopefully be defeated by the urgent appeal of the Secretary-General 
of the United Nations. If the political is defined as an area of contestation where 
conflicting interests engage in order to arrive at binding rules, we are clearly con­
fronted with a depoliticisation of poverty in the central MDG documents. This, 
however, has already been identified as a central feature of traditional develop­
ment discourse (Ferguson 1994). Returning to our question, we can observe that 
the theoretical concepts underlying the MDG documents are reminiscent of 
old-fashioned growth theory coupled with basic needs strategies and economic 
liberalisation. A historical comparison will provide a more precise picture of the 
continuities and discontinuities in development discourse that can be observed 
in the MDG. 
Historical comparison 
It could be argued that the depoliticising quality of the MDG documents is not 
untypical of UN documents and reports in general, especially if we deal with dec­
larations requiring the consensus of all represented governments, and of develop­
ment policy programmes in particular. This would be a rather broad criticism, but 
in order to further specify the analysis, it seems useful to compare the Millennium 
Declaration of 2000 to the International Development Strategy for the Second 
Development Decade of 1970 (UN 1970, hereafter IDS). This can illuminate 
elements of the transformation of development discourse which took place dur­
ing these 30 years. Both documents are UN declarations adopted by the Gen­
eral Assembly and both are programmatic texts dealing with problems of global 
inequality interpreted under the heading of development. These two texts shall be 
compared regarding their topics and priorities, objectives and lines of causation, 
responsible actors and proposed measures. 
Topics and priorities 
Comparing the two documents in terms of their topics, it is conspicuous that 
the IDS is far more focused on development, and mostly in a narrow sense of eco­
nomic development and growth. International trade is given a priority role in 
this respect and is dealt with specifically in paragraphs 21–40 and 53–55, that 
is in more than a quarter of the whole document. Another prominent topic is 
(unsurprisingly) development aid respectively ‘financial resources for develop­
ment’ (par. 41–52). The document also deals with the specific problems of the 
‘least developed’ and ‘land-locked developing’ countries (par. 56–59), with sci­
ence and technology (par. 60–64) and with various topics subsumed under the 
heading human development: population growth (65), employment (66), educa­
tion (67), health (68), nutrition (69), youth and children (70), housing (71), and 
the environment (72). In a section on ‘expansion and diversification of produc­
tion’ it also covers agricultural strategies (among others land reform and rural 
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calls for an end to apartheid and colonialism, for general and complete disarma­
ment, and equal political, economic, social and cultural rights for all (5) and 
somewhere even mentions that ‘The full integration of women in the total devel­
opment effort should be encouraged’ (par. 18 h). 
Although it introduces what became the MDGs, the term development is sig­
nificantly less in the centre of the MD. It has sections on ‘Peace, security and 
disarmament’ (par. 8–10), ‘Development and poverty eradication’ (11–20), 
‘Protecting our common environment’ (21–23), ‘Human rights, democracy and 
good governance’ (24–25), ‘Protecting the vulnerable’ (26), ‘Meeting the special 
needs of Africa’ (27–28) and ‘Strengthening the United Nations’ (29–32). Not­
withstanding the fact that the section on development is (in terms of paragraphs) 
by far the largest, it is merely one among several in the MD. Although many (not 
all) of the topics addressed in the other sections have already been present in the 
IDS, it seems that they are no longer seen as aspects of development, but as issues 
in their own right and are thus attributed more space in document, independent 
of the section on development. The significance of development as a universal signi­
fier for global improvements has obviously declined. 
Some of the topics of the MD are in fact new, while others are not new but 
are taken more seriously. Other topics have disappeared or severely lost in sig­
nificance. Three topics that are new are ‘international terrorism’, ‘the world drug 
problem’ and ‘trafficking as well as smuggling in human beings’ (MD par. 9). 
These three in particular (others include HIV/AIDS, migration, human rights, 
good governance and small arms trade) are significant insofar as they are all refer­
ring to problems usually constructed in terms of the South being the origin of 
threats against which the North has to protect itself, through a ‘war on terror’ 
in Afghanistan and Iraq and the London underground,5 through a ‘war on drugs’ 
in Colombia and elsewhere, and through stricter controls at the borders of the 
EU and the US. This hints at a change in the perception of North-South rela­
tions already evident after the end of the Cold War, but certainly intensified 
after September 11, which has been described in the following way: ‘Third World 
countries are now risk zones. All kinds of dangers are to be found there, as the 
newspapers and television keep telling us . . . even the stronghold of the North 
is not immune from the threat of immigration, . . . drug traffic, terrorism and war 
. . . In these circumstances, the “development” concept . . . slowly . . . is being 
substituted by the concept of “security”6 – from the North’s viewpoint’ (Sachs 
1999: 21f). Even if the concept of development is not entirely substituted, it is 
increasingly linked to the concept of security (see section 1). Good governance 
and human rights, it should be added, also became important issues only after the 
end of the Cold War, during which both superpowers generously overlooked the 
despotic and nondemocratic nature of some of their allies. 
One topic which was mentioned only marginally in the IDS is the issue of gen­
der. It appears three times in the MD: In par. 25 it is resolved to ‘combat all forms 
of violence against women and to implement the Convention on the Elimination 
of All Forms of Discrimination against Women’; in par. 19 the goal of reducing 
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equality and the empowerment of women as effective ways to combat poverty, 
hunger and disease and to stimulate development that is truly sustainable’. This 
illustrates at first glance the shift from a Women-in-Development approach 
which aimed at integrating women in an otherwise unchanged development pro­
cess (‘The full integration of women in the total development effort should be 
encouraged’) (IDS, par. 18 h, see Boserup 1970) to a Gender-and-Development 
approach (see Kabeer 1994). On a second glance, the concept of gender is limited 
to achieve women’s equality, and, on top of that, women’s empowerment (see the 
above discussion of the content of the term) is merely seen in an instrumental 
perspective as a means to combat poverty, not as a goal on its own. 
Topics which have disappeared in 2000 include the strategy of land reform 
(IDS par. 75) and a more equitable distribution of income (18). What is more 
remarkable is that the issue of international trade has severely lost its significance. 
From being the clearly dominant topic in the IDS to one not even addressed in 
an own section, but merely mentioned in passing in a few paragraphs (14, 15, 28). 
Here, a significant shift in development discourse can be observed on the level 
of topics: international trade and the distribution of assets do no longer appear 
as issues which deserve political debate and regulation. Other important differ­
ences between the documents can be found in the different position of the con­
cept of development and the new prominence of security issues in North-South 
relations. 
Objectives and lines of causation 
Despite the different significance attributed to the term, one could argue that 
both documents adopt development as their main objective. However, scope and 
content of this objective are not quite identical and neither are the causal mech­
anisms with which it is assumed to be achieved. The perception of the problem is 
still relatively similar in both texts: 
[T]he level of living of countless millions of people is still pitifully low. These 
people are often still undernourished, uneducated, unemployed and want­
ing in many other basic amenities of life. While a part of the world lives in 
great comfort and even affluence, much of the larger part suffers from abject 
poverty, and in fact the disparity is continuing to widen. This lamentable 
situation has contributed to the aggravation of world tension. 
(IDS, par. 3) 
In the last sentence, the alleged relationship between security and development 
discussed in the previous section is hinted at. In the MD, the corresponding pas­
sage reads: 
We will spare no effort to free our fellow men, women and children from the 
abject and dehumanising conditions of extreme poverty, to which more than 











right to development a reality for everyone and to freeing the entire human 
race from want. 
(par. 11) 
It is conspicuous that the view on the poor in the first document puts them in the 
context of comfort and affluence and sees inequality as the problem, whereas the 
picture drawn in the second document does not – poverty is seen as an absolute, 
not a relative condition, independent of wealth in other places. The first view is 
reinforced in other paragraphs, notably in the following passage: 
In the conviction that development is the essential path to peace and justice,7 
Governments reaffirm their common and unswerving resolve to seek a better
and more effective system of international co-operation whereby the prevail­
ing disparities in the world may be banished and prosperity secured for all. 
(IDS, par. 6) 
Here, the ambitious objective of eliminating global inequalities is articulated. 
The MD adopts far more modest objectives, above all to halve ‘the proportion of 
the world’s people whose income is less than one dollar a day and the proportion 
of people who suffer from hunger and . . . the proportion of people who are unable 
to reach or to afford safe drinking water’ (par. 19). However, for these as well as 
the other goals (ensure primary schooling, drastically reduce maternal and child 
mortality, halt and reverse the spread of HIV/AIDS and Malaria, and others) a 
concrete time frame (‘by the year 2015’) is mentioned. For the elimination of 
global disparities in the IDS, it was not. Still, the document did mention a time 
frame (‘not later than 1975’) for the obligation of the developed countries to pro­
vide financial transfers of 1 per cent or at least 0.7 per cent of its GNP (par. 43). 
Concerning the contents of the signifier development, the goals mentioned 
above sum up the MD position quite well. Equality is mentioned as an objective 
in the MD as well, as an equality ‘at the global level’ (par. 2) and as the ‘equality 
of all states’ (4). However, in the enumeration of fundamental values in par. 5 
(‘Equality. No individual and no nation must be denied the opportunity to ben­
efit from development. The equal rights and opportunities of women and men 
must be assured.’) it is specified primarily as an equality of opportunity. Affluence 
existing next to poverty or inequality in the distribution of wealth are nowhere 
seen as problems in the MD. In contrast, to this, in the IDS development is also 
linked again to the question of inequality: ‘If undue privileges, extremes of wealth 
and social injustices persist, then development fails in its essential purpose’ (IDS, 
par. 7). In the view prevalent in the IDS, a change in the international situation 
or even the world order is required to achieve this objective: ‘The success of 
international development activities will depend in large measure on improve­
ment in the general international situation’ (IDS, par. 5) ‘Governments desig­
nate the 1970s as the Second United Nations Development Decade and pledge 
themselves, individually and collectively, to pursue policies designed to create a 
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more just world order cannot be found in the MD, and the closest phrase is: ‘We 
resolve therefore to create an environment – at the national and global levels 
alike – which is conducive to development and to the elimination of poverty’ 
(MD, par. 12). 
What is worth mentioning is that in the IDS, the overcoming of inequality and 
the achievement of development is closely linked to improvements in economic 
growth. In the section on Goals and Objectives, in the paragraphs 13–17, it lists 
the detailed numbers which rates of growth are required: 
The average annual rate of growth in the gross product of the developing 
countries as a whole during the Second United Nations Development Dec­
ade should be at least 6 per cent . . . The average annual rate of growth of gross 
product per head in developing countries should be about 3.5 per cent . . .
The target for growth in average income per head is calculated on the basis 
of an average annual increase of 2.5 per cent in the population of developing 
countries . . . An average annual rate of growth of at least 6 per cent in the 
gross product of developing countries during the Decade will imply an aver­
age annual expansion of a) 4 per cent in agricultural output. . . . there should 
be an average annual expansion of: a) 0.5 per cent in the ration of gross 
domestic saving to the gross product so that this ration rises to around 20 per 
cent by 1980; b) Somewhat less than 7 per cent in imports and somewhat 
higher than 7 per cent in exports. 
We are thus confronted with a detailed concept of socioeconomic planning dis­
playing an impressive amount of confidence regarding the possibility to politi­
cally control the economy which under the present circumstances and Zeitgeist 
appears almost anachronistic. 
However, the most important shift in terms of objectives and lines of causa­
tion is to be found in a new modesty concerning the goals and the disarticulation 
between development and equality. Whereas in the IDS, development was conceiv­
able only in a context of a movement towards global equality and poverty was 
perceived in relation to affluence, this view is no longer present in the MD. 
Responsible actors 
Who are the actors supposed to achieve these objectives? Again, we find marked
differences between the two documents. In the MD, the dominant subject is ‘We’,
specified in paragraph 1 as ‘heads of State and Government’. (The implications
of this conception have been discussed in the previous section.) In every single of
the 32 paragraphs this unified collective actor appears (altogether 49 instances),
usually in formulations like ‘we resolve’, ‘we are determined’ or ‘we will spare no
effort’. In contrast to this, in the IDS the actors are often specified as developed or 
developing countries, although there are also many passive constructions avoid­
ing an explicit subject (e.g. ‘The well-being of children should be fostered’, IDS,












the MD. While in the MD only in rare instances the developing and industri­
alised countries are addressed separately (par. 5, 15), in the IDS we find differ­
ent positions and obligations of developed and developing countries in 64 out of
the 84 paragraphs. Thus in the MD, the common convictions and interests are
emphasised, while in the IDS the different needs and interests of rich and poor
countries were stressed. Although paragraph 11 announces ‘The primary respon­
sibility for the development of developing countries rest upon themselves’, the
IDS is very explicit about the obligations of the OECD world – in stark contrast
to the MD. 
Another point worth mentioning is that in both documents states are the 
dominant types of actors and multilateral organisations also appear occasionally 
(MD par. 29–32, IDS 21, 24, 32, 51). In the MD, two new groups of actors turn 
up: the private sector and civil society organisations as potential partners ‘in pur­
suit of development and poverty eradication’ (par. 20). That capitalist enterprises 
can be partners in eradicating poverty is a view certainly not shared by all, but 
this point (indicating a shift in development discourse) cannot be pursued here. 
Concerning the responsible actors mentioned in the document, it is clear that 
between 1970 and 2000 a shift has taken place in the direction of a more harmo­
nious, nonantagonistic relation between rich and poor countries. Whereas the 
IDS continuously emphasises different needs and obligations of these actors, the 
MD merges them into a benevolent international ‘we’. 
Proposed measures 
A detailed comparison of all the proposed measures cannot be provided, but the 
main principles and announcements of the two declarations should be addressed 
here. In the MD, the proposed measures for reducing poverty and achieving 
development are above all: ‘good governance within each country’, ‘good gov­
ernance at the international level’ (whatever that might mean – fighting corrup­
tion at the UN?), ‘transparency in the financial, monetary and trading systems’, 
‘an open, equitable, rule-based, predictable and non-discriminatory multilateral 
trading and financial system’ (par.14), mobilise sufficient resources the developing
countries need ‘to finance their sustained development’, ‘a policy of duty- and 
quota-free access for essentially all8 exports from the least developed countries’ in 
the industrialised countries, to grant more development assistance especially to 
countries ‘that are genuinely making an effort to apply their resources for poverty 
reduction’ and to deal with the debt problems of ‘low and middle-income devel­
oping countries’ (15, 16). 
The policy measures proposed in the IDS are more numerous and more detailed. 
They include commodity agreements between producer nations to regulate out­
puts and prices (par. 21, 22), buffer stock mechanisms to stabilise prices through 
regulation of supply (23), pricing policies aimed at ‘securing stable, remunerative 
and equitable prices with a view to increasing the foreign exchange earnings 
from exports of primary products from the developing countries’ (24) and the 
use of bilateral and multilateral development assistance to support the attempts 
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of developing countries to ‘accelerate the diversification of their economies with 
a view to the expansion of the production and exports of semi-manufactures and 
manufactures, as well as semi-processed and processed commodities’ (28). Strong 
emphasis is given to the preclusion and reduction of protectionist measures of 
the developed countries (‘No new tariff and non-tariff barriers will be raised nor 
will the existing ones be increased by developed countries against imports of pri­
mary products of particular interest to developing countries’) (25). ‘Developed 
countries will accord priority to reducing or eliminating duties and other barriers 
to imports of primary products, including those in processed or semi-processed 
form’ (26),9 ‘Developed countries will not, ordinarily, raise existing tariff or 
non-tariff barriers to exports from developing countries, not establish new tar­
iff or non-tariff barriers or any discriminatory measures, where such action has 
the effect of rendering less favourable the conditions of access to the markets of 
manufactured and semi-manufactured products of export interest to developing 
countries.’ (33) and correspondingly to the promotion of nonreciprocal prefer­
ential treatments for exports from the South to the North (32). Other measures 
are the general prevention of tied aid (45),10 the establishment of a World Bank 
scheme providing financial assistance ‘for dealing with the problem of disruption 
of development arising from adverse moments in the export proceeds of develop­
ing countries’ (51). 
Already these brief quotes allow for the recognition of the following points 
concerning the proposed measures of the documents: Many measures proposed 
in the IDS aim at regulating global trade in a manner beneficial for exporters of 
primary products while others aim at supporting the diversification and industri­
alisation of their economies, having recognised the structural problems they are 
confronted with under the present structures of the international economy. The 
measures were also concerned with abolishing protectionist measures, but first 
and foremost those in the North harming the export revenues of the South. These 
measures have almost completely disappeared in the MD. What remains is the call 
for tariff-free access of essentially all exports of the least developed countries and 
apart from that for a nondiscriminatory trading system. This can be interpreted as 
testifying the influence of neoliberal thinking which sees the political regulation 
of trade (especially the control of prices) as economically harmful and is commit­
ted to a level playing field and getting the prices right. Another point worth men­
tioning is that in the MD, the industrialised countries appear less as dominant 
actors in the global economy which are politically and morally obliged to change 
their behaviour and the structures of the global economy (as they did in the IDS), 
but as benign actors giving out aid to those poor countries that have deserved 
it by proving their intents to govern responsibly and reduce poverty. Although 
the MD mentions the right to development twice (par. 11, 24), development aid 
is not seen as an unconditional right of a peripheral country, no matter how its 
government acts, but as a favour given in response to good conduct. This has the 
positive aspect of preventing the financing of corrupt dictators and at the same 
time the negative ring of continued dominance by ex-colonial powers assuming 
the pedagogical role of parent subjects. So it can be stated that in comparison to
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the IDS, the discourse present in the MD is characterised by a rejection of market 
interventions and a basic commitment to neoliberal economic thinking and by a 
markedly more benign portrayal of the industrialised countries and their relation­
ship to the periphery. These results indicate significant shifts in power relations 
that took place between the writing of these two documents. 
Conclusion 
The analysis of the key documents relating to the MDGs yields the following 
results (which can only be summarised in a slightly simplified form): on vari­
ous occasions, a chain of equivalences is established between the signifiers devel­
opment, poverty reduction and economic growth which is reminiscent of early 
modernisation theories, although as new elements noneconomic factors are 
mentioned as well and poverty reduction is also seen as a contribution to eco­
nomic growth (not only vice versa). Meeting the MDGs is primarily constructed 
as a technical problem, as a challenge in terms of mobilising sufficient resources. 
Conflicts of interests are hardly mentioned, resulting in a depoliticised view of 
the problem of global inequality. The global harmony of interests is seen as a 
consequence of increasing global interconnectedness and the ensuing mutually 
reinforcing relationship between development, security and human rights leading 
to a reconceptualisation of interests and identities – a rather fragile construction 
downplaying the vast differences in resources and power within the collective 
actor assumed here (humanity). 
The comparison of the Millennium Declaration with the International Devel­
opment Strategy of 1970 places these results in a historical perspective and indi­
cates that the features identified here are not specific to UN documents on the 
topic in general. It illustrates that the term development is less relevant in today’s 
debates, linked to more modest objectives and portrays the problem of poverty in 
absolute instead of relative terms, thus disarticulating development and inequality. 
The most conspicuous element identified in the comparison is the predominance 
of efforts to regulate global trade as a strategy to promote development in the IDS 
which has almost disappeared in the MD. The numerous differentiations between 
developing and developed states as actors and their corresponding needs and obliga­
tions have also disappeared. The proposed measures today are far more concerned 
with free trade than with intervening in the market mechanisms of the global 
economy in favour of peripheral countries or reforming world order. 
It can be stated that in the documents we are confronted with manifestations 
of a significant shift in discourse that has taken place between 1970 and 2000, a 
shift in favour of neoliberal, market-oriented measures to counter global poverty 
and in favour of a nonantagonistic conception of the global community of states 
which precludes demands for global regulation of trade or redistribution. This 
must not only be seen as a shift in power relations between North and South after 
the end of the Cold War reflected in discourse, but the prevalent discourse repro­
duces and constitutes these power relations, providing depoliticised conceptions 
of poverty and confining poverty reduction measures to those compatible with 
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market-oriented solutions. To return to our initial question: in some respects the 
current discourse does indeed seem anachronistic, especially in focusing on mobi­
lising large resources (big push) and in the close relation implied between poverty 
reduction and economic growth, neglecting a wide range of scholarship since the 
1970s. In other respects, there are marked differences to old-school concepts: 
MDG discourse tries to incorporate significant neoliberal elements into devel­
opment discourse and has abandoned attempts of what could be called global 
Keynesianism to regulate the global economy for the benefit of poorer countries. 
Notes 
1	 Of course there are significant differences between the different concepts of discourse 
used by Foucault, but the view put forward here is that an archaeological examination 
of the rules of formation is compatible with an analysis of the link between power and 
knowledge. 
2 A more thorough critique of the ‘legend of the Big Push’ is provided by Easterly 2006, ch. 2.
 
3 Thus we are faced with a strategy of depoliticisation, which has been analysed by 

Ferguson 1994 and Murray Li 2007 as a structural feature of development discourse.
 
4 The words probably and maybe are crucially important here unless one wants to imply 

a theory of objective interest. 
5	 On July 22, 2005, a Brazilian man was shot dead (in the head at close range) in a 
London tube station by the Metropolitan Police who misidentified him as a terrorist 
(see http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jean_Charles_de_Menezes, January 11, 2009). 
6	 Cynthia Enloe (1989) has clearly demonstrated that these interpretations of security 
are patriarchal, neglecting threats to security, e.g. from marital violence. 
7 Again, a link between security and development is postulated. 
8 Which of course means: not quite all – significant ones have been excepted. 
9 This phrase refers to the tariff escalation practiced by industrialised countries which 
charges higher tariffs for processed primary products – a measure directed against 
building up processing industries in the South. 
10 Aid which is given under the condition of using it to purchase certain goods or ser­
vices from enterprises of the donor country is referred to as tied aid. 
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12 Justice, not development 
Sen and the hegemonic framework for 
ameliorating global inequality 
Amartya Sen’s work Development as Freedom can be regarded as development 
theory’s best-seller of the last decade, and the ‘capability approach’ put forward 
in it (as in some other books by him and Martha Nussbaum) is certainly a con­
tender for the most influential approach within the discipline at the moment. It 
appears to be equally influential within institutions of development policy like 
the United Nations Development Program (UNDP) or indeed the World Bank 
where Sen worked as an advisor and research fellow. This article points out some 
merits, but also some problems of Sen’s version of this approach and argues that 
the problems are related to Sen’s uncritical adoption of the discourse of develop­
ment. This discourse is the hegemonic framework for ameliorating global ine­
quality today but limits our thinking and action on the question of global justice 
and therefore should be abandoned. 
In the first part of the chapter, I will be discussing the merits and flaws of 
Sen’s Development as Freedom, highlighting positive as well as negative aspects. 
In the second part, I will link the problems identified in the approach to the dis­
course of development which constitutes the hegemonic framework for discuss­
ing questions of global inequality since the mid-20th century. Finally, I will point 
out which questions of global justice are neglected by adopting this hegemonic 
framework. 
Sen’s approach and its problems 
Sen’s Development and Freedom has earned much praise since its publication in
1999, and certainly a great deal of it is justified. Before starting to criticise it,
some of its merits have to be remembered. By seeing development as ‘a process of
expanding the real freedoms that people enjoy’ (Sen 2000: 1) and by including
not only political freedoms, transparency guarantees and protective security in
his notion of human freedoms, but also economic facilities and social opportuni­
ties (4), he considerably broadens the definition of the concept. This has cer­
tain consequences. The most important one is that it undermines the frequent
discussions about whether political freedom or gender equality was conducive
to development (understood as economic growth). To this, Sen replies: ‘this way

















substantive freedoms [. . .] are among the constituent components of develop­
ment’ (5). Taking Sen’s approach seriously prevents such discussions and their
concomitant privileging of the growth of the Gross National Product (GNP)
which still take place decades after the Pearson Report (published in 1969 by
the UN)1 has established that economic growth does not automatically lead to
poverty reduction. 
The critique of narrow growth-centred perspectives is expanded when Sen
points out several examples of countries which managed to significantly improve
life expectancy without high GNP growth such as Sri Lanka, China before 1978
and the Indian state of Kerala, and inverse cases such as Brazil, South Africa and
Gabon where a boost of the latter took place without substantial progress in the
former indicator (44–48). His polite style of writing would never allow the author
to put it that way, but the book is a slap in the face of all those in development
theory and policy who still maintain that a focus on economic growth was the most
successful way to reduce poverty and achieve development (e.g. Dollar/Kraay 2002). 
Even more relevant is that he manages to break up the black box of the state by 
comparing survival rates of African Americans in the US and Indians in Kerala. 
Despite the former group being far more prosperous in terms of per-capita income, 
the latter has better chances of reaching a higher age. The picture becomes more 
drastic if one narrows the group, e.g. to black men from Harlem (21–23). 
Last, but not least, Sen revisits his insights in the study of food policy, pointing 
out that famines have nothing to do with a general lack of food, but a lot with 
the ‘substantive freedom of the individual and the family to establish ownership 
over an adequate amount of food’ (161), and usually affect 5–10 per cent of the 
population at most (168). Thus he highlights that famines are a result of unequal 
distribution of assets. According to him, a functioning multi-party democracy 
and a free press would be the best methods of famine prevention, since the rul­
ers simply could not afford to let it happen without losing their job, and serious 
attempts to prevent it by boosting the purchasing power of hard-hit groups were 
usually successful (178–184). 
However, despite these significant merits there are some problematic points in 
his work which deserve closer attention. 
1) Conceptual confusion. Regarding the term development and its content, Sen 
is at times ambiguous. There is a lack of conceptual clarity in statement 2) where 
he writes: 
Freedom is central to the process of development for two distinct reasons. 
1) The evaluative reason: assessment of progress has to be done primarily 
in terms of whether the freedoms that people have are enhanced; 2) The 
effectiveness reason: achievement of development is thoroughly dependent 
on the free agency of the people. 
(4) 
If, as it seems to suggest, development is a process different from attaining freedoms 
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again conducive to some other process (of improvement, growth, etc.) – an argu­
ment he strongly criticises elsewhere (5, see above) and one which is incompat­
ible with his view that development consists in removing unfreedoms (33). If, on 
the other hand, development consists in attaining freedoms, as he argued earlier, 
then the sentence basically reads ‘The achievement of freedom is dependent on 
freedom’ – a textbook tautology.2 
2) All good things go together. Throughout the book, Sen writes about ‘mutually 
reinforcing connections’ (4) between different kinds of freedoms: between politi­
cal rights and economic opportunities and health care and gender equality and 
low population growth etc. This assumption dates back to modernisation theory 
which claimed that all the good things would come with the transition to socie­
ties of high mass-consumption (Rostow 1960). But there are numerous empirical 
observations which do not quite fit into this assumption: nondemocratic states 
achieving high rates of economic growth (China), high levels of education and 
health care not leading to economic growth (Cuba), indigenous communities 
practicing direct democracy but excluding women from it – the list could go on. 
Obviously good and bad things can occur quite independently. 
3) Benevolent institutions. In discussing the World Bank’s Comprehensive 
Development Framework (127) or the role of governmental institutions in fam­
ine prevention (133), these institutions are implicitly conceived as rational, non­
political and benevolent actors pursuing the interest of the poor and waiting to 
implement the policy recommendations of development theory.3 This is little 
more than a convenient fiction neglecting relations of power and institutional 
interests, assuming that development organisations will in fact work for develop­
ment and nothing else.4 
4) Modernisation theory and the equation of development and capitalism. By con­
trasting ‘elements of “underdevelopment” in some parts of the [Italian] economy’ 
with ‘the most dynamic capitalism elsewhere in the same economy’ (264), Sen 
implicitly equates development with capitalism – as if the latter would automati­
cally bring the substantive freedoms he writes about earlier. This argument was 
originally made by modernisation theory, and it is not the only relation to this 
school of thought. In writing ‘there are plenty of examples of the problems faced 
in precapitalist economies because of the underdevelopment of capitalist vir­
tues’ (263) the author reproduces the belief of modernisation theory (e.g. Ros-
tow 1960), that entrepreneurial ethics are a remedy for the problems of societies 
identified as precapitalist. The problematic aspects of capitalist virtues (eroding 
communal solidarity, etc.) are not an issue here. Also, modernisation theory’s 
equation of precapitalist and underdeveloped economies which neglects the colo­
nial exploitation to which many of these were subjected within global capitalism, 
remains unquestioned. 
5) Liberal bias. Even beyond the implicit argumentative structure of modernisa­
tion theory, there is an explicit bias towards capitalist relations of production and
free markets as the best way to achieve an improvement of living standards or devel­
opment respectively freedom throughout the book. This becomes manifest in cat­
















can do without very extensive use of markets’ (7) – what about Cuba?), in praise
for the hard-core neoliberal Hayek (114) and for microcredits as a best practice
of poverty reduction (201), in advocating the freedom that markets bring (ch. 5)
without mentioning the unfreedom of those who cannot afford the market prices of
urgently needed goods, in chastising ‘the political power of those groups that obtain
substantial material benefits from restricting trade and exchange’ (122) while for­
getting about the often far more powerful transnational business lobby groups that
benefit from implementing market liberalisations, by confounding economic free­
dom and economic openness (123) while neglecting the social costs of producers
unable to compete with the world market, and in attributing all problems related to
market mechanisms to inadequate regulation (142) – reminding me of the saying
that ‘there is no bad weather, only inappropriate clothing’. 
6) Universalist assumptions. In his lucid discussion of the problems of cultural 
relativism (ch. 10), Sen points to numerous different philosophical traditions in 
Asia, concluding that 
the modern advocates of the authoritarian view of ‘Asian values’ base their 
reading on very arbitrary interpretations and extremely narrow selections of 
authors and traditions. The valuing of freedoms is not confined to one cul­
ture only, and the Western traditions are not the only ones that prepare us 
for a freedom-based approach to social understanding. 
(240) 
However, his assumption that the capability approach is valid for all cultures 
raises some questions. Because in postulating that a good life is impossible with­
out ‘basic education’, ‘free media’ and ‘elections’ (242) (as sympathetic as this 
may seem to most, including myself), he again introduces universalist criteria for 
evaluating societies which may not be shared by the people concerned. Is the life 
of indigenous subsistence communities really objectively inferior because it lacks 
these three elements? A plurality of conceptions of a good life is conceivable. 
My argument is that all these flaws (as I see them) are related to the concep­
tual framework Sen employs, which is the hegemonic framework for dealing with 
questions of global inequality since the middle of the 20th century: the discourse 
of development. The use of this framework is contingent, in fact, the situations 
of ‘unfreedom’ that Sen describes (undernourishment, premature mortality, dis­
crimination of women, religious violence, tyranny, etc. – e.g. Sen 2000: 3, 8, 20) 
could easily be framed as questions of economic, social and political inequality –
or as questions of justice. 
The discourse of ‘development’ 
The perspective to analyse development as a discourse which is presented here 
builds on the works of Post-Development scholars (Sachs 1992, Ferguson 1994, 
Escobar 1995 and Rist 1997) as well as on Michel Foucault. According to Fou­
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particular by rules of formation concerning the objects, concepts, enunciative 
modalities and thematic choices. While this is not the place for a thorough pres­
entation of the structure of development discourse (see chapters 4 and 5), a brief 
sketch is certainly necessary. Throughout the following description of the dis­
course those elements will be highlighted which we encountered in the critical 
reading of Sen’s work. 
While the discourse of development as we know it today has been established 
in the mid-20th century, its roots go back somewhat further. On the one hand to 
evolutionist thinking of the 19th century (Spencer, Marx, Comte, etc.) which 
perceived the industrialised capitalist countries of Western Europe to be at the 
top of an evolution of mankind towards progress and other countries to be back­
ward. On the other hand to Enlightenment thinking and the Saint-Simonians, 
planning to reform society rationally to reconcile order and progress on the basis 
of trusteeship and expert knowledge (Cowen/Shenton 1996). Already in the 
19th century this intent to improve the social situation of certain groups was 
a reaction to socialist movements and the intent was to stabilise capitalism by 
ameliorating poverty. In the first half of the twentieth century, when the idea 
of development was increasingly applied to the European colonies, this intent 
became even more pressing against the background of the Russian Revolution 
and anti-colonial movements. Alcalde (1987: 223) concludes that ‘The first and 
broadest function of the idea of development was to give economic activity, par­
ticularly foreign economic activity, a positive and essential meaning for the lives 
of less-developed peoples. . . . the aim was essentially . . . enhancing a men­
tal linkage between capitalism and well-being in the South.’ So when Truman 
(1949), in the context of the Cold War and the dusk of colonialism, announced 
the first program of development to help the underdeveloped peoples and simultane­
ously support the US economy and fight world communism, the explicit liberal 
bias was an important element of the discourse. 
During the first post–World War II decades, the picture was clear and the ten­
ets of development discourse were unshaken: there are developed and less developed 
countries, the industrialised capitalist countries constituting the former group. 
So there is a universal scale of comparison, unit of analysis is the state, the West 
sets the norm and the measure is the GNP. The dominant approach in devel­
opment theory and policy was modernisation theory (e.g. Rostow 1960), which 
treated subsistence communities and non-Western empires alike as traditional 
societies in need of capital, technology and modern values. It assumed that tra­
ditional societies are underdeveloped because they are precapitalist, neglecting the 
ties which had linked most of them to global capitalism since they had been 
colonised and implicitly equating development and capitalism. Not only Rostow, but 
also later development theorists (e.g. Menzel 1993: 132) assumed that the pro­
cess of development simultaneously comprised economic growth, modernisation, 
industrialisation, democratisation, and even redistribution (leading to ‘societies 
of high mass-consumption’, as Rostow put it), thus that all good things go together.5 
Already at the beginning of the 1960s, however, it became clear that the tran­





theory. Economic growth did not necessarily lead to poverty reduction (let alone 
democratisation), and capitalist modernity did not provide viable livelihoods 
for everyone. Thus new aspects of the objects (underdeveloped countries) gained 
visibility in development discourse, leading to new strategies of development 
policy. After the new strategy turned out to be less successful than had been 
hoped for, the failure led to a new diagnosis of deficiency, a new concept and a 
renewal of the promise of development to overcome poverty and bring affluence 
(see Figure 4.1). So the rule of formation concerning the objects led to a ‘cycle 
of the clinical gaze’, prescribing ever new recipes for the less developed countries: 
rural, endogenous, sustainable, participatory or human development, basic needs, 
structural adjustment, good governance, mainstreaming gender, ownership, etc. 
This cycle has led to the proliferation of meanings of the term development and to 
the ensuing conceptual confusion. While earlier it was clear that the term denoted 
economic growth, nowadays anything from female empowerment or biodiversity 
protection to road building can be the object of a development project. Even on 
a more abstract level in development theory, the term is used to denote differ­
ent things: 1) social change in general, 2) social change as a result of capitalist 
modernity and 3) social change leading to an improvement in the lives of people. 
And even a brilliant thinker like Sen sometimes gets entangled in this ‘web of 
meanings’ (Esteva 1992: 10). 
After the end of colonialism, the trusteeship for development has been passed 
on to development institutions, primarily governmental bodies, but also organi­
sations of bilateral or multilateral development cooperation. That these are not 
necessarily benevolent institutions has been shown in the study of Ferguson 
(1994), where he portrays the transfer of resources to elites and the increase in 
bureaucratic power as regular (often unintended) effects of development projects. 
At the same time, their actions are assumed to be benign because development 
is seen as something positive, aiming at ending poverty or achieving freedom. 
In the discourse of development, there is usually no place for social conflicts or 
political struggles, because development is seen as a process which benefits the 
whole society and which consists of technical solutions, e.g. projects resulting in 
improvements in irrigation, productivity, technology or governance. Thus the 
question of inequality is removed from relations of power and depoliticised. And 
development organisations reproduce this discourse: their construction of reality 
is influenced by the means they have at their disposal: nonpolitical, technical 
projects. Other solutions to social problems which would entail taking sides in 
political conflicts, opposing the elite or supporting revolutionary struggles are 
excluded because they are incompatible with their institutional self-interest and 
their identity as development organisations. Yet the development organisations 
discursively produce the image of benevolent institutions working for the common 
good without pursuing any other interest. 
One last point to be made concerns the rule of formation of enunciative 
modalities. The discourse of development inevitably constructs a subject posi­
tion of the knowing expert who says what a good (developed) society looks like 
and how it can be achieved. Other types of statements appear meaningless within 
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this discourse. Assuming that there is a plurality of visions how a good society 
looks like, this means that the discourse universalises a particular vision and sub­
ordinates others, thus universalist assumptions about one model of a good soci­
ety contain an authoritarian element. This element was responsible for violence 
and paternalism in uplifting, educating or developing those who were perceived as 
backward Others. The critique of this authoritarian element has led to concep­
tual innovations in development policy like participation or empowerment. Yet 
neither development policy nor theory can do without these universalist assump­
tions, and this is why we find them in the work of Sen as well. If one would reject 
these assumptions, saying something like: ‘People have their own priorities in 
life and the world is too complex to generalise about processes of social change’, 
one would embrace the plurality of visions and the heterogeneity of reality, but 
could not any longer provide advice to development institutions. Because they 
are based on the assumptions that there is just one vision of a good society and 
that social change occurs everywhere along very similar patterns, which is why it 
makes sense to send experts to some country in order to provide advice who have 
never lived there before – but who have a lot of knowledge about development. 
So it appears that the problematic aspects of Sen’s work Development as Free­
dom are related to this discourse of development. And this discourse has been 
the hegemonic framework for dealing with global inequality since the mid-20th 
century, defining poverty as a global problem to be dealt with by development 
project, programmes and organisations (Ferguson 1994, Escobar 1995). Countless 
aspirations for a better life and a more just society have been framed in this dis­
course. However, this framework has serious limitations which come to the fore 
when we examine its contribution to some areas in which debates about global 
justice take place. 
‘Development’ and justice 
Adopting the discourse of development has implications which limit the scope 
of thought and action concerning global justice. If questions of global inequality 
are answered with the hegemonic framework of development, the ‘web of mean­
ings’ (Esteva 1992: 10) surrounding the concept suggests that 1) the solutions to 
global inequality lie in each country’s process of social change, 2) these solutions 
do not require political struggles and transformations of the existing relations of 
power or capitalist relations of production, 3) these solutions have to be based 
on expert knowledge and economic growth. Of course critical approaches like 
the dependency school or world systems theory have questioned these tenets, 
but the dominant views in the institutions today remain largely untouched by 
these critiques. However, on this basis better development projects and policies 
are possible, but a different world order is out of the question. Even if we assume 
that global capitalism was compatible with global justice (a somewhat question­
able assumption according to many definitions of justice), there are at least three 
areas where urgent questions of justice have been largely ignored by development 
theory and policy. 
 























1)	 Reparations for colonialism: After 400 years of conquering, subjugating and 
exploiting the rest of the planet, there have so far been no reparations from
the former colonial powers to the former colonies. This is so despite the fact
that reparations, e.g. after the world wars, have been a common feature of
international law. However, while the white nations have been willing to pay
for their crimes they committed against other white nations, they have not
been prepared to do so for their crimes against former colonies.6 The African
World Reparations and Repatriations Truth Commission has estimated the
amount of reparations due at US$777,000 trillion. Of course the (substan­
tially lower) financial transfers declared as development aid have sometimes
been linked with colonialism, but certainly not all of these transfers have ben­
efited the people in recipient countries – the keywords odious debts and tied
aid may suffice here – and it does make a significant difference whether money
is given in repayment of a crime or as a benevolent gesture of compassion. 
2)	 Ecological justice: Contrary to the idea that justice can be achieved through 
development in the sense of the poor catching up with the rich, ecological 
limits demand another kind of justice: namely that the industrialised coun­
tries discontinue a way of life based on nonrenewable energy sources and a 
disproportionate share of resource use and environmental pollution, in par­
ticular regarding the question of climate change.7 Ecological justice could 
mean that the environment is seen as a public good and that each person 
must not use more of it than its fair share. And even here, one could talk 
about historical debts in terms of processes of industrialisation in some coun­
tries which have depleted the resources and polluted the environment in 
such a way that other processes by late-comers are being prevented or ren­
dered irresponsible. But why should some people be entitled to a larger share 
than others? And is it just to permit oligarchic (or imperial, Brand/Wissen 
2011) lifestyles which are possible only if a majority is excluded from them? 
3)	 A cosmopolitan world order: According to a Rawlsian ‘veil of ignorance’, all 
people on the world are entitled to the same chance for a decent life. This 
is in fact not the case, and the coincidence of being born into a slum in São 
Paulo or an upper-class neighbourhood in Munich determines individual life 
chances to a considerable extent. This is not only related to social inequal­
ity, but also to a nation-state system which severely restricts migration into 
richer countries and guarantees human rights only for citizens (and even that 
only in an imperfect manner). Movements for a cosmopolitan citizenship are 
hardly existent, but some migrants in North Africa and Europe have been 
organising for a global right to free movement and settlement.8 
Remembering the critique of universalist assumptions, one might ask: do these
struggles not also imply struggles for universal rights? Indeed they do. But here we have
to differentiate between universal rights which imply normative judgements on how
people should live (to which they could object in the name of self-determination)
and universal rights which create conditions for self-determination. In all three
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protect the rights of others to self-determination, denying rights to exclude people
on the basis of their nationality, to consume resources in a oligarchic manner, and
to colonise others without compensation. 
Of course, the debates and conflicts in these areas have been sketched here 
only very briefly, but the central point is that Sen’s work and in fact the vast 
majority of development theory and policy remains silent on all three points. 
Improvements in these areas cannot be expected from development projects 
based on expert knowledge nor from successful programs of economic growth in 
income poor countries, but only from changes in political structures as a result 
of political struggles and social movements. In all three areas pressing questions 
about global justice are pertinent. And the discourse of development does not 
provide answers. It is time to overcome this discourse. Struggles for justice should 
not take the detour of development. 
Notes 
1	 http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0005/000567/056743eo.pdf (December 17, 2013) 
2	 A possible line of defence would be if Sen argued that he merely meant that different 
kinds of freedom are mutually reinforcing each other (4, 37). But then, he first should 
have been more precise; second, this statement is problematic in itself, as we shall see. 
3	 At the same time, Sen is quite ready to assume less than benevolent motives in indi­
vidual actors, taking into account the possibility that some parents keep one child 
deliberately famished to receive nutritional support (132). 
4	 To give but one drastic example: The food-for-work programmes which Sen advocates 
(133) have often been used as political instruments. The most extreme case probably 
was Guatemala during the 1980s where these programmes (funded by development 
agencies) were used as a part of the scorched-earth and counterinsurgency policy of 
the military dictatorship to recruit refugees to build model villages in the vicinity of 
military camps after their own villages had been destroyed (Schultz 1992). 
5	 It has to be noted that some conservative (Huntington) or neoliberal (Lal) develop­
ment theorists did not share this assumption, but saw the necessity for undemocratic 
governments implementing economic reforms which lead to growth even against the 
will of the people. 
6	 This seems to be a case of what Doty (1996: 33–36) calls the Western bond: the differences
among former war enemies are overcome by a bond vis-à-vis the non-Western countries. 
7 See http://www.climate-justice-now.org/ (March 21, 2014). 
8 See their homepage on www.afrique-europe-interact.net (March 21, 2014). Interestingly,
they also struggle for a right to stay in their home countries, provided there are opportuni­
ties for a secure, dignified and self-determined life, which they frame as fair development. 
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13 Migration management as 
development aid? 
The IOM and the international migration 
and development initiative 
During the past two decades, traditional development aid has become quite 
unfashionable or at least lost considerable ground in the debate on North-South 
relations due to end of the Cold War and the distrust towards interventions in 
the market mechanisms (see chapter 8). Instead, increasingly prominent issues 
were (among others) global governance, sustainable development and market 
liberalisation. The latest trend consists of promoting migration as an engine for 
development in the countries of origin. The International Organisation for Migra­
tion (IOM) has summoned an initiative aiming at the improved coordination of 
the areas of migration and development policy. However, the rights of migrants 
are not on the centre stage in this initiative. 
Migration and development 
Since the mid-1980s it has been recognised that global economic inequality has 
increased in spite of countless development projects and considerable aid flowing 
to the South. Also, with the end of the Cold War the geopolitical motivation 
for development aid has mostly disappeared. The traditional patterns of develop­
ment policy have gradually been pushed aside by new debates and concepts: one 
party recommended or even prescribed market liberalisation, export orientation, 
improved investment climate and increased competitiveness, another called for 
the reform of global economic structures according to social and ecological objec­
tives, for worldwide reregulation and global governance. The latest trend in the 
development debate focuses on highlighting the positive effects of migration for 
the economies of the countries of origin and promoting ‘development through 
migration’ (Thränhardt 2005). The World Bank alone published seven books 
(IOM/OECD/World Bank 2004; Ozden/Schiff 2005; World Bank 2005; Golding/ 
Reinert 2006; Kuznetsov 2006; Mansoor/Quillin 2006; Wodon 2007) and numer­
ous working papers on this topic within only a few years, and more and more 
researchers emphasise the economic potential of increased migration from the 
South to the North. 
The concept of ‘brain drain’, that perceived the emigration of highly quali­
fied experts from poorer to richer countries as a negative factor for the economic 
















So is the enduring practice of sending back migrants after they have completed 
their studies for example in Germany, which, however, owes at least as much to 
the fear of rising numbers of foreigners as to the fear of the brain drain. Instead, 
a ‘brain gain’ is said to exist: numerous positive impulses for economic growth in 
the countries of the South are supposed to arise through remittances of migrants 
to their countries of origin, through the transfer of capital and knowledge, and 
through the creation of commercial networks instigated by migrants. There are 
estimates that, for example 60–65 per cent of all FDI in China comes from for­
mer emigrants. The rapid development of technology in Taiwan is also based to 
a significant extent on the know-how of engineers who have remigrated from 
the US (Hunger 2003: 60f). On the other hand the industrial countries were 
dependent on immigration due to the aging of their demographic structure, the 
argument goes, and in the age of globalisation they were competing for the best 
and brightest from all over the world – a classical win-win-situation. The policy 
of building ever higher walls around one’s country had not quite worked anyway, 
in the light of high numbers of irregular migrants. And the idea of fighting the 
causes of migration through increased and improved development cooperation 
had also not been too successful. Migration, this is the message, should in general 
be seen less as a sign of crisis, but rather as an opportunity, and migrants less as 
deficient beings in need of integration, but rather as enriching and useful for our 
society (Thränhardt 2005: 3f). Migration, it seems, is on its way to become the 
secret formula for at least slightly developing the less developed countries while at 
the same time being beneficial to all parties involved. 
The International Organisation for Migration 
This view is shared by the International Organisation for Migration (IOM), which
recently has presented an International Migration and Development Initiative
(IMDI). The IOM (for the following see www.iom.int; Düvell 2002: 101–107;
Angenendt 2003: 195f; Antirassismusbüro Bremen 2004; Klemz 2006) is an inter­
governmental organisation with 120 member states dedicated to regulating migra­
tion. Some other states and several dozen international organisations are observers
at the IOM. Originally, it has been founded in 1951 as the Provisional Intergov­
ernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants in Europe before it was insti­
tutionalised two years later as the Intergovernmental Committee for European
Migration (ICEM). Its member states were recruited from the allies of the US, and
its main task was the transfer of migrants in post–World War II Europe. The ICEM
was an instrument in the Cold War and supposed to act as a counterbalance against
the shortly before created UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCR).
In order to adapt its name to its increasingly global role, it was renamed in Inter­
governmental Committee on Migration (ICM) in 1980 and finally in Interna­
tional Organisation for Migration in 1989. It is concerned with providing logistic
support for the transfer of (international and national) refugees and migrants,
often in postconflict situations, where it is also involved in humanitarian and
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IOM include the arrangement of labour migration, above all supporting the rel­
evant countries in the area of recruitment; providing integration aid, repatriation
and resettlement assistance, information for potential migrants, capacity building
and technical cooperation for police officers and administrative staff, countertraf­
ficking programmes and finally fostering international cooperation in migration
policy. The IOM headquarters are located in Geneva, its Technical Cooperation
Centre in Vienna. All in all, 6,000 people work for the organisation. The IOM is
especially significant in the field of research and knowledge production: it regularly
publishes the World Migration Report, as well as the series IOM Migration Research
and the bulletin Trafficking in Migrants. Its programmes are financed by voluntary,
often tied financial contributions of the member states. It is only to these that
the IOM is accountable, it is not authorised by international law or part of the
UN system. The IOM itself describes its main task as the ‘organized transfer of
migrants’ and the provision of services in the area of migration at the request of
states (IOM 2005a). According to its homepage, the IOM is ‘dedicated to the
principle that humane and orderly migration benefits migrants and society’ (IOM
2005b). In the light of the previous chapters, we can already discern the principle
of social technology and a link to trusteeship. 
In its public relations work, the IOM draws a positive picture of migration which
is not compatible with discourses presenting migration as a threat that northern
countries have to protect themselves against – discourses which are prevalent in
many European countries. Of utmost importance was, according to this represen­
tation, the efficient management and the regulation of migration: irregular migra­
tion is described as highly dangerous in several respects. One report from the IOM
homepage, for example extensively covers the story of irregular migrants whose
dream of a better future ended when they were shipwrecked close to Lampedusa,
where 50 of them lost their lives. In contrast to the discourse of pro-migrant
organisations, the casualties are not linked with the increasing protection of the
EU-border, which leads migrants to use ever more dangerous routes into Europe,
but are attributed to criminal traffickers, who had seduced gullible Africans. The
latter are nowhere seen as active subjects who, in the face of a bleak future in
Africa, had consciously decided to migrate to Europe without legal permit. The
vivid portrayal of the ‘horrific experiences of those lucky enough to survive the
journey’, of the terrible scenes when a wave capsized the boat of the migrants
almost none of whom could swim, of the endless hours before rescue patrols arrived
and of the bodies (Moscarelli 2006) does not provide balanced information on the
risks and possibilities of crossing the Mediterranean, but primarily serves the func­
tion of deterring potential irregular migrants. It ends by stating 
Knowing that migrants have a very poor knowledge of European immigra­
tion laws and virtually no knowledge of the often abusive conditions of the 
journey they are about to undertake allows IOM and others to devise more 
effective responses on the dangers of irregular migration. The more effective, 











More effective responses to irregular migration, like enforcing stricter border 
controls, are in this way constructed as efforts to save lives. 
A similar function can be attributed to the posters and brochures published by 
the IOM in Central and Eastern Europe. They show a half-naked young woman 
which is literally hooked to the strings of an invisible puppet master. Under­
neath there are slogans like ‘You will be sold like a doll’ and ‘Do not trust easy 
money abroad’. (The poster is reproduced in Antirassismusbüro Bremen 2004: 
18). Human trafficking and slavery in the sex trade are harsh realities and unde­
niable dangers for women in Central and Eastern Europe willing to migrate into 
the West. Still, two objections have to be raised, one concerning the style of 
presentation, the other its goal. Andrijasevic points to the fact that 
the representation of the body of trafficked women as tricked, wounded and/or
broken is far from being innocent; strategies of representation employing inani­
mate, wounded and mute female bodies reenact the well-known scenario in which
female bodies are passive objects of male violence and simultaneously demarcate
the borders in which women can be conceived as active actors/subjects. 
(Andrijasevic 2005) 
The image sends a clear and threatening message: women ought to stay at 
home, at least if they want to avoid ending in this way. Here again the aim of the 
presentation is not providing neutral information for an informed decision for or 
against migration, but the prevention of irregular (and in this case specifically 
female) labour migration into the more prosperous countries. 
This suggests that the struggle against irregular migration is a far higher priority 
for the IOM than the balanced information for potential migrants. After all, the 
IOM provides services in the field of migration management for the states that 
are financing it, it is not a humanitarian organisation. In spite of the rhetoric on 
the homepage, according to which it seeks to ‘uphold the human dignity and 
well-being of migrants’, it sides rather with states preventing migration if there is 
a conflict between loyalties. This has become unambiguously clear in the project 
that has become known as the ‘pacific solution’. In August 2001 the Austral­
ian navy stopped a Norwegian freighter that was going to bring refugees from 
Afghanistan and Iraq which were shipwrecked before the Australian coast to the 
nearest harbour. Instead, the refugees were brought to the Pacific island of Nauru 
and interned in camps. These camps are run by the IOM. Human rights organisa­
tions like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch therefore accused 
the IOM of being complicit in Australia’s breach of the Geneva Convention and 
expressed concerns regarding the human rights impact of IOM operations (Anti­
rassismusbüro Bremen 2004: 27; noborder network 2002, 2003). 
The international migration and development initiative 
In September 2006 the IOM initiated a High-level Dialogue on International 
Migration and Development at the UN General Council to present the IMDI. 
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discussions and passed a resolution to continue the dialogue and to implement 
measures to better link the areas of migration and development. Members of the 
Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM) had approached the
IOM with the request to simultaneously address two issues, together with
the World Bank: to search for ways to close the gap between labour supply and 
demand on the one and to promote human resource development on the other 
hand. The IOM got in touch with the World Bank, but expanded the circle of 
organisations concerned with the planning debates to include all members of the 
Global Migration Group (GMG) – the International Labour Office (ILO), the 
UN High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the UN Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), the UN Development Programme (UNDP), the 
UN Fund for Population Activities (UNFPA), the UN Department for Economic 
and Social Development (UN-DESA) and the UN Office for Drugs and Crime 
(UNODC) (IOM 2006b: 1; http://www.un.int/iom/GMG.html). The IMDI is 
the result of these consultations. 
What shape does this initiative take and what are the concrete measures 
intended? According to the suggestions of the IOM (and the GMG) first of all 
labour supply and demand ought to be better coordinated. This can be arranged 
through global databases on labour market trends and labour force profiles, a 
centralised information source on regional and national migration regulatory 
frameworks, and policy and programme models for building the capacity of gov­
ernments to formulate national labour market, human resources development 
and migration policies in an integrated manner. Additionally, workers are for 
example to be prepared for the work abroad by language training and courses for 
cultural orientation, and agreements for the mutual recognition of qualifications 
are to be negotiated between countries of origin and countries of destination 
(IOM 2006a: 6–8). 
Further, the positive effects of migration on development are to be improved. 
This should happen through increased research and improved data on remit­
tances and their specific effects and the consideration of this knowledge in the 
conception of developmental and poverty reducing strategies. For example remit­
tances should be made easier and tax incentives for their use in development 
projects are to be created. Investments by returnees ought to receive support, 
advice and loans, and the diaspora population is to be better integrated in these 
strategies (ibid., 9–10). 
Finally, safer, more human and orderly labour movements are to be ensured. 
This is to be achieved by fostering an international dialogue on managed labour 
migration, by building the capacity of governments to formulate sound policies 
on labour migration, and by the development of assessment tools and monitoring 
mechanisms on labour migration policies. Partnerships with the private sector 
assume a prominent role in this context: a set of nonbinding guiding principles 
concerning the ethical recruitment and fair treatment of migrant workers is to 
be elaborated in consultation with business, and those enterprises complying 
with these principles are to be awarded a quality label. The IMDI also aims to 
develop a Twinning Programme for Facilitated Mobility between countries of 
















related to combating irregular migration and in exchange obtains visa facilitation 
or increased labour market access by the latter (ibid., 10–12). 
It is emphasised that the IMDI ‘would not create any rights of entry or alter any
country’s right to determine its immigration policy, as this is the sovereign domain
of States’ (ibid., 3). The IMDI proposal has been outlined slightly more precisely in
the debates on the High-Level-Dialogue. As a result, there is a stronger reference
to human rights of migrants which are to be protected, but the best way to do so is
still seen in ‘creating safe and legal channels for orderly migration’ and in combat­
ing irregular migration (IOM 2006b: 4). The IMDI’s task is perceived as providing
a frame for coordinating different intergovernmental organisations, avoiding paral­
lel activities and creating synergies. The importance of integrating private actors
is stressed once more (ibid., 5). The administrative structure of the IMDI is to be
discussed and outlined by a task force comprising all interested organisations of
the GMG. The possibility of including representatives of civil society in addition
to those of international organisations, governments and the private sector is con­
sidered. Projects that are to receive funding have to be agreed on with the govern­
ments concerned and they have to be compatible with the development models
and poverty reduction strategy papers (PRSPs) of the country in question (ibid., 7). 
The IMDI led to the Joint Migration and Development Initiative (JMDI) in 
2008, a programme implemented by the UNDP in Brussels in partnership with 
the EU, the IOM, the UNHCR, UNFPA and the ILO – though funded entirely 
by the European Commission. Its official aim was to support local authorities 
and civil society organisations in countries of origin, transit and destination in 
linking migration and development. It involved programmes and projects in the 
Philippines, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Jamaica, Ecuador, ten African and twelve 
European countries, and, according to Peter Sutherland, Special Representa­
tive of the UN Secretary-General for Migration and Development,1 worked to 
‘amplify the development benefits of migration’ (JMDI 2011: 14).2 
A new regime of migration and development? 
At this stage a well-founded evaluation of the IMDI is difficult, because con­
crete consequences for migrants are as yet difficult to discern. It has to be seen as 
positive that restrictive immigration laws are being criticised, and so is the per­
ception of migration as a threat to national security and as a phenomenon invari­
ably causing xenophobia (IOM 2006b: 2). Development, on the other hand, is no 
longer seen as the result of development projects, expert knowledge and loans or 
investments from the north, but as a consequence of people’s own initiative, of 
the capital and know-how accumulated by former emigrants and returnees – a 
conception which seems far less paternalistic. From the perspective of migrants, 
the IMDI certainly includes useful elements. Services like preparatory language 
courses or a reliable data base on the immigration laws, the possibilities and pre­
conditions in potential countries of destination are among them. 
The most significant point may be that the initiative is directed against the 
privilege of receiving dramatically higher payments than other people simply 
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because one was lucky enough to be born in a country with comparatively high 
wages. The active defence of this privilege through border regimes supposed to 
prevent labour migration or linking it with the status of being here illegally and 
implicitly with the almost complete absence of rights, is challenged by the IMDI. 
And in contrast to the German Green Card or the mode 4 of the negotiations on 
trade in services in the WTO the relevant matter is not only the mobility of highly 
qualified labour. From a perspective that perceives nations, peoples and states as 
historically situated or artificially created constructs and not as natural or fateful 
communities, this has to be seen as a progressive aspect. 
A critical evaluation, however, has to proceed further. It has to be taken into 
consideration that the collecting of data and information on supply and demand 
on the labour market will lead to a significant intensification in the visibility and 
surveillance of people. On top of that, the IMDI links the partial legalisation 
of labour migration of less qualified workers with an intensified struggle against 
irregular migration of which the EU’s border agency FRONTEX is only the most 
visible manifestation. It can be presumed that governments which have to fear 
right-wing populism and correspondent losses in votes will implement especially 
the latter aspect first and implement it thoroughly. The cracks in the walls will be 
larger, but the walls higher. 
Furthermore, it is obvious according to which principles the restructuring of 
the migration regime is taking place. The fundamental idea is not a right to move 
freely that challenges the privileges and wage differentials, but it is the interest of 
firms and service enterprises in industrial countries in a cheap and flexible labour 
force. As far as this interest is compatible with the interest of certain people 
in the periphery willing to migrate, the IMDI surely is bound to have positive 
consequences for this group. It is clear, however, that the right to migrate will 
only be granted to those that can be employed (or exploited) in the market, and 
presumably only as long as their labour is needed in the countries of destination. 
Two elements of the initiative spoil the positive aspects contained: its primary 
goal of bridging the gap between supply and demand in the labour market can be 
reached only if the differences in wages and social security between migrants and 
domestic labour persist – otherwise the gap would stay the same. So if rights of 
migrants are put forward by the IMDI, it is exclusively the right to be employed 
or exploited more cheaply and more flexibly than domestic workers in the north. 
To be sure: this can be a desirable goal for a large part of the world’s population 
and is to be taken seriously. We still have to bear in mind that in contrast to a 
universalist, cosmopolitan approach the separation in citizens on the one hand 
foreign immigrants on the other hand remains untouched here. The idea of equal 
rights for all is not mentioned anywhere. 
The fact cannot be ignored that the situation as a regular (even if only tempo­
rary) migrant (who is still systematically being discriminated against in compari­
son to citizens), is far more comfortable than the situation of an irregular migrant. 
For the people concerned, it would constitute a significant progress, legally and 
financially, even if it does not entail completely equal status. But this increase 





















labour markets as a means in the conflict between capital and labour. The open­
ing up of the labour market for cheaper and more flexible labour from abroad 
serves to weaken the position of unionised domestic labour and to fend off their 
demands. In a somewhat sloppy Marxist formulation one could argue that immi­
gration laws are always strategies in the class struggle. 
From the perspective of anti-racist movements it becomes clear that the demand
for open borders and equal rights for migrants should not be content with partial
successes. Even if immigration models like those envisioned in the IMDI include
more legal possibilities for migration and concrete improvements for foreign work­
ers, they nevertheless still operate with a separation alongside national identities
and utilise this separation for the disadvantage of both (foreign and national)
groups. One group is still being systematically discriminated against, the other has
to renounce social rights long fought for. The beneficiaries are the usual suspects.
It is politically naive to expect a solution to questions of global social inequality
from initiatives like these. The effect of migration management as development
aid maybe should not be underestimated, but it is inherently limited. 
From the perspective of migration research the IMDI can be interpreted as
another sign of a turning of the tide in the migration policy of the OECD coun­
tries. This shift does not constitute a complete break with the former policy which
was primarily concerned with preventing migration, but rather consists of sup­
plementing it with measures of selective and managed immigration. The develop­
ment of the EU’s regime of migration which was decided on the conference of the
European Council in Tampere 1999 provides a telling example. It rests on three
elements complementing each other: the extension of the EU’s border regime to
countries of origin and of transit (through preliminary border controls, repatria­
tion agreements and implementation of stricter migration laws), the intensifica­
tion of the struggle against irregular migration, and the selective and controlled
labour migration (Düvell 2002: 80f, 49). The demographic crisis in the industrial
countries serves as a justification for the third element: labour migration is thus
conceived as serving the national interest of the country of destination. 
From the perspective of development research the IMDI can be identified as 
a manifestation of the gradual transformation of the development dispositive 
into a dispositive of globalisation (Ziai 2007). The Herculean task of turning 
the less developed countries into developed ones has been given up quite a while 
ago. Instead, the policy towards the south is more concerned with crisis preven­
tion, liberalisation and access to resources. State interventions in the market 
aimed at development, such as differential treatment or even ODA transfers, are 
increasingly seen as detrimental. In times of constrained budgets in the north 
and geopolitical insignificance of the south they are an increasingly anachro­
nistic model, as the transformation of the Lomé-treaty between the EU and the 
ACP-countries into free trade agreements vividly demonstrate (see chapter 8). 
The IMDI is a further step in this transformation: its measures – declared as a 
new form of development policy – include neither financial transfers by govern­
ments to improve other states’ economies nor market-distorting interventions 
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by the migrants themselves (Kunz/Schwenken 2014). The opening up of the 
labour markets of the industrial countries, which is at the core of the initiative, 
corresponds far more to the principles of neoclassical economic theory. Measures 
for the redistribution of global wealth are envisioned only in a very indirect man­
ner: redistribution will take place as an indirect consequence of an intensified 
and controlled labour migration from the South to the North which is oriented 
towards optimised conditions for employment/exploitation by the enterprises in 
the industrial countries and will probably result in wage decreases and further 
abolition of the welfare state in the countries of destination. A very special kind 
of redistribution. 
In both areas – migration policy and development policy – neoliberal concepts
are gradually pushing aside more traditional approaches (prevention of migration
in one, state interventions aiming at development in the other area). The conver­
gence of both areas in the new approach of promoting migration management
as a new form of development aid therefore has to be analysed as an element of
neoliberal globalisation. The possible progressive aspects of the restructuring of
the regime of migration should not detract from the fact that its main concern is
the interest of enterprises in the North and not the rights of migrants from the
South. 
Just like the new trend towards microfinance in development policy (Bateman 
2010), the focus on the migration-development nexus and the idea of migration 
working as an engine for development has to be interpreted as a new cycle of the 
circle of diagnosis and promise in development discourse. The new prescription, 
which is perfectly in line with the neoliberal transformation of the discourse and 
dispositive of development, recommends letting the poor take care of their pov­
erty themselves by allowing them to migrate into high-income countries and to 
send remittances to their families at home – of course not in the context of an 
equal right to mobility, but of controlled labour migration programmes tuned 
to the needs of the labour markets (i.e. the private sector) of the North. While 
this interferes with the interests of unions defending the achievements (globally: 
the privileges) of workers in the North, it does relieve international organisa­
tions, states and multinational companies of any responsibility to change existing 
distributions, relations of power or economic systems in order to combat global 
poverty. This task is given to the supposedly empowered migrant subjects in the 
new discursive regime of migration and development. 
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1 Others may remember him as the last Director General of the General Agreement 
on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and the first Director General of the World Trade 
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Bilderberg Conference, the Trilateral Commission and the European Roundtable of 
Industrialists. 
2 See alsohttp://www.migration4development.org/content/about-jmdi (March21, 2015) and
https://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/what-we-do/migration—development-1. 
html (March 21, 2015). 
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14 The post-2015 agenda and the 
Sustainable Development Goals 
The persistence of development discourse 
As the year 2015 drew nearer, the debate in development policy was increasingly 
dominated by the agenda which would follow up the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs). Countless reports, proposals and statements were issued and con­
ferences were held on the topic, and even within the UN there was a sometimes 
bewildering array of global reports on the post-2015 agenda: the Report of the 
Secretary-General ‘A life of dignity for all: accelerating progress towards the 
MDGs and advancing the UN development agenda beyond 2015’ (UN 2013a); 
the report by the UN Development Group ‘A million voices: The world we want’ 
which was based on a global consultation on the post-2015 agenda (UN 2013b); 
the report of the Open Working Group of the General Assembly on Sustainable 
Development Goals, which was the outcome of the UN conference on sustain­
able development titled ‘The future we want’ (UN 2014a); the report of the 
High-Level Panel of Eminent Persons on the post-2015 development agenda 
‘A new global partnership: Eradicate poverty and transform economies through 
sustainable development’ (UN 2014b); and finally the synthesis report of the 
Secretary-General ‘The Road to Dignity by 2030: Ending Poverty, Transforming 
all Lives and Protecting the Planet’ (UN 2014c). And while the one report based 
not on experts but on more participatory methods states that ‘a sense of injustice 
at the deep inequalities and insecurities permeates all the consultations’ (UN 
2013b: 17), the others are (although dealing with a comprehensive number of 
issues) focused on the topic of sustainable development, considering however not 
only the inclusion of the North into the agenda, but also the question of inequal­
ity and the objective of ending poverty. 
During this period, the criticisms of the MDG agenda and its continuation 
increased as well. They concern various issues such as the neglect of gender and 
empowerment issues (Sen/Mukherjee 2014), the fuzziness of the targets (Van­
demoortele 2014: 227), the effects of the focus on numbers and measurable tar­
gets (Fukuda-Parr et al. 2014, Lepenies 2014), and the fact that the apparently 
impressive successes in poverty reduction claimed by the MDG proponents to a 
great extent came about as a result of tinkering with the international poverty 
line by the World Bank (Hickel 2014, Pogge/Sengupta 2014).1 Another criticism 
was voiced by Ashwani Saith at the British Academy Conference ‘After 2015: 
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SDGs) as ‘a diversion from the significant questions of political economy’ (see 
also Saith 2006). What is lacking so far is a critical assessment of the post-2015 
agenda from the perspective of historical discourse analysis and this chapter shall 
be a first attempt at such an assessment. 
Taking the High-Level-Report (UN 2014b), which probably received the most 
attention, as an object of study, in this chapter I will examine which significant 
changes and continuities in development discourse can be discerned if we apply 
the lens of discourse analysis to the text. 
The report: eradicate poverty through sustainable 
development and partnership 
The panel assembled by UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon in July 2012 
was headed by Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, President of Indonesia, Ellen 
Johnson-Sirleaf, President of Liberia, and David Cameron, Prime Minister of 
Great Britain. The other 24 members are described as ‘leaders from civil society, 
private sector and government’2 – which corresponds to the idea of global gov­
ernance as outlined by the UN commission (Commission on Global Governance 
1995) – and include persons like former IMF Director and German President 
Horst Köhler; Fulbert Gero Amoussuga, Chair of the African Union and eco­
nomic adviser to the President of Benin; Izabella Teixeira, Minister of Environ­
ment in Brazil; Paul Polman, the CEO of Unilever; Nigerian Minister of the 
Economy and former World Bank Director Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala; Indian econo­
mist Abhijit Banerjee; EU Commissioner for Development Andris Piebalgs; 
Nobel Peace Prize winner Tawakel Karman of Yemen and Queen Rania of Jordan. 
The report they submitted is entitled ‘A new global partnership: Eradicate pov­
erty and transform economies through sustainable development’ and generally 
employs a vocabulary familiar from many UN declarations and specifically the 
emphatic variant of the discourse of global governance (Brand et al. 2000) invok­
ing a ‘spirit of cooperation’, mutual learning (‘we have learnt much from each 
other’) and working together ‘for the sake of humanity’ (UN 2014b: i). 
The report starts by praising the achievements of the MDGs but criticises as 
their most serious shortcoming ‘not integrating the economic, social, and envi­
ronmental aspects of sustainable development’ and ‘not addressing the need to 
promote sustainable patterns of consumption and production . . . environment 
and development were never properly brought together’ (v). Instead, we need a 
‘single sustainable development agenda’ (5). Its conclusion is that ‘the post-2015 
agenda . . . needs to be driven by the five big, transformative shifts’ (vi), namely 
‘Leave No One Behind’ (commitment to the excluded, to end discrimination and 
tackle causes of poverty, 7); ‘Put Sustainable Development at the Core’ (lower 
global carbon emissions, moving towards a green economy, investments in sus­
tainable technologies, civil society as watchdogs, 8); ‘Transform Economies for 
Jobs and Inclusive Growth’ (sustained growth that can overcome the challenges 
of unemployment, resource scarcity and climate change, creating opportunities 


















business environment and support for sustainable production and consumption, 
8f); ‘Build Peace and Effective, Open and Accountable Public Institutions’ (rec­
ognise peace and good governance as core elements of well-being, transparency 
and accountability, right to protest and international cooperation, 9); and ‘Forge 
a new Global Partnership’ (a new sense of global partnership based on our com­
mon humanity and universal principles of human rights, solidarity, etc. and a 
shared common vision of a better future, 9f). The participants of this partner­
ship (which gave the report its title) are national governments; local authori­
ties; international institutions; business; civil society organisations; foundations, 
other philanthropists and social impact investors; scientists and academics (10f); 
and ‘people’ (12). 
Instead of the eight MDGs, the report proposes twelve universal goals for 
sustainable development, each accompanied by four to six specific targets. The 
goals are: 
1) End Poverty 
2) Empower Girls and Women and Achieve Gender Equality 
3) Provide Quality Education and Lifelong Learning 
4) Ensure Healthy Lives 
5) Ensure Food Security and Good Nutrition 
6) Achieve Universal Access to Water and Sanitation 
7) Secure Sustainable Energy 
8) Create Jobs, Sustainable Livelihoods, and Equitable Growth 
9) Manage Natural Resources and Assets Sustainably 
10) Ensure Good Governance and Effective Institutions 
11) Ensure Stable and Peaceful Societies 
12) Create a Global Enabling Environment and Catalyse Long-Term Finance. (30f) 
According to the report, the new goals need to be specific, measurable, attain­
able, relevant, and time-bound (13). The reformulation of MDG 8 (Global Part­
nership for Development) is given particular attention, as it was the only one 
involving industrialised countries and at the same time very vague and not linked 
to quantified targets. This reformulation should, according to the report, develop 
universal targets, quantify them wherever feasible, ‘pay more attention to raising, 
long-term finance for development’, ‘signal priorities that go beyond aid’ and 
‘infuse global partnerships and cooperation into all the goals’ (15). 
Before entering into the analysis of changes and continuities in development 
discourse, some remarkable and – at first sight – progressive elements of the report 
deserve to be mentioned. One is the explicit mentioning of inequality (‘Of all 
the goods and services consumed in the world each year, the 1.2 billion people 
living in extreme poverty only account for one per cent, while the richest 1 bil­
lion people consume 72 per cent’, 4) and gender-based violence (‘Every year, one 
billion women are subject to sexual or physical violence because they lack equal 
protection under the law’, 4), which has often been avoided in similar reports of 
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climate change. Concerning carbon emissions, the report states clearly, ‘there is 
no evidence yet that the upward trend has been slowed or reversed, as it must be 
if potentially catastrophic changes are to be avoided . . . Changes in consump­
tion and production patterns are essential, and they must be led by the developed 
countries’ (4). Further, it is argued that it was ‘unrealistic to think we can help 
another one billion people to lift themselves out of poverty by growing their 
national economies without making structural changes in the world economy’ 
(5). This focus on the world economy instead of development cooperation (‘End­
ing poverty is not a matter for aid or international cooperation alone’, 5) has 
been a standard demand of leftist critics for a long time. It is linked to the great 
responsibility of the developed countries, which are called upon to stem tax eva­
sion and illicit capital flows and monitor and control multinational corporations 
(5). And concerning the measurement of SDG success, the report suggests that 
‘in all cases where a target applies to outcomes for individuals, it should only be 
deemed to be met if every group – defined by income quintile, gender, location 
or otherwise – has met the target’ (15). This suggestion would avoid the problem 
that improvements which have been taking place only for the more privileged 
parts of the population are designated as improvements, ignoring the situation of 
those excluded. This suggestion of group- or class-specific targets corresponds not 
only to the demands of critics like Pogge and Sengupta, who show that behind 
aggregate poverty reduction in the global economy, an increase of already severe 
inequality is hidden (2014: 5f).3 It also corresponds to the demands of the World 
Bank itself in its report on redistribution and growth (Chenery et al. 1973), as 
discussed in chapter 9. 
Discursive shifts 
In comparison to the transformations in the discourse of development analysed in 
chapters 7 and 8, the shifts that can be analysed in the HLP report on the SDGs 
are only minor. One could even claim that it contains no discursive elements 
which have not been present in the history of development discourse already. 
Mainly, it draws on elements familiar from the debates around global governance, 
sustainable development and the MDGs. The story lines identified in chapter 11 
are present here as well, but to reiterate them would probably be more tedious 
than surprising. What I intend to do in this section is to trace the shifts which 
can be observed in historical perspective, before discussing the more significant 
continuities in the next. 
The first obvious shift in comparison to the MDGs concerns the formation of 
objects. Taking the discourse of sustainability serious, the report claims to focus 
not any longer on those geographical units defined as less developed, but deals 
with aspects of the developed societies. Here, the universal approach of the One 
World concept or of neoliberalism is manifest. The introductory letter of the 
co-chairs emphasises that the transformations envisioned are ‘applicable to both 
developed and developing countries alike’ (UN 2014b: i) and in the report, sus­









and every person on earth’ (vi) including ‘developed and developing countries 
alike’ (5). Nevertheless, the familiar division between developed and developing 
countries appears throughout the report. Developed countries are called upon to 
provide development aid, foster new technologies, change their unsustainable 
consumption and production patterns, and reform the global economy (trade, tax 
evasion, illicit capital flows) (vi, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, etc.). Developing countries, on the 
other hand, are as usual the primary objects of policies aimed realising the SDGs 
(as exemplified in the figures on pages 33, 41, 49), they need ‘substantial external 
funding’ (12) and massive infrastructure investments (3), although it is recog­
nised that they are ‘much more diverse than when the MDGs were agreed’ (10) – 
which can be seen as a recognition of the critique of the one-size-fits-all approach 
(see chapter 7). So the binary structures are reaffirmed not only regarding the 
obligation of the one group of countries to provide aid, but, and this is a new 
element, also regarding a higher obligation of this group to change its production 
and consumption patterns. This, at least in theory, enables interventions in the 
name of sustainable development to be staged in countries of the global North. In 
practice, such initiatives are hardly existent. However, in the context of climate 
change, the goals to reduce emissions in industrialised countries (according to 
the principle of shared, but differentiated responsibilities) are formally compa­
rable to the goals of reducing poverty in poorer countries. This means that the 
discourse of sustainability – which rose to prominence during the late 1980s and 
early 1990s and gained increased attention with global warming – has achieved 
the visibility of industrialised countries in development discourse: they can now 
be perceived as objects in need of improvement – which beforehand was the 
dubious privilege of less developed countries. 
A second discursive shift is that in historical perspective, the SDG report 
examined here exhibits a little bit of a 1970s-stlye in comparison to the MDG 
reports analysed in chapter 11. This relates to the elimination of poverty, and 
the aspects of inequality and justice. Regarding the first issue, the report proposes 
that ‘after 2015, we should move from reducing to ending poverty, in all its forms’ 
(vi, emphasis in the original). So after the more modest approach of the MDGs 
(reducing by half the extreme forms of poverty), a more ambitious goal is being 
formulated which is somewhat reminiscent of the fervour of the 1970s (‘There 
can be no excuses’, vi). As we saw in chapter 11, the International Development 
Strategy for that decade also envisioned the elimination of all forms of poverty. 
Apparently, a world without poverty has reentered the terrain of legitimate polit­
ical visions. Likewise, the issue of inequality is taken up again. The term is men­
tioned 22 times in the HLP report, whereas it did appear only once (in a quote) 
in the report of the UN Millennium Project headed by Jeffrey Sachs (UN Millen­
nium Project 2005).4 A similar picture emerges of we focus on the term justice: 
only three mentions in 2005 (and of these two in quotes), 30 mentions in 2014. 
If we take into consideration the absence of any concern with inequality and 
justice as a characteristic of the neoliberal era (which was a result of the analysis 
in chapter 9), we could therefore argue that the hegemony of neoliberalism has 
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not figure quite as prominently on the agenda as in the early 70s, but clearly the 
discursive ground has shifted: inequality and justice are certainly issues which can 
legitimately be addressed in the context of the post-2015 agenda. This was hardly 
or at the very least distinctively less so the case in the MDG context. 
However, a note of caution is appropriate in case one is inclined to diagnose the
demise of neoliberalism. Concerning economic theory and policy, the case for the
benefits of free trade is presented as beyond doubt and self-evident in the report. It
stresses the necessity of open markets and free trade and a ‘level playing field’ (2, 8,
9) and includes it in Goal 12 of the SDGs (43). The elaboration of this goal claims
‘Increased trade and access to markets brings more equitable growth and opportunity
for all’ was ‘the surest way to defeat poverty and deprivation’ (54) – an unqualified
statement that could well come from the heyday of neoliberalism which disregards
the substantial evidence to the contrary. The report even postulates that ‘we must . . .
champion free and fair trade’ (vii) – apparently oblivious of the antagonism between
the two. While according to classical and neoclassical economics free trade is seen as
welfare enhancing precisely because individuals opt for the lowest price and because
any distortions and interventions in the market mechanism are banned (‘Get the
prices right’), fair trade’s defining characteristic is the decision not to pay the produc­
ers the market price but a fixed one which enables them to live off their work. The
ignorance towards such contradictions will be a theme in the next section. For now,
we can observe that while there is a new emphasis on the issues of inequality and jus­
tice, the central tenets of neoliberalism are still unchallenged in the HLP report. This
leads us to focus on the discursive continuities in the history of development policy. 
Discursive continuities 
The continuities between the SDG agenda and the MDG debates are rather obvi­
ous and shall not be discussed here. What is less obvious and will be discussed here
are the continuities between the discourse of the current post-2015-agenda and the
overarching discursive structures present since the middle of the 20th century. Wil­
liam Easterly, in an article entitled ‘The Cartel of Good Intentions’ (2002: 236), has
already pointed out numerous parallels between the different aid epochs, which he
calls the ‘stone age’ (1950s and 1960s), the ‘iron age’ (1970s and 1980s), and the
‘silicon age’ (2000s) of development aid. He demonstrates that numerous ideas and
phrases – on the necessity of donor coordination, an increase of aid volume and
policy reform; on the desirability of country ownership and debt relief; on the recog­
nition that aid works only in a good policy environment and that reforms are already
taking place; and on the intention to increase the emphasis on poverty in develop­
ment aid – occur in all three epochs.5 This insight is in stark contradiction to the
image of continuous innovation that the development industry constructs and tries
to convey. It is, however, perfectly in line with the hypothesis on the diagnostic cycle
of the development promise discussed in chapter 4. This cycle consists of a diagnosis
of a deficit in the object of development discourse, followed by the prescription of
a recipe, a strategy which entails the promise of development. The failure to fulfil













   






failure and a new cycle in which a renewal of the promise takes place. In this way,
the development industry can constantly reaffirm its legitimacy, its competence,
its good intentions and its effectiveness: ‘we’ve recognized the problem (1) and we
know the solution (2) and we’re working on it (3) and we’re making progress (4)’.
This is the message of the discourse of the development industry throughout the
epochs. Here, the institutional requirements of aid organisations heavily influence
their perception and their discourse, as Ferguson (1994) has so lucidly pointed out in
his study of Lesotho and the ‘Anti-Politics-Machine’ of development aid.6 
So if there are these general structures to be found in the discourse of
development – a claim vehemently disputed by its proponents – then we should 
be able to identify them in the SDG report of 2014 as well as in Truman’s address 
of 1949. As we have already briefly dealt with a change in the formal structures –
namely the formation of objects according to the idea of sustainability – I will 
focus on structures more related to the content in the following analysis. 
Diagnosis: global poverty as a problem 
More than half the people of the world are living in conditions approaching mis­
ery. Their food is inadequate. They are victims of disease. Their economic life is 
primitive and stagnant. Their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and 
to more prosperous areas. 
(Truman 1949) 
We are deeply aware of the hunger, vulnerability, and deprivation that still shape 
the daily lives of more than a billion people in the world today . . ., the 1.2 bil­
lion people living in extreme poverty . . . Today, 870 million people in the world 
do not have enough to eat. Undernourished women give birth to underweight 
babies, who are less likely to live to their fifth birthday and more likely to develop 
chronic diseases and other limitations. 
(UN 2014b: 4, 40) 
The common diagnosis at the foundation of development discourse is that the 
conditions of living of a large part of world population pose a problem. Hunger 
and disease are described as obvious manifestations of this problem which is des­
ignated as poverty. (It could alternatively be framed as global material inequal­
ity or as oppression.)7 This discursive structure can easily be identified in both 
texts and illustrates the first continuity. Nevertheless, it has to be mentioned that 
the diagnosis of the problem is complemented in the SDG discourse by another 
aspect which is characterised as having potentially catastrophic effects and pos­
ing ‘perhaps the biggest challenge of all’ (UN 2014b: 8) – climate change. 
Promise: we can solve the problem today 
For the first time in history, humanity possesses the knowledge and the skill to 
relieve the suffering of these people . . . we must embark on a bold new program 
for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress available 
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[T]here is a chance now to do something that has never before been done – to 
eradicate extreme poverty, once and for all . . . We have a historic opportunity to 
do what no other generation has ever done before: to eradicate extreme poverty 
by 2030 and end poverty . . . We are convinced that . . . the world possesses the 
tools and resources it needs to achieve a bold and ambitious vision. 
(UN 2014b: 4, 47) 
Constructing humanity as a homogeneous subject (devoid of race, gender and 
class divisions), this second discursive structure postulates that in the present his­
toric moment, we can solve the problem of global poverty by acting determinedly 
(or boldly). This implies a presentism which neglects the historical capacities 
of solving the problem 10 years before or after the present moment and thus 
excludes the question why it has not been done before. Likewise, by ignoring 
these divisions, it promises that the problem actually can be solved within the 
current world order and the existing relations of power. The promise thus legiti­
mates this world order and these relations, suggesting that an end to poverty and 
suffering can be expected in the near future. 
Recipe: technical solutions 
[O]ur imponderable resources in technical knowledge are constantly growing and 
are inexhaustible. I believe that we should make available to peace-loving peoples 
the benefits of our store of technical knowledge in order to help them realize their 
aspirations for a better life . . . Greater production is the key to prosperity and 
peace. And the key to greater production is a wider and more vigorous application 
of modern scientific and technical knowledge. 
(Truman 1949) 
The resources, know-how and technology that are needed [to eradicate poverty] 
already exist, and are growing every year. . . . Developed countries . . . can encour­
age innovation, diffusion and transfer of technology. . . . Scientists and academics 
can make scientific and technological breakthroughs that will be essential to the 
post-2015 agenda. Every country that has experienced sustained high growth has 
done so through absorbing knowledge, technology and ideas from the rest of the 
world . . . A profound economic transformation can end extreme poverty and pro­
mote sustainable development, improving livelihoods, by harnessing innovation, 
technology, and the potential of business. 
(UN 2014b: 18, 10f, 29) 
One central recipe which follows from the diagnosis to cure the problem is 
technical knowledge, which is not portrayed as a scarce, but as an ever-growing 
resource. Side effects of technology (limited resources, resource extraction, pollu­
tion) are not discussed. The solutions are seen to be lying in the field of innova­
tion and progress which corresponds to a construction of the problem as a lack 
of knowledge and technology. This view excludes a construction of the problem 
centred around inequality and divisions (according to race, gender, class, etc.) 
and the corresponding political and conflictive solutions of the problem. Tech­
nology is, in the discourse of development perceived as neutral, freely available 
 
   
   
   













and beneficial to all. All three perceptions are highly controversial if not dubious 
in a world where technology is to a large extent owned by private companies and 
where patents not only exist but are increasingly expanded and enforced.8 
Recipe: economic growth 
Their economic life is primitive and stagnant. . . . we must embark on a bold new 
program for making the benefits of our scientific advances and industrial progress 
available for the improvement and growth of underdeveloped areas. . . . we should 
foster capital investment in areas needing development. Our aim should be to 
help the free peoples of the world, through their own efforts, to produce more 
food, more clothing, more materials for housing, and more mechanical power to 
lighten their burdens. . . . this program can greatly increase the industrial activity 
in other nations and can raise substantially their standards of living. . . . Greater 
production is the key to prosperity and peace. 
(Truman 1949) 
The Panel calls for a quantum leap forward in economic opportunities and a profound
economic transformation to end extreme poverty and improve livelihoods. There
must be a commitment to rapid, equitable growth – not growth at any cost or just
short-term spurts in growth, but sustained, long-term, inclusive growth that can over­
come the challenges of unemployment (especially youth unemployment), resource
scarcity and – perhaps the biggest challenge of all – adaptation to climate change. 
(UN 2014b: 8) 
The other central recipe which has remained constant throughout the history 
of development discourse is economic growth in the sense of an increased pro­
duction of goods and services to be exchanged over the market in the formal 
economy. (For the criticism of this conception of the economy, see e.g. Ekins/ 
Max-Neef 1992). Comparing the two texts, it becomes clear that on the one 
hand, economic growth has lost some of its credibility as a recipe for poverty 
reduction and improvement of livelihoods, so that nowadays it has to be con­
stantly qualified as inclusive and often also sustainable growth. On the other 
hand, this can be seen in the quote above, it still is assumed to work miracles: 
overcome unemployment and resource scarcity and poverty in general, while 
helping people to adapt to climate change. 
Credo: harmony of objectives 
All countries, including our own, will greatly benefit from a constructive program for
the better use of the world’s human and natural resources. Experience shows that our
commerce with other countries expands as they progress industrially and economically. 
(Truman 1949) 
Countries have resources, expertise or technology that, if shared, can result in 
mutual benefit. Working together is not just a moral obligation to help those less 
fortunate but is an investment in the long-term prosperity of all. 
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The alleged nature of the recipes – technical knowledge and economic growth
are beneficial for everyone – allows to maintain the underlying credo of devel­
opment discourse, namely that all parties involved, developed and developing
countries, will benefit from the program of development. This claim is based on
two analytically separate tenets: 1) investment and trade will help the poor
(through economic growth) and 2) poverty reduction will help the economy
(through economic growth) and thereby also the rich will benefit. These tenets
also appear regularly in World Bank reports (see chapter 9). If they hold true,
there is no need for hard choices between the interests of poor peasants, mul­
tinational companies and rich consumers – they all benefit from development. 
Therefore this discursive structure has been used for convincing the govern­
ments of poorer countries to keep their markets open to their former colonisers –
according to Alcalde, ‘[t]he first and broadest function of the idea of develop­
ment was to give economic activity, particularly foreign economic activity, a
positive and essential meaning for the lives of less-developed peoples’ (1987:
223) – as well as for convincing rich country citizens of the need for develop­
ment assistance, as it corresponds to their enlightened self-interest, to borrow an
oft-used phrase. 
This self-interest of the North is linked to improvements in the South not 
only via the route of investment and markets, but also through the prospect of 
security and stability.9 This can be observed in the statements of Truman (1949) 
that ‘their poverty is a handicap and a threat both to them and to more prosperous 
countries’ and that ‘greater production is the key to prosperity and peace’ (empha­
sis added). Whereas at that time, the threat arising out of poverty took the form 
of communist revolutions, this has for obvious reasons changed since 1989. The 
security of the North is now increasingly threatened by drugs, migration and – 
predominantly since 2001 – terrorism. Remarkably, this discursive structure is 
relatively hard to find in the HLP report – apart from the occasional coupling of 
‘peaceful and prosperous societies’ (2014b: 29).10 Yet it manifests itself in Goal 
11 which clearly states: ‘Without development, there can be no enduring peace’ 
(52). According to the report, the privileged should realise that development is 
necessary for a stable and peaceful world order and that there is thus a harmony 
of objectives regarding poverty reduction and growth. The sustainability agenda 
and the issue of climate change add a new twist to the credo, which can be seen 
in the following quote: 
It is sometimes argued that global limits on carbon emissions will force devel­
oping countries to sacrifice growth to accommodate the lifestyles of the rich, 
or that developed countries will have to stop growing so that developing 
countries can develop – substituting one source of pollution for another. 
We do not believe that such trade-offs are necessary. Mankind’s capacity for 
innovation, and the many alternatives that already exist, mean that sustain­
able development can, and must, allow people in all countries to achieve 
their aspirations. 














Just like the harmony of objectives prevents hard choices between reducing pov­
erty and fostering foreign investment, it also allows to combine unlimited growth 
with sustainability through the belief in technical innovations. Even under the 
conditions of climate change and global warming – so the credo assumes – there 
is no need to give up or even limit the resource-intensive lifestyle of the rich. On 
the contrary, all people can achieve it, due to our unlimited capacity for innova­
tion. This argument appears closer to an act of faith than to a reasonable evalu­
ation in the light of the increasingly alarming reports of the Intergovernmental 
Panel on Climate Change.11 
Conclusion: the persistence of development discourse 
We have seen that the HLP report, as a representative of the SDG debate, exhib­
its some features which distinguish it from the older MDG agenda. On the level
of content, there is on the one hand a more determined inclusion of issues of
inequality and injustice. On the other hand, sustainability and issues of climate
change and resource use have (unsurprisingly) taken centre stage in the debate.
The latter is also linked to a change in the formation of objects: the industrialised
countries of the North finally become conceivable as objects of development targets
and interventions, although in practice the focus of the report still lies with the
less developed countries. However, the discursive elements of report found in the
report have been present in the debate about development policy at least since
the 1990s in the discourses of sustainable development and global governance. 
The analysis in this chapter even demonstrated that some central discursive 
structures to be found in the SDG debate date back to the origins of development 
aid in the middle of the 20th century. Comparing the HLP report of 2014 with 
Truman’s address of 1949, in which he announced a program of development for 
the underdeveloped areas, we find clear similarities: the diagnosis of global poverty 
as a problem, the promise of being able to solve the problem, the recipes of tech­
nical knowledge and economic growth, and the credo of a harmony of objectives 
can be found in both texts. While it would be wrong to claim that nothing has 
changed during these 65 years, the changes are surprisingly minor: these discur­
sive structures manifest themselves in a new form and accommodate past criti­
cisms and current debates to a certain extent, but can still be identified as the 
same structures which were used after World War II to achieve acceptance for the 
practices designated as development in a capitalist world order. The persistence of 
development discourse throughout the decades is remarkable. 
Notes 
1	 According to LSE economist Jason Hickel, the World Bank transformed a rise in the 
numbers of the poor to a substantial decrease by changing the international poverty 
line on the basis of which the poor were counted from US$1.02 in the purchasing 
power parity (PPP) of 1985 to US$1.08 in the PPP of 1993 and then to US$1.25 
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437 million. On the basis of a more reasonable poverty line of US$2.50 in 2008 PPP, 
there was an increase of 353 million poor people since 1981, an exclusion of China 
boosts this number to 852 million people (Hickel 2014). Pogge/Sengupta (2014: 4) 
also make this point. It is interesting to note in this context that already in the 1990s, 
Apthorpe wrote: ‘Given then that in case after case “absolute” [measurement of pov­
erty with a poverty datum line] proves on re-reading to be close to “negotiable” and 
“negotiated”, one might expect that this mode would have by now disappeared from 
development policy studies. But this has not happened. . . . The reality is that policy 
drives the practice of numbering, rather than numbering practice driving the policy.’ 
(1996: 27). 
2	 http://www.un.org/sg/management/hlppost2015.shtml (January 25, 2015). 
3	 Pogge and Sengupta show that the share of global household income has risen for 
the richest 5% from 42.87 to 45.75% between 1988 and 2008, while for the poorest 
quintile it has fallen from 0.85% to 0.66% during the same period and for the second 
poorest quintile from 1.52 to 1.43% (2014: 6). 
4	 Here, I did not count the four mentions of gender inequality, which referred more to 
discrimination than to economic inequality. Both reports are somewhat comparable 
in length (UN 2005: 95 pages, UN 2014b: 81 pages). 
5	 However, it has to be admitted that Easterly is a bit sloppy regarding the separation of 
these epochs: some of the empirical examples he cites to support his claim about the 
stone age are from the 1970s and even the early 80s, while one statement allegedly 
from the iron age is from 1973 (Easterly 2002: 236). 
6	 ‘ “[D]evelopment” institutions generate their own form of discourse, and this discourse 
simultaneously constructs Lesotho as a particular kind of object of knowledge, and 
creates a structure of knowledge around that object. Interventions are then organised 
on the basis of this structure of knowledge, which, while “failing” on their own terms, 
nonetheless have regular effects, which include the expansion and entrenchment of 
bureaucratic state power, side by side with the projection of a representation of eco­
nomic and social life which denies “politics” and, to the extent that it is successful, 
suspends its effects. The short answer to the question of what the “development” appa­
ratus in Lesotho does, then is . . .: it is an “anti-politics machine” . . . An academic 
analysis is of no use to a “development” agency unless it provides a place for the 
agency to plug itself in, unless it provides a charter for the sort of intervention that the 
agency is set up to do. An analysis which suggests that the causes of poverty in Leso­
tho are political and structural (not technical and geographical), that the national 
government is part of the problem (not a neutral instrument for its solution), and 
that meaningful change can only come through revolutionary social transformation 
in South Africa has no place in “development” discourse simply because “develop­
ment” agencies are not in the business of promoting political realignments or support­
ing revolutionary struggles. . . . For an analysis to meet the needs of “development” 
institutions, it must do what academic discourse inevitably fails to do; it must make 
Lesotho out to be an enormously promising candidate for the only sort of intervention 
a “development” agency is capable of launching: the apolitical, technical “develop­
ment” intervention’ (Ferguson 1994: xivf, 68f). 
7	 Another alternative, suggested by neopopulist Post-Development approaches, would 
be to differentiate between frugality (a simple life characterised by a lack of goods not 
necessary for survival and well-being) and destitution (a lack of means of survival 
resulting from processes of pauperization and the expansion of market economy) as 





   







8 For a critique of the view that technology is neutral and beneficial to all, see especially 
the work of Ivan Illich. 
9 On this issue, see above all the work of Mark Duffield (2007, 2014). 
10	 It occurs much more frequently and explicitly in the statements of bilateral develop­
ment agencies more concerned with convincing citizens of the North of the usefulness 
of development assistance. Explaining its fundamental purpose, the German Ministry 
for Economic Cooperation and Development claims that: ‘The large problems of our 
time do not stop at national borders. . . . Conflicts in other countries also endanger the 
security of people in Germany. . . . Development cooperation helps to prevent crises 
and cope with conflicts’ (BMZ 2013). 
11	 See also Wuppertal Institut 2005, Latouche 2011 and Paech 2012. 
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The contribution of discourse analysis to 
development studies 
Having followed the history of the term development through various decades 
and issues, it is now time to take stock of the analysis and contextualise it within 
the research on discourse in development studies. This research is relatively 
novel and has (except for a few early starters) emerged during the 1990s (see e.g. 
Escobar 1985 and 1995, Sachs 1990 and 1992, Manzo 1991, Nederveen Pieterse 
1991, Ferguson 1994, Crush 1995, Moore/Schmitz 1995, Apthorpe/Gasper 1996, 
Cooper/Packard 1997a, Grillo/Stirrat 1997) and has continued to draw atten­
tion in the 2000s (Abrahamsen 2000, Biccum 2002 and 2006, Karagiannis 2004, 
Oommen 2004, Stein 2004, Eriksson Baaz 2005, Groves/Hinton 2005, Mosse/ 
Lewis 2005, Smith 2006, Duffield 2007a and 2014, Li 2007, Greenstein 2009, 
Cornwall/Eade 2010, Griffiths 2010). However, there were numerous books on 
the history of development theory and the idea of development in earlier decades 
(e.g. Alcalde 1987, Arndt 1987, Nisbet 1969) without using the term discourse 
which became popular only in the – often somewhat superficial – reception of the 
works of Michel Foucault. 
While a relatively recent article claims that ‘the study of discourses about 
underdevelopment appears to have been neglected by discourse analysts’ and that 
‘analysis that examines dynamics of power through the study of speech, text 
and images has not broken through into mainstream development studies and 
remains a marginal field of analysis in critical IDS’ (della Faille 2011: 215f), a 
closer look casts doubt on this claim. This doubt not only rests on the number 
of works listed above, but also on their presence in academic debates. While 
development agencies on the one hand and established scholars in development 
theory have usually not at all been keen to take these new approaches serious, 
the quotes in google scholar certainly cannot testify a marginalisation: while both 
Jeffrey Sachs’ The End of Poverty and William Easterly’s The White Man’s Burden –
two of the best-selling and oft-quoted books in development studies during the 
last decade – have been quoted a little under 3,000 times, Escobar’s Encountering 
Development has (in February 2015) over 7,000 quotes.1 
So, judging from this admittedly narrow evidence, discourse analysis in devel­
opment studies seems at least to inspire debate. While this strand of research 
is too vast to be comprehensively paraphrased and evaluated here, this chapter 
will nevertheless try to deal with the contribution of discourse analysis to devel­
opment studies. It will do so by 1) summing up and discussing frequent points 
 









of criticism towards discourse analysis in development studies, 2) highlighting 
important points of selected texts of this research and articulate their contribu­
tion in the light of this critique and 3) specify what the preceding chapters have 
to add to the state of the research. 
The critique of discourse analysis in development studies 
The critical point is not to make the easy claim that poststructural critics [i.e. 
discourse analysts] of development theory overstate their position, but to argue 
that the analysis of discourse, with its linking oppositional theoretical traditions 
because they ‘share the same discursive space’ (i.e. oppose one another!) is prone 
to this kind of overgeneralization. . . . because it diverts attention away from the 
‘international and class relations’ and material contexts expressed in discourses, 
hence merging conflicting positions (PAR and World Bank) into a single develop­
mental discourse, or condemning modernity as a whole rather than, for example, 
capitalist versions of modern consumptive life. 
(Peet 1999: 156) 
Peet is probably among the most outspoken critics of discourse analysis in 
development studies, but similar concerns have been raised as well by numerous 
writers from different perspectives (Gasper/Apthorpe 1996: 4, Kiely 1999: 36 and 
41f, Blaikie 2000: 1034, Nederveen Pieterse 2010: 115f and 2011: 239, to name 
but a few; see also Peet 1999: 154–56). Their main arguments can be summed up 
in the following points: 
1)	 The focus on discourse risks losing sight of materiality. By concerning itself pri­
marily with questions of representation, language and identity, discourse analy­
sis neglects material questions of poverty and survival in capitalism. And these
material relations are what counts (or should count) in development studies. 
2)	 The critique of development discourse in the singular homogenises different, 
even opposing discourses into a single monolithic entity. This ignores crucial 
political differences. 
3)	 Foucauldian approaches to discourse analysis construct a pervasive and 
all-powerful discourse, thereby losing track of questions of agency. Subjects 
are reduced to cogs in the machine. 
4)	 Therefore, the critique of discourse is unable to provide political alterna­
tives. Sometimes, the issue of epistemological relativism (all discourses are 
equally valid on their own terms, one cannot distinguish between true and 
false discourses) is raised, which would also lead to political inertia. 
In order to evaluate the contribution of discourse analysis to development stud­
ies, these four points have to be examined more closely. 
Losing sight of materiality 
As a first step, it has to be conceded that discourse analysis in development studies 
is concerned primarily with issues of representation, but with the representation 
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of material inequality and of the attempts to ameliorate it. So unless one assumes 
that the representational practices (development discourse) and the material 
practices (development policy) are entirely unrelated, there is obviously some 
degree of relevance of the former for the latter. By proponents of discourse analy­
sis in development studies, this degree is assumed to be considerable. Escobar 
claims that: 
As a discourse, development is thus a very real historical formation, albeit 
articulated around a fictitious construct (underdevelopment) and upon a 
certain materiality (the conditions baptized as underdevelopment), which 
must be conceptualized in different ways if the power of development dis­
course is to be challenged or displaced. To be sure, there is a situation of 
economic exploitation that must be recognized and dealt with. . . . There is 
also a certain materiality of life conditions that is extremely preoccupying 
and that requires effort and attention. . . . Changing the order of discourse 
is a political question that entails the collective practice of social actors and 
the restructuring of existing political economies of truth. 
(Escobar 1995: 53, 216) 
In this perspective, a change in the order of discourse is a necessary component 
of a larger transformation and a progressive change in the materiality of life con­
ditions is possible only if discursive transformations take place. So it is not the 
case, to use the words of Christine Sylvester, that discourse analysis in develop­
ment studies ‘does not tend to concern itself with whether the subaltern is eating’ 
(1999: 703), but that the problem is seen as a larger complex of power relations in 
which representational and material practices can only be transformed together. 
But although they differ regarding the importance of representation, the concern 
for material inequality is as present with the discourse analysts as it is with the 
critics warning of losing sight of materiality. 
However, and this is the second step, a closer look reveals that the exami­
nation of material inequality in some of the best-known examples of discourse 
analysis in development studies is superficial at best. A much-criticised passage of 
Escobar’s introduction reads: 
[I]nstead of the kingdom of abundance promised by theorists and politicians 
in the 1950s, the discourse and strategy of development produced its oppo­
site: massive underdevelopment and impoverishment, untold exploitation 
and oppression. The debt crisis, the Sahelian famine, increasing poverty, 
malnutrition and violence are only the most pathetic signs of the failure of 
forty years of development. . . . most people’s conditions not only did not 
improve but deteriorated [during the era of development]. 
(Escobar 1995: 4f) 
Here we observe again that Escobar sees discursive and material practices as 
closely interlinked in development. But the sweeping statements about impover­





evidence or more detailed analysis of the role of development discourse in the 
debt crisis or the Sahelian famine. And they ignore, as numerous critics have 
pointed out (e.g. Kiely 1999: 37), the rise in living standards on average at least 
regarding standard indicators like life expectancy and school enrolment, which 
has taken place during the era of development in the Third World. According 
to UN figures, average life expectancy at birth in less developed countries rose 
between 1960 and 1996 from 46 to 62 years (Thomas 2000: 7).2 A critical posi­
tion may now investigate the distribution of this progress in the richer and poorer 
segments of these countries, examine in how far this progress is linked to inter­
ventions in the market mechanism, or even dispute that life expectancy should 
be seen as a crucial indicator of a good life, arguing that a shorter life as a happy 
and self-reliant subsistence farmer lived in communal solidarity and dignity is 
closer to this ideal than a longer life as an unhappy wage labourer living in com­
petition to others and constant fear of unemployment and deprivation. But to 
talk about deteriorating conditions without engaging these questions can be seen 
as an inadequate treatment of issues of material inequality. 
Nevertheless, there are also analyses of development discourse which have 
been based on thorough empirical studies not only of discursive but also of mate­
rial practices, and it is no coincidence that these are often the most interest­
ing because they illuminate the specific interrelation between the two. This is 
the case when Ferguson (1994) contrasts the discursive construction of Lesotho 
by the World Bank as a rural subsistence economy with the reality of many of 
the designated farmers being in fact migrant wage labourers in South African 
mines – a fact which he explains with the institutional necessities of construct­
ing the problem of Lesotho’s poverty in such a way that development projects 
improving agricultural productivity actually make sense. A more realistic agenda 
for improving living standards of the poor in Lesotho, namely supporting work­
ers’ struggles in South Africa, was inconceivable for organisations involved in 
development. Another example is provided by Mitchell (1995) who shows that 
USAID constructs itself as a rational consciousness outside of Egypt while in 
fact being a powerful actor in the country working to channel heavily subsidised 
grain from US producers to the country which allowed higher meat consumption 
of more prosperous classes while at the same time demanding an end to subsidies 
of the national state. Despite acting as an interested party for international and 
national classes, the agency engaged in necessary self-deception on the level of 
discourse which enabled it to maintain its material practices. So, and this is the 
last step of the argument, the combination of the analysis of discursive and mate­
rial practices which some authors engage in has not only produced original and 
convincing research but has also demonstrated that a focus on discourse need not 
lead to losing sight of materiality. 
Homogenisation and overgeneralisation 
A common critique is that already talking about development discourse in the 
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concepts – simply put, it even ignores the differences between capitalist develop­
ment and socialist development. In general, one can reply that it may well be 
worthwhile to explore (differences notwithstanding) the striking commonalities 
of even these two discourses: the emphasis on technological progress, economic 
growth and the privileging of modern, scientific forms of knowledge – as was done 
by Ivan Illich, whose critique could be applied to both kinds of modern societies. 
Yet we have to be more specific than that. 
Probably the most sophisticated critique of this point is provided by Gasper 
who argues that ‘a plurality of practices [in “development”] requires a plurality of 
concepts’ (1996: 170). Taking the examples of Ferguson and Escobar, who both 
argue that ‘bureaucratic control is an essential component of the deployment of 
development’ (Escobar 1995: 145; see also Ferguson 1994: 255), Gasper correctly 
points out that ‘[t]his “development” then seems to exclude free-marketeers and 
important approaches prominent in the 1980s and 1990s’ (Gasper 1996: 169). 
Indeed one central point in what Toye (1987) has called the ‘counter-revolution 
in development theory and policy’ of neoliberalism was to dismantle the develop­
mental state and its bureaucracy. One could, however, argue that these neoliberal 
policies in fact constitute a significant departure from development discourse, 
as I have done in chapter 8. Yet Gasper has a point when he writes that ‘these 
and other authors . . . give to an ideal type of one part of development discourse 
(often a different ideal type per author) the status of a description of the whole’, 
leading to ‘oversimplification and misrepresentation of complex discursive fields’ 
(Gasper 1996: 169). In this context, he points to Moore (1995) whose identifica­
tion of equity, democracy and sustainability as the core concepts of development 
discourse might have been plausible for the 1990s (and even then not all would 
agree – what about the market?), but certainly not for the 1960s.3 
Gasper also takes issue with Ferguson’s (and others’) hypothesis that depo­
liticisation (see section 2) was a central element of development discourse and 
argues that this description ‘do[es] not fit the language of political conditionality 
or human rights’, trying to make the point that the heterogeneity of development 
discourse is ignored. Obviously the discourse of good governance which rose to 
prominence during the 1990s (after the end of the Cold War!) addresses politi­
cal issues and at first sight does not seem compatible with the hypothesis. Yet if 
good governance is defined as ‘sound development management’ (World Bank 
1992: 1) or as ‘the manner in which power is exercised in the management of a 
country’s economic and social resources for development’ (World Bank 1992: 3), 
politics is reduced to a technical matter: ‘what the tethering of politics to gov­
ernance does is to marginalise questions about authentic degrees of democratisa­
tion within both government and society, in favour of issues of functional utility 
related to development performance. The effect, ultimately, is to de-politicise 
policy debates while still casting them within a normative framework which sub­
ordinates democracy to development’ (Schmitz 1995: 74f). So following Schmitz 
(1995) as well as Abrahamsen (2000) and Mkandawire (2010), one could see 
good governance (at least the way it was deployed in development policy since 



















version of politics.4 Therefore in this case Gasper’s point is not a convincing 
rejection of the attempt to generalise about development discourse. 
So Gasper is right about warning of overgeneralisation if one writes about the 
discourse of development in the singular. Yet overgeneralisation is not a neces­
sary feature of such writing. Of course there is a bewildering array of different 
historical, geographical and thematic contexts and one should always be aware of 
that. But generalisation is the stuff that theory is made of, the element that sets it 
apart from mere description or history. And I would argue it is not only possible, 
but even necessary to reflect which discursive structures Truman’s point 4, World 
Bank reports of the 1980s and current reports on the Sustainable Development 
Goals have in common. 
Questions of agency 
It is true that theoretical works based on Foucault are conventionally strong on 
structures and weak on agency. However, not all studies of discourse in devel­
opment studies belong to this camp.5 The frequent reference to Truman’s inau­
gural address as the starting point of development discourse (e.g. in the works 
of Escobar, Sachs or Esteva) already implies an emphasis on individual agency 
which is difficult to reconcile with Foucaults earlier very structuralist writings. 
Further, for those analyses belonging to the camp of Post-Development, it can be 
observed that by pointing to the rejection of development discourse and resist­
ance to development projects in social movements and indigenous communities 
in the South, they do attribute agency to those often seen as the passive objects 
of this discourse. 
Yet regarding the fact that these people are sometimes seen as manipulated
by the ‘ideology of development’ if they do not resist (e.g. Rahnema 1997),
one might point to the fact that this is a rather narrow conceptualisation of
agency: either being manipulated by a discourse or explicitly resisting it. James
Scott (1985, 1990) has shown that poor people’s agency often takes other and
more subtle forms than outright resistance – which is a dangerous option for the
weak. In development studies, few people have analysed the transformations and
appropriations of development discourse by subjects in the South. If these are
taken into account, development does no longer merely look like a technocratic
discourse allowing to uphold the colonial division of labour, but as a discourse
which also enables unions, parties and anticolonial movements in the South (and
later the heads of state of the independent states) to pose demands and make
claims regarding social and economic progress which could not be dismissed out
of hand by colonial officials and Northern politicians (see chapter 6 and Cooper
1997: 84). 
One interesting example of an indigenous engagement with development dis­
course is provided by Wainwright (2008) who examines the Maya in Belize’s 
Toledo district and the discourse of Mayanism describing them and constructing 
their identity as nonmodern since colonial times and legitimising interventions 
in their way of life. He focuses in particular on the Maya atlas, an attempt at 
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countermapping in which the Maya portray their land and their culture, oppos­
ing attempts to assimilate and settle them. Wainwright shows, however, that 
this atlas includes discursive elements from nationalism, international law and 
sustainable development, and how their self-representation blanks out ambiva­
lences and hybridities – in fact, is even shaped by a romantic Mayanism. External 
influences visible in everyday life of Maya communities such as rice, wage labour, 
chain saws and Christianity, do not appear in the atlas. ‘The meaning of what 
constitutes “Maya” space in the Atlas is produced through a set of exclusions’ 
(Wainwright 2008: 257), also concerning gender relations and marital violence. 
Thus even in explicitly resisting the discourse of those who define their way of 
life as less developed, the Maya atlas betrays the influence of these discourses of 
colonialism and development, excluding all that they have actually appropriated 
from the Western modernisers in terms of discursive and material practices and 
attempting to conform to the image of the noble savages. Here, discourse analysis 
in development reveals an exertion of agency in the South which simultaneously 
denies its own agency. 
Political alternatives 
The greater part of analyses of discourse in development studies is visibly con­
cerned with a critique of relations of power and often also with the promotion 
of political alternatives. These alternatives take different shapes. While Escobar 
outlined the ‘defence and promotion of localized, pluralistic grassroots move­
ments’ (1995: 215), Rist, when answering the question ‘What is to be done?’, 
broadened the range of possibilities to ‘self-organization’, ‘finding new ways of 
social linkage’ and collectively ‘secure [one’s] existence’ (1997: 243), but also 
considered constructive and deconstructive criticism of the existing order as 
legitimate alternatives (242–248). 
The most interesting and thoughtful answer to the same question was in my 
view given by Ferguson: 
‘What is to be done?’ demands first of all an answer to the question, ‘By whom?’ 
Often, the question was put to me in the form ‘What should they do?’ . . .
The ‘they’ here is an imaginary collective subject . . . Such a ‘they’ clearly 
needs to be broken up. The inhabitants of Lesotho do not share the same 
interests or the same circumstances, and they do not act as a single unit. . . . 
the interests represented by governmental elites . . . are not congruent with 
those of the governed . . . There is not one question – ‘what is to be done’ – 
but hundreds: what should the mineworkers do, what should the abandoned 
old women do, what should the unemployed do, and so on. It seems, at the 
least, presumptuous to offer prescriptions here. The toiling miners and the 
abandoned old women know the tactics proper to their own situation far 
better than any expert does. Indeed, the only general answer to the question, 
‘What should they do?’ is: ‘They are doing it!’ . . . A second, and apparently 
















again, the crucial question is, which ‘we’? . . . What should we scholars and 
intellectuals working in or concerned about the Third World do? . . . One of 
the most important forms of engagement is simply the political participation 
in one’s own society that is appropriate to any citizen. This is perhaps par­
ticularly true for citizens of a country like the United States, where – thanks 
to an imperialistic power projected across the globe – national politics pow­
erfully impacts upon the rest of the world. 
(Ferguson 1994: 280f, 282, 285f) 
In this section, Ferguson does not only suggest counterhegemonic alternative 
points of engagement, he also soothes those worried about the neglect of class 
(and gender!) by pointing to the relations of oppression concealed by a national 
collective and at the same time reveals the presumptuousness of outside experts 
on development advising poor people around the world what they should be doing. 
So discourse analysis in development studies does seem capable of reflecting upon 
and providing political alternatives. 
While all the arguments listed in this section should not be interpreted to 
refute the points of criticism for any and all contributions to discourse analysis 
in development studies (far from it), the general point to be made here is that if 
they occur it has nothing to do with the approach itself – contrary to what Peet 
claims in the quote at the beginning. 
Significant arguments of discourse 
analysis in development studies 
Having dealt with the criticisms voiced against it, we now attempt to assess the 
contribution of discourse analysis in development studies. In order to do so, I will 
reiterate the arguments of some key works in this section which I deem signifi­
cant. I maintain that these approaches have yielded crucial insights for develop­
ment studies in regard to the following features of at least orthodox development 







Naturalisation and the universal scale 
The first and maybe most fundamental achievement discourse analysis in devel­
opment studies provides is the insight that the categories and strategies of devel­
opment imply a certain perspective which is contingent – in contrast to being 
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according to their level of development, that there are developed and less developed
countries, and that the latter can be found in Africa, Asia and Latin America 
and are in need of development, development experts, development projects and 
development aid provided by the former, are assumptions that are by no means 
self-evident. Discourse analysis has shown that they belong to a certain historical 
and geopolitical context – the aftermath of World War II and the beginning Cold 
War, although of course there are predecessors in colonial development (Hodge 
et al. 2014) and 19th century social policy and post-Enlightenment social engi­
neering (Cowen/Shenton 1996). As Ferguson describes it: 
Like ‘civilization’ in the 19th century, ‘development’ is the name not only for 
a value, but also for a dominant problematic or interpretative grid through 
which the impoverished regions of the world are known to us. Within this 
interpretative grid, a host of everyday observations are rendered intelligible 
and meaningful. The images of the ragged poor of Asia thus become legible 
as markers of a stage of development . . . Within this problematic, it appears 
self-evident that debtor Third-World nation states and starving peasants 
share a common ‘problem’, that both lack a single ‘thing’: ‘development’. 
(Ferguson 1994: xiii) 
Escobar agrees that the discourse of development has ‘created a space in which 
only certain things could be said and even imagined’ (1995: 39) and goes on to 
point out ‘even today most people in the West (and many parts of the Third 
World) have great difficulty thinking about Third World situations and people in 
terms other than those provided by the development discourse’ (1995: 12), terms 
like poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy, etc. Now the point of discourse analysis is 
not to claim that these terms are pure fantasy and have no empirical referent in 
these regions, the point is that other terms which also have empirical referents 
do not form part of the discourse, the representation of reality is partial and struc­
tured according to certain stereotypes, excluding those parts which do not fit. 
The question of which stereotypes we are talking about will be answered in the 
subsection on Othering. But regardless of their content, there is already a prob­
lematic implication in any talk about development, about more and less developed
countries. According to Esteva, ‘[developed] is a comparative adjective, whose 
base support is the assumption, very Western but unacceptable and indemonstra­
ble, of the oneness, homogeneity and linear evolution of the world’, using one 
fragment of the world ‘as a general point of reference’ (1992: 11f). Thus the dis­
course of development assumes a consensus on what is seen as developed, progres­
sive and desirable. If one were to take serious the talk that ‘people have to decide 
for themselves what they see as development’ (see chapter 7), this universal scale 
would disappear and we could not compare societies unless they had explicitly 
agreed to one scale. 
Now to what extent the discourse of development really limits what can be 
said and establishes a universal scale of measurement for all societies, cannot 
















achievement of discourse analysis in development studies. It introduced the lin­
guistic turn into the thinking about global inequality and North-South relations, 
enabling us to question the very basic categories of our discipline. 
Othering and the problematisation of deviance 
The naturalisation of the Self enables the problematisation of the Other. The 
universal scale allows to measure and compare according to a certain norm. In 
development discourse, this is no neutral endeavour, but inextricably linked with 
the construction of the Self as superior, as the norm, and the Other as inferior, as 
deviant. Based on this Eurocentric scale, the majority of humanity was defined 
as underdeveloped through development discourse: ‘they ceased being what they 
were, in all their diversity’ and were burdened with the challenge to ‘escape from 
the undignified condition called underdevelopment’ (Esteva 1992: 7).6 As we 
have seen in chapter 3, the discourse of development evolved out of colonial dis­
course, but employed similar binaries describing ‘us’ and ‘them’. And yet it is not 
quite correct to reduce the shift from the ‘civilized/barbarian dichotomy’ to that 
of ‘development/underdevelopment’ (Duffield 2007b: 228) to a ‘shift in vocabu­
lary’ (Biccum 2002: 49) – the recognition of the sovereignty of formerly colo­
nised peoples is not a trifle. We are faced with the ‘emergence of an international 
discourse that reproduces the dualism of the colonial relationship without its 
explicit racism and without its reliance on the direct exercise of political power 
by an imperial government’ (Cooper 1997: 83f). However, in both discourses, the 
Other is seen not only as inferior, but as a backward version of the Self. Nandy 
identified this discursive operation as the ‘transformation of geo-cultural differ­
ence into historical stages’ (Nandy 1992: 146). Consequently, our own ‘modern’ 
society, in the words of Manzo, ‘was placed in hierarchical opposition to other 
areas of the globe which remained “traditional,” that is, less cosmopolitan, less 
scientific, less secular, less rational, less individualist, and less democratic. They 
were defined solely in relation to the West, the foundational source of “develop­
ment,” as an inferior or derivative form’ (Manzo 1991: 10). 
Escobar has described this process of Othering as an ‘infantilization of the Third
World’ (1995: 30) in analogy to the view that these backward peoples need tute­
lage and education, and as a ‘medicalization of the political gaze’ (1995: 30) as they
were, in the new discourse, perceived not as biologically inferior but as stricken
by disease, malnutrition, and so on. He contends that development ‘proceeded
by creating “abnormalities” (such as the “illiterate”, the “underdeveloped”, the
“malnourished” . . . which it would later treat and reform’ (1995: 41). This latter
activity will be dealt with later, here we are mainly concerned with the problema­
tisation, which also according to Li takes place through ‘identifying deficiencies’
(Li 2007: 7). All of this of course implies that the problem lies with the deviance
from the norm in the non-West (the lack of capital, technology and modern val­
ues, see Escobar 1995: 162), not with the norm, i.e. the West itself: that the West
may have had something to do with the problems in the South, is ruled out in this
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development discourse7 which sees each country as a kind of container unrelated
to others – ‘a free-standing entity, rather than a particular position within a larger
arrangement of transnational economic and political forces’ (Mitchell 1995: 147) –
and in part due to ‘an elision of colonial relations of power’ (Biccum 2002: 44),
neglecting the historical entanglements which allowed Europe’s rise. 
It has to be mentioned again that what has been described here are domi­
nant structures, but is not an accurate description of anything that has been said 
and written in development policy, let alone theory. Nevertheless, even in the 
21st century we find processes of Othering in development discourse which are 
remarkably similar to earlier, colonial representations of the South. Examples for 
this are Eriksson Baaz’s analysis of interviews with white development aid workers 
in Tanzania, who consistently characterise ‘the Africans’ as unreliable, passive, 
irrational and ‘situated at a different stage of development and Enlightenment’ 
(2005: 167) or Bendix’s (2013) critique of the racist imagery used in poster cam­
paigns of the German ministry for development cooperation. 
Legitimisation and the promise of betterment 
One central function of development discourse is legitimisation through the 
promise of betterment, but the object of legitimisation varies depending on the 
specific discourse. In the discourse of immanent development (according to 
Cowen/Shenton, 1996, concerned with the evolution of capitalist society), the 
issue is the legitimisation of capitalism and private enterprise; in the discourse of 
intentional development (concerned with planned interventions), the issue is 
the legitimisation of these interventions and the development apparatus, and in 
both cases the secondary object is the existing political and economic order on 
the national or international level. 
In both liberal and interventionist development discourse, the legitimisation 
works via the promise to improve the lives of less developed people, to solve the 
problem of poverty and ameliorate the deficiencies identified in the diagnosis, 
either through investments and the market or through projects and planned 
interventions in the market (economic growth, technological progress and mod­
ern values feature in both versions). In both cases, criticisms concerning the fail­
ure of the promise to deliver in the past are repelled by a mechanism which can be 
called the shifting of signifiers. It builds on the polysemy of the term development 
(see chapter 10): one the one hand, the term refers to a transformation towards 
a modern, capitalist, industrial economy, on the other, to an improvement in 
living standards and reducing poverty. By shifting between the two meanings, 
it can now be argued that the remedy to poverty is a transformation towards a 
capitalist economy even though this transformation might cause or contribute 
to the impoverishment of some part of the population: they are poor (i.e. lack 
development in the second sense) so they need to be integrated into the capitalist 
world market (i.e. development in the first sense) (Ferguson 1994: 15, 55).8 This 
shift also allows for what Gasper (1996: 150) calls the ‘beyond criticism gambit’: 




   













excused as not real examples, not “real development”; and the concept of “devel­
opment” can live on as at the same time a definite programme and an untarnish­
able promise’ (Gasper 1996: 149). The actions of development organisations by 
definition bring development and if they do not, then something went wrong in 
the implementation, but the policy or programme itself is ‘not to blame’ (150).9 
Together with the legitimacy provided by expert knowledge, the polysemy of 
development enables the reformulation of the promise even after obvious failure. 
The meaning of the term can be shifted to include new aspects. After the Pear­
son report had shown clearly that development policy’s growth strategy had not 
reduced poverty and inequality during the 1960s, the World Bank discovered the 
rural poor as a new target group and redefined development as rural development, 
adding new integrated rural development projects to its standard infrastructure 
projects. In the words of Sachs: 
The logic of this conceptual operation is obvious enough: the idea of devel­
opment was not abandoned; indeed, its field of application was enlarged. 
Similarly, in rapid succession, . . . the eradication of poverty, basic needs, 
women, and, finally, the environment, were swiftly turned into problems 
and became the object of special strategies. The meaning of development 
exploded, increasingly covering a host of contradictory practices. . . . So, 
development has become a shapeless, amoeba-like word. . . . Development 
thus has no content, but it does possess a function: it allows any intervention 
to be sanctified in the name of a higher, evolutionary goal. 
(Sachs 1990: 6; see also Esteva 1985 and 1992, Escobar 1995: 58) 
Here, the legitimising function of the promise is spelled out clearly. The reformu­
lation and renewal of the promise of betterment by the apparatus of development
has been described by Duffield as an ‘institutional “Groundhog day” in which
every decade or two similar pronouncements are repackaged by a new generation
of aid administrators and presented afresh as the way forward’ (2007: 227). While
Duffield describes this promise as a decidedly ‘liberal strategisation of power’ (231,
227), Berger (1974) has shown already in the 1970s that such a painting of a
bright future to legitimate the negative sides of the current political and economic
order has been a feature of both capitalist and socialist regimes in the South. 
For the development apparatus of the West, the promise requires that the 
solutions offered match the problematisation in order to be credible: ‘The West 
possesses the expertise, technology and management skills that the non-West is 
lacking. This lack is what has caused the problems of the non-West’ (Mitchell 
1995: 156). Thus the promise is dependent on a privileged type of knowledge, 
and this brings us to the next point. 
Hierarchisation and the expert knowledge of trustees 
While the problematisation has identified deficiencies in ‘less developed’ societies
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on expert knowledge on how to achieve development. This in turn requires a hierar­
chisation of different types of knowledge (and sometimes also cultures and values),
with one type (universally applicable expert knowledge) being privileged and the
other (local, unscientific knowledge) denigrated (DuBois 1991: 7). Taking up the
category of trusteeship (Cowen/Shenton 1996: ixf, 25, 31), Li argues that develop­
ment experts and aid workers ‘occupy the position of trustees, a position defined
by the claim to know how others should live’ (2007: 4f) – of course not with the
intent to dominate them, but to develop them, to enhance their capacities and
improve their lives. Escobar also contends that within the discourse, development
professionals should be entrusted with the management of social life identified as
underdeveloped because their ‘specialized knowledge allegedly qualified them for
this task’ (1995: 52). This power entrusted to them relies on this knowledge which
consists in the ability of the development professionals to ascertain procedures for
diagnosis and treatment of the underdeveloped (Apthorpe 1996: 20). 
Yet while this knowledge about development presents itself as technical and
neutral, Cooper and Packard (1997b: 19) remind us that ‘development is funda­
mentally about changing how people conduct their lives, and the very claim to
technical knowledge is in itself a political act.’ Assuming that development is about
improvement and a good life, Berger (1974: 35, 45) concurs: ‘People who speak of
development should frankly admit that they are engaged in the business of ethics
and, at least potentially, of politics. . . . Development is not something to be decided
by experts, simply because there are no experts on the desirable goals of human life.’ 
But what if experts rightly claim that their knowledge leads to an improvement 
in the lives of their beneficiaries? And the latter willingly accept the advice of 
the experts? Here, the characteristic (and controversial) position of Foucauldian 
discourse analysis is illustrated by DuBois (1991): after the lifestyles of the benefi­
ciaries have become transparent, experts proscribe safer, more efficient, healthier 
and generally better ways of doing things (1991: 21). As a result of these discipli­
nary techniques at the micro-level, 
an accompanying and unspoken hierarchization is produced between the 
ways, in general, of performing tasks in the two cultures as these introduc­
tions multiply. The hierarchization of cultures that characterizes the catego­
rization of ‘developed’ and ‘developing’ nations is not imposed from the top 
down but is the sum (effect) of a multiplicity of localized hierarchizations or 
judgments regarding economic, political, social, and cultural aspects. Finally, 
even though many of the norms erected by relations of disciplinary power 
in the context of development are based not on the discourse of the human 
sciences but on that of the natural sciences (and therefore ‘really are true’) – 
boiling drinking water to kill bacteria, using fertilizer to increase yields, and 
so on – the effects mentioned above are still produced. 
(DuBois 1991: 22) 
So even if the knowledge is correct, a hierarchisation takes place. This hierar­





problems of underdevelopment are located in the South, while the North pos­
sesses the knowledge to solve these problems – experts are sent only in one direc­
tion and development cooperation is not designed as intercultural exchange, 
although one can think of indicators and social problems where the latter might 
well make sense for the North: suicide rates, drug abuse, treatment of the elderly, 
etc. (DuBois 1991: 25). 
Now one may perfectly well adopt the ethical position that engendering power 
relations and subordinating local knowledge and culture is legitimate if the intro­
duction of scientific practices can save lives – but at least one should be aware of 
these effects and implications, in particular for the production of developed identi­
ties supposedly part of a superior culture as well as less developed identities suppos­
edly part of an inferior culture (1991: 25). These effects are what leads Escobar to 
the hypothesis that the institutionalisation of development discourse in agencies 
producing and circulating knowledge about the Third World ‘has been able to 
integrate, manage, and control countries and populations in increasingly detailed 
and encompassing ways’ (Escobar 1995: 47) and DuBois to the statement that 
‘one may understand the process of development as the increased governance 
of the Third World’ (1991: 28). However, what both seem to neglect somewhat 
is the question of agency already mentioned in the first section of this chapter. 
Therefore, processes of appropriation and hybridisation need to be discussed as 
well. But before that, we have to turn to the political consequence of the claim 
that the knowledge about development is merely technical: the depoliticisation of 
conflicts. 
Depoliticisation and the common interest 
The discourse of development, at least the one employed by most development 
agencies, assumes that development is something that benefits everyone and there­
fore no one can object to, something removed from conflicts over political and 
economic questions. Simply put, this discourse wants to help the poor without 
hurting the rich (on a national and international level). It has to do so in order 
to gain support and legitimacy, but in doing so neglects an analysis of the struc­
tural causes of poverty and depoliticises the conflicts and divisions in society. The 
most explicit articulation of this insight comes from Ferguson, who explains the 
distortions he finds in development discourse’s representation of Lesotho through 
institutional necessities: 
An academic analysis is of no use to a ‘development’ agency unless it provides 
a place for the agency to plug itself in, unless it provides a charter for the sort 
of intervention that the agency is set up to do. An analysis which suggests that 
the causes of poverty in Lesotho are political and structural (not technical 
and geographical), that the national government is part of the problem (not 
a neutral instrument for its solution), and that meaningful change can only 
come through revolutionary social transformation in South Africa has no 
place in ‘development’ discourse simply because ‘development’ agencies are
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not in the business of promoting political realignments or supporting revo­
lutionary struggles. . . . For an analysis to meet the needs of ‘development’ 
institutions, it must do what academic discourse inevitably fails to do; it must 
make Lesotho out to be an enormously promising candidate for the only sort 
of intervention a ‘development’ agency is capable of launching: the apoliti­
cal, technical ‘development’ intervention. 
(Ferguson 1994: 68f) 
Ferguson goes on to argue that ‘[b]y uncompromisingly reducing poverty to a 
technical problem, and by promising technical solutions to the sufferings of the 
powerless and oppressed people’, the discourse of development was ‘the principal 
means through which the question of poverty is de-politicised in the world today’ 
(256). And although development projects are always concerned with the trans­
fer of resources and social restructuring which benefits some groups more than 
others and thus with political questions, the development apparatus denies its 
political role and functions as an ‘anti-politics machine’ (256). 
This argument is supported by numerous other analyses of development dis­
course. Mitchell, in his analysis of USAID in Egypt, finds that the organisation 
is ‘a central element in configurations of power within the country’ but ‘must 
imagine itself as a rational consciousness standing outside the country’ – a neces­
sary self-deception to maintain its role as a neutral provider of technical knowl­
edge (Mitchell 1995: 149). Mitchell investigates the exclusions and silences in 
USAID’s analyses and concludes: ‘Questions of power or inequality, whether on 
the global level of international grain markets, state subsidies, and the arms trade, 
or the more local level of landholding, food supplies and income distribution, will 
nowhere be discussed’ (156). These exclusions illustrate ‘the necessary limits of 
development discourse’ (ibid.). 
A more recent study by Li (2007) of development projects in Central Sulawesi 
in Indonesia confirms Ferguson’s and Mitchell’s findings. The project documents 
neglected political-economic causes of poverty and reframed social and environ­
mental problems ‘in terms amenable to a technical solution’ (2007: 126). And 
even when police and army collaborated with illegal practices of timber extrac­
tion, sabotaging the sustainability objectives of the project, the development 
agencies were not interested: ‘refractory findings suggesting that “the govern­
ment” is not dedicated to the public good cannot be processed by the develop­
ment machine’ (134). Li empirically identifies three limitations of development 
agency discourse, all contributing to depoliticisation: the assumption that the 
state apparatus can be made to work in the public interest, the ignorance of 
experts to the power relation implicit in their positioning and the credo that 
capitalist enterprise and the search for profit can only be a solution to poverty, 
not a cause (267, 275). 
Escobar agrees that development discourse (by what he calls professionaliza­
tion) ‘remove[s] problems from the political and cultural realms to the more neu­
tral realm of science’ (1995: 45) and similarly concludes that ‘the problem [of rural 
poverty] is thought to be characterized by exclusion from markets and state policy,
 
 
   






not by exploitation within the market and the state’ (150). In the words of Rist 
(1997: 78), it ‘presented “development” as a set of technical measures outside the 
realm of political debate (utilisation of scientific knowledge, growth of productiv­
ity, expansion of international trade)’ serving the ‘common good’. Moore (1995: 
22) stresses that development usually functions as a catch-all phrase capturing 
goals and aspirations of all parties and Gasper remarks that the discourse works 
through the ‘concealment of divisive issues’ (Gasper 1996: 151). Development 
thus is, since Truman, in everyone’s interest: we as donors (or investors) can help 
the poor and at the same time pursue our economic or geopolitical interest. Rist 
identifies the ‘yoking together of solidarity and self-interest’ as ‘one of the basic 
elements in “development” discourse, as a way of convincing both those who 
emphasised the “humanitarian imperative” and those who focused on national 
interest’ (1997: 91). If the argument is not based on investment and markets, 
it is based on the crises in the South which have to be prevented or contained 
through development aid before we in the North are affected negatively by drugs, 
migrants or terrorism: ‘In fostering “their” development, we improve “our” secu­
rity’ (Duffield 2007: 225; see also Sachs 1999: 20–23). The argument about the 
enlightened self-interest sounds familiar: development benefits everyone and no 
one can object to it, it manifests the common good. That is why the transfer of 
resources to Village Development Committees made up of members of the ruling 
party in the Thaba-Tseka development project in Lesotho and the ensuing theft 
and sabotage elicited contradictory reactions: while a chief remarked that ‘devel­
opment has many enemies here’, an oppositional informant commented ‘politics 
is nowadays nicknamed development’ (quoted in Ferguson 1994: 247). 
Against such an ‘amoeba word’ that ‘denotes nothing while claims the best of 
intentions’ (Sachs 1990: 6), discourse analysis can be a useful tool, as Cornwall 
has pointed out, if we apply what Cornwall calls constructive deconstruction: 
‘the taking apart of the different meanings that these words have acquired. . . .
in development discourse. . . . this process can bring into view dissonance 
between these meanings. If the use of buzzwords as fuzzwords conceals ideological 
differences, the process of constructive deconstruction reveals them.’ (Cornwall 
2010: 14) 
Appropriation and the hybridisation of development discourse 
The last feature of development discourse to be discussed here is one that is often
neglected in the analyses cited above and one which corresponds to the critical
comments on the question of agency in the first section. It concerns the transforma­
tion of the discourse through 1) its appropriation through actors in the South and 2)
the effects of the critique articulated by discourse analysis in development studies. 
Regarding the appropriation, it can be observed that although the discourse 
of development was initiated by Western actors concerned about access to raw 
materials and markets in the South, it would be myopic to assume that all South­
ern actors employing this discourse were manipulated and pursuing someone 
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Cooper (1997: 84f) has shown that although the discourse of development ‘was 
originally supposed to sustain empire’, it ‘did not simply spring from the brow of 
colonial leaders, but was to a significant extent forced upon them, by the collec­
tive actions of workers’. Once it was articulated, 
developmentalist arguments . . . were something trade union and political 
leaders in Africa could engage with, appropriate, and turn back. The frame­
work allowed them to pose demands in forms that could be understood in 
London and Paris, that could not be dismissed as ‘primitive’. Political parties 
could assert that true development required sovereign control over a devel­
opment apparatus . . . Much as one can read the universalism of development 
discourse as a form of European particularism imposed abroad, it could also 
be read . . . as a rejection of the fundamental premises of colonial rule, a firm 
assertion of people of all races to participate in global politics and lay claim 
to a globally defined standard of living. 
(Cooper 1997: 84) 
So, and this is important to note regarding the contribution of discourse anal­
ysis to development studies, development discourse did not only function as a 
discourse of hierarchisation and depoliticisation, but it also worked (as has also 
been shown in chapter 6) as a discourse of claims and rights for those who were 
designated as deficient and inadequate by it. Ferguson (2006: 186) has remarked 
that many people pointing to a lack of development or modernity in their context 
are referring to inadequate socioeconomic conditions or a low standard of living. 
Here, we can conclude, development discourse provides a language to criticise 
material inequality and articulate ‘expectations of modernity’ (Ferguson 1999). 
Abandoning the promise of development as in neoliberal discourse leaves them 
without a prospect of material improvement and a ‘de-developmentalized’ global 
hierarchy (Ferguson 2006: 189, see chapter 8). 
This insight may also shed new light on the possibility of resignifying the term devel­
opment. Contrary to the position taken in chapter 5, Cornwall argues that Laclau’s
notion of chains of equivalences between signifiers may prove to be useful here: 
Used in a chain of equivalence with good governance, accountability, 
results-based management, reform and security, . . . words like democracy 
and empowerment come to mean something altogether different from their use 
in conjunction with citizenship, participation, solidarity, rights, and social jus­
tice. . . . Thinking of words in constellations rather than in the singular opens up 
further strategies for reclaiming ‘lost’ words, as well as salvaging some of the mean­
ings that were never completely submerged. 
(Cornwall 2010: 15) 
So would it be a strategy for reclaiming development to use it in a constellation 
with hospitality, degrowth, sharing, autonomy and commons? I have no answer here, 
but remain doubtful. 
 
 





A second point has to be made, and this concerns the transformations in 
development discourse which came about as a result of its critique. Often linked 
with postcolonial and Post-Development approaches, discourse analysis in devel­
opment studies has become somewhat influential in academia (not policy) during 
the past two decades. As a consequence, almost every introduction to the field 
of development studies at least mentions and often engages with its critique. 
A striking example to me is the new edition of the Development Reader (Chari/ 
Corbridge 2008). While in the first edition (Corbridge 1995), one out of 27 texts 
came from one of the three mentioned approaches, in the new edition there are 
nine out of 54 – a more than fourfold increase. As mentioned in the beginning, 
the work of Escobar is a top contender for the highest number of quotes in devel­
opment studies. And still discourse analysis perceives itself as marginalised (della 
Faille 2011) – why? Eriksson Baaz (2005) gives the following answer. Of course 
the critics have been influential and even the development industry does not 
remain entirely unperturbed by their arguments, but at the same time this means 
that a decisive critique is more difficult to maintain if one has to admit that the 
establishment has adopted some of the critique. So it is easier for the critics to 
portray themselves as marginalised in order not to compromise the severity and 
appropriateness of their critique of the development apparatus: 
[B]y placing the critics of development [solely] outside the development 
industry [they] tend to neglect the workings and influence of their own 
critique. . . . any influential, successful critique adopted by the mainstream 
Other will destabilize the opposing identity (as an alternative inherently dif­
ferent from the mainstream). The neglect of influence and simplistic repre­
sentations of development practitioners can thus be seen as, partly, reflecting 
a destabilized, threatened identity, which feeds a need to distance the alter­
native, critical Self further from the mainstream Other. 
(Eriksson Baaz 2005: 169f) 
So while it does make a lot of sense for discourse analysis in development studies 
to examine how institutions like the World Bank have adopted once opposi­
tional concepts like sustainability and empowerment, robbing them of their criti­
cal edge, an equally useful task is to investigate how critical concepts managed to 
unsettle and change institutional practice. What is decried as co-optation by the 
establishment can from another perspective be seen as a first step in the struggle 
for change, as changing the terrain of discourse to one’s advantage (Cornwall 
2010: 13). 
Added value? Some conclusions 
So what has the research in this book, what have the arguments of the preceding 
chapters added to the state of the art outlined above? I believe that the archaeo­
logical and genealogical attempts undertaken here yielded some added value, and 
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1)	 On the general level it could be shown that despite early programmes of 
colonial development and despite continuities regarding the binary divi­
sion between the progressive Self and the backward Other, the Eurocentric 
evolutionism and the social technology linked to the notion of trusteeship, 
the discourses of colonialism and development can be described as separate 
discourses in the area of North-South relations. In the new discourse, the 
explicitly racist element (they are unable to govern themselves) is aban­
doned and the trusteeship for the development of the (former) colonies is 
given over to national elites. Also, the objects of discourse are constituted 
more in the area of economic geography (underdeveloped regions) and less in 
that of biology (uncivilised peoples). The new discourse was far more attrac­
tive to people in the South because it offered to those designated as back­
ward the opportunity to catch up in the economic race on their own through 
modernisation, industrialisation and growth – although supported by invest­
ment, technology and aid from the West (chapters 3 and 4). 
2)	 The analysis of rules of formation showed the existence of mechanisms 
within the discourse of development which those who employ the discourse 
are usually unaware of. The most notable among these is the subject position 
which comes about as a result of the rules of the enunciative modality of the 
discourse: anyone speaking in the discourse occupies the subject position of 
someone who knows what development is and how to achieve it. As devel­
opment is concerned with a desirable state of society, this subject position 
automatically subordinates other visions of such a state and thus invariably 
contains an authoritarian element. Knowledge about development therefore 
is knowledge about the deficiencies of others’ ways of life and involves politi­
cal claims presented as technical knowledge (‘this is how you should live’ or 
the slightly less arrogant ‘this is how we should live’) (chapters 4 and 5). 
3)	 The analysis has further affirmed and specified two significant points which 
have been made before. While Sachs (1990), Esteva (1992), Escobar (1995), 
Easterly (2002) and Duffield (2007b) have made the point about the recur­
rent promise of development discourse to fight poverty, the archaeological 
analysis has yielded that the appearance of objects in the discourse is regu­
lated according to a pattern which renders visible ever new aspects of these 
objects identified as deviant according to the Western norm. These new 
aspects become the object of treatment and reform, allowing an articula­
tion of recipes and a reformulation of the promise. Failure of the strategy is 
explained by an inadequate implementation, but soon also leads to research 
highlighting a new aspect responsible for the failure and allowing a reformu­
lation of the promise. There is a recurrent cycle of diagnosis – prescription 
and promise – disappointment – new diagnosis, etc. in which the develop­
ment industry produces new concepts and strategies regularly (chapter 4). 
4)	 The second point made before concerns the characterisation of the develop­
ment concept as an amoeba, i.e. to the argument that the frequent redefini­
tions let the term appear shapeless or devoid of any precise content (Esteva 



















development can be linked to any signified, to any activity, if and as long as it 
assumes the form of a technical, nonpolitical intervention in the interest of 
the poor (chapter 10). 
5)	 One point neglected in most critical research on development discourse 
is the appropriation of the concept by Southern actors. An analysis of the 
appropriation of the discourse by elites in the decolonising and postcolonial 
states showed that its results had different political effects on the national 
and the international level. While the technocratic and authoritarian prin­
ciple of trusteeship was affirmed on the national scale, it was challenged and 
rejected on the international level. This illustrates a theoretical point made 
by Foucault (1978: 100): the tactical polyvalence of discourses (chapter 6). 
6)	 Regarding the inclusion of oppositional concepts in the discourse of develop­
ment agencies in the context of its transformation after the crisis of develop­
ment in the 1980s, my research has examined the effects of the concepts of 
participation, sustainability and heterogeneity on the discourse of develop­
ment workers. Because the new concepts were at odds with some of the basic 
rules of formation of the discourse, they led to incoherence and contradic­
tions in the interviews. For example: the critique of top-down procedures 
in development projects has led to the inclusion of participatory principles, 
but taking seriously these principles (manifest in sentences like ‘the people 
have to decide themselves what development is for them’) is at odds with the 
discursive practice of defining development (chapter 7). 
7)	 Regarding another aspect of the transformation of development discourse, 
we could observe clear differences between the discourse of development and 
the discourse of neoliberalism and globalisation. While the former assumed 
two different kinds of subjects in international politics (developed and under­
developed countries) and correspondingly special rules in trade for the weaker 
kind, the latter knows just one kind and accordingly just one set of rules. The 
new discourse is no longer dedicated to the principle of social technology 
(aiming at the transformation of less developed into developed regions), but to 
the principle of adjustment to the demands of the world market. Interven­
tions in the market mechanism, which are standard tools in developmental 
states and development aid, are seen as ineffective and damaging in the neo­
liberal discourse. This also means that the promise of ‘developing the less 
developed regions’, which was linked to the vision of global socioeconomic 
equality, has been abandoned in neoliberalism (chapter 8). 
8)	 Historical analyses have exemplified the massive shift in the representation of 
North-South relations and the struggle against poverty between the 1970s and
the 2000s as a result of the influence of neoliberal discourse. They have also
shown the emergence of a neoliberal discourse of development that combines the
inevitability and benevolence of market-based strategies of one discourse with
the insistence on financial transfers and the necessity of development institutions
of the other discourse – although the assumptions of these discourses actually
contradict one another. The research has illustrated different variants of this dis­
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9)	 Finally, the historical comparison between Truman’s speech of 1949 and an 
SDG report of 2014 has shown that through the concept of sustainability, 
industrialised societies today also become conceivable as objects of interven­
tion in the discourse (although not yet in practice). But it has also demon­
strated the persistence of certain structures of development discourse (the 
diagnosis of global poverty as a problem, the promise to be able to solve the 
problem today, the recipes of technical knowledge and economic growth and 
the credo of a harmony of objectives) over a period of more than six decades 
(chapter 14). In this light, Escobar’s diagnosis (1995: 42) that ‘although the 
discourse has gone through a series of structural changes, the architecture 
of the discursive formation laid down in 1945–55 has remained unchanged, 
allowing the discourse to adapt to new conditions’ may fail to explore the 
transformations discussed above, but still appears surprisingly plausible. 
Regarding the contribution of discourse analysis to development studies, my 
opinion is that it has beyond doubt convincingly pointed out the relations of 
power implicit in the discourse and at its best (Ferguson 1994, Mitchell 1995, 
Li 2007, Wainwright 2008) showed the entanglement of capitalism, state, the 
development apparatus and development discourse; the limitations of the dis­
course caused by institutional necessities and material interests as well as the 
limitations of the practice caused by discursive boundaries. 
To the critics of discourse analysis, one point must be conceded: We must not 
stop at deconstruction and provide alternatives. Even if the current discourse of 
development includes Eurocentric, depoliticising and authoritarian features, it is 
the most influential discourse in which claims to material improvements for the 
poorer classes can be articulated today. The challenge remains to construct the 
problem of global economic inequality in a way that is devoid of these features, in 
a way that offers more political and more progressive possibilities of engaging the 
problem. For if theory does not serve to overthrow all those conditions in which 
humans are abased, enslaved, abandoned, contemptible beings (Marx 1844: 18) 
and to contribute to building more humane conditions – how can we justify it in 
a world like this? 
Notes 
1	 So in this respect, Nederveen Pieterse (2011) is right in rejecting della Faille’s margin­
alisation hypothesis. Yet when he supports his counterclaim that development studies 
has experienced the linguistic turn and that ‘all critical development scholars use 
discourse analysis, except for quantitative scholars and empiricists and policy special­
ists’ (2011: 237), he is excluding three substantial groups plus all noncritical scholars –
which might together well add up to a majority. Empirical studies of this question may 
be helpful. 
2 The rise is even more impressive regarding the time span from 1950 and 2010: from 42 
to 67 years (UN 2012: 4). 
3 He also points to Manzo’s (1991) argument that the idea of the modern West 

















(countermodernist) models of development. This is not quite convincing: trying to 
catch up with and overtake the West (Gasper mentions Japan and South Korea) 
does imply adopting the model and one would have to look closely in which aspects 
another path (he also mentions Mugabe and Nyerere) has been taken. 
4	 ‘Good governance thus simply became one more instrument for ensuring the imple­
mentation of adjustment programmes. Because macroeconomic policies were sacro­
sanct, it was important that the democratic institutions that might come with good 
governance were not used to undermine economic policy. This was ensured by intro­
ducing institutional reform that effectively compromised the authority of elected bod­
ies through the insulation of policy technocrats and the creation of “autonomous” 
authorities’ (Mkandawire 2010: 267). 
5	 In an earlier work (Ziai 2004) I showed that while Post-Development approaches are 
often seen as exemplars of discourse analysis inspired by Foucault, their theoretical 
approaches are closer to a traditional critique of ideology. 
6	 See also Shreshta (1995) for a first-hand experience of being deprived of dignity 
through development discourse. 
7	 Of course, the great achievement of dependency and world-system approaches in 
development theory has been to overcome this methodological nationalism. 
8	 Already Rostow’s modernization theory implicitly employed this discursive mecha­
nism by defining poor countries as traditional, i.e. precapitalist, excluding the pos­
sibility that poverty may be a result of an inclusion into the capitalist world-system on 
subordinate terms. 
9	 The World Bank’s defence of structural adjustment is a good example of this (see also 
chapter 9). 
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